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This thesis is a study of literary and sectarian identities in the early Buwayhid Period (c. 945-
1050), focussing on the work of the Imāmī Shīʿī scholar al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq. Al-Ṣadūq’s 
works are compilations of the sayings (ḥadīth) of the Prophet and the Imāms, whose recorded 
speech served as essential proof-texts for emerging legal and theological literature, as they 
continue to be to this day. However, the potential sacrality of the ḥadīth engendered fierce 
debates about how they could and should be treated by scholars, ranging from 
historiographical doubts about the reliability of their transmission to troubled epistemological 
speculation about the viability of an absent authority accessed only through text and anecdote.  
The goal of this thesis is above all to illustrate the profound mimetic sophistication of 
compilation. Al-Ṣadūq’s writings, like those of countless other ḥadīth compilers, contain little 
sustained prose or narrative, indeed little of al-Ṣadūq’s own voice, rather they amass short 
anecdotes, aphorisms and commands attributed to the Prophet and the imāms. This has led to 
compilers being treated as mere tradents with no creative input or originality, judged only for 
their preservation of these texts for posterity. Conversely, this thesis demonstrates through 
sustained readings of al-Ṣadūq’s writings how the selection and arrangement of material 
engenders semiosis of extraordinary sophistication. 
Scholarship has overwhelmingly regarded ḥadīth as scripture, the prerogative of jurists and 
theologians with little relevance to literature and what are misleadingly termed ‘secular’ 
writings. In examining the art of compilation in al-Ṣadūq’s approach to the ḥadīth, this thesis 
also challenges such artificial divisions, examining how his writings are just as engaged with 
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INTRODUCTION – Ḥadīth, Occultation & Compilation 
 
 
THE TRUTHFUL MASTER 
 
This thesis presents a study of the fourth/tenth-century Imāmī Shīʿī scholar Abū Jaʿfar 
Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn b. Mūsā b. Bābawayh al-Qummī, better known as ibn 
Bābawayh or by the honorific al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq (‘the truthful master’).1 Al-Ṣadūq is best 
known as an early ḥadīth scholar of the Imāmīya, being the author of Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-
faqīh (‘Every Man His Own Jurist’), one of what became the four canonical books of Imāmī 
ḥadīth and the second oldest.2  
Despite his prominent, indeed canonical position in the earlier history of Imāmī Shīʿism3 
importance, al-Ṣadūq has received little scholarly attention. There is as yet no monograph 
devoted to the study of his work, nor even do we see him as the primary subject of article 
length studies.4 Rather, he remains a component of studies whose focus lies elsewhere. 
Moreover, even here he has tended to occupy a marginal position, the clear reason for which 
                                                            
1 Hereafter al-Ṣadūq. 
2 It should be noted that this canon was only fixed much later, around the turn of the eighth/fourteenth 
century. It is also the case that another work of al-Ṣadūq, Madīnat al-ʿilm, was also included as a fifth 
book in the canon, but this was subsequently lost. When this exactly this happened remains obscure. 
3 Though his beliefs in the hidden, twelfth imām render him solidly a part of what we now call Twelver 
(Ithnāʾ ʿasharī) Shīʿism, the tradition to whose canon he belongs, al-Ṣadūq refers to himself as an 
Imāmī Shīʿī. ‘Imāmī’ is an older term than Twelver, being a label that had been attached to Shīʿī groups 
since at least the second/eighth century. The second/eighth-century Imāmīya were the group out of 
which emerged a number of distinct Shīʿī groups including the Twelvers as well as the Nuṣayrīya and 
the Ismāʿīlīya. While a distinct Twelver Shīʿism clearly owes its origins to the point where a group of 
Imāmīs distinguished themselves by fixing the number of imāms at twelve, something that had already 
happened several decades before al-Ṣadūq, the term ‘Twelver’ had yet to emerge, and Imāmīs like al-
Ṣadūq who believed in the occultation of the son of al-ʿAskarī simply saw themselves as the ‘true’ 
Imāmīs (see al-Nawbakhtī, Firaq al-shīʿa, pp. 90-93), though doubtless other, differently inclined 
Imāmīs believed the same about themselves. However, it is clear that writers like al-Ṣadūq clearly saw 
Imāmīs who held other beliefs as their fellow Imāmīs. We read, for example, in the works on the 
question of the Twelfth Imām written by al-Ṣadūq and his father that the Imāmī faithful were ‘confused’ 
about this matter, clearly indicating an impulse among Imāmī scholars to solidify a homogenous 
orthodoxy on this point amongst a still hetergenous Imāmīya (See Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 31-34, Ibn 
Bābawayh the Elder, al-Imāma wa'l-tabṣira, pp. 7-9). When al-Ṣadūq talks about the Imāmīya, then, 
he is talking about himself, but he is also potentially talking about a group larger than those who adhere 
to what would become Twelver orthodoxy. In this thesis, therefore, we refer to al-Ṣadūq and his earlier 
and contemporary co-religionists as Imāmīs, while the term Twelver will be used only when it is 
necessary to specifically differentiate those Imāmīs who believed in the hidden, twelfth imām and when 
we are discussing the later Twelver tradition. For a discussion of the transition between these two names 
see Kohlberg Imāmiyya,. 
4 An exception to this is Marcinkowski, which gives a brief introduction to al-Ṣadūq. The most complete 
survey of his works to date is that supplied by Newman. See Newman, Twelver Shīʿism, pp. 62-72. 
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is the correspondingly marginal position which he occupies in the accepted narratives of 
Imāmī history.5 Conversely, this study seeks to demonstrate that the study of al-Ṣadūq has 
immense promise to shed light on the seething richness of later Abbasid religious and 
intellectual culture, as one of the foundational figures of Twelver Shīʿism, as scholar of ḥadīth, 
as a member of the Buwayhid court and as a writer of prodigious skill and ingenuity. 
 
BETWEEN ḤUJJA AND SUNNA - Shīʿī Ḥadīth and Sunnī Ḥadīth 
 
The study of ḥadīth is now a venerable discipline in the academy. It remains, however, a 
discipline that is overwhelmingly dominated by the study of Sunnī ḥadīth, with Shīʿī ḥadīth 
having received only sporadic attention. While the situation has changed over the past three 
decades, which have seen marked expansion of Shīʿī studies as a field, the study of Shīʿī ḥadīth 
continues to be a discipline under construction. There as yet exists no book-length survey of 
Shīʿī ḥadīth literature, while introductions to Shīʿī ḥadīth thus far remain in the form of articles 
or appendices to introductions to Sunnī ḥadīth.6 There now exist several excellent 
introductions to Shīʿī Islam, but in none of these does one find Shīʿī ḥadīth discussed as a 
discrete topic. The contrast with introductions to Islam is, of course, pronounced, wherein 
ḥadīth is usually afforded generous discussion.7 
Not unlike other aspects of Shīʿī thought, Shīʿī ḥadīth confronts the scholar familiar with 
Sunnī intellectual traditions with a mixture of the familiar and the unfamiliar. There remains, 
of course, substantial similarity between Sunnī and Shīʿī conceptions of what a ḥadīth is and 
how it is to be used. The text is usually supplied with an isnād that may be interrogated in 
terms of the reliability of the narrators it comprises, while the text may similarly be scrutinised 
and subject to a variety of paradigms of use depending on the persuasions of the reader; it may 
be interpreted as containing a general injunction or one confined to the specific context of the 
ḥadīth’s utterance, it may or may not be placed in contest with the deductions of human reason. 
Shīʿī and Sunnī groups differ on such questions, but not noticeably more so than they do 
                                                            
5 The reasons for this will be discussed in detail in Chapter I. 
6 The term ‘Sunnī’ is far from unproblematic when used with reference to the period under discussion, 
referring to a set of divisions and identities that had yet to solidify at that time. Nonetheless, when 
discussing Imāmī thought and in particular Imāmī ḥadīth it retains a distinct utility. Imāmī writers are 
quite clear in their division of the Muslim community into Shīʿīs and non-Shīʿīs, the latter of which 
they usually refer to by the derogatory term ʿawwām; ‘the masses’. ‘Sunnī’ serves as a convenient 
shorthand for ‘non-Shīʿī,’ with the added specificity that in al-Ṣadūq’s context when we talk about non-
Shīʿīs we are indeed talking about those groups and ideas that were rapidly coalescing into a self-
consciously united Sunnism, rather than other non-Shīʿī groups such as the Khawārij. 
7 See Haider Introduction; Newman, Twelver Shīʿism. 
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amongst themselves. Moreover, when viewed from a diachronic perspective such points of 
difference have changed dramatically over time. It is commonly said today that Duodeciman 
Shīʿī law gives a greater role to reason and a correspondingly reduced role to ḥadīth than Sunnī 
law, but we shall have ample opportunity to observe in the chapters that follow that in earlier 
periods there were many Shīʿīs, least al-Ṣadūq himself who condemn Sunnīs and others for 
their excessive reliance on reason. 
Despite these similarities in theory and practice, Shīʿī ḥadīth remains a corpus sharply 
differentiated from the Sunnī one.8 The most conspicuous difference is the different authorities 
to whom the aḥādīth are traced. While Sunnī ḥadīth ultimately became restricted to the words 
of Muḥammad, Shīʿī ḥadīth came to accord equal sanctity to the words of various of the 
Prophet’s descendants, with Duodeciman ḥadīth comprising the words of Muḥammad, the 
twelve imāms and Muḥammad’s daughter Fatima. Not only is this a significant divergence of 
substance, it also points to a very different process of origins. The eventual Sunnī focus on 
prophetic ḥadīth is usually traced back to the third/ninth century, to the back-and-forth 
between traditionist and rationalist positions that dominated the very earliest stages of Islamic 
law and theology and to the resolution of that debate in formerly in figures like al-Shāfiʿī and 
latterly in the institutionalised schools of law. With Shīʿism, meanwhile, we can find ourselves 
confronting what seems a very different process. The idea of the Prophet’s authoritative 
precedent as recorded in ḥadīth is inextricably tied to that of the imām, the living successor to 
the Prophet who inherits his full authority to instruct the Muslims in their religion. During the 
second/eighth and third/ninth centuries, usually called the formative period of Sunnī law, a 
period which saw the careers not only al-Shāfiʿī but also no less illustrious ḥadīth scholars 
than al-Bukhārī and Muslim, Imāmī intellectual life still revolved around a succession of 
living imāms. Though as the third/ninth century progressed the imāms became less active 
presences in the life of the community, their authority increasing devolving to a network of 
scholars and agents, it is the conception of the imām and of his authority, rather than questions 
of ḥadīth-criticism and oppositions between text and reason, that dominates both modern 
scholarship of this period and the surviving literature. Aḥādīth are certainly in circulation 
amongst Imāmīs as early as anyone else, including both the words of their imāms and the 
words of the Prophet, but discussion of their status and use is eclipsed by discussion of the 
imām.  
The picture is complicated further by the occultation of the Twelfth Imām. In 260/874 the 
eleventh Imām of the Imāmīya, al-Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī, died in 874 aged 29, ostensibly leaving 
                                                            
8 Indeed, it has been said with some justification that it is their different ḥadīth corpora above all that 
have come to separate Sunnī and Shīʿī Islam. See e.g. Amir-Moezzi, ‘Remarques’, p. 5. 
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no male heir. With a prodigious swiftness, however, a significant number of the Imāmī faithful 
and their leaders adopted the position that he had, in fact, had a son, who was now in a state 
of hiddenness, or occultation (ghayba). It was also declared that he would one day return from 
this state of hiddenness, and do so as the triumphant messiah (qāʾim) who would restore the 
rights of Muhamad’s house and bring a new era of just utopia in prelude to the Last Day. Over 
the course of the fourth/tenth century, Imāmī scholars established a narrative whereby there 
were two occultations: the first, the lesser occultation, wherein the Hidden Imām still 
communicated with a line of four successive emissaries (safīrs), and the second, greater 
occultation, wherein, following the last emissary’s death in 941, the Imām was completely 
hidden from all until his promised but indefinitely deferred return. The absence of an 
accessible imām and the cessation of the Imāmī community’s reliance on such a figure meant 
profound changes for Imāmī reckonings with the sources of salvific knowledge and thus with 
ḥadīth. Previously the option to consult an infallible, living guide had presented a potential 
alternative both to seeking authority in the recollected precedent of ḥadīth and to solving 
problems with independent reason. With the vanishing of this third option Imāmīs found 
themselves effectively in the same position as non-Shīʿī groups, ever more compelled to 
address in detail the dilemma of text versus reason that had been at the centre of the intellectual 
inquiries of other groups for over a century, but which amongst the Imāmīya had thus far been 
overshadowed by explorations of the idea of direct, inspired authority.9 
It is precisely at this time, at the end of the third/ninth century, that we see the first large-scale, 
systematic ḥadīth compendia appear amongst Imāmīs. The imāms’ words had been written 
down before in small collections, often by disciples of the imāms who recorded what they 
heard 10 but it is around the time of al-ʿAskarī’s death that we see appearing large, structured 
collections after the familiar model of a ḥadīth compendium. Some of the authors of these 
works (e.g. al-Ṣaffār, al-Barqī) had been companions of the last imāms, but the aḥādīth they 
compiled were not restricted to the words of the imāms they had met, but gathered the words 
of the earlier imāms back to ʿAlī and of the Prophet, words that were transmitted by a host of 
narrators and not by any living imām.  
                                                            
9 The events surrounding al-ʿAskarī’s death have been the subject of a considerable number of studies 
over the past three decades. This increasing volume of scholarship notwithstanding, beyond the facts 
of al-ʿAskarī’s death and the eventual acceptance of the narrative of two occultations and four 
emissaries narrative over the course of the tenth century, the history of this development in the Imāmī 
community is deeply contentious. The question of when exactly the several components of what became 
the standard position became generally accepted is not easy to answer. By the time al-Kulaynī 
completed al-Kāfī in the 930’s the doctrine of the twelfth, hidden, messianic Imām seems established, 
however the eventual orthodoxy regarding the emissaries may not have solidified until the close of the 
tenth century. See Modarressi, Crisis; Kohlberg, ‘Imāmiyya’; Klemm, ‘Vier Sufarāʾ’, Abdulsater, 
Arjomand, ‘Crisis’; ‘Imam Absconditus’; ‘Consolation’; Amir-Moezzi, Divine Guide; Hayes. 
10 Kohlberg, ‘Uṣūl’. 
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The genesis of a distinct, Imāmī ḥadīth corpus is thus intimately tied to the changes in 
circumstance and doctrine that surrounded the death of the eleventh imām and the onset of the 
idea of occultation. The idea of salvation found in the guidance of a single, living leader, an 
idea about which lingered aspirations to political change and an idea that still lay at the 
foundation of other Shīʿī groups,11 retreated in favour of models of salvation based on 
hermeneutics, on the study of God’s will as manifest in a group of texts, on the efforts of 
scholars and the recollection of the past.  
 
THE SHĪʿĪ CENTURY 
 
These significant doctrinal developments which characterise the Imāmī experience of the late 
third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries were meanwhile accompanied by profound political 
changes that took place over the course of the fourth/tenth century, changes which would in 
turn produce dramatic alterations in the group’s circumstances. The period between c. 340/950 
and 440/1050 is often called the Shīʿī century,12 owing to the unprecedented subsequently 
usurpassed political ascendancy of Shīʿī groups during its course. North Africa, Egypt and 
later much of the Levant came under the dominion of the Ismāʿīlī Fāṭimids, who established 
a fully-fledged Shīʿī imām-caliphate to rival that of the Abbasids. In Syria, meanwhile, the 
Ḥamdānid dynasty of Aleppo were rulers with strong Shīʿī leanings. Though their affiliations 
do not seem to have much impinged on their statecraft (relations with the Abbasids remained 
unexceptional), their short-lived dominance nonetheless allowed Aleppo and its environs to 
become an important centre of Shīʿī activity that saw a considerable traffic of important Shīʿī 
thinkers, including Imāmīs.13 
For the Imāmīya, for Imāmī ḥadīth and, indeed, for al-Ṣadūq, the most important Shīʿī power 
of this century was that of the Buwayhids. The Buwayhids were a family of Daylamite origin 
who rose from leading bands of mercenaries to establishing a dynastic federation that ruled 
over the central Abbasid heartlands in Iraq and Iran. The three brothers ʿ Alī b. Būya, al-Ḥasan 
b. Būya and Aḥmad b. Būya respectively conquered Fārs (320/932), Rayy (335/947) and 
Baghdad (335/946) in the first half of the fourth/tenth century, together establishing a triad of 
                                                            
11 This in turn has allowed the Imāmīya a remarkable continuity over the centuries in contrast to the 
Ismāʿīlī and Zaydī Shīʿa, whose continued need for a politically active Imamate has often provoked 
radical adaptations to the vicissitudes of history. 
12 The term was coined in Hodgson, vol. ii, p. 36. 
13 The authoritative history of the Ḥamdānids remains Canard. This work, however, give much 
discussion to religion, and the nature of the Ḥamdānids’ relationship with Shīʿism remains poorly 
understood. For a brief discussion thereof see Winter, pp. 19-20. 
13 
 
dynasties ruling over the three centres. Though the brothers were of a Shīʿī persuasion, Aḥmad 
b. Būya did not depose the Abbasid caliph following his conquest of Baghdad, electing instead 
to maintain him as a puppet, for whom the Buwayhids theoretically acted as governors, though 
in practice the caliph had no choice in the matter, was stripped of all political power and was 
confined to his palace.  
Not only did the Buwayhids emasculate the caliphate, humbling the political aspirations of 
Sunnī Islam, but they also took active steps to enfranchise Shīʿīs within their domains. Shīʿīs 
courtiers could become viziers, Shīʿī scholars could become judges and in Baghdad in 353/964 
the Buwayhid ruler of Baghdad Muʿizz al-Dawla sanctioned and encouraged the public 
celebration of Ghadīr, which commemorated the Prophet’s designation of ʿAlī as his successor 
at Ghadīr Khumm, and commemorations of al-Ḥusayn’s death on the tenth day of Muḥarram. 
Never before had Shīʿism had so assertive a presence in the public space of the Abbasid 
capital. The Imāmīya in centres like Rayy and Baghdad found themselves transformed from a 
community subject to state-sponsored persecution to one that was able access to the highest 
levels of courtly and intellectual life, a circumstance which thrust upon them opportunities for 
exchange and necessities of polemical engagement with other traditions.14 This development, 
meanwhile, overlaps precisely with the formation of an Imāmī ḥadīth corpus along the lines 
of that being developed by the non-Shīʿī mainstream. 
It is clear that the hundred years between 390/900 and 390/1000 saw the Imāmīya transformed, 
and that the production of ḥadīth compendia was integral to that transformation.15 What is less 
clear by far is how this transformation of the Imāmīya happened, and what role their 
relationship with and development of their ḥadīth literature played in that. Compared with our 
picture of Sunnī ḥadīth literature at this time and the network of institutions, movements and 
ideas into which it fits, our information about the Imāmīya is woefully lacking. In terms of 
our view of Sunnī thought in this period we now have populous and vigorous field of 
substantial studies regarding the formation of institutional schools of law, the 
conceptualisation of the value of ḥadīth and the compilation and canonisation of ḥadīth 
compendia. We have a vivid (though by no means uncontested) picture of the intellectual 
context in which ḥadīth compendia like those of al-Bukhārī and al-Tirmidhī were written read 
and consulted as sources of doctrine and law.16 By way of contrast, the surviving collections 
                                                            
14 For the history of the Buwayhids, including the little that is known about the exact nature of their 
Shīʿī inclinations, see primarily Busse; Kennedy; Donohue. It is interesting to note that the two other 
main branches of Shīʿism, the Zaydīs and the Ismāʿīlīs, who continued with doctrines of revolutionary 
politics centred around very present, very active imāms, did not develop a lasting interest in ḥadīth. 
15 See Madelung, ‘Reception’.  
16 For the development of the Sunnī schools of law see above all Hallaq, Origins; Melchert, Formation; 




of Shīʿī ḥadīth from the late-third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries are pricks of light in the 
dark. We have little or no knowledge regarding how these texts were compiled and how they 
were used. 
Al-Ṣadūq is superbly placed to shed light on these shadowy formations of Imāmī ḥadīth 
literature. With a career spanning the second half of the fourth/tenth century, he represents the 
last point in this literature’s development before, at the turn of the fifth/eleventh century, our 
picture becomes much clearer. In al-Ṣadūq’s student al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022) we encounter 
methodological literature of the kind produced by other groups and the apparent formation of 
institutional structures similar to those of the emerging schools of law.17 Al-Ṣadūq is firmly 
situated in the intellectual traditions of the earlier part of the century before the advent of such 
familiar shapes, yet he represents an unique window onto these uncertainties, owing to the 
simple fact that he leaves us a quantity and diversity of writings that far exceeds any previous 
Imāmī author. No other Imāmī author before al-Ṣadūq leaves more than a single surviving 
work, with the exception of al-Nuʿmānī, who leaves two. Al-Ṣadūq leaves us no fewer than 
eighteen (though this is a small fraction of perhaps two-hundred that he wrote).18 This is far 
more than an expansion in volume (al-Kulaynī’s al-Kāfī is, after all, very large), for this array 
of different works allows us to see al-Ṣadūq compiling ḥadīth in different ways for different 
objectives in different circumstances. However large it may be, al-Kāfī’s many volumes, its 
hundreds of chapters and thousands of aḥādīth are all compiled as part of the same operation, 
namely to create a reliable encyclopaedia of belief and practice. Al-Ṣadūq, too, writes works 
with a similar objective to instruct, but he also writes to entertain, to deceive, to persuade, and 
to negotiate. Law and theology share pages with stories about the Buddha, the chicken which 
supports the universe and the reason why the recently deceased appear to weep. For the first 
time we have an Imāmī author whom we can examine as the creator of an oeuvre, across which 
we can get a real sense of his authorial repertoire, of how an Imāmī scholar of this period 




                                                            
17 See Chapter I. 
18 For a discussion of the reasons for this seemingly radical loss, see Ansari, ‘Uṣūl’. As well as the 
usual suspects of violence and persecution, Ansari also points out that many of these ‘lost’ works 
may well have been subsumed into those that survive. Similarly, we may owe the vanishing of 





THE LIFE OF AL-ṢADŪQ – The Sources and Their Limits 
 
The following chapters will attempt to describe the nature of al-Ṣadūq’s intellectual character 
with as much precision as is possible. As far as his biography is concerned, meanwhile, the 
paucity of sources means that the sum of what is known for certain about his life may be 
presented here. Despite al-Ṣadūq’s extensive literary output, the biographical details therein 
are few and far between, and though more of his writings have become available over the past 
few decades there is little to add to the biography given by Fyzee in 1942.19 We know that al-
Ṣadūq was born into a scholarly family of Qummī origin, but that he settled in Rayy, where 
he died and was buried and where his tomb may still be visited in Ibn Bābūya Cemetery in 
what is now the unglamorous suburb of Shahr-i Rayy in south Tehran. He travelled widely in 
Khurāsān and also to Baghdad. Basic though it is, this outline is still an essential component 
to understanding al-Ṣadūq as a scholar, as is the nature of the sources from which these details 
are gleaned.  
Our principle two sources of evidence remain the writings of al-Ṣadūq himself and near-
contemporary prosopographical works. Later generations of Imāmī scholars, though not 
infrequently interested in al-Ṣadūq’s intellectual contributions, add very little to the record of 
these earlier sources.20 With this long-standing evidence we are able to construct a broad 
picture of al-Ṣadūq’s associations – the people he met and the places he visited. We can list 
important teachers and students, as well as centres where al-Ṣadūq was active, thereby (at least 
partially) mapping his intellectual associations.  
Rijāl literature, usually the primary resource for biography in Islamicate intellectual history, 
little avails the would-be biographer of al-Ṣadūq. While in the works of al-Najāshī (d. 
463/1071) and al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1066-7) we have Imāmī rijāl works from only two generations 
after al-Ṣadūq (both authors studied with students of al-Ṣadūq) – works to which we shall 
regular recourse in what follows – they are more bibliographies than prosopographies, and 
                                                            
19 Fyzee, pp. xxxii-xxxvi. 
20 To write a history of al-Ṣadūq’s reception in Imāmī thought would require a study at least as long 
as the present one. Newman has contributed a part of that history, examining specifically how 
medical aḥādīth in al-Ṣadūq’s writings were transmitted into the Safavid period. He observes that al-
Ṣadūq’s writings seem to have decreased in popularity after the Buwayhid period until the Safavid 
period when interest was rekindled (See Newman, Recovery). It may be observed in this light that it 
is the Akhbārī-Uṣūlī conflict that began in Safavid times that still deeply effects how al-Ṣadūq’s 
standing as a scholar is perceived in the modern seminary. Thus we see in contemporary mujtahids’ 
evaluation of his works an enduring concern to rebut the Akhbārī assertion of the total authenticity 
of the ‘Four Books.’ See e.g. al-Khūʾī, vol. i, p. 26. 
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their substantial record of al-Ṣadūq’s works are accompanied by only the scarcest 
supplementary details about his life. Al-Ṭūsī offers little more than praise of his scholarly 
acumen21 (though as we shall see in Chapter I, these early prosopographers’ favourable view 
of al-Ṣadūq is not without significance). Al-Najāshī gives a little more, informing us that al-
Ṣadūq originated in Qum but subsequently settled in Rayy, that he considers him to have been 
the leader (literally wajh; ‘face’) of the Imāmīya in Khurāsān. He also states that al-Ṣadūq 
visited Baghdad as a young man in 355/966, where he taught prominent Imāmī scholars.22 
This already amounts to nearly all the ‘purely’ biographical details we have. A final, oft-noted 
detail that originates in a statement in one of his books is that al-Ṣadūq was in fact born as a 
result of a prayer from the Hidden Imām.23 We shall discuss this at length in Chapter IV. 
In is primarily from al-Ṣadūq’s own works that further details may be sought. An invaluable 
resource is his asānīd. Al-Najāshī and al-Ṭūsī both provide the sources from whom they 
learned al-Ṣadūq’s works, but from al-Ṣadūq’s asānīd and from those of his contemporaries 
we can, as with any ḥadīth compiler, compile a list of those from whom he has transmitted 
and who transmit from him, and thus create a substantial map of scholarly relationships. Such 
lists that have been exhaustively constructed by Shīʿī scholars, with al-Khūʾī and Ṭihrānī’s 
magisterial encyclopaedias providing essential reference points.24 Asānīd can also attest to the 
strength of relationships: al-Ṣadūq’s father ibn Bābawayh the Elder for instance, is a perennial 
presence in his son’s asānīd, suggesting a formative intellectual influence, born out by what 
can be seen of comparisons between their works. Such information is vital for assessing al-
Ṣadūq’s intellectual associations, as well as his reception among the next generation. More 
often than not, however, this utility is hampered by the fact that many of al-Ṣadūq’s most oft-
cited teachers, among them Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. al-Walīd, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī 
Mājīlawayh and Muḥammad b. Mūsā b. al-Mutawakkil, themselves leave no extant works 
whereby to examine the substance of their influence on al-Ṣadūq. 
Though asānīd are a rich resource, and it must be noted that those of the early Shīʿī ḥadīth 
tradition have yet to receive anything approaching the monumental systematic attention that 
figures like Juynboll have applied to the Sunnī ḥadīth corpus,25 theirs can be only a partial 
picture. They only attest to interactions in which ḥadīth were narrated, and even in the case of 
                                                            
21 Al-Ṭūsī, Fihrist, p. 442. 
22 Al-Najāshī, p. 372. 
23 Kamāl al-dīn, p. 529. 
24 Al-Khūʾī, vol. xvii, p. 339; Ṭihrānī, Ṭabaqāt, vol. i, pp. 287-288. 
25 Newman (Formative Period) and Haider (Origins) in particular have made efforts in this direction 
with careful analyses of select samples of Imāmī asānīd. It remains to be seen whether, in the face of 
a changing field of ḥadīth studies, the will remains in the academy to produce for Shīʿī ḥadīth the 
kind aspired to by Juynboll for Sunnī ḥadīth.  
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so staunch a traditionist as al-Ṣadūq this does not account for all points of intellectual contact. 
This will be substantially illustrated in Chapter II’s exploration of al-Ṣadūq’s relationship with 
adab literature, an area where the isnād is much less dominant than in traditionist law and 
theology, but in other chapters, too we will frequently see myriad influences acting on al-
Ṣadūq’s work beyond those of his teachers in ḥadīth. 
A vital complement to the information of asānīd is the information we have on al-Ṣadūq’s 
geographical movements. The few details given by al-Najāshī already offer promising avenues 
of investigation: a scholar of Qummī origin, based in Rayy with strong links to the community 
in Khurāsān as well as contacts in Baghdad. The conversation during the century before al-
Ṣadūq between a more traditionist Imāmī community in Qum and more rationalist-leaning 
Imāmīs in Baghdad, including specifically the reflection of these tensions in ḥadīth literature 
has been examined by Newman (2000), and certainly we will see echoes thereof in al-Ṣadūq’s 
challenging of those who would subject the imāms’ aḥādīth to theological scrutiny. In al-
Ṣadūq’s works we find accounts of his journeys to other locations such as Ṭūs and Nishāpūr, 
including some instances wherein he mentions meeting and discoursing with other scholars in 
these places. A more substantial account of these journeys, of whom he met and where and 
what they exchanged, would doubtless increase our understanding of al-Ṣadūq, of his 
contemporary Imāmīs and of scholarly networks of the period more generally. The nature of 
these scattered, laconic references, however, does not readily lend itself to such an account. 
Though on his travels al-Ṣadūq often eludes us, the city with which he is most associated, 
Rayy, where he lived, died and was buried, provides an invaluable piece of context. We find 
al-Ṣadūq contending with the Muʿtazilī ideas that so dominated the court of Rayy, we find 
him addressing and even challenging the city’s potentates and we find him engaging its literary 
culture. His relationship to other Shīʿīs, too, reflects the Rāzī backdrop: he is largely 
untroubled by Ismāʿīlīs, whose daʿwa had encountered major setbacks in the region by the 
time al-Ṣadūq was active, while Muʿtazilī-leaning Zaydīs are much more of a vexation.26 
A crucially absent piece of information for this study is any chronology for al-Ṣadūq’s works. 
Naturally, it would have been illuminating to be able to examine what developments or 
changes in his thinking emerge or are reflected in writings from different periods of his life. 
Unfortunately, the information is simply not available to construct even a rudimentary 
                                                            
26 A glimpse of a more personal aspect to al-Ṣadūq’s location amongst the Shīʿa of the east is his 
particular reverence for the eighth imām ʿAlī al-Riḍā and his shrine in Ṭūs. While other surviving 
Imāmī discussions of pilgrimage to the shrines of the imāms from the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh 
invariably place the most emphasis on visitation to al-Ḥusayn’s shrine in Karbalā, al-Ṣadūq in al-
Faqīh’s chapters on these rites allots the longest discussion to the virtues of vising al-Riḍā, ‘the 
stranger,’ at his tomb in Ṭūs. See al-Faqīh, vol. ii, pp. 379-383. 
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chronological framework. Several of his books refer to dated events, before which they 
naturally cannot have been written, but in no case can we definitively mark a work as being 
wholly subsequent to another. It is true that in many of his books al-Ṣadūq cites his other 
writings, which might be taken as an indication that the cited work is older. However, we also 
find cases where two of his works cite one another.27 There could be many explanations for 
these mutual citations, such as later editing of previous works or the writing of more than work 
simultaneously, entirely normal in al-Ṣadūq’s context. Nonetheless, whatever the reason it 
renders such citations insufficiently reliable as a stand-alone source for establishing the order 
in which his works were composed.  
There are many instances where this lack of a chronology is particularly frustrating. As we 
will see, al-Ṣadūq produced works of many very different kinds, and to know their sequence 
– for instance, whether he at some points in time moved substantially from one sort of writing 
to another – would certainly allow for a more developed picture of his thought. At times more 
specific historical details are a keenly-felt loss: ʿUyūn akhbār al-Riḍā is dedicated to the same 
al-Ṣāḥib b. ʿAbbād whom al-Tawḥīdī tells us banished al-Ṣadūq from Rayy out of dislike for 
his intellectual positions. Knowing which of these two important interactions came first might 
substantially colour how we approach the text of ʿUyūn - was it a plea for reconciliation or the 
very cause of the vizier’s ire? 
Most importantly, a chronology of al-Ṣadūq’s writings might assist us in determining and 
locating any significant ideological changes of heart that he may have undergone over his 
career. It must be asserted in this regard that the following examination of al-Ṣadūq’s oeuvre 
finds not a single substantial instance of two of al-Ṣadūq’s works being in substantial, 
inescapable doctrinal conflict, such that we could confidently conclude that at some point 
between he changed his mind. Perhaps, with the added assistance of a reliable sequence of al-
Ṣadūq’s works, we might better have been able to spot shifts in his views that for now remain 
hidden.28 
Such is the available biographical context for our author. Given the scale and complexity of 
his works it is certainly a frustration that we do not have a richer personal history to which to 
relate them. On the other hand, it is not lest due to the particular character of these works, 
                                                            
27 See for instance ʿIlal, p. 34; ʿUyūn, vol. ii, pp. 92-93.  
28 One such instance that has more than once been hypothesised is a perceived conflict between al-
Ṣadūq’s al-Iʿtiqādāt and his al-Tawḥīd, based on readings of the latter as conceding to Muʿtazilī 
doctrines that the former opposes, a hypothesis that has been used in turn to assert that al-Tawḥīd 
represents a later acquiescence. As shall be explored at length in Chapter III, however, such a reading 




largely bereft as they are of lengthy discussions from the author regarding his activities and 
circumstances, that our knowledge about al-Ṣadūq’s life is so laconic. It is to this character of 
his works that we shall now turn. 
 
COMPILATIONS AND COMPILATION CRITICISM 
 
Al-Ṣadūq was a compiler of aḥādīth. While his surviving works are many, they offer us little 
in the way of theoretical discussions, systematic explanation of theology and epistemology or 
careful delineations of the Imāmīya from other schools. Instead they present us with thousands 
of collected aḥādīth. Al-Ṣadūq’s voice appears commenting upon these aḥādīth, explaining, 
summarising and introducing them, but such appearances are tiny islands in an ocean of 
transmitted material.  
To many eyes this limits al-Ṣadūq’s utility as a resource for the study of his own context. 
While his amassed words of the Prophet and the imāms are a potential treasure-trove for 
exploring the mostly second/eighth-century world whence they purport to originate, they are 
not widely held to offer much information on their compiler, beyond their illustration that he 
was indeed a traditionist who preferred to deal with texts rather than discursive argument. 
Those analyses that have been made of al-Ṣadūq’s thought have fluctuated between basing 
themselves only on those texts where he does speak in propria persona and the problematic 
assumption that whatever is said in the aḥādīth he collects may be taken as a verbatim 
statement of his own view. The results have been an assessment of al-Ṣadūq’s works and of 
his character as a scholar that is largely both self-evidently confused and confined to a small 
fraction of his extant oeuvre (see Chapter I). 
Al-Ṣadūq’s fate is largely symptomatic of the broader state of the study of ḥadīth and other 
areas of premodern Arabic literature during the last century and beyond. From Goldziher’s 
first, epochal work on the subject,29 scholars of ḥadīth in the Western academy have in their 
readings of ḥadīth compendia overwhelmingly focussed on the origin of what has been 
compiled, the aḥādīth themselves, rather than treating the compilation, the labours of the 
compiler, as deserving of interest. More broadly, it has long been assumed that the medium of 
compilation, immensely widespread across diverse literatures in Arabic and other languages, 
is not worth significant consideration as a vehicle of expression. A Western model of literature 
that elates the sustained narrative of the epic, the tragedy and the novel and which celebrates 
                                                            
29 It must be remarked that Goldziher did, on occasion, remark on the nature of compilations as 
distinct from the question of their contents’ authenticity. See Fadel, p. 163. 
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authorial claims to total originality has little time for the compiler’s fragmented, disemplotted 
relaying of others’ words. This thesis, conversely, will take compilation seriously as a potent 
medium of authorial self-expression. While al-Ṣadūq’s collected aḥādīth may well be valuable 
evidence for their supposed origins, as material compiled by al-Ṣadūq they are at the very least 
just as valuable as evidence for his own interactions with his intellectual context. The fact that 
al-Ṣadūq’s works are overwhelmingly made up of words that he transmits rather than words 
he has composed, of collected discrete components rather than a continuous address renders 
these works no less capable of conveying complex ideas and arguments and of pursuing 
nuanced authorial agenda.  
In such aims it is hoped that this thesis will build upon a of the other studies that have sought 
both to contend the unacknowledged richness of compilation literatures and whose number 
has been steadily increasing over the past two decades. Notable works in this respect include 
Montgomery’s study of al-Jāḥiẓ’s al-Ḥayawān, Kilpatrick’s study of al-Iṣfahānī’s al-Aghānī 
and Davis’ study of Firdowsī’s Shāh nāmah.30 In all three the authors seek to radically expand 
the horizons of meaning offered by these texts, rehabilitating the figure of the compiler from 
that of a faceless tradent to that of a writer who channels a distinctive authorial potency. The 
situation is well-expressed in the words of Hilary Kilpatrick (who is speaking specifically with 
regard to adab compilations but could be discussing a far broader group of texts): ‘the 
designation “compilation” is no more, and no less, useful in the context of Arabic adab 
literature than the term ‘novel’ is in the context of modern literatures.’31 
The study of ḥadīth, meanwhile, has proved fertile ground for this increasing interest in 
compilation. In Kevin Reinhart’s manifesto for the state of the field, ‘Juynbolliana, 
Gradualism, the Big Bang and Ḥadīth Study in the Twenty-First Century’, the author exhorts 
just such a shift away from atomising questions of origins towards a greater attention to 
compilation. Addressing and echoing a number of other recent works, Reinhart advocates a 
shift from questions of authenticity to those of authority: what kind of authority do Muslims 
accord to ḥadīth? How do they construct that authority? How is that authority deployed in 
practice? To draw attention to such questions, moreover, is to draw attention to the variety of 
answer they may receive across the history the Muslim world – rather than being governed by 
a single trajectory of canonisation, whereby it attains scriptural status in the late third/ninth 
century that it then retains uniformly for ever more, Reinhart highlights studies that have 
                                                            
30 See Montgomery, Kilpatrick, ‘Context’; Making the Great Book of Songs; Davis. Though the Shāh 
nāmah is not a compilation as such, rather its myriad stories and episodes are synthesised into a single 
epic narrative, Davis’ lament over scholarship’s tendency to assume that Firdowsī collects and transmits 
these narratives uncritically, contending instead that Firdowsī brings the tales of Persia’s kings together 
into an intensely structured exactly mirrors the sentiments expressed here regarding ḥadīth compendia.  
31 Kilpatrick, ‘ʿAbbāsid’, p. 78. 
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shown the changing understandings and uses of ḥadīth in different contexts.33 These questions 
will all be central to our discussions of al-Ṣadūq, observing how he labours to construct the 
words of the imāms as a viable authority for his very particular epistemological circumstances. 
These questions in turn place questions of compilation centre stage. If we see ḥadīth’s 
authority not as the inevitable consequence of their prophetic source but as constructed by 
Muslim scholars, our attention must be drawn to the mechanics of how those scholars present 
aḥādīth to be read, examined and/or obeyed. A number of recent studies have subjected these 
processes to examination in various contexts. Taking a diverse range of ḥadīth compendia as 
their subject matter, Burge, Fadel, Newman, Pouzet, Tokatly, Mourad and Lindsay, all 
demonstrate the extent to which how an individual ḥadīth is compiled can dramatically shape 
the message it conveys. 
Fadel and Tokatly have both approached the question of compilation through its study by 
premodern Muslim writers, specifically with regard to the al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaḥīḥ of al-Bukhārī. Al-
Bukhārī’s compilation’s unparalleled status has attracted numerous commentaries, and 
amongst these several specifically examine the structure of the work.34 Focussing on the work 
of ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī’s Hady al-sārī, Fadel affirms the significance of such commentators 
as historians of ideas,35 not least for their illustration of the dramatic extent to which the 
context in which a ḥadīth is compiled can dramatically affect its content.36 Tokatly, 
meanwhile, focusses on the commentator, in this case al-Khaṭṭābī, exploring how his selection 
and presentation of the material from al-Bukhārī’s work that he chooses to comment on reveals 
the polemical intentions behind his commentary. 
Also working on al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaḥīḥ, Burge has pursued a more ambitious approach, seeking to 
take analysis of the work’s structures to a level beyond that achieved by the commentators of 
earlier centuries. He examines detail the individual structures of sections (‘books,’ sg. kitāb) 
of the work to illustrate how the precise ordering of chapters and their contents are engineered 
to suit al-Bukhārī’s objectives, such that his examination of those structures may shed light 
upon those objectives.37 
                                                            
33 Reinhart, pp. 430-436 and passim. Studies to which Reinhart draws attention in this regard that 
are of particular relevance to al-Ṣadūq are Brown’s exploration of the establishment of al-Bukhārī 
and Muslim’s collections as canonical over the fourth/tenth century and Musa’s exploration of the 
mostly third/ninth-century debates regarding the status of the ḥadīth corpus as a whole. 
34 Tokatly, pp. 56-57. 
35 Fadel, p. 162. 
36 Ibid., p. 165-167. 
37 Burge, ‘Reading Between the Lines’, pp. 177-195 and passim. 
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Quite different from al-Bukhārī’s voluminous compendium, a genre within ḥadīth literature 
that has received attention is that of the ‘forty ḥadīth’. In two very early examples of the study 
of compilation that unfortunately did not inspire emulation, both Pouzet and Bishop explored 
the most famous example of this genre, the Arbaʿūn ḥadīth of al-Nawawī. Pouzet takes 
advantage of the arbaʿūn form’s relative brevity to subject al-Nawawī’s compilation to 
thoroughgoing analysis from beginning to end, exploring how in content and structure it is 
tailored to best achieve al-Nawawī’s goal of instructing lay believers in the fundamentals of 
the faith. A valuable contribution is Pouzet’s study of how al-Nawawī’s book sits within a 
genre of other compilations of forty ḥadīth.38 Bishop’s earlier study, though brief and largely 
interested in comparison with the Gospels, also observes of how al-Nawawī’s selection of 
material reflects his didactic priorities.39 That he sees no ordering of material in al-Nawawī’s 
book may be contested, but his impulse to look for it and his suggestion that form-critical 
methods be applied more widely to ḥadīth literature40 is worthy of recognition.  
More recently, Mourad and Lindsay have subjected to productive examination another 
collection of forty, that of ibn ʿAsākir. This collection is devoted to exhorting the faithful to 
jihad, its compiler being an enthusiastic recipient of the patronage of Nur al-Dīn Zangī. Like 
Pouzet, this study studies this short compilation as a whole, exploring how ibn ʿ Asākir imbued 
his message into the selection and ordering of aḥādīth, as well as his asānīd.41 This study is 
of especial interest to us for their exploration of how ibn ʿAsākir exploits the particular 
strengths and possibilities of the ḥadīth compendium. His task was to provide a manifesto 
authorising the diverse campaigns of his patron, a task to which a conventional fiqhī discussion 
of jihad, containing as was bound to do all the exacting conditions, caveats and prohibitions 
concerning when the faithful should march to war. By contrast, he may with good faith present 
without commentary forty aḥādīth that contain no such inhibiting detail.42 This same utility of 
compiled ḥadīth as a medium was also explored by Hodgson in his analysis of how al-Ṭabarī 
reports the killing of ʿ Uthmān. Faced with so divisive an event, Hodgson shows how al-Ṭabarī 
lays a breadcrumb trail of engaging narratives that toe the line of Jamāʿī orthodoxy, he 
meanwhile subverts this through a mixture of carefully chosen asānīd and arrangement of 
reports to point the discerning reader away from these platitudes towards a more developed 
legal consideration of the problem. Al-Ṭabarī’s capacity to juxtapose different reports without 
being compelled to deliver a single, synthesised account thus allows him to enact a subtle 
                                                            
38 See also Burge, ‘Myth’, p. 224 for a brief discussion of the genre. 
39 Bishop, pp. 255, 259-260. 
40 Bishop, pp. 260, 261.  
41 Mourad and Lindsay, pp. 63-81. 
42 Ibid., pp. 56-58, 70. 
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discussion of power and legitimacy while also seeming to hostile eyes to uphold the accepted 
narrative.43  
Perhaps the most immediately significant recent study of compilation for our purposes is the 
work of Andrew Newman, who in his The Formation of Twelver Shīʿism develops the idea of 
‘ḥadīth as discourse.’ Along similar lines to the other authors discussed, Newman’s work is 
distinguished by its focus on al-Ṣadūq’s immediate Imāmī predecessors. Discussing early 
Imāmī compendia from al-Barqī to al-Kulaynī (thus ending the study around the time of al-
Ṣadūq’s birth) Newman explores how in particular the theological content of these compendia, 
that is to say how the compilers select and arrange aḥādīth with theological content, can be 
demonstrated to be in response to the changing circumstances faced by each author and by the 
Imāmī community. Newman explores both how these changes reflect responses to theological 
currents (al-Kulaynī, for instance, responding to the more rationalist environment of Baghdad 
by excluding and dispersing traditions containing doctrines deemed suspect), and also how 
compendia may reflect the broader experiences of the Imāmī community, with accounts of 
imāms with extraordinary abilities proliferating in context of a Shīʿa still struggling in the 
aftermath of the occultation. 
All of the above studies provide an essential grounding on which our study of al-Ṣadūq aims 
to build. Beyond all else, they allow us to begin with the assertion that not only is the 
assumption of compilers’ lack of authorial agency in their works theoretically untenable, but 
that it is demonstrably false. Not all of the avenues they explore are readily possible for al-
Ṣadūq: his works, for instance, are hard to place in meaningful categories of genre, and 
Mourad and Lindsay are able to pursue rich avenues both of manuscript history and authorial 
biography that a study of al-Ṣadūq cannot hope to emulate. Nonetheless, beyond all else these 
scholars together show in diverse contexts the importance of paying due scrutiny to how 
compilers present their material in understanding ḥadīth collections and their significance. 
It is in Burge’s work that the theoretical underpinnings and implications of such an approach 
to ḥadīth compendia has been most thoroughly developed. As well as productively applying 
close attention to compilation to a number of quite different ḥadīth collections, Burge outlines 
the bases for of a methodology of ‘compilation criticism.’ He draws on the literary theory of 
Eco, Greimas and especially Frye to provide foundations for an examination of how 
compilations produce meaning from their constituent parts, exploring the dynamics of 
semiosis at work when a compiler adduces a given ḥadīth in a given context. Burge’s study 
extrapolates a framework from Frye’s readings of the biblical text, drawing analogy between 
                                                            
43 Hodgson, vol. i, pp. 353-358. 
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the latter’s exploration of how words generate meaning and how ḥadīth do so. Frye models a 
word’s meaning as a conversation between an individual usage, its use across the larger work 
in which that usage occurs, its dictionary definition and its meaning in others’ usage thereof. 
Burge explores how the ḥadīth in the compilation may be conceived as operating along the 
same quadripartite lines – possessing meaning in terms of its individual usage and its usage 
elsewhere in the same compilation, as well as in terms of how it is used by other compilers 
and, for some ḥadīth, also a ‘dictionary meaning,’ a long-standing, conventional 
understanding of a ḥadīth and what it is about. Thus conceived, compilation becomes an active 
process of adaptation and reappropriation, setting aḥādīth in conversation with the pre-
existing range of ways they have been compiled and read, prompting them to speak in ways 
that are slightly or even radically different.44 
Burge also points to two critical methods current in Biblical scholarship, canonical criticism 
and selection criticism, as particularly valuable starting points for the study of the compilation 
of ḥadīth. While stressing that one can never simply transplant a methodology wholesale from 
one field to another,45 Burge points to the efficacy of certain questions that each of these 
critical methods ask, as well as their shared disinterest in the ultimate provenance of the text 
under discussion. Redaction criticism instead interrogates the reasons why a given compiler 
selects the texts she does from amongst those available. Canonical criticism, meanwhile, 
examines how the texts in a given collection are presented – what order they are placed in, 
how they are grouped and so on.46  
Canonical criticism, in its interrogation of how compendia are structured, comprises a host of 
questions that will accompany our readings of al-Ṣadūq that we shall set out below. Burge has 
demonstrated the efficacy of this approach in studies of sections from al-Bukhārī’s al-Jāmiʿ 
al-ṣaḥīḥ and the tafsīr of al-ʿAyyāshī, but he also notes that it would be best applied to 
compilations that can be observed as a whole.47 This is exactly what we shall undertake in the 
chapter-long studies of whole compilations that make up Section II of this thesis. 
As for redaction criticism, as Burge observes, this method is not always easy for ḥadīth 
compilations, for we do not always have a clear picture of the corpus from which a compiler 
was selecting at our disposal.48 Where he finds it productive is in his examination of al-Suyūṭī, 
for whom he has the resource of that prolific author’s other works with which any single work 
may be compared, determining what materials were excluded or included for different 
                                                            
44 Burge, ‘Myth’, pp. 215-221 and passim. 
45 Burge, ‘Reading Between the Lines’, p. 176. 
46 Burge, ‘Reading Between the Lines’, pp. 171-177; Myth, p. 215. 
47 Burge, ‘Reading Between the Lines’, p. 174. 
48 Ibid., pp. 171-173. 
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projects.49 Such is the case with our chosen compiler, and the different corpora that al-Ṣadūq 
deploys in different compilations will frequently have much to tell us about his authorial 
choices. 
Redaction criticism also invites us to consider the more difficult but highly relevant task of 
identifying the broader ḥadīth corpus in circulation amongst the Imāmī scholarly community 
and beyond from which al-Ṣadūq drew his material, of which we can only have a very partial 
picture. Sometimes we are able to compare how a group of scholars respond to a common 
corpus. In Chapter IV, for example, we will look at a highly controversial set of aḥādīth – 
those pertaining to visions of the Hidden Imām – and see how different compilers including 
al-Ṣadūq deal with them, but such opportunities are relatively rare. If, for instance, we consider 
al-Kulaynī’s al-Kāfī, we have a vast corpus of aḥādīth, many of which al-Ṣadūq does not 
narrate but which were certainly in circulation when he was writing. Why is this the case? Al-
Kulaynī is only a very sporadic presence in al-Ṣadūq’s asānīd, but there are substantial 
overlaps in the two writers’ intellectual associations.50 When, therefore, we see al-Ṣadūq 
apparently neglecting of a given text or group of texts in al-Kulaynī, the reason for this could 
be one of several, including al-Ṣadūq’s ignorance of the text, his considered objection to its 
contents and/or isnād or his hostility to its immediate source. Considerations such as these 
mean that the questions involved in redaction criticism may not always be possible to answer. 
What is important, regardless, is to acknowledge their pertinence as questions in our goal of 
understanding why al-Ṣadūq’s compilations look the way they do. 
The expanding literature on ḥadīth compilation surveyed here allow us now to set out some 
guiding criteria, building particularly on Burge’s work to construct a skeleton methodology 
for compilation criticism. Below, then, are six guiding questions that will underlie our 
examination of al-Ṣadūq’s texts, and which, it is hoped, will contribute to subsequent studies 
of ḥadīth compendia.  
1. Our first question when approaching al-Ṣadūq’s ḥadīth compendia is that of the 
compendia’s purpose. What is it for? What does al-Ṣadūq wish to convey to his 
reader? As we shall see, answers to this question can vary considerably, as, 
correspondingly, does the construction of his several works. An effective measure for 
this interrogation is to draw attention to anomalies, that is to say features of a 
compilation that challenge an otherwise tempting view of its intention (including the 
                                                            
49 Burge, ‘Jalāl al-Dīn’, pp. 280ff. 
50 This set of relationships shall be explored in depth in Chapter I. 
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all-too-prevalent view of all compilations as straightforward encyclopaedias).51 If al-
Ṣadūq wishes to denounce the credibility of a particular narrator, why does he 
juxtapose these with reports from that same narrator that he apparently asks the reader 
to believe? If al-Ṣadūq is intent on demonstrating the compliance of Imāmī aḥādīth 
with Muʿtazilī theology, why does he include material that appears both to contradict 
that theology and indeed to assault the very exercise of theological reasoning? If al-
Ṣadūq wishes us to ridicule Sunnī apocryphal traditions, why does he select examples 
of those traditions that seem to offer proof of his dearly-held doctrine of the 
occultation? 
2. An important consequence of the first question that also complicates it somewhat is 
its alerting us to the capacity of the compiler to deliberately mislead the reader. We 
must, therefore, constantly be asking whether a compiler is telling us the whole truth. 
It is no rarity for authors to operate something less than full disclosure of their 
intentions, and compilers, as authors, are unsurprisingly no exception to this rule. 
Burge, Tokatly and Hodgson have all observed as much in the compilations they have 
studied, such misdirections constituting a valuable component of how the compiler 
delivers his message.52 This returns us to the value of anomalies. Just as we should be 
on the lookout for aspects of compilations that conflict with what we may have 
presumed is what they intend to tell the reader and how, we should be open to 
indications that the stated purpose of a compiler’s presentation of material may not be 
entirely true. 
3. Reinhart announces the shift from authenticity to authority, and when examining a 
ḥadīth compendium we must ask how the compiler is constructing and using the 
potentially prodigious authority of his collected texts. Brown, Musa, Mourad and 
Lindsay and others draw attention to the utter heterogeneity of ḥadīth’s scriptural (or 
not) status in different contexts. As we shall come to see, al-Ṣadūq’s endeavour to 
condition his readers’ response to the words of the imāms in the aftermath of the 
vanishing of the imām who speaks them is a pervasive concern across his works, but 
also one which he pursues in a wide variety of ways.  
4. The compilation critic must forever be asking how the different components of a 
compilation affect one another. She holds that how a reader reads and responds to a 
                                                            
51 Such an approach is regularly of use to scholars examining ḥadīth compendia. See Burge, ‘Reading 
Between the Lines’, p. 187; ‘Jalāl al-Dīn’, p. 285; Fadel, pp. 163-164. It is also integral to the 
approach of premodern Muslim commentators al-Bukhārī’s structure. If, for instance, al-Bukhārī 
wishes to inform us about the subject outlined in his chapter title, why does he include material that 
seems to have little to do therewith, or indeed exclude material that would seem to have been 
pertinent? See Tokatly, pp. 55-57. 
52 Tokatly, pp. 60, 87, Burge, ‘Jalāl al-Dīn’, p. 299, Hodgson, vol. i, pp. 353-358. 
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given ḥadīth will be conditioned by that ḥadīth’s particular setting in a compilation. 
It may be conditioned by other ḥadīth the reader has also encountered in that 
compilation that seem to contradict it. It may be conditioned by the rubric under which 
it is collected – when reading a chapter purporting to discuss the question of 
predestination, a reader will be focussed on how the texts therein shed light on that 
question, and may be correspondingly less focussed on other information they may 
contain. The same ḥadīth may be used in the very different context of a narration of 
the imām’s life – there the reader’s focus may be less on the doctrinal content of the 
imām’s teachings and more on the circumstances in which those teachings are 
delivered. The first three questions concern what a compiler is trying to do. This 
question lies at the heart of how we may discover this.  
5. An underlying conviction that must sustain compilation criticism is that of the 
sophistication of this medium and of its authors that is to say the compilers. The 
studies here cited have already demonstrated the considerable intricacy with which 
compilers’ mould their material, and none gives any indication (most of these studies 
being of article-length) that they consider the measure of that intricacy to be exhausted 
in their observations. This is not a question of imposition, of assuming the presence 
of elaborate systems where there may be none. Rather it is a question of undoing the 
anomalous presumption that such sophistication is absent. Compilers are authors – we 
must assume that they seek to influence and anticipate how their texts will influence 
their readers just as we assume of other kinds of author. 
A useful concept in this regard is Ricoeur’s notion of the hermeneutic wager.53 Posited 
in the context of creating a hermeneutics of symbols, Ricoeur’s ‘wager’ is the 
necessary gamble of assuming that a set of symbols have an internal logic such that 
they may be interpreted systematically. Only by such an assumption may we begin to 
decode them, and in turn our assumption may (or may not) then be vindicated by the 
meaning that we are then able to produce. Compiled aḥādīth seem a good deal less 
abstract than the worlds of signification for which Ricoeur invents this concept, but 
they face the same hurdle of Ricoeur’s symbols in that the structures of meaning that 
govern them are not self-evident to the outside observer. The compiler does not tell 
us that we can only understand a given ḥadīth properly by first reading those that 
precede it in careful sequence. If, however, we wager that this might be his intent, and 
then explore how our perception of a compiled ḥadīth changes when read in its 
compiled context, we may find that the effect is substantial, possibly to the point 
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where the accidental engineering of these effects by the compiler becomes very 
unlikely.  
Nonetheless, this opening wager compels us to enquire on a technical level to what 
extent this sophistication reaches. This especially concerns the previous question. As 
we ask how different components of a compilation affect one another, we must ask 
how far the constructed resonances between them may reach. How ambitious were 
compilers like al-Ṣadūq with regard to how much one part of their work might 
influence the reading of another? That a ḥadīth’s reading should be affected by other 
aḥādīth in the same chapter, and indeed the heading of that chapter seems a reasonable 
expectation. Similarly, we may extend this to the title of the compilation as a whole, 
though this might be rather more faint a resonance. What about the sometimes detailed 
statements of intention with which compilers open their works? These often carry the 
potential to dramatically affect how we read the aḥādīth within, but did compilers 
always expect their readers to remain mindful of their introductory sentiments 
(sometimes virtually the only direct instance of their authorial voice) hundreds of 
pages and many hundreds of ḥadīth later? 
Burge has engaged this question to some extent in his readings of al-Bukhārī, 
identifying indications both that al-Bukhārī intends the reader to start with the first 
chapter and that more generally he intends his chapters to be read in sequence.54 If a 
given chapter significantly affects how subsequent chapters will be read, the author 
must rely on the reader to read in the right direction. This same question of linearity 
of reading will concern us especially in chapters III and IV.  
6. A last pertinent question is one of categories: to what extent are the ḥadīth 
compilations studied here to be regarded as literature? Though the literary possibilities 
of compilation have been explored in the work of Kilpatrick, Montgomery and others 
in their study of undisputed artists like al-Jāḥiẓ, ḥadīth compiled as such are seldom 
considered as literary. As we explore the extent of these compilations’ subtlety and 
nuance, is their exclusion from this category justified? Of the studies of the art of 
compilation discussed above only Burge asserts that what he is doing amounts to 
treating these compilations as literature. This he qualifies to mean that they are 
discursive such that they can be elucidated by literary criticism.55 Certainly this 
question could be interrogated at greater length, indeed a far greater length than the 
present study, and the answer would hinge not least on the troubled applicability to 
                                                            
54 Burge, ‘Reading Between the Lines’, pp. 187, 190. See also Burge, ‘Jalāl al-Dīn’, pp. 295-296. 
55 Burge, ‘Myth’, pp. 215, 226. In an earlier article, meanwhile, he states that though these 
compilations may be productively subjected to literary readings, they are nonetheless ‘not literary in 
the full sense.’ Burge, ‘Reading Between the Lines’, p. 196. 
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Western notions of the literary to premodern Arabic contexts in general.56 We shall 
therefore not be visiting this question with same frequency of the previous five, rather 
our purpose in naming it here is to affirm that the extent to which al-Ṣadūq’s works 
are literary will be kept open as we set out to read them.   
.  
THE AIMS OF THIS THESIS 
 
This thesis aims to study al-Ṣadūq as a thinker and as a compiler. It will ask the above 
questions of al-Ṣadūq’s many surviving ḥadīth compendia to explore how he negotiates the 
transformative challenges facing the Imāmīya at the dawn of the Buwayhid period. In so doing 
we will discover the importance of this scholar as a witness to the formation of Imāmī ideas 
and the nature of the unique Imāmī vision of traditionism that was ultimately replaced by 
rapprochements with more conventional models of jurisprudence and theology. We will 
discover, too, the breadth of al-Ṣadūq’s skill as a compiler, and as we do so it is hoped that 
this study will suggest new possibilities for the study of compilers and compilation. As we 
shall see, these objectives merge in the fact of compilation itself’s centrality to al-Ṣadūq’s 
epistemological vision. 
This study aspires to be representative rather than comprehensive. There must be two reasons 
for this. The first is that while al-Ṣadūq’s extant oeuvre is prodigious, it remains dwarfed by 
what bibliographers tell us once existed. While, for instance, we may assume that his extant 
legal works have much in common than those that are no longer available, for his works on 
subjects like history and Qurʾānic exegesis we have no surviving fragments from which we 
might be able to extrapolate an image of a whole. His works of history might have given us 
examples of the kind of sustained narrativity that is overwhelmingly absent from his surviving 
writings, while in his approach to the Qurʾān we might have found much to compliment our 
study of his approach to aḥādīth. Such opportunities remain lost to us, and to recognise this is 
to recognise that however colourful a portrait of al-Ṣadūq’s intellectual life we may be able to 
create it will inevitably be a partial one. 
The second reason is the more modest hurdle of space. The thousands of pages with which al-
Ṣadūq’s eighteen surviving books confront us are far broader an object than can be given 
universal coverage within the confines of a PhD thesis. As the survey of his works supplied 
below will illustrate in more detail, several of al-Ṣadūq’s surviving writings receive little to 
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no discussion in what follows, while among those volumes to which considerable space is 
allotted here there are some that could quite easily provide ample material for an entire thesis 
if not several. 
Nonetheless, these constraints of space and ravages of time need not scupper our aspiration to 
offer a representative study of al-Ṣadūq. While there are many facets of his thought and career 
that could be studied – his theology; his politics; even his biography – it is, as has been 
declared, his compilation of the imāms’ aḥādīth and his understanding of that task that 
concerns us here, and, as we shall demonstrate, constitutes the very foundation of his thought. 
We will see in what follows a prodigious variety in al-Ṣadūq’s writing, and we must be 
resigned to the fact that there was once more to be seen, but there is also continuity; a core of 
shared concerns that unite the different texts studied here and point to a project grander than 
any one book or even the eighteen we have extant.   
 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis consists of four chapters divided into two sections, each containing two chapters. 
The first of these sections is entitled ‘Placing al-Ṣadūq’ and the second ‘Reading al-Ṣadūq.’  
 
1. Placing al-Ṣadūq 
In this first section we will analyse al-Ṣadūq’s position in his tumultuous context. As alluded 
to already, this context encompasses two principal spheres: that of Imāmī legal-theological 
thought and that of adab literature. Chapter I, Ghayba, will examine the former, while the 
latter will be examined in Chapter II, ‘Taqīya.’ In both chapters our task will be to establish 
how al-Ṣadūq’s writings may be situated in relation to those of his contemporaries, and in both 
we will need to examine a great many of al-Ṣadūq’s writings. In Chapter I we will trawl al-
Ṣadūq’s writings for indications of his position regarding the epistemological status of ḥadīth 
in relation to other proofs such as human reason and his methodology of selecting and 
critiquing aḥādīth, questions to which he never accords sustained, systematic treatment. In 
Chapter II we will examine how a great many of al-Ṣadūq’s works diverge radically from the 
conventions of form and content governing the legal-theological manuals, creeds and 
catechisms that were already taking form among the Imāmīya and other groups, and in fact 
exhibit features that bring them closer to the adab literature that was so prominent at the 
Buwayhid court where al-Ṣadūq was active. Both of these chapters, moreover, will incorporate 
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extensive reviews of current scholarship on these areas. As observed above, scholarship on al-
Ṣadūq to date has almost exclusively considered him as a legal-theological scholar, and thus 
it is in Chapter I that we will be reviewing the state of scholarship on al-Ṣadūq himself, and 
in turn what that scholarship has to say about his legal-theological thought. Chapter II, 
meanwhile, concerns as aspect of al-Ṣadūq’s work that has been almost completely ignored, 
and therefore has little to review in terms of studies of al-Ṣadūq himself. There is, however, a 
great deal of scholarship on the nature of adab literature in the premodern period and how it 
relates to other literatures and intellectual frameworks. Our examination of al-Ṣadūq’s 
relationship with adab and adab literature will therefore necessitate extensive engagement 
with that body of work.  
 
2. Reading al-Ṣadūq 
Following the first section’s reckoning of al-Ṣadūq in his broad context, in this section we 
embark on close readings of two of his most important works. In Chapter III we examine al-
Tawḥīd, an extended polemic of theology and epistemology that takes as its starting point the 
nature of the divine, and in Chapter IV we look at Kamāl al-dīn wa tamām al-niʿma, a work 
on the occultation of the Twelfth Imām.   
These extended readings of individual works are a product of the focus on compilation 
discussed above that is applied across this thesis. While the detailed interrogation of how al-
Ṣadūq compiles his transmitted materials will be vital to the studies conducted in Section I, 
the project pursued here to develop that approach in the chapter-length study of single works 
has a number of benefits. The first of these is purely demonstrative. In these two chapters we 
will see something of the extent of al-Ṣadūq’s sophistication as an author, observing how he 
enacts intricate and extremely potent addresses to the reader which he can sustain, develop 
and expand across hundreds of pages. It is in Section II that we see how a compilation can 
work as an interconnected whole, the understanding of one part of it inescapably conditioned 
by the workings of other parts, and ultimately by overarching structures of meaning that al-
Ṣadūq the compiler effects across the work. It is here that the discussion of compilation above 
will become most relevant, and these readings will also build on the discussions of 
understandings of, approaches to and even philosophies of compilation current amongst al-
Ṣadūq’s contemporaries that make up parts of Chapter I and especially Chapter II. 
In establishing that these works can and indeed should be read in this manner, these two 
chapters meanwhile deliver important conclusions about the image of al-Ṣadūq established in 
Section I and how we may go about constructing and developing that image. In both al-Tawḥīd 
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and Kamāl al-dīn al-Ṣadūq gives an account of the doctrinal questions raised in each texts that 
far exceeds what might be summarised in the brief dicta of a creed. Questions of the imāms’ 
theological knowledge, the limits of human reason and the nature of the Twelfth Imām’s 
occultation are subject to prolonged meditations, meditations which do not dwell on the 
clarification of technical minutiae (and often test the limits thereof), describing to the reader 
through assembled aḥādīth the lived reality of his relationship with the imāms and with their 
reported words. Al-Ṣadūq’s theological contentions in these compendia are inextricably 
intertwined with the medium of compilation through which he gives them expression, and in 
reading them we come to see that a full understanding of him as a scholar cannot rest only on 
isolated statements of conviction and polemic, but must rather be acquainted with the literary 




THE WORKS OF AL-ṢADŪQ 
 
Before we begin there is first offered an overview of al-Ṣadūq’s extant oeuvre, listing each of 
his surviving works with a brief description of their contents as well as a guide as to where 
they will be discussed in this study. 
 
 Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh, ‘Every Man His Own Jurist’60 (al-Faqīh) - al-Ṣadūq’s 
most famous surviving work and also his largest, as already mentioned it is now counted as 
one of the four canonical books of Imāmī ḥadīth. Not unlike other members of this quartet, 
al-Faqīh does not entirely resemble the encyclopaedic model followed by the books of the 
Sunnī canon. For one thing, as its title suggests, it only concerns matters of law. For another, 
it does not include the asānīd of the aḥādīth it collects. As al-Ṣadūq explains in his 
introduction, this is a book to guide the faithful effectively and conveniently in matters of law, 
and including asānīd would only make it cumbersome. The book follows the customary 
structure of a legal manual, and while most injunctions are affirmed mostly by collected 
ḥadīth, many are accompanied by al-Ṣadūq’s own clarifications and summaries and others 
consist only of al-Ṣadūq’s words with no supporting ḥadīth. Most of our discussion of al-
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Faqīh is found in Chapter I, but as the chief exemplar of al-Ṣadūq writing with the voice of 
the instructor of the Imāmī faithful it will remain a key point of comparison across the thesis. 
 Al-Iʿtiqādāt, ‘Beliefs’61 – al-Ṣadūq’s creed, this invaluable text outlines al-Ṣadūq’s 
opinion of the correct Imāmī belief on a wide range of subjects, including core doctrines like 
the nature of God, the infallibility of the Imām and the punishment of sinners, but also a few 
subjects less usual in a creed such as how to confront contradictions in ḥadīth. It is one of al-
Ṣadūq’s best known works thanks to Fyzee’s translation, and as well as its value to the study 
of al-Ṣadūq still numbers among a fairly small number of published creeds from the early 
centuries of Islam. While it is not a ḥadīth compendium, consisting in the main of al-Ṣadūq’s 
prose which he then supports with aḥādīth, it is an essential point of reference for 
understanding al-Ṣadūq, its utility as an example of al-Ṣadūq discussing theological matters 
in a didactic register corresponding to that of al-Faqīh’s representation of his mode of legal 
instruction. As such it is similarly taken as a point of reference across the thesis. 
 Al-Hidāya, ‘Guidance’ – A short work, al-Hidāya is a brief guide to being an Imāmī. 
It begins with a short creed giving central beliefs, followed by a manual of laws. The former 
is shorter than al-Iʿtiqādāt, while the latter is nowhere near as comprehensive as al-Faqīh, but 
follows a similar model, combining al-Ṣadūq’s prose with supporting aḥādīth, mostly without 
full asānīd. It answers few questions that al-Faqīh and al-Iʿtiqādāt do not, but nonetheless 
provides the present study with occasional points of reference and comparison. 
 Al-Muqniʿ, ‘Assurance’ – This work is very similar to al-Hidāya except that it 
includes no creed section, rather it consists only of a short legal manual. Like al-Hidāya it 
receives little direct study in what follows but serves as a valuable example of a particular 
style of writing. 
 Al-Khiṣāl, ‘The Quantities/Numbers’ – One of al-Ṣadūq’s stranger texts, this long 
work amasses a very diverse range of aḥādīth and arranges them according to the numbers 
mentioned therein. It will be studied in depth in Chapter II. 
 ʿIlal al-sharāʾiʿ, ‘The Causes of Laws’ (ʿIlal) – Another unusual work, ʿIlal gathers 
a very large and diverse body of aḥādīth under the rubric of causation. It will receive detailed 
study in Chapter II.  
 Kamāl al-dīn wa tamām al-niʿma, ‘The Perfection of Religion and the Completion of 
Grace’ (Kamāl al-dīn) – al-Ṣadūq’s surviving work on the occultation of the Twelfth Imām. 
This work is the chief subject of Chapter IV. 
 ʿUyūn akhbār al-Riḍā, ‘Wellsprings of the Traditions of al-Riḍā’ (ʿUyūn) – One of 
al-Ṣadūq’s more popular works in the present day, ʿUyūn presents a large number of traditions 
about al-Riḍā’s life and death and an even larger number of traditions narrated from him 
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containing his teachings. It is also distinguished by being al-Ṣadūq’s only work written for a 
named patron, the Buwayhid vizier of Rayy al-Ṣāḥib b. ʿAbbād. Some aspects of the work are 
discussed in Chapter II, however much of it left without discussion in what follows. This is 
partly due to the fact that al-Ṣadūq’s presentation of al-Riḍā, a key component of the book, 
has received some study by Cooperson,62 but partly also as an unfortunate result of the 
constraints of space.  
 Al-Tawḥīd, ‘Divine Oneness’ – al-Ṣadūq’s largest work on theological matters, al-
Tawḥīd is a large compendium of reports mostly pertaining to the nature of God. It is the chief 
subject of Chapter III. 
 Thawāb al-aʿmāl, ‘Deeds and their Rewards’ – This short work collects aḥādīth in 
which are described the rewards for a variety of virtuous deeds. It stands alongside a number 
if al-Ṣadūq’s works that exhort the reader to pious conduct through aḥādīth arranged around 
a particular theme, but in comparison to other such works, such as ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl, Thawāb 
is relatively unambitious, and its discussion here is therefore subordinated to that of more 
interesting works of this type. As such it receives some discussion in Chapter II. 
 ʿIqāb al-aʿmāl, ‘Deeds and their Punishments’ – Very much the sister work to 
Thawāb, ʿIqāb is of near identical length and structure, except of course that the traditions are 
united by the theme of how wicked deeds will be punished. Like Thawāb this book is discussed 
in Chapter II but not as extensively as other works.  
 Muṣādaqa al-ikhwān, ‘Sincerity Amongst Brethren’ – This small book enjoins the 
reader to treat his fellow believers with respect, collecting aḥādīth on the subject of the 
righteous conduct among Muslims. It is discussed extensively in Chapter II. 
 Ṣifāt al-shīʿa, ‘The Attributes of the Shīʿa’ (Ṣifāt) – This work gathers aḥādīth in 
which are discussed and enumerated the distinguishing moral and pious characteristics of the 
Shīʿa. It is studied in Chapter II. 
 Faḍāʾil al-shīʿa, ‘The Virtues of the Shīʿa’ (Faḍāʾil) – Subtly different to Ṣifāt, 
Faḍāʾil’s aḥādīth speak of the exalted position of the Shīʿa. It, too, is studied in Chapter II.  
 Al-Mawāʿiẓ, ‘The ‘Sermons’ – This book collects texts from the imāms for their 
kerygmatic value. It contains short aphorisms and maxims, but also stirring sermons which 
exhort the faithful to piety with powerful rhetoric, amongst them texts which al-Sharīf al-Raḍī 
would later deem of sufficient aesthetic quality to be included in his Nahj al-balāgha. It is 
discussed in Chapter II.  
 Al-Amālī, ‘Dictations’ – It is common for Buwayhid Imāmī scholars to leave works 
of ‘dictations’ (amālī) in which are recorded individual teaching sessions in which the author 
narrates aḥādīth to students. Alongside al-Ṣadūq, al-Mufīd and al-Ṭūsī also leave collections 
                                                            
62 See Cooperson, pp. 70-106. See also Lazarus-Yafeh, passim. 
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of amālī. Their wide-ranging subject matter makes these books an invaluable source for the 
aḥādīth in circulation in this period, but as yet no study has been made of their workings. Were 
they collected during an author’s lifetime, under the author’s supervision and sanction? To 
what extent are they an accurate representation of oral teaching practices (as their form 
indicates they may well be)? al-Ṣadūq’s al-Amālī is not much discussed in this thesis. This is 
partly as a result of this set of unanswered questions that surround the work, but more 
specifically because what purports to be a student’s record of al-Ṣadūq’s dictations has an 
unclear role in a study of al-Ṣadūq’s own practices of written compilation. Ostensibly all al-
Amālī can tell us is how al-Ṣadūq chose to communicate when using the format of brief 
dictation sessions in which he relayed only a handful of aḥādīth. In the other compendia listed 
here, those that he authored himself as written works, he constructs an address out of hundreds 
of aḥādīth, an address the complexity of which entirely reflects this scope, and it is these 
authorial efforts that this thesis takes as its focus. 
 Faḍāʾil al-ashhur al-thalātha, ‘The Virtues of the Three Months’ – This little book 
gathers aḥādīth extolling the virtues of the months of Rajab, Shaʿbān and Ramaḍān. These 
virtues in the main take the form of the particular rewards that await those who act piously in 
these months and especially those who perform supererogatory acts of worship. Alongside the 
book’s exhortations to such devotion many of its aḥādīth also supply the details of particular 
rites and practices that should be pursued by the God-fearing Muslim. Even more so than 
Thawāb and ʿIqāb, this work appears as a fairly uncomplicated exhortation to piety, and is 
therefore not much discussed here. 
 Majālis maʿa Rukn al-Dawla, ‘The Counsels Before Rukn al-Dawla’ – The given title 
is only the shortest of a number attached to this work, which is sometimes listed as five 
separate works each containing one counsel.63 These narrated counsels take place at the court 
of the Buwayhid prince Rukn al-Dawla, in which the prince consults al-Ṣadūq on various 
matters and receives wise answers. This is not the only time we read of al-Ṣadūq’s interactions 
with Rukn al-Dawla; al-Ṣadūq also narrates exchanges with him in Kamāl al-dīn and more 
briefly in ʿUyūn,64 and in these texts he appears as a wise and sympathetic sovereign (in 
contrast to the other potentate with whom al-Ṣadūq is recorded as having dealings, ibn 
ʿAbbād). It is potentially of great interest, given its rare portrayal of al-Ṣadūq’s style of 
discourse and argument, which appears as a combination of reason and text.65 It is narrated in 
                                                            
63 See al-Najāshī, Rijāl, p. 373. 
64 Kamāl al-dīn, p. 117, ʿUyūn, vol. ii, p. 312. 
65 This is interesting given the stern injunctions against dialectic levelled by al-Ṣadūq in other texts (e.g. 
al-Iʿtiqādāt, p. 70). Nonetheless, it should be noted that a very similar style of mixing text and reason 
is in evidence in al-Iʿtiqādāt itself and Kamāl al-dīn, such that this work does not tell us anything 
especially new in this regard. As to whether the styles observable here and in his other texts are 
completely identical, this is a question which for now must remain unanswered.  
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the third person, thus rendering it unclear whether it was actually written by al-Ṣadūq himself. 
Furthermore, the current edited version is incomplete. This is a fascinating little text and merits 
detailed study. However, even more so than in the case of al-Amālī, the uncertainty of its exact 
provenance and its correspondingly unclear pertinence to al-Ṣadūq’s approach to ḥadīth have 
allowed it little room for discussion in the following pages. The provenance and history of the 
work has received brief discussion by Ansari.66 
  
                                                            


















GHAYBA – Tradition and Innovation Among the Tenth-Century Imāmīya 
 
 
INTRODUCTION – Absence  
 
This chapter re-examines al-Ṣadūq’s place in the context in which he is most commonly 
located: the development of Imāmī legal and theological thought in the first century of the 
occultation of the Twelfth Imām. We will begin with a comprehensive review of scholarship 
on al-Ṣadūq as a jurist and theologian to date, noting in particular a number of deep 
ambiguities, liminalities and unanswered questions that surface in the view of his significance 
found therein. We will then turn to his works and attempt to clarify and answer these questions, 
and in so doing provide an anatomy of the key dynamics of how his compiling of the imāms’ 
ḥadīth relates to the changes and challenges facing Imāmī legal-theological thought in this age 
of transition. We shall above all aim to provide as complete and contextualised a picture as 
we can of al-Ṣadūq’s methods of compilation and his approach to the essential concerns of 
compiling ḥadīth within a legal-theological context: concerns such as the authenticity of 
aḥādīth and the role of reason in their interpretation and application.  
The study of Imāmī thought in this period is dominated by the concept of absence for two 
reasons. The first of these is an absence of evidence. It is from the next generation of Imāmī 
scholars, in particular al-Ṣadūq’s student al-Mufīd, that we receive the first substantial Imāmī 
literature on systematic theology and jurisprudence. For al-Ṣadūq’s and previous generations, 
meanwhile, we have very little extant other than ḥadīth compendia with little or no discussion 
of methodology, leaving deep uncertainties about the nature of Imāmī thought at the time, 
including how aḥādīth were compiled. This is in contrast to other groups in this period, in 
particular the Muʿtazilīs, the Ḥanafīs and the Shāfiʿīs, for whom we already have substantial 
literatures discussing problems of authenticity and transmission of texts as well as 
hermeneutics of application and detailed discussions of the role of reason and revelation. What 
the Imāmīya made of such questions meanwhile remains based largely on conjecture from the 
few, often taciturn extant contemporary sources and later bibliographical literature. 
The paucity of sources stems not least from the fact that the Imāmīya were a small group, but 
they were also a group undergoing profound changes. The second absence with which we 
must contend is the new reality of the absence of the imām facing the fourth/tenth-century 
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Imāmīya, following the acceptance of occultation around the beginning of the century. 
Adjusting to an epistemology that was not distinguished by the presence of a living successor 
to the Prophet’s authority at its centre, something that other Shīʿī groups still maintained,67 
was a transformation of daunting proportions for the Imāmī intellectual elite, and the 
negotiation of the imām’s looming absence remained a perennial concern. This highly unusual 
epistemological dilemma only complicates the historian’s task of reconstructing Imāmī 
thought in this period. Not only do we lack evidence, but the evidence we do have points to 
the highly unusual and unsettled character of the Imāmī community at this time, rendering 
analogy both with the better-known development of other groups and the later, more familiar 
stages of Imāmī thought all the more difficult. This is only exacerbated by the arrival of the 
Buwayhids in the middle of the century, inaugurating the far-reaching changes to the Imāmīs’ 
political circumstances discussed above. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW – al-Ṣadūq in Between 
 
If these ambiguities of al-Ṣadūq’s position are evident in this barest of historical frameworks, 
they are firmly reinforced by scholarship on the period. Al-Ṣadūq is a regular appearance in 
studies of Imāmī thought in the tenth century, studies which have increased in number and 
scope in the past three decades.68 However, he is hardly ever the central focus of such studies, 
despite his formidable oeuvre, and a survey of scholarly literature reveals to the contrary that 
he is consistently allotted an anomalously marginal place in views on the Imāmīya at this time.  
This sidelining of al-Ṣadūq is no coincidence. Rather it is the product of a tenacious set of 
categories and periodisations which dominate the study of the Imāmīya in the tenth century. 
It is these patterns of study which have engendered the perception of him as representing a 
liminal, transitional space between more important figures and events. In this review of 
scholarship on al-Ṣadūq, then, we must pay due attention to the patterns of understanding that 
have consistently engendered a depreciation of his value as an object of study. We shall 
                                                            
67 The Ismāʿīlī Fāṭimids had swept to power in North Africa in the first half of the fourth/tenth century, 
finally conquering Egypt in 358/969, in whom their Ismāʿīlī followers revered both a temporal ruler 
and a divinely appointed imām (other Ismāʿīlī groups did continue in opposition to the Fāṭimid imāmate, 
most prominently the Qarāmiṭa). The Zaydīs, meanwhile, had seen the rise of successful (if short-lived) 
imāmates in Yemen and northern Iran, and meanwhile unlike the Imāmīs maintained a concept of the 
imamate as something that could be established at any time by a legitimate claimant, rather than as a 
distant eschatological event.  
68 Most prominent of these are those of Modarressi, Crisis; Bayhom-Daou, Al-Mufid; Melchert, 
‘Imāmīs’; McDermott, Stewart, Orthodoxy; Gleave; Newman, Formative Period; Amir-Moezzi, Divine 
Guide; Madelung, ‘Imāmism’; Sander; Marcinowski. 
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examine in turn how this leaves to waste a valuable resource for a significant and poorly 
understood period in Islamic intellectual history, and how a close look at al-Ṣadūq’s abundant 
extant writings alongside those of his contemporaries can remedy some distortions in the 
generally held assumptions regarding the development of the Imāmī community. As the above 
historical outline has shown, al-Ṣadūq’s position at a transitional point in Imāmī intellectual 
history is indubitable, but rather than meriting his marginalisation, we shall explore how this 
renders him a vital window onto the nature of the formative transformations of which he was 
part. 
We shall have much occasion below to discuss how al-Ṣadūq’s Imāmī contemporaries, most 
notably al-Mufīd, found fault with his work. Before that, however, we shall see that responses 
of criticism and bewilderment are far more widespread, and in fact are a frequent sight in 
modern scholarly discussions of al-Ṣadūq. McDermott describes him variously as ‘clumsy,’ 
‘rambling’ and ‘cryptic.’69 Bayhom-Daou dismisses perceived contradictory statements as 
‘paradoxical’ and laments the poor quality of his theological prose as evidence of his lack of 
training in this area,70 while Madelung describes al-Ṣadūq as employing ‘arbitrary 
interpretations’ of aḥādīth.71 Beyond outright denigration, however, there is a great deal of 
ambiguous language, not without its own contradictions, in scholars’ assessments of him. For 
Ali Adam he confronting rationalist challenges with a traditionist methodology,72 for Melchert 
he is a semi-rationalist,73 for McDermott he is a traditionist with Muʿtazilī sentiments.74 This 
plethora of curious, chimerical monikers can only speak of a pervasive unease about how to 
relate al-Ṣadūq to the paradigms and dichotomies with which his context is usually viewed, a 
state of affairs which may also give rise to scholars’ resorting to outright criticism of his work. 
Al-Ṣadūq is greatly overshadowed in scholarship by his erstwhile student al-Mufīd. In contrast 
to the uncertain hybridity with which al-Ṣadūq is discussed, al-Mufīd is considered a definitive 
and momentous figure in Imāmī history. Scholarly testaments to this are as numerous as they 
are diverse: Amir Moezzi points to al-Mufīd as the death-knell of ‘primitive, esoteric, 
nonrational Shīʿism’ and the corresponding beginning of rationalist legalism amongst 
Imāmīs;75 Stewart, meanwhile, identifies al-Mufīd as the first head of an Imāmī school of 
law;76 Madelung argues al-Mufīd’s significance as the beginning of Muʿtazilī theology’s 
                                                            
69 McDermott, pp. 324-325. 
70 Bayhom-Daou, Al-Mufid, p. 94. 
71 Madelung, ‘Imāmism’, p. 17. 
72 Adam, p. 9 
73 Melchert, ‘Imāmīs’, passim. 
74 McDermott, p. 369. 
75 Amir-Moezzi, ‘Remarques’, pp. 17-20, Divine Guide, pp. 138-139. 
76 Stewart, Orthodoxy pp. 128-129. 
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successful incorporation into Imāmī thought.77 Al-Mufīd’s pivotal role as embodying the 
beginning of a new, Buyayhid, post-occultation Imāmī scholarship is to be found affirmed in 
a continuing succession of works on Shīʿism.78  
There is no doubt that al-Mufīd cuts a decisive figure in Imāmī history. It is in his writings 
that we first see what will become the definitive features of Imāmī scholarship in the 
Buwayhid period and beyond: the incorporation a distinctive Imāmī imamology into a strongly 
Muʿtazilī-leaning theological framework and a correspondingly rigorous interrogation of the 
sources of law, underpinned with substantial methodological literature. We moreover see in 
al-Mufīd organisational innovations in the Imāmīya, moving towards an institutionalised 
Imāmī school of law after the model of those emerging among the Sunnīs.79 
What is less clear is how al-Mufīd’s apparent importance should affect our view of earlier 
scholars. In identifying al-Mufīd as a point of departure, there is an unfortunate temptation to 
consequently see earlier authors as primitive, their less-successful endeavours serving only to 
point towards al-Mufīd’s subsequent triumph. Many studies take al-Mufīd as their starting 
point, emphasising the image as his predecessors as just that: primarily serving to prefigure 
and anticipate al-Mufīd, and thus worthy of study only as marginalia.80 This is exacerbated 
further by the nature of the literary record, with the lack of systematic theology or 
jurisprudence in earlier authors’ extant works leading some scholars to despair of extracting 
workable understandings of their thought.  
A change that has occurred in the last thirty years has been an increased interest in the earlier 
history of Imāmī Shīʿism. This has been occasioned to a great extent by a newly available set 
of texts that greatly increase our capacity to study the Imāmīya from first-hand sources even 
back into the ninth century. Though works are still published that cite al-Kulaynī as the 
beginning of Imāmī ḥadīth scholarship, a growing body of scholarship is applying fruitful 
analysis to such earlier scholars as al-Barqī and al-Ṣaffār, with the result that we now have a 
detailed and growing understanding of Imāmī intellectual life up to a century before al-Mufīd. 
Himself a predecessor of al-Mufīd himself, this would appear to be good news for the study 
of al-Ṣadūq. In practice, however, this new interest in the earlier Imāmīya has tended to create 
a second centre of gravity centred around the beginning of the tenth century, leaving al-Ṣadūq 
just as much on the periphery as does the focus on al-Mufīd at the beginning of the eleventh 
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century. Newman’s ‘The Formative Period of Twelver Shīʿism,’ ends its eponymous 
formative period with al-Kulaynī.81 Greatly influential, meanwhile, is Amir Moezzi’s 
hypothesis of an original, nonrational, esoteric and initiatic Shīʿism, one that he ambitiously 
traces to the imāms themselves. Amir Moezzi points to the extravagant cosmological and 
imamological elements of the works of al-Ṣaffār and al-Barqī in particular, ideas such as 
precreation, metemphotosis and the super-existence of the imām, ideas in which al-Mufīd and 
his successors take a pronounced disinterest and, indeed, tend to regard as ‘exaggeration’ 
(ghuluww).82 Vilozny’s research takes a more concentrated approach to the same 
phenomenon, attempting to reconstruct the cosmology, indeed the mythology of these early 
Imāmīs.83 The focus thus remains decisively before al-Ṣadūq. While Amir-Moezzi names al-
Mufīd as the point where this distinct, earlier form of Imāmism was extinguished, in practice 
the last author in whose work he decisively identifies its presence in al-Kulaynī.84 Bar Asher, 
meanwhile, in his study of exegetical literature from the same period, identifies a distinctive 
‘pre-Buwayhid’ school of exegesis peculiar to this early period, the last representative of 
which is al-Kulaynī’s student al-Nuʿmānī (d. 345/956).85 
Al-Ṣadūq is thus placed in an ambiguous barzakh between a pre-Buwayhid ‘non-rationalism’ 
that ends with al-Kulaynī and the Buwayhid rationalism inaugurated by al-Mufīd. It is little 
surprise, therefore, that he is described with consistently mixed terminology. What is more 
surprising is that his position between these two apparently disparate intellectual moments in 
Imāmī thought does not merit more attention. The increased attention given to the 
distinctiveness of Imāmī thought at the beginning of the tenth century only heightens the 
dramatic shift that must take place during its course to arrive at al-Mufīd a few decades later, 




There have recently emerged a number of studies which do reconsider the transformative role 
of al-Mufīd. A pioneering work in this regard and one of the most extensive to date is Sander’s 
‘Charisma und Ratio.’ Sander here contends against the (at the time near-unanimous) 
                                                            
81 Newman, Formative Period. 
82 Amir-Moezzi, Divine Guide, passim. 
83 Vilozny (2007). 
84 See Amir-Moezzi & Ansari, pp. 124-160. 
85 Bar-Asher. 
86 Marcinowski points to al-Ṣadūq as a transitional figure between these changes in circumstance, but 
does not much delve into how this is reflected in his writings.  
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scholarly grain that al-Mufīd in fact has a great deal in common with earlier Imāmī 
theologians. This affirmation of continuation with the earlier tenth century holds promise for 
a more exacting verdict on the position and role of al-Ṣadūq, however, as we shall see, 
Sander’s study in fact produces the exact opposite, his interrogation of the place of al-Mufīd 
seeming strangely to emphasise the uncertain place of al-Ṣadūq and deemphasise his 
significance. 
Sander’s study takes the form of a survey of Imāmī theology from the late ninth to the early 
eleventh centuries, examining the works of al-Barqī, al-Kulaynī, al-Ṣadūq and al-Mufīd to 
show principally that there is considerable continuity between these four figures. In so doing 
he challenges the generally held position that al-Mufīd’s work constitutes a transformative 
shift towards the positions of the Muʿtazila, affirming that his theology overlaps far more 
closely with his Imāmī predecessors, and indeed that he has no more in common with his 
Muʿtazilī contemporaries than he has with their traditionist Sunnī opponents.87 
Sander articulates his hypothesis principally in opposition to Madelung’s early work on 
Imāmī-Muʿtazilī relations.88 As such his conclusions rest not least on a methodological 
challenge to the latter. Madelung declares that the ḥadīth compendia of al-Kulaynī cannot be 
used as workable sources for the theological thought of the author and thus of Imāmīs in the 
earlier tenth century, due to their nature as compilations of disparate, transmitted akhbār rather 
than systematic theological discourse.89 Sander denies this, contending that though the 
compilations’ format is a hindrance they can nonetheless give voice to the doctrines held by 
the compiler. Not only is al-Kulaynī unlikely to include material that he considers heretical, 
but many ḥadīth themselves contain developed theological argument (as is to be expected in 
a corpus originating in the eighth and ninth centuries), giving a picture of al-Kulaynī and al-
Barqī’s doctrines that is perfectly adequate to support Sander’s assertions of continuity with 
al-Mufīd.90 His conclusion about theological continuity thus rests upon contentions about the 
nature and legibility of ḥadīth compendia as theological texts, an assertion of great value to 
the study of a figure like al-Ṣadūq whose works are overwhelmingly dominated by such 
compendia.  
When it comes to al-Ṣadūq, however, Sander provides surprisingly few answers. We are 
informed that this will be the case as Sander opens his chapter on al-Ṣadūq with the disclaimer 
that al-Ṣadūq will not be treated with the same degree of detail as al-Barqī, al-Kulaynī or al-
                                                            
87 Sander. 
88 Madelung, ‘Imāmism’. The views expressed in this article, to which Sander was reacting, have more 
recently been partially updated. See below.  
89 Ibid., p. 29. 
90 Sander, pp. 18, 123-128. 
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Mufīd, meriting comment only as and when he constitutes a significant departure from his 
predecessors and successor.91 He does not justify this at length, however the reason seems 
clear for the work’s objectives: if Sander has identified common ground between al-Kulaynī 
and al-Mufīd, he only needs to note that al-Ṣadūq does not constitute any disruption of this 
continuity. But Sander leaves significant ambiguities which overstep this practicality. 
Foremost among these is a conspicuous taxonomical uncertainty: Al-Kulaynī and al-Barqī 
share a chapter, into which they are grouped as ‘the traditionists,’ whereas al-Ṣadūq, allotted 
a separate chapter, is implicitly rendered outside this category, but without indication of what 
he is instead. This, it should be recalled, stands alongside the fact that the compilation of 
traditions makes up the overwhelming majority of al-Ṣadūq’s oeuvre, accompanied by his 
numerous statements declaring the absolute epistemological sovereignty of traditions over 
reason,92 and indeed al-Mufīd’s denunciation of him as excessively reliant on traditions.93 
Nonetheless, Sander’s discussions consistently address al-Mufīd, al-Ṣadūq and ‘the 
traditionists’ as separate categories. If al-Ṣadūq is not a traditionist in the same way as al-Barqī 
and al-Kulaynī, what is he? On the whole, Sander seems to concur with Madelung et al. that 
al-Ṣadūq is to be located in a kind of intermediate space between ‘true’ traditionism and 
attempted rapprochement with rationalist currents.94 Though his conclusion indicates that al-
Ṣadūq’s theology does not differ significantly either from al-Mufīd or from al-Barqī, despite 
the many changes in circumstance that divide them, he conversely suggests, too, that al-Ṣadūq 
belongs outside Buwayhid Imāmism proper. He points to the doctrines of al-Kulaynī, al-Ṣadūq 
and al-Barqī concerning the nature of God’s will as reflective of an Imāmī minority complex 
in their difficult circumstances, driving them to shape elaborate theologies to explain their 
community’s diminutive and disenfranchised status. Pointing to al-Mufīd as the point where 
this changes and identifying Buwayhid tolerance as facilitating that change, he thus places al-
Ṣadūq solidly in the pre-Buwayhid intellectual world at least as far as his theology is 
concerned.95 
Sander’s conclusions96 are of great interest and are supported by a valuable survey of the 
theological contents of al-Barqī and al-Kulaynī. However, the liminal position that he 
nonetheless ascribes to al-Ṣadūq is symptomatic of the fact that he leaves certain pivotal 
developments of the period unexplored. Firstly, Sander does not discuss the many areas, 
highlighted by Amir-Moezzi, Vilozny and Bar-Asher, in which profound changes in belief do 
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occur between al-Barqī and al-Mufīd. While continuity can be observed in questions regarding 
God’s attributes and his justice, great swathes of material from al-Barqī and his 
contemporaries regarding the extraordinary powers of the imām and his cosmic connection 
with the Shīʿa find no echo in al-Mufīd, the latter having decisively rejected these aspects of 
the theology of the earlier Imāmīya.97 Sander defends his selection of topics for comparison 
by asserting the centrality of the relationship between man and God to any theology,98 but 
while this may be true of Muslim theology in general it neglects the fact that it is precisely in 
humanity’s relationship with the imām that Imāmī theology distinguishes itself from other 
groups, and that to neglect this most definitive of subjects can only harm his study’s capacity 
to be representative of the corpus it discusses. 
Secondly, in Sander’s valuable assertion that the early ḥadīth compendia are valuable sources 
of theological doctrine, thus facilitating the comparison with al-Mufīd’s dialectic texts, he 
shifts his analysis away from the fact that however similar their doctrines may be, al-Barqī 
and al-Mufīd differ profoundly in how those doctrines are expressed. Al-Barqī leaves us only 
aḥādīth without authorial comment on their content or their provenance, whereas al-Mufīd 
delivers densely argued positions supported both by rational tools and by aḥādīth the sources 
of which are expressly scrutinised. Sander does not challenge that such a shift takes place, 
only implying in his conclusions that this change had little effect on some of the Imāmīya’s 
central theological beliefs.99 His focus thus remains squarely on doctrines without 
interrogating the methodologies whereby those doctrines were arrived at. The demonstration 
that these methodological changes took place while leaving some doctrines unaffected is a 
valuable one, but in omitting questions methodology and indeed of epistemology, combined 
with the doctrinal discontinuities that it leaves unaddressed, Sander’s study does little to alter 
the picture of al-Mufīd as a radical departure from earlier Imāmism, leaving al-Ṣadūq’s 
marginalisation between the two unaltered.  
Sander’s choice to focus on theology has, meanwhile, been emulated by subsequent scholarly 
challenges to the model of al-Mufīd as a point of radical transition. Madelung has in more 
recent work revisited the question of Imāmī theology before al-Mufīd, and concluded that it 
has a great deal in common with the Muʿtazila, echoing Sander’s view that al-Mufīd’s role 
was not a transformative one.100 The conclusion is, of course, an ironic one given the starting 
point of Sander’s hypothesis as being in opposition to Madelung’s earlier article, and indeed 
                                                            
97 See Amir-Moezzi, Divine Guide; Bar-Asher, Vilozny, ‘Life Cycle’. 
98 Sander, pp. 3-4, 25-27. 
99 Indeed, Sander does not much interrogate perhaps the most interesting question arising from his 
study, namely how it comes to be that the Imāmī ḥadīth corpus such as is in the hands of al-Barqī and 
al-Kulaynī is so forthcoming with doctrinal positions amenable to Muʿtazilī positions.   
100 Madelung, ‘Early Imāmī Theology’, p. 468. 
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there are number of points on which Madelung’s more recent writing on early Imāmī theology 
relates to the former conclusions with which Sander was contending. Chief among these is the 
nature of al-Kāfī as a viable source of al-Kulaynī’s views. Madelung’s article is thoroughly 
focussed on al-Kāfī, but as a source for the views of the imāms themselves in the second/eighth 
century, to whom al-Kulaynī’s aḥādīth are attributed, and their followers at that time, rather 
than of the scholar who compiled these aḥādīth almost two hundred years later. Though he 
does not address the question of the authenticity of al-Kulaynī’s material, Madelung makes it 
clear that he considers it a reliable testament to the views of the imāms themselves. 
Significantly, the point where he acknowledges that the views he is discussing are those of 
‘the Imams as presented by al-Kulaynī’ is his rejection of Amir-Moezzi’s view that the 
‘intellect’ (ʿaql) referred to in al-Kulaynī’s text refers to a superhuman ‘hiero-intelligence,’ 
and thus Amir-Moezzi’s blurring of the common distinction between ‘extremist’ and 
‘moderate’ Imāmīs, the relationship between al-Kulaynī and slightly earlier Imāmī works like 
those of al-Ṣaffār which unquestionably contain extremist elements.101 The article’s very 
plausible assertion that the imāms espoused some Muʿtazilī beliefs102 therefore circumvents 
the question of how and to what extent this was reflected in the views of subsequent 
generations of Imāmīs, who were functioning at an ever-increasing distance from the direct 
authority of the imām, and indeed how this effected their practical relationship with the 
Muʿtazilīs themselves. Madelung attributes to the imāms as encountered in al-Kulaynī’s 
aḥādīth an ‘unprecedented assertion of the primacy of reason over prophetic revelation in 
religion,’ a position violently contradicted by both al-Ṣadūq and al-Kulaynī.103 
It is Modarressi’s contention that the later Imāmīya were compelled to adopt views that the 
imāms themselves rejected for the sake of cohesion amongst the group, most significantly the 
very same views on the superhuman nature of the imāms that Madelung denies are present in 
al-Kāfī (saying nothing of al-Ṣaffār, al-Barqī or, indeed al-Ṣadūq).104 If this is so (and it has 
never been seriously challenged) then the suggestion that the imāms themselves subscribed to 
some Muʿtazilī views does not equate to simple continuity between them and al-Mufīd. The 
question becomes that of how the imāms’ views were processed and transmitted by later 
Imāmī scholars, a question that has received extremely little discussion in scholarship on the 
early Imāmīya and one that is central to that with which we began this chapter: what is the 
scholars’ approach to ḥadīth?105 
                                                            
101 Madelung, ‘Early Imāmī Theology’, p. 467. 
102 Ibid., p. 468. The view has since been upheld by Schmidtke & Ansari. 
103 Ibid., pp. 466. 
104 Modarressi, Crisis, pp. 19-48. 
105 It is Melchert’s valuable contention that the most useful taxonomy with which to study the 




UṢŪL AL-FIQH – Reason and Tradition 
 
The great majority of the studies cited above have been concerned with theology rather than 
law, and as such have not been much addressed to questions of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). It 
is in jurisprudential literature, conversely, that questions of scholars’ approach to ḥadīth are 
usually discussed, and this theological focus of scholarship of fourth/tenth-century Imāmī 
thought has correspondingly remained distant from such questions. Indeed, more studies have, 
like Madelung, pronounced on the capacity of the modern scholar to determine the authenticity 
or otherwise of the aḥādīth in these compendia than on what the compilers themselves made 
of this task.106 
A notable exception to this tendency to prioritise the theological over the jurisprudential is 
Stewart’s ‘Islamic Legal Orthodoxy.’ Though this work undertakes to examine the Shīʿī 
tradition over a much longer timeframe than concerns us here, still its analysis of the earlier 
period is invaluable. Stewart frames his study into an enquiry across a millennium of Imāmī 
legal tradition into how Imāmī Shīʿism has responded to what Stewart identifies as the 
majoritarian monopoly on orthodoxy, mobilised primarily through the concept of consensus 
(ijmāʿ) wielded by the Sunnī schools of law from the fourth/tenth century onwards.107 Imāmīs, 
Stewart suggests, have historically had three options available to them in responding to this 
attempted imposition and exclusion by the Sunnī majority: conformance to consensus, 
adoption of consensus or rejection or consensus.108 What is significant to us is how he uses 
this schema to interpret the Imāmī community of the tenth century. Stewart points to the 
formation of institutionalised Sunnī schools of law at this time as institutional entities that 
functioned systematically to train professional scholars,109 and with them the development of 
the doctrine of consensus as a means of claiming orthodoxy (those who broke with consensus 
being condemned as heretics and even as apostates) as the central challenge to which the 
Imāmīs had to respond. As noted above, he identifies their most successful response as the 
                                                            
key methodological axis of traditionism and rationalism; it is in scholars’ comparative attitudes to texts, 
not the theological doctrines they happen to arrive at from those texts, that give us the more substantial 
picture of their intellectual character. See Melchert, ‘Imāmīs’, p. 273. 
106 For a significant of examination of the utility of the asānīd found in Shīʿī compendia to shed light 
on earlier centuries see Haider, Origins, pp. 24-53. 
107 See above. 
108 Stewart, Orthodoxy, pp. 52-59. 
109 Ibid., p. 26.  
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formation in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries of an Imāmī school of law after the 
same institutional model under al-Mufīd, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and al-Ṭūsī.110  
The utility of this observation is its drawing attention to the key ambiguities and anomalies of 
the position of al-Ṣadūq and his fellow scholars in the earlier fourth/tenth century. If, in 
contradistinction to the Sunnīs, they were not operating as a school of law in the full, 
institutional sense, what were the methodological and ideological foundations of their 
scholarly activities? Stewart points to uṣūl al-fiqh and specifically to the production of 
manuals of uṣūl al-fiqh as key to the functioning of such schools. Did the Imāmīs before al-
Mufīd have such manuals and, if so, what did they contain and to what extent was their content 
and, indeed, their necessity agreed upon? In identifying al-Mufīd as a point of departure, the 
first chief jurist of the Imāmīya,111 Stewart contends in opposition to the theological picture 
discussed above that the scholars before al-Mufīd were doing something appreciably different 
to what we see in al-Mufīd’s work. Moreover, Stewart has stated in a more recent work that 
by the early tenth century every group needed a manual of uṣūl al-fiqh.112 The tenacious 
ambiguity surrounding the question of whether or not the Imāmīya fit this pattern underscores 
how different this group was from other legal traditions at the time of al-Ṣadūq. 
Though it asks invaluable questions, Stewart’s study does not dwell long on the nature of 
Imāmī jurisprudence in the earlier tenth century.113 In attempting to identify a tradition of 
jurisprudence prior to al-Mufīd, Stewart focuses on two figures, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. al-
Junayd al-Iskāfī (d. c. 360/970) and ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Masʿūdī (d. 346/957).114 While both 
authors are recorded as having authored works on jurisprudence, they are of limited use for 
supplying a general understanding of earlier Imāmī thought on the subject, let alone of 
conceiving of the roots of any kind of school. This is due to the fact that later Imāmī tradition, 
starting immediately with al-Iskāfī’s student al-Mufīd, accords them only minimal influence 
amongst their fellow Imāmīs. Al-Iskāfī is singled out by al-Mufīd and the first bibliographers 
in the early fifth/eleventh century as having sanctioned the deviant practice of analogy, for 
which he was ostracised by most Imāmī scholars.115 Al-Masʿūdī, meanwhile, though 
acknowledged by the Imāmīya as one of their own, appears to be viewed from a distance by 
the subsequent tradition. No sources name any students of his, let alone students who 
                                                            
110 Stewart, Orthodoxy, pp. 111-133. 
111 This is supported by al-Ṭūsī who says of al-Mufīd that he held headship (riʾāsa) of the Imāmīya, a 
title he does not mention in connection with any earlier scholar. See al-Ṭūsī, Fihrist, p. 157. The same 
position, moreover, is accorded him by Ibn al-Nadīm (Fihrist, p. 279). 
112 Stewart, ‘Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī’, pp. 347-348. 
113 Stewart (1998), pp. 137-143, 163-165. 
114 Stewart’s identification of al-Masʿūdī as an Imāmī follows increasing consensus on this point. See 
primarily Khalidi, Islamic Historiography, pp. 136-142.  
115 Al-Ṭūsī, Fihrist, p. 134; al-Najāshī, Rilaj, p. 371; al-Mufīd, al-Masāʾil al-ṣāghānīya, p. 18. 
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continued his teaching in jurisprudence, while al-Najāshī notes only that the noted scholar 
Abū al-Mufaḍḍal al-Shaybānī ‘claimed to have met him,’116 seemingly setting him at a 
distance from the familiar scholarly context of Imāmī scholarship in Iraq and Iran. It is also 
the case that none of the most influential scholars of the generations before al-Mufīd, among 
them al-Mufīd’s most cited teacher in law Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad ibn Qūlawayh (d. 367/998), 
al-Ṣadūq himself, al-Ṣadūq’s principle teachers, his father ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn b. Mūsā b. 
Bābawayh (‘Ibn Bābawayh the Elder’) (d. 329/941) and Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad b. 
al-Walīd (d. 343/954-5) and al-Kulaynī (who taught ibn Qūlawayh), are recorded as having 
written any works on jurisprudence. This suggests that if not jurisprudence itself then certainly 
the writing of manuals thereof was a decidedly fringe activity amongst the Imāmīya for several 
decades after it became an essential element of the Sunnī schools of law. 
Lest we hasten from the above to a hazardously simplistic view of the Imāmīya at this time, 
we should emphasise that, with or without manuals of jurisprudence, there is clear evidence 
that methodological disputes were an established presence in Imāmī legal activity in this 
period. We should recall that al-Iskāfī was denounced for his sanctioning of analogy, and this 
is symptomatic of a pervasive discourse of such debates. A foundational work for 
understanding the early methodological concerns of the Imāmīya in the fourth/tenth century 
is Hossein Modarressi’s ‘Introduction to Shīʿī Law.’ By drawing heavily on Shīʿī 
bibliographical literature, Modarressi provides a schema of the different groups117 within the 
Imāmīya and their relations to one another that is far more expansive than other studies of the 
period. Modarressi identifies three distinct strands of Imāmī thought in the generations before 
al-Mufīd: the rationalists, the traditionalists, and those who were between the two. Sure 
enough, he states that the rationalists were represented primarily by al-Iskāfī and Hasan b. ʿ Alī 
b. Abī ʿ Aqīl (d. mid fourth/centh century). Much later these two acquired the epithet ‘The Two 
Ancients’ (al-qadīmān) signifying their status as the earliest scholars to engage in the science 
of jurisprudence. Modarressi names al-Kulaynī and al-Ṣadūq as well as al-Ṣadūq’s teacher 
Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad b. al-Walīd as prominent representatives of the 
traditionists, while he identifies al-Ṣadūq’s father alongside ibn Qūlawayh as belonging to the 
intermediates.118 The chief limitation of Modarressi’s work remains its brevity, constituting as 
it does only part of an introductory chapter in a survey of the entire Imāmī legal tradition. As 
such he only discusses the bases on which these groups were divided in the most general of 
                                                            
116 Al-Najāshī, Rijāl, pp. 243-244. 
117 Modarressi uses the term ‘school’ for these groups and earlier ones, a usage of which Stewart is 
critical on the grounds that it should be reserved for the truly institutionalised bodies discussed above. 
We will here be following Stewart’s usage of the term, which follows that established by Melchert, 
Makdisi et al. See Stewart, Orthodoxy, p. 26, Melchert, Formation, Makdisi.  
118 Modarressi, Introduction, pp. 32-39. 
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terms, focussing on the extent to which principles of law and of jurisprudence were 
permissible to derive from the texts of the aḥādīth themselves.119 Modarressi’s schema, 
meanwhile, does not much touch on the institutional and comparative questions opened up 
later by Stewart. Nonetheless, it is a crucial starting point for mapping the intellectual 
landscape of the early Imāmīya regarding these methodological questions, and we shall have 
cause to return to his taxonomy when we analyse the primary sources in what follows.  
A third useful model is supplied by Gleave, one which again achieves substantial 
differentiation of scholars according to their attitudes to text and reason. Comparing a set of 
ḥadīth compendia from al-Kulaynī to al-Ṭūsī,120 Gleave points out a clear trajectory of 
development between the compilers, with each compiler more willing to supplement aḥādīth 
with his own views, summaries and commentary than those of previous generations. Thus al-
Kulaynī gives almost no material beyond (albeit meticulously ordered) aḥādīth, al-Ṣadūq 
gives aḥādīth alongside his own regular summaries and asides, while with al-Mufīd and al-
Ṭūsī (al-Ṭūsī’s Tahdhīb al-aḥkām supplying commentary on and expansion of al-Mufīd’s al-
Muqniʿ) giving full discussion of technical problems, conflicting reports and so on. He thus 
points to a clear, steady increase in the role of reason between al-Kulaynī and al-Mufīd. 121  
While we must avoid drawing the conclusion that this was a trajectory followed by all (it is 
clear that some earlier scholars like ibn Abī ʿAqīl were of a more rationalist persuasion than 
al-Ṣadūq, who flourished a little later), it certainly demonstrates that there is more than simple 
continuity at work between Buwayhid Imāmī scholarship and what came before, and that the 
comparative roles of ḥadīth and reason were an important part of the changes and 
developments that took place.  
It is primarily in jurisprudence, then, not in theology, that we see the tenacious unanswered 
questions about the Imāmīya in al-Ṣadūq’s era and the significance of those questions. A better 
understanding of the Imāmī approach to ḥadīth criticism in the decades before al-Mufīd would 
offer valuable insights into the clearly unusual nature of this group in the transformative 
century after the death of al-ʿAskarī, and indeed into the early history of uṣūl al-fiqh as a 
whole.122 Al-Ṣadūq represents an invaluable resource for such an enquiry for two reasons. 
First is the unparalleled volume of literature that he leaves us, far greater than any other Imāmī 
scholar prior to al-Mufīd. The second reason is al-Ṣadūq’s dates. Only a generation older than 
                                                            
119 As we shall see, the imāms’ aḥādīth potentially have a great deal to say on methodological matters. 
120 Gleave restricts his study to only the four canonical books of Imāmī ḥadīth (as they eventually were 
designated). Nonetheless, since al-Kāfī and al-Faqīh in particular are the only two substantial Imāmī 
legal works to survive from before al-Mufīd (particularly given that the two others, al-Muqniʿ and al-
Hidāya, were also written by al-Ṣadūq and differ little from al-Faqīh except for their smaller scale), it 
is a valuably illustrative sample. 
121 Gleave, pp. 381-382.  
122 Stewart, Disagreements, p. xxviii. 
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al-Mufīd, it is in al-Ṣadūq that we see this pre-jurisprudential, pre-institutional edifice (if not 
school) of Imāmī law at its most advanced and thus at its most anomalous. Standing alongside 
contemporary Sunnī scholars who wrote volumes on jurisprudence,123 al-Ṣadūq represents this 
discrepancy between the extant Sunnī and Imāmī literary records at its most striking, and also 
perhaps its most challenging. As we now turn to his works to examine what we can see of his 
ḥadīth methodology we must remain mindful of this unusual setting, and how it may relate to 
the thoroughly unusual set of upheavals that shook his community over the course of the 
century.  
 
TRADITIONISM – al-Ṣadūq on Jurisprudence  
 
In the second half of this chapter we will examine al-Ṣadūq’s writings to see what can be 
learned regarding his approach to ḥadīth. This is not a straightforward task. As discussed, the 
first extant Imāmī treatise on jurisprudence comes from al-Mufīd, and there neither survives 
any such treatise from al-Ṣadūq nor any indication that he wrote one. Such comparatively 
meagre extant oeuvres as survive from his Imāmī contemporaries, meanwhile, are no more 
forthcoming.  
This difficulty is not insurmountable, however, for what we lack in extended confessions of 
methodology we may try to make up for with such scattered clues as can be gleaned from 
comments and asides in al-Ṣadūq’s own work and that of his fellows, combined with cautious 
reference to the earliest bibliographical sources, some of which coming only a few decades 
after al-Ṣadūq’s death.  
As we began the above survey with modern scholarship’s unease with al-Ṣadūq, let us begin 
this one with that if his contemporaries, foremost among them his student al-Mufīd. Such was 
al-Mufīd’s discontent with al-Ṣadūq’s views that he authored a ‘correction’ of al-Ṣadūq’s 
creed (al-Iʿtiqādāt), entitled Taṣḥīḥ al-iʿtiqād bi-ṣawāb al-intiqād; ‘Correcting Belief with 
Appropriate Criticism.’ Though both al-Iʿtiqādāt’s contents and al-Mufīd’s criticisms thereof 
are predominantly theological in nature, during the course of these criticisms al-Mufīd 
frequently expresses his views of al-Ṣadūq’s approach to text, views that are rarely 
complimentary. The recurring sentiment of Taṣḥīḥ on this subject is that al-Ṣadūq relies on 
weak aḥādīth with inadequate asānīd, which he then interprets in an unsophisticated manner, 
                                                            
123 In terms of extant works, examples include the Ḥanafī Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s (d. 370/985) al-
Fuṣūl fī al-uṣūl, or the lengthy treatment of jurisprudence (al-Sharʿīyat) in the Muʿtazilī ʿAbd al-Jabbār 
b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī’s (d. 415/1024) al-Mughnī. 
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complaints that al-Mufīd usually follows with what he states are more reliable aḥādīth on 
which he reasons an amended doctrine.124 It is a criticism that found echoes ever since up to 
modern scholarly characterisations of al-Ṣadūq as traditionist, even primitive in his approach 
to aḥādīth.125 
Al-Mufīd’s critique notwithstanding, it is clear from al-Ṣadūq’s works and other sources that 
he was far from ignorant of the methods of ḥadīth-criticism. The early bibliographical 
evidence is quite unanimous on this point. Both al-Najāshī and al-Ṭūsī provide a detailed 
record of al-Ṣadūq’s extensive oeuvre on the subject of rijāl: as well as a commentary on an 
earlier work of rijāl by al-Barqī, al-Ṣadūq is attributed a set of fifteen works concerning 
respectively the men and women who have narrated material from Muḥammad, those who 
have narrated from each of first eleven imāms, those who have narrated from Fatima and those 
who received letters from the twelfth imām.126 Moreover, while nearly all of his recorded 
works are enumerated by the bibliographers haphazardly and with purely descriptive titles 
(‘The Book of Marriage;’ ‘The Book of Pilgrimage’ etc.), these books of rijāl are listed as a 
group and referred to by the distinguishing title of ‘The Lanterns’ (sg. miṣbāḥ) suggesting that 
they held a particular status as notable works. We must allow al-Mufīd his criticisms, but they 
cannot compel us to deny the fact that al-Ṣadūq was evidently a respected author on the subject 
of asānīd and their contents. 
The bibliographers also serve to mollify al-Mufīd’s complaints by according al-Ṣadūq 
unambiguous praise, even though they were his students. Both al-Najāshī and al-Ṭūsī give 
descriptions of the standing and reliability of the authors they discuss, especially those more 
famous or more prolific, including any notable failings. It is therefore noteworthy that their 
comments on al-Ṣadūq are entirely, indeed emphatically positive. Both laud him with such 
honourifics as ‘our master (shaykhunā),’ ‘our scholar (faqīhunā),’ ‘illustrious (jalīl)’ and so 
forth, while al-Ṭūsī praises his memory and critical eye for aḥādīth and akhbār and his 
perspicuity in matters of rijāl.127 It should be noted that both authors are quite capable of 
praising an eminent scholar while including caveats. Al-Ṭūsī, for example, praises al-Iskāfī as 
good (ḥasan) author, but openly laments that he subscribed to analogy (qiyās).128 Al-Najāshī 
similarly heaps praise on the prolific and respected scholar Muḥammad b. Masʿūd al-ʿAyyāshī 
(d. c. 280/900) but notes that he transmits a great deal from weak narrators.129 That al-Ṣadūq 
                                                            
124 E.g. al-Mufīd, Taṣḥīḥ, pp. 27, 30, 32, 34, 39. 
125 See above.  
126 Al-Najāshī, Rijāl, pp. 373-375. 
127 Al-Ṭūsī, Fihrist, p. 157, al-Najāshī, Rijāl, p. 372. 
128 Al-Ṭūsī, Fihrist, p. 134. 
129 Al-Najāshī, Rijāl, p. 335. 
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is spared such criticism speaks alongside their eulogies of him to place al-Mufīd’s criticism 
of his teacher’s narrations in valuable context. 
It is already apparent that a view of al-Ṣadūq off as a naïve, indiscriminate transmitter is quite 
untenable. We must regret that none of his rijāl works survive to be analysed, but his extant 
compendia do offer glimmers of the expertise that al-Ṭūsī describes. Rare though they are, 
there are instances in al-Ṣadūq’s writing where he gives pronouncements on the isnād of a 
ḥadīth. In Kamāl al-dīn he notes that the narrator of a ḥadīth, Aḥmad b. Hilāl, is condemned 
(majrūḥ) by his teachers and that using his narrations is forbidden.130 In ʿUyūn he explains of 
one ḥadīth that although his revered teacher Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad b. al-Walīd 
distrusted its narrator, he nonetheless recorded this ḥadīth in one of his works which al-Ṣadūq 
read with him, and he gave no sanction against it.131 In Maʿānī, meanwhile, al-Ṣadūq takes the 
trouble to point out of a particular hadith that although he has only heard it from one source 
and it is not corroborated by Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad b. al-Walīd, he deems it 
authentic nonetheless, given its support from other reliable material.132 We also see him 
discuss concepts related to the analysis of aḥādīth. Kamāl al-dīn includes lengthy discussion 
of tawātur; the property of a ḥadīth of having too many avenues of transmission to be faked.133 
In his al-Iʿtiqādāt, meanwhile, he briefly mentions the technical designations of aḥādīth as 
giving general (mujmal) or specific injunctions (mufassar).134 Not only are such references 
witnesses to a clear knowledge of jurisprudential concerns and vocabulary, they also seem to 
go beyond what Modarressi prescribes as al-Ṣadūq’s standpoint on such matters in his capacity 
as a traditionist. The traditionists, Modarressi states, were only willing to use such 
jurisprudential concepts as were explicitly outlined in texts of aḥādīth.135 In terms like mujmal 
and tawātur, however, al-Ṣadūq is using vocabulary that does not appear in the available 
corpus of Imāmī ḥadīth, and indeed he does not when invoking these terms cite any aḥādīth 
to justify their use.136  
It is evident that al-Ṣadūq was not only fully conversant in the discourse of ḥadīth-criticism 
but was accorded significant praise for his expertise in this subject by subsequent generations. 
We are tempted therefore to condemn al-Mufīd at this juncture as deeply unjust in his assault 
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132 Maʿānī, p. 272. 
133 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 31-157. 
134 Al-Iʿtiqādāt, p. 117. 
135 Modarressi, Introduction, pp. 32-33. 
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on his teacher. This may be premature, however. Alongside these clear indicators of al-
Ṣadūq’s expertise in this matter, there also appear in his works a number of features which 
place him at odds with the approach to ḥadīth and authenticity found in other Imāmī writings 
of the period. 
 
THE PROBLEM WITH AL-ṢADŪQ 
 
Al-Ṣadūq’s occasional comments and al-Mufīd’s select criticisms notwithstanding, the vast 
majority of al-Ṣadūq’s asānīd stand without any clear marker of what al-Ṣadūq or his 
contemporaries made of their reliability. Many of al-Ṣadūq’s narrators are simply unknown 
beyond the presence of their names in asānīd, and contemporary rijāl literature gives us only 
an extremely partial picture of how different narrators were viewed by the Imāmī scholarly 
community. There is no systematic comparative study of the asānīd of different Imāmī 
scholars of the fourth/tenth century, and such a study would certainly be a valuable avenue for 
future research. In the absence of such analysis, meanwhile, there remain a number of 
observations that can be made of al-Ṣadūq’s selection of tradents that can be made on the basis 
of the available evidence, many of which indicate a willingness to use material judged 
questionable by others. 137 
One of the early chapters of al-Ṣadūq’s al-Tawḥīd, ‘That [God] has Neither Body nor Form,’ 
is dominated by the figure of the prominent narrator and disciple of Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, Hishām 
b. al-Ḥakam.138 The chapter features a large group of ḥadīth in which the Imām is asked by a 
disciple about the teaching that God has a body, to which the Imām invariably responds that 
this is blackest heresy. As often as not, the imām’s disciple identifies the propagator of this 
seditious doctrine that the imām rejects as Hishām b. al-Ḥakam. So frequently do the aḥādīth 
blame Hishām for this heresy that when, later in the chapter, reports do appear which attribute 
the heresy only to ‘a group’ or ‘someone’ the reader is left in little doubt as to who that is. Not 
                                                            
137 Important work in this field has been done in Newman, Formative Period, and Haider, Origins, 
though neither study quite touches al-Ṣadūq, with Newman studying the asānīd of earlier collections 
(al-Kulaynī and his forbears) and Haider studying asānīd with a view to reconstructing events in the 
second/eighth century rather than the circumstances of later compilers. 
138 A controversial follower of Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, Hishām numbers among a handful of his disciples who 
engaged in theological debates, apparently with some success. This seems to have placed him on 
potentially thorny ground regarding his relationship to his master. Reports suggest that taking too much 
theological initiative earned the rebuke of al-Ṣādiq, and his record is further complicated by apparent 
animosity between him and Mūsā al-Kāẓim, whom he followed only after disappointment with his older 
brother ʿAbd Allāh. What is certain is that he was a prolific narrator, and this unsurprisingly results in 
a rather ambiguous status among later Imāmī scholars, who are faced both with accounts of his lauded 
service to the Imāms and his rich body of narrations from them, but also of reports of his censure at 
their hands. See al-Kashshī, Rijāl, pp. 329-348. 
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only is Hishām a teacher of falsehoods, but some aḥādīth make the more specific accusation 
that he attributes these teachings to the imāms.139 Clearly, these aḥādīth repeatedly tell the 
reader, ibn al-Ḥakam is not a source to be trusted. 
The reader is therefore liable to be surprised to encounter Hishām appearing, unremarked 
upon, as a frequent feature of al-Ṣadūq’s asānīd in the rest of the book, indeed in the very next 
chapter. Scarcely could there be a more iron-clad reason to distrust a narrator than being 
condemned by the imām as attributing false teachings to him, yet al-Ṣadūq seems unperturbed, 
an approach all the more striking in a work much of which is devoted to defending the integrity 
of the imāms’ aḥādīth.140 The case is an isolated one in al-Tawḥīd, and indeed the vast majority 
of its aḥādīth are purely theological injunctions which offer no comment on the imāms’ 
disciples. We may suppose that al-Ṣadūq includes the denunciations of Hishām for their 
valuable theological content (the imām’s disavowal of anthropomorphism), and hopes that the 
reader will take them as such without dwelling on their other contents. Conversely, it is hard 
to ignore the connotations which this concentrated group of traditions raises, especially given 
Hishām’s near-immediate subsequent appearance as an apparently trusted source, and hard to 
imagine that al-Ṣadūq would expect his readers to ignore it. 
The implications of these condemnations of Hishām are not confined to the pages of al-
Tawḥīd. Though al-Ṣadūq does not repeat them elsewhere, he has told us that such aḥādīth 
are in circulation and must therefore colour any ḥadīth from this narrator with potential 
suspicion.141 Al-Ṣadūq is clearly willing to discount such suspicion, as is attested to by 
Hishām’s consistent presence in the asānīd of his other compendia, including in al-Faqīh, a 
book not of aḥādīth to be consulted and pondered but of al-Ṣadūq’s rulings which he tells us 
in the introduction are his authoritative opinions supported by sources he considers 
trustworthy. 
The glaring contradiction of al-Tawḥīd’s juxtaposition is not the only one of its kind,142 but 
overall al-Ṣadūq’s works are largely silent on the reliability of their sources. Nonetheless, such 
criticism can meanwhile be found in the writing of one of his Imāmī contemporaries, in the 
invaluable resource that is Rijāl al-Kashshī. An exact contemporary of al-Ṣadūq, Muḥammad 
b. ʿUmar al-Kashshī (d. 385/995) leaves us the second extant Imāmī work on rijāl after that 
of al-Barqī. While al-Barqī’s earlier text survives only as list of names of the imāms’ 
                                                            
139 Al-Tawḥīd, pp. 104-112. 
140 See below, Chapter III.  
141 This is not to say that there are not other aḥādīth in which Hishām is praised by the imāms. See, for 
instance al-Tawḥīd, pp. 132-134. 
142 In al-Khiṣāl, for instance, one finds a good few aḥādīth narrated from Abū Hurayra, but also aḥādīth 
condemning Abū Hurayra as a falsifier of aḥādīth. See al-Khiṣāl, p. 218 (ḥ. 263). 
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companions, al-Kashshī’s text is a true book of rijāl as later scholars would understand it, not 
just naming narrators but giving detailed descriptive material concerning their integrity or 
otherwise. 
There is, unfortunately, a catch, one which renders al-Kashshī’s work as frustrating as it is 
useful. This is that the text which survives is not his complete original, rather an abridgement 
thereof made by Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī. As such, the text confronts us with a 
prodigious unknown in the form of all the material which al-Ṭūsī removed. This robs us of the 
ability to know for sure what al-Kashshī’s verdict was on any given figure. An apparently 
positive entry could have been stripped of negative reports and vice versa. More generally and 
more importantly, our capacity to reconstruct al-Kashshī’s overall approach to rijāl criticism, 
that is to say how he reached and gave expression to his verdicts on individual transmitters 
and their reliability is radically curtailed. Al-Ṭūsī’s abridgement consists only of narrated 
material, any words from al-Kashshī himself – if there was any – having been expunged. 
Nonetheless, while our ability to attain a clear view of al-Kashshī himself and his enterprise 
is thus stymied, the work can still be of great use in our evaluation of al-Ṣadūq. Al-Ṭūsī’s text 
is not a commentary but an abridgement, and we can thus remain confident that the material 
which it does contain, selected as it was by al-Kashshī, was in circulation amongst the 
Imāmīya in al-Ṣadūq’s time. This knowledge is illuminating because so little of what we see 
in al-Kashshī is to be found in al-Ṣadūq’s surviving works. While al-Ṣadūq’s surviving 
comments on narrators’ reliability are so scarce (a sizeable portion of the total having already 
been cited above!), al-Kashshī gives us such information on every page. We straightaway 
know, more confidently still than we did from our awareness of al-Ṣadūq’s lost rijāl works, 
that behind al-Ṣadūq’s predominant silence on the subject, his narrators are the foci of a dense 
literature of evaluation, and each asānīd he mutely supplies might have been deeply 
contentious to some of his contemporaries.  
We learn from al-Kashshī that Hishām b. al-Ḥakam was not the only one of al-Ṣadūq’s regular 
sources to be the subject of critical evaluations. Confining ourselves to al-Faqīh, the text in 
which al-Ṣadūq is most explicit in affirming the reliability of his sources, we find two regular 
narrators, Ḥarīz b. ʿAbd Allāh and Hishām b. Sālim, who, while accorded some praise in al-
Kashshī’s material, also have aspersions cast on their reliability.143 Another source is al-
Mufaḍḍal b. ʿUmar, who meets with stinging criticism in al-Kashshī’s narrations.144 A 
significant and useful control is meanwhile supplied in the fact that the most regularly cited 
sources in al-Faqīh, figures like Zurāra b. Aʿyan, Muḥammad b. Muslim al-Ṭāʾifī and Abū 
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Baṣīr, find consistent praise in al-Kashshī.145 From this we learn that the material we see in 
the latter clearly overlaps significantly with that informing al-Ṣadūq’s own views on matters 
of rijāl, reinforcing our confidence that al-Ṣadūq was well aware of the criticisms levelled at 
some of his other narrators. 
From al-Kashshī we learn that al-Ṣadūq, even at the points where he is most compelled to 
produce reliable proof-texts; in the defence of the imāms’ traditions in al-Tawḥīd, supporting 
his own edicts in al-Faqīh and affirming the existence and legitimacy of the twelfth imām in 
Kamāl al-dīn, draws on figures like Hishām b. al-Ḥakam, Hishām b. Sālim and al-Mufaḍḍal 
b. ʿUmar in evidence, figures who al-Kashshī shows us the Imāmī scholarly community had 
reason to distrust. We thus begin to see indicators of the methods to which al-Mufīd finds 
cause to object.  
Interrogating what other scholars made of al-Ṣadūq’s asānīd must remain for the moment an 
inexact science. Where we can speak with more confidence is how al-Ṣadūq himself presents 
the reliability or otherwise of his material, and how this may compare to his contemporaries. 
A voice to draw upon is another exact contemporary of al-Ṣadūq, ibn Qūlawayh. Ibn 
Qūlawayh is significantly linked to our discussion by a number of additional factors. His father 
and teacher was Muḥammad. b. Qūlawayh, who was also a teacher of al-Kashshī. Ibn 
Qūlawayh, meanwhile, was another teacher of al-Mufīd, indeed his principal teacher of law 
who enjoys far more regular citation in al-Mufīd’s works than al-Ṣadūq, whose appearances 
are rather exceptional. Ibn Qūlawayh thus constitutes a link between two figures both of whom 
harboured critical views of the contents of some of al-Ṣadūq’s asānīd.146  Regrettably for so 
significant a figure, ibn Qūlawayh leaves us only one extant work of his own, on the relatively 
innocuous subject of ziyāra. Yet this little-noticed manual of devotion supplies an extremely 
revealing text. In ibn Qūlawayh’s short introduction to his work we read as follows: 
I have not included herein any ḥadīth narrated from anomalous persons (al-
shadhdhādh min al-rijāl),147 narrated as their aḥādīth are from those who have been 
mentioned but who are not among those known for narration, famed for ḥadīth and 
knowledge.148 
These few lines are a first in the history of Imāmī jurisprudence. Nowhere else in the extant 
textual record prior to al-Mufīd, not in al-Barqī, al-Kulaynī or al-Ṣadūq, do we find a ḥadīth 
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146 In the case of al-Kashshī, of course, we only know that he narrated material to this affect.  
147 It is this very criticism of being from anomalous persons (shawwādh) that al-Mufīd levels against 
al-Ṣadūq’s proof-texts in Taṣḥīḥ (p. 39). 
148 Ibn Qūlawayh, Kāmil al-ziyārāt, p. 6. 
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collector who begins his compilation with so detailed a guarantee that the narrations therein 
are trustworthy, conveyed by reliable sources, sources indeed that are known to have been 
reliable, rather than anomalous names. What we do see in earlier collections are briefer, more 
general claims to the authenticity of the contents: al-Qummī (d. ) states in the introduction to 
his tafsīr that what follows is narrated ‘from our masters and those we trust (sg. thiqa);’149 al-
Kulaynī himself presents al-Kāfī as offering knowledge based on ‘sound traditions from the 
truthful ones and established sunan upon which one can act.’150  
In all three of these authors these opening assertions of reliability are to be found in their only 
extant works, none of the three leaving us more than a single book. Al-Ṣadūq, of course, leaves 
us a great many books, but in contrast to these other compilers we find amongst his eighteen 
extant compendia only a single instance of such an introductory promise to supply only 
authentic aḥādīth. Moreover, this is in al-Faqīh, and comes in the context of al-Ṣadūq 
justifying his omission of asānīd in this work, and, indeed, assuring the reader that the many 
rulings in al-Faqīh for which no proof-text is supplied are based on reliable material.151 All 
his other works, meanwhile, with their assembled aḥādīth and asānīd, are given no such 
guarantee. Moreover, as we have seen, he is sometimes content to narrate material that he 
himself has cast aspersions on, as well as asānīd with self-evident defects such as gaps or 
narrators who are not even named.152 Though by no means a regular occurrence, such features 
only enhance the contrast with ibn Qūlawayh’s eagerness to guarantee that his every isnād 
and narrator is sound.  
This contrast is particularly striking given al-Kulaynī’s and ibn Qūlawayh’s relationship to al-
Mufīd. As he criticises al-Ṣadūq’s choice of ḥadīth in Taṣḥīḥ, al-Mufīd cites al-Kulaynī’s al-
Kāfī as a preferable, reliable source, according the work some high praise.153 When al-Mufīd 
himself narrates from al-Kulaynī, meanwhile, as he does regularly, his source is ibn Qūlawayh. 
We may thus observe that these scholars whom al-Mufīd deems more reliable than al-Ṣadūq 
themselves vest more importance in asserting the authenticity of their own material.  
Just as al-Ṣadūq seems less anxious to assert the reliability of his compendia’s contents en 
masse, we may also observe an apparent reluctance to invoke questions of authenticity in 
polemical situations. We have seen how al-Mufīd, if confronted by a tradition narrated by al-
Ṣadūq with which he disagrees, dependably responds by declaring the tradition unreliable. 
Though al-Ṣadūq occasionally adopts a similar approach, as in the examples cited above, he 
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152 See also below.  
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far more regularly deals with troublesome material not by casting doubt on its source but rather 
by interpreting the text differently.154  
This evidence suggests a picture of the fourth/tenth-century Imāmī scholars as a community 
for whom variations in opinion regarding formal standards of authenticity stand alongside 
variations in the rhetorical import accorded to those standards. Though al-Ṣadūq commands 
evident, even celebrated technical knowledge in matters of ḥadīth-authentication, a picture 
thus begins to emerge of divisions within the Imāmī community regarding the value of such 
discourses of authenticity, with al-Ṣadūq appearing as a figure to whom they are of 
comparatively reduced import, distancing him from the intellectual genealogy to which al-




A more developed picture of al-Ṣadūq’s ambiguous attitude to the value of isnād-criticism is 
to be found in his al-Iʿtiqādāt, the final four chapters of which come as close as al-Ṣadūq ever 
does to discussions of jurisprudential methodology. This is, in itself, unusual for a creed, a 
work the first forty-one chapters of which have outlined core theological concerns for the lay 
believer: predestination, the unity of God, the fate of sinners and so forth. This suddenly 
changes at the book’s close, and after an unremarkable chapter on the sanctity of the Prophet’s 
descendants we encounter the following: 
The Chapter of Belief Regarding Akhbār Which Explain Specifics (mufassara) and 
Those Making General Pronouncements (mujmala): our belief concerning the ḥadīth 
which explains specifics is that it overrules that which makes general 
pronouncements. 
The Chapter of Belief Regarding Prohibition (ḥaẓr) and License (ibāḥa): our belief 
concerning this is that all things are permitted (muṭlaq) except those for which there 
exists a prohibition.155 
The very shortest in the book, these terse pronouncements are pure jurisprudence. Al-Mufīd 
adds an amendment to the second one (some things are known by the intellect to be wrong 
even in the absence of revealed prohibition) but leaves the first without criticism, clearly 
recognising and engaging the brief pronouncements as legal theory. To an extent they 
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constitute another of those glimpses of an unpreserved methodology found across al-Ṣadūq’s 
work, but they are all the more puzzling and frustrating that the others. This is firstly because 
they are even rarer for touching on an area of jurisprudence concerning not the authenticity of 
aḥādīth but the legal consequences of the linguistic technicalities of their text, constituting the 
only time we see al-Ṣadūq engaging these questions in such terms. Secondly there is the 
enigma of their presence in al-Iʿtiqādāt, for the discussion of such methodological matters in 
a creed is, as Fyzee notes, most irregular.156 The combination of their isolated subject matter 
and their extreme terseness makes a glaring contrast with the didactic, theological tone of the 
rest of the work. Wherefore does al-Ṣadūq seek to include unelaborated jurisprudential 
technicalities as a tenet of faith? 
These disembodied fragments of jurisprudence seem to form a prelude to the more involved 
though rather less conventional discussions of textual proofs in the following two chapters. 
The penultimate chapter discusses ‘Belief Concerning Available Reports About Medicine.’157 
In a fascinating insight into the life of the tenth-century Imāmī community, al-Ṣadūq here 
supplies a list of reasons why heeding aḥādīth containing medical advice may be inadvisable 
for one’s health, even though the imām himself is not at fault. The Imām, for example, may 
have known better than his patient what ailed him, and thus the prescribed cure may fit the 
real affliction, undisclosed to posterity, not that of which the imām’s interlocutor complains. 
Alternatively, the medical advice supplied may only be valid in Mecca where it was delivered, 
and thus should be treated with extreme caution by Imāmīs in far off Khurāsān. Thus far we 
see reasons why a perfectly authentic ḥadīth is nonetheless best treated with caution when it 
comes to medicine.  
Another eventuality, meanwhile, is that the ḥadīth may not be authentic: al-Ṣadūq lists the 
scenarios of an absent-minded narrator, a narrator who has memorized only part of the ḥadīth 
and deliberate falsifications spread by the Imāmīya’s enemies to discredit them as instances 
of this. Once again this discourages believers from taking the advice of these texts at face 
value, and again reassures them in doing so that the imām’s infallibility is left unscathed by 
this need for caution. 
This approach is thus far recognisably in keeping with that observed above. Though al-Ṣadūq 
evokes the reliability of texts as potential grounds for circumspection, he also supplies a set 
of reasons whereby a perfectly authentic ḥadīth may nonetheless be in need of particular 
interpretation to be understood correctly. Al-Ṣadūq is not content thus to warn his reader, 
however. He ends the chapter with the clear message that the true medicine of the imāms is to 
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be found in supplication and the verses of the Qurʾān, ending the chapter with the Prophet’s 
ḥadīth: ‘God does not cure whomsoever is not cured by “Praise be to God.”’ Pious expectation 
can only be superior to the haphazard application of honey and aubergines. Al-Ṣadūq supports 
this position most uncharacteristically by declaring it to be ‘in accordance with what traditions 
have come to us through strong asānīd and authentic channels.’ 
The concern here is evidently to shape the reader’s attitude to a particular sub-corpus of 
aḥādīth and in so doing to control their attitude to the corpus as a whole. Al-Ṣadūq subjects 
one problematic segment of the corpus to the whole, cautioning the reader against consulting 
hazardous, unreliable medical aḥādīth on the authority of the more reliable texts which 
counsel cure through recitation and prayer. The medical texts are a threat, discrediting the 
imāms’ reported speech through their questionable content (as al-Ṣadūq’s suggestion that they 
might be forged in a deliberate attempt to discredit the corpus clearly indicates). Al-Ṣadūq’s 
manoeuvres serve to neutralise this threat. Though this chapter shares with the previous two a 
concern with the application of aḥādīth, its tone decisively subjects such technical concerns 
to the didactic tone of the rest of the book. Al-Ṣadūq touches on the question of forged aḥādīth, 
but the overall goal of the chapter is not to equip readers to critique the ḥadīth corpus, but to 
maintain and encourage their reverence for it.  
The final chapter of al-Iʿtiqādāt bears the promising title ‘Belief Concerning Two Conflicting 
Aḥādīth.’ This, it seems will get to the heart of the matter, purporting to settle for the reader 
this most fundamental problem of jurisprudence. For the researcher of tenth-century Imāmī 
jurisprudence such a text is an exciting prospect indeed. Such expectations are to be frustrated 
however. Al-Ṣadūq begins the chapter thus: 
Concerning the authentic narrations of the imāms, our belief is that they are in 
concordance with the Book of God, blessed and exalted, coherent in their meanings 
without contradiction, for they come from the conduit of revelation from God, and 
were they from other than God they would contradict. Thus the apparent meanings of 
akhbār do not contradict except for a number of reasons.158 
Al-Ṣadūq has already dashed our hopes in the first line: he is only talking about authentic 
aḥādīth that may seem to disagree. How problems of authenticity are to be dealt with, let alone 
how they might impinge on this problem of contradicting texts, is not up for discussion. The 
primary reason he gives for why authentic akhbār may seem contradictory once again hinges 
on interpretation of the texts rather than their provenance. Al-Ṣadūq gives the example of three 
texts which on the face of it prescribe three different ways to expiate the sin of ẓihār (a Arab 
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divorce custom outlawed by Muḥammad): freeing a slave, fasting for two consecutive months 
and feeding sixty destitute persons. He explains that fasting is prescribed for those with no 
slaves to free, and the feeding of the destitute for those who are also unable to fast (for example 
due to illness). Correct understanding thus dissolves the conflict without any need to question 
the imāms’ consistent infallibility. A second, more briefly expounded but nonetheless 
significant given reason for conflicting reports is the possibility that some aḥādīth of the imām 
were uttered while the imām was in a state of taqīya: giving false information to conceal his 
true identity. 159 Such a ḥadīth, of course, is not legally binding, but nor does its existence 
render the imāms’ words any less sacrosanct. (How one tells whether or not a ḥadīth was 
spoken in taqīya is not a question al-Ṣadūq discusses here.) 
This is not an hermeneutic methodology, rather it is a continuation of the didactic project of 
the previous chapter. Al-Ṣadūq is not helping his reader to judge the corpus’ authenticity, let 
alone explaining how he himself does so, indeed he is discouraging them from engaging with 
such questions. This chapter is a defence of the imāms’ infallibility and of its continuation in 
reported text, reassuring the reader of the perfect validity of the imāms’ akhbār, showing them 
how what seems contradictory to the untrained eye may be reconciled with the scholar’s 
expertise. The chapter is framed not in jurisprudential but theological terms, anchoring the 
imāms’ speech in the fabric of revelation. 
This balanced of priorities is underscored in the long ḥadīth that makes up the greater part of 
the chapter.160 This is a ḥadīth from ʿAlī, in which the imām responds to his disciple Sulaym 
b. Qays who is perturbed by the discrepancy between what he has heard the imām attribute to 
the Prophet and what he hears attributed to him by the masses. ʿAlī roundly condemns the 
community at large, who attribute falsehoods to God’s prophet and sacrilegiously interpret the 
Qurʾān’s myriad complexities with their own baseless opinions.  
He continues his instruction of Sulaym with an ubiquitous feature of the literature of ḥadīth 
criticism: the taxonomy of narrators. Just as we see in texts from al-Shāfiʿī’s Risāla to 
Muslim’s Ṣaḥīḥ to al-Jaṣṣāṣ to al-Mufīd, ʿ Alī lays out the different kinds of people who narrate 
aḥādīth and the different qualities and defects that affect their reliability. There is the hypocrite 
who lies, the sincere narrator who nonetheless errs by fault of memory and the one whose 
memory does not fail but who is ignorant of technicalities such as whether the Prophet’s 
recollected command may have been abrogated. He ends the list with its essential component, 
the narrator who is free of all these faults, and can thus be trusted to transmit the Prophet’s 
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words accurately. Were it not for such individuals, of course, the ḥadīth corpus would be 
unworkable. 
Once again we come tantalisingly close to a discussion of isnād-criticism, and once again al-
Ṣadūq has other plans. ʿAlī follows his taxonomy of narrators with a long speech in which he 
emphatically and identifies the fourth type of narrator perfect and reliable, exclusively with 
himself. He alone attended on Muḥammad every night, questioning him on every aspect of 
his teachings, writing them down and committing them all to memory. The only people 
allowed in the room during this unique instruction were Fāṭima, al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn.  At 
the end of every session the Prophet would place his hands on ʿAlī’s breast and pray that his 
memory be infallible. He informed ʿAlī that God himself had assured him that ʿAlī’s memory 
would not fail, nor would those of the imāms who would come after him. 
This is not a text that discusses how to evaluate the narrators of the imāms’ ḥadīth. Rather it 
is a text that again reinforces the status of those aḥādīth as the sovereign source of knowledge, 
the imām’s supremacy as the perfect narrator, the infallible conduit of the Prophet’s 
knowledge. Just as in the chapter’s opening and the previous chapter, al-Ṣadūq is suppressing 
questions of authenticity in favour of compelling reverence to the corpus as a whole.  
The fact that this ḥadīth clearly does not address the task of the fourth/tenth-century ḥadīth 
scholar does not escape the notice of al-Mufīd, who finds much to criticise in this element of 
the chapter. He laments precisely al-Ṣadūq’s failure to discuss how one discerns authentic 
aḥādīth from false, how one discerns texts on which one must act from those on which one 
must not. Sporting as it does such gaping lacunae, he declares, al-Ṣadūq’s treatment of the 
topic is valueless. He first directs the reader to his other works wherein he discusses the 
problem in depth, but nonetheless then affixes a discussion of the topic as long as any in 
Taṣḥīḥ, clearly unable to conclude whilst leaving the matter so lamentably undiscussed as al-
Ṣadūq has done. As if to assert his point, he finishes by noting that al-Ṣadūq’s ḥadīth of ʿAlī 
and Sulaym is from untrusted sources and is for the most part impermissible to act upon.161 
For his part, al-Ṣadūq makes conspicuous efforts to affirm the truth of the story. While al-
Iʿtiqādāt’s proof-texts are usually single reports supplied without isnād, at the end of this 
ḥadīth al-Ṣadūq includes numerous corroborating stories of how Sulaym and those who heard 
the ḥadīth from him subsequently met later imāms, who confirmed that they continue to 
transmit Muḥammad’s knowledge perfectly as God promised they would. 
We may recall that Modarressi classifies al-Ṣadūq as belonging to a group of scholars for 
whom jurisprudential concepts and methods were only permissible to the extent that they were 
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outlined in aḥādīth. Such a hypothesis could be offered to explain why al-Ṣadūq allows his 
discussion an apparently jurisprudential problem to be dominated by a ḥadīth, a ḥadīth that 
falls short of what others consider adequate treatment of the topic. Not only is such an 
explanation undermined by our having already noted that al-Ṣadūq is not so restricted (as 
illustrated by passages elsewhere in al-Iʿtiqādāt), it is also the case that we see in other authors 
aḥādīth in which problems of conflicting aḥādīth are discussed more thoroughly. Al-Kulaynī 
includes a chapter on precisely this issue in al-Kāfī, which includes this same ḥadīth of ʿAlī 
and Sulaym but also a number of others. Most commonly these counsel the referring of 
dubious texts to the Qurʾān or established practice, but other solutions are offered, such as the 
claim that of two aḥādīth the one more recently uttered is binding.162 One of al-Kulaynī’s texts 
in particular offers a detailed procedure for solving textual contradictions: if a believer is in 
need of a ruling, the first step is to find and consult someone who narrates the imāms’ ḥadīth, 
but this is soon complicated by the possibility that one may meet two such narrators who offer 
different solutions. In such cases one should follow the most just, the wisest and the most 
trustworthy, but if no distinction is to be found on those grounds then one follows the narrator 
whose answer is more in agreement with the generally agreed observed practice of the imām’s 
followers, avoiding suggestions that touch on obscure territory where such consensus is not 
found. Failing this, one should adhere to whichever report agrees more with the Qurʾān and 
the Prophet’s sunna and which, meanwhile, is less in agreement with the practice of the 
general populace, that is to say non-Imāmīs.163 
Al-Kulaynī is clearly able to supply his reader with a substantial, entirely ḥadīth-based body 
of material to solve such problems as they may encounter in the ḥadīth corpus. In particular it 
should be noted that this ḥadīth and several others entertain and offer solutions to the problem 
of unreliably narrated aḥādīth. It is debatable to what extent al-Kulaynī is presenting any one 
of his several texts as the definitive solution,164 but it is meanwhile quite plain that al-Ṣadūq, 
as he addresses the reader in propria persona, gives a discussion of conflicting ḥadīth that is 
far more restricted than what the available aḥādīth themselves potentially advocate. Even as 
he elsewhere departs from the vocabulary attested ḥadīth in discussing methodological 
questions, here for his own reasons he prefers the ḥadīth’s uncomplicated affirmation of the 
imām’s superiority to such complex, narrator-focussed approaches as al-Mufīd demands. 
In this concluding excursus of al-Iʿtiqādāt we thus see elaborated the divergence of approach 
between al-Ṣadūq and al-Mufīd, and thus we may assume between broader intellectual trends 
                                                            
162 Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. i, pp. 107-112. 
163 Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. i, pp. 67-68. 
164 Bayhom Daou (‘Imāmī Shīʿī Conception’, pp. 194-209) supplies an interesting attempt to extract 
the details of al-Kulaynī’s attitude to aḥādīth and other sources of law from this section of al-Kāfī.  
65 
 
amongst the Imāmīya at this time. Al-Ṣadūq and al-Mufīd no doubt had their differences over 
what certifies a text’s authenticity, but both were conversant in the same language of 
jurisprudence and isnād criticism. Rather what divides them is a crucial point of rhetoric and 
emphasis. In al-Mufīd and ibn Qūlawayh we see the urge to draw on isnād-critical models of 
textual authenticity as a central means of affirming the validity of the Imāmī ḥadīth corpus. 
Al-Ṣadūq, meanwhile, sees such matters as the business of the faqīh but counterproductive to 
invoke before a lay audience. He does not see fit to pledge the soundness of his asānīd to the 
reader as ibn Qūlawayh does, rather his concern is to valorise the perfect soteriological value 
of the imāms’ words, an exercise that is not improved by reminding the reader of the perils of 
transmission. Al-Iʿtiqādāt, after all, is a creed, and the at first anomalous presence of 
methodological discussions therein now reveal themselves as anything but, rather the 
suppressing of such discussions beneath articles of faith. Traditionism here is not an ignorance 
of isnād criticism, rather it is active, reasoned opposition to it.165 
An essential background what we have seen of al-Ṣadūq’s approach to ḥadīth is to be found 
in the only surviving work of his father Ibn Bābawayh the Elder, a text entitled al-Imāma wa'l-
tabṣira min al-ḥayra, ‘The Imāmate and Insight that Delivers from Confusion.’. This small, 
apparently incomplete text contains the earliest extant Imāmī discussion the problems of 
ḥadīth criticism, a text that provides fascinating insight into the balance between soteriology 
and authenticity we see negotiated in al-Ṣadūq’s work. Al-Imāma wa'l-tabṣira is a work 
seeking to reassure the Imāmī faithful with regard to the new circumstance of occultation and 
to dispel the confusion (ḥayra) that besets the community. An integral part of this confusion 
is, Ibn Bābawayh the Elder notes, the profusion of conflicting narrations from and about the 
imāms, and the greater part of the book’s introduction is his discussion of this particular 
problem.166 
This discussion revolves around taqīya. Like al-Ṣadūq in al-Iʿtiqādāt, ibn Bābawayh the Elder 
explains that it is due to taqīya, the need for dissimilation, that the imāms uttered contradictory 
statements, thus to the contemporary menace of conflicting aḥādīth.167 What distinguishes ibn 
Bābawayh the Elder is his driving assertion that this taqīya is utterly, existentially necessary. 
It is necessary not merely in the sense that the imām is compelled to hide for fear of 
persecution, rather hiddenness and the withholding of information is an indispensable part of 
God’s benevolent guidance of humanity. Taking the example of the day of judgement, he 
                                                            
165 This is an interesting amendment to Gleave (p. 374), who states that al-Ṣadūq was aware of isnād-
related discussions but did not consider them important. Here we see that al-Ṣadūq’s distance from 
isnād-criticism is motivated not merely by disinterest but by animosity! 
166 Ibn Bābawayh the Elder, al-Imāma wa'l-tabṣira, pp. 7-9. 
167 Ibn Bābawayh the Elder, al-Imāma wa'l-tabṣira, pp. 9-11. 
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observes that Prophets and Imams alike have always asserted that the end times are near, thus 
motivating their followers towards righteousness, and yet, infallible as they were, they knew 
that in fact it would not occur for centuries. Similarly, Jesus could not tell his disciples that in 
a few hundred years the sharī’a which he preached would be abrogated by that of Muḥammad, 
as this would doubtless deflate their enthusiasm somewhat! Moving to the present, ibn 
Bābawayh the Elder explains that the time of the Twelfth Imām’s reappearance is concealed 
for the believers’ own good. Were they to be told, for example, that it was centuries hence, 
they would inevitably become despondent, whilst this withholding of knowledge leaves them 
in a constant state of hopeful expectation.168  
Ibn Bābawayh the Elder is particularly concerned to assert this necessary taqīya as an 
alternative and a rebuttal to badāʾ; the concept that God can change his mind, and thus that 
the imāms, though they are privy to God’s secrets, can be surprised.169 The crux of this concern 
is the occultation of the Twelfth Imām: this must not be conceived of as a change of the divine 
plan, rather it was preordained at the dawn of creation, and not only the previous imāms but 
the previous prophets back to Adam knew that the Twelfth Imām was the last imām and would 
enter occultation before returning as the qāʾim. The obstacle to this model of absolute 
foreknowledge is a body of aḥādīth in which the imāms indicate that this was not always the 
plan. Ibn Bābawayh the Elder cites a well-known ḥadīth of Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq which seems to 
ascribe the death of his son and successor designate Ismāʿīl to such a divine prevarication, 
forcefully refuting on the basis of other aḥādīth that such a thing is possible, since the names 
of the imāms have been known since time began.  Rather al-Ṣādiq is concealing the truth that 
he knows.170 Ibn Bābawayh the Elder cites other reports in which Mūsā al-Kāẓim states that 
he will not die until he had restored justice to the world, only to subsequently concede in the 
face of adversity and imprisonment that this may not occur, again attributing the change to 
God. Ibn Bābawayh the Elder explains that this was a white lie intended to give hope to faithful 
in those dark times, just as Muḥammad’s deceptive forewarning of the imminence of 
Judgement Day was to impart a sense of urgency, affirming again that the literal truth of the 
imām’s words is theologically impossible.171  
While other examples are given in this sustained and well-reasoned polemic, the significance 
of these two is their centrality to momentous schisms within the Imāmīya. The first, of course, 
pertains to the Ismāʿīlīya’s following of the Ismāʿīl b. Jaʿfar and his descendants instead of 
Mūsā, while the second concerns the most prominent group of the Wāqifīya who claimed that 
                                                            
168 Ibn Bābawayh the Elder, al-Imāma wa'l-tabṣira, pp. 10-11. 
169 See below.   
170 Ibn Bābawayh the Elder, al-Imāma wa'l-tabṣira, pp. 11-17. 
171 Ibid., pp. 11, 15. 
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Mūsā was the last imām who remained alive in occultation until his return as the qāʾim. Ibn 
Bābawayh the Elder’s treatment of these aḥādīth is striking because he never questions their 
authenticity. The ḥadīth of al-Ṣādiq concerning Ismāʿīl did subsequently retain acceptance in 
Duodeciman circles, the potential ambiguity of its wording and the resultant theological 
conundrum continuing to draw interest, but for an Duodeciman to accept that Mūsā al-Kāẓim 
did effectively declare himself to be the qāʾim is most unusual! Ibn Bābawayh the Elder’s 
extraordinarily bold approach is to admit in the face of textual diversity that the imāms did 
utter the aḥādīth that contradict his own beliefs and on which his opponents base their 
teachings, but that they did not mean what they said, emulating the divine precedent of secrecy 
that is, as he argues, essential to the process of revelation. This is made all the more interesting 
that he presents this in opposition to the alternative solution of badāʾ. It is apparent from his 
examples that other Imāmīs are explaining away contradictory aḥādīth of the imāms, even 
apparent rescinded claims to messiahship, as resulting from God’s changes of heart. This work 
thus reveals a context of multiple Imāmī strategies for explaining conflicts in the textual 
record, approaches that are united by their circumvention of the problem of unreliable 
narrators. 
This provides invaluable context for what we have seen of al-Ṣadūq’s approach to authenticity. 
For ibn Bābawayh the Elder reliability of transmission is emphatically excluded from the 
discussion of aḥādīth, even when that exclusion necessitates such severe compromises as 
authenticating core legitimating texts of the Wāqifīya. The battle over the ḥadīth corpus is 
fought not through isnād-criticism but theology, by negotiating not with human failings but 
with divine imperatives. al-Ṣadūq’s scholarly influence from his father was vast, as is 
represented by the countless aḥādīth that al-Ṣadūq narrates on his authority. In his own 
surviving work on occultation, Kamāl al-dīn, we see the imprint of ibn Bābawayh the Elder’s 
formulations. Al-Ṣadūq embraces his father’s concept of the existential necessity of 
hiddenness as he expounds the reason and wisdom of the occultation. He supplies the example 
of God’s commanding the angels to bow before Adam, the command that the Devil fatally 
refused. God, he reminds the reader, did not, as he could have done, explain to the angels why 
Adam was worthy of their prostrate reverence. Instead his command was issued whilst 
maintaining their state of ignorance, ignorance that allowed them the virtue of faithful 
obedience (even as it allowed the Devil to reach his own conclusions).172 The analogy with 
God’s current concealment of his imām is no less useful to al-Ṣadūq than it was to his father. 
Unlike al-Imāma wa'l-tabṣira, however, Kamāl al-dīn also engages with question of 
authenticity and transmission. When it comes to refuting the Wāqifīya’s claims about al-
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Kāẓim he does not entertain aḥādīth that support them, rather focussing on amassing 
testimonies of al-Kāẓim’s death and so refuting any notion that he lives on in occultation. He 
uses am ingenious variety of mechanisms to assert the truth of the Twelfth Imām and his 
occultation, and amongst these is the retort to his opponents that their proof-texts are not as 
reliable as his.173  
We thus see in al-Ṣadūq’s use of discourses of authenticity a qualified emendation and 
hybridisation of his father’s position. The latter’s radical decision to negotiate the problem 
textual difference entirely through theology dropped in favour of al-Ṣadūq’s sporadic but 
effective recourse to the strength or otherwise of aḥādīth’s transmission. Nonetheless, 
theological approaches to the problem still retain a substantial presence in al-Ṣadūq’s writings. 
Though less uncompromising, his discussion of conflicting aḥādīth in al-Iʿtiqādāt, excluding 
questions of rijāl and isnād-criticism in favour of emphasising the corpus’ unique sanctity, 
presents a pronounced echo of ibn Bābawayh the Elder’s approach. It is an echo that is 
perceptible across his oeuvre and its reception, in others’ denigrations of his standards of 
criticism and his own reluctance to invoke authenticity either as a source of legitimacy or as a 
polemical tool.  
Examination of these few surviving discussions of ḥadīth criticism from the fourth/tenth 
century prompts us to suggest some revisions to Modarressi’s taxonomy of traditionists and 
intermediates. He groups al-Ṣadūq and al-Kulaynī as traditionists, while ibn Qūlawayh and 
ibn Bābawayh the Elder are together classed as intermediaries. The latter are distinguished 
from the traditionists on the basis of their following the practice of ijtihād, even though they 
lacked the systematic jurisprudence offered by the rationalists.174 We have not encountered 
much of the above to dispute Modarressi’s taxonomy on these grounds. Whether or not and 
how ijtihād was practiced by all four of these authors remains a topic that would require a 
great deal of further research, not least since two of them leave no surviving legal works. 
Nonetheless, there are a number of points that the preceding examination has raised which 
renders Modarressi’s brief schema an incomplete picture of the relationships between these 
scholars and the intellectual trends they represent. 
Ijtihād notwithstanding, we have seen aspects of these scholars’ writings on ḥadīth criticism 
that complicate Modarressi’s picture. We have already observed that al-Ṣadūq does not seem 
to fit the mould of the traditionists as described, drawing on a conceptual framework beyond 
the letter of the ḥadīth. On the other hand, we have also seen that al-Kulaynī appears to draw 
from the letter of the ḥadīth a critical approach that appears, at least in some aspects, more 
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174 Modarressi, Introduction, pp. 32-29. 
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sophisticated than what we see in al-Ṣadūq. What we have seen of ibn Bābawayh the Elder, 
meanwhile, shows a scholar who offers an ingenious dialectic solution to textual difficulties 
that goes quite beyond what may be found in any ḥadīth, but who is meanwhile apparently 
unwilling to entertain any isnād-criticism, even as al-Kulaynī narrates aḥādīth that advocate 
it. The relative sophistication of these approaches and the extent to which their authors would 
have credited them to independent reason as opposed to text cannot be judged with much 
certainty from the available texts, however a clear dividing line seems to be the authors’ 
willingness or otherwise to adopt isnād-criticism in their discussions of conflicting aḥādīth. 
Al-Kulaynī is, though as far as we can see only within such limits as expounded in the aḥādīth 
themselves. Ibn Qūlawayh, meanwhile, has no such reservations. Ibn Bābawayh the Elder 
gives no sign of entertaining such discussions, a position that his son al-Ṣadūq partially 
follows, acknowledging questions of forgery and reliability but keeping the focus on his 
father’s preferred mechanisms of interpretation and soteriological affirmation.  
This draws attention to another difference with Modarressi’s model, which cuts across 
teacher-student relationships. In his schema, al-Kulaynī is a traditionist but his student is an 
intermediate, as is ibn Bābawayh the Elder though his son remains a traditionist. What we 
have rather observed here is how these relationships are valuable in grouping our scholars. 
The two ibn Bābawayhs have a distinct approach that is quite different from that of al-Kulaynī 
and his student ibn Qūlawayh, while in both pairs we see a distinct development between 
teacher and student, both al-Ṣadūq and ibn Qūlawayh exhibiting methods that are more open 
to developed jurisprudential concepts than their masters. 
We recall Melchert’s verdict that it is the traditionalist-rationalist spectrum that is the most 
effective tool in reckoning the differences between schools of thought in this period, one that 
Modarressi’s taxonomy seems to pre-empt. In the schema offered here, however, it is 
suggested that this is only one of two axes along which these scholars are to be differentiated. 
In terms of the role of reason, it appears that this increases with the passage of time, such that 
both of the younger scholars are more amenable to jurisprudence than their teachers, a 
conclusion that Gleave’s evidence seems to support.175 A second point of contention, 
meanwhile, is the extent to which discussions of isnād-criticism are allowed to impinge on 
theological explanations of textual diversity. This difference remains a sharp division between 
scholars who are contemporaries, and approaches are seen to be maintained across two 
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generations, indicating that this was a sustained disagreement between rival groups of 
scholars.176 
 
THE GHOST OF THE IMĀM – Jurisprudence and Occultation 
 
What remains to be explored are the reasons why al-Ṣadūq and his father adhered to this 
peculiar animosity to isnād-criticism. As we have seen, this is a separate question from the 
scholars’ view of the role of reason, and therefore cannot be explained by the simple, familiar 
sentiment that human reason should not be allowed to distort what God has revealed in text. 
Moreover, that age-old dispute between reason and revelation is a constant presence 
throughout the history of the Imāmīya, as it is in other Muslim traditions, whereas these 
particular attitudes to isnād-criticism, not to mention the eccentric hermeneutics of taqīya of 
ibn Bābawayh the Elder, do not seem to outlive the fourth-tenth century, and the wholesale 
embrace of jurisprudential literature after al-Mufīd. It thus appears to be quite a different kind 
of problem. 
Returning to ibn Bābawayh the Elder, we recall that his lionisation of taqīya is embedded in 
a work on occultation. All this obscure confusion of texts and interpretations, ibn Bābawayh 
the Elder says, is ultimately part of that greater obfuscation of the truth that is the concealment 
of the imām.177 Just as the imām’s cosmic role as ḥujja is the reason why his understanding of 
the Qurʾān and his recollection of the Prophet’s sunna are uniquely perfect, so the difficulty 
in accessing that sacred imāmic knowledge is part of the same divine plan of revelation that 
puts the imām on earth in the first place. We have above referred to ibn Bābawayh the Elder’s 
approach as subjecting textual problems to theology, but in fact it subjects them to imāmology.  
Why this is important and, indeed, entirely reasonable is that the Imāmī doctrine of the 
imāmate has a relationship with the problem of textual contradictions that precedes the 
occultation. This is the very relationship that is encapsulated in the ḥadīth of ʿAlī and Sulaym 
cited by al-Ṣadūq in al-Iʿtiqādāt. The imām in this ḥadīth is the solution to conflicting aḥādīth 
and dishonest narrators. The last prophet is succeeded by ḥujja after ḥujja so humanity need 
not rely on so frail a thing as memory to access God’s final message to his creation.  
                                                            
176 It is worth noting that Haider has (much more extensively) demonstrated a similar phenomenon with 
regard to the Jārūdī and Baṭrī Zaydīs. Haider shows that two groups that doxographical literature 
describes as contemporary, opposed positions were actually different stages in a linear development. 
See Haider, Origins, p. 192 and passim.  
177 Ibn Bābawayh the Elder, al-Imāma wa'l-tabṣira, pp. 9-11. 
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Al-Ṣadūq, of course, narrates this ḥadīth decades after the occultation, but it voices a basic 
doctrine that is a staple of the Imāmīya since perhaps the eighth century, and indeed may have 
been their central point of contention with other groups, Shīʿī and otherwise. Though the 
imāms were surrounded by disciples and narrators, and were certainly aware of the potential 
problems of their words being misrepresented to distant followers (claims of their divinity 
being the most obvious such hazard), this doctrine of the imām as the single perfect conduit, 
who renders laughable other groups’ attempts to reconstruct God’s will with faulty 
recollections and fallible reasoning, was certainly in evidence amongst their followers. So, 
too, was the closely related belief that it was impossible for the world to be without such a 
ḥujja, since by no other means could accurate preservation of Muḥammad’s true teachings be 
assured. The imām is thus the solution to the Prophet’s absence long before the notion of the 
imām’s absence is conceivable.178 
This is not the moment to begin piecing together how the extraordinary negotiation of the 
occultation, whereby the imām who must be present was rendered effectively absent, was 
achieved by the Imāmī elites. What matters is that decades later al-Ṣadūq is still drawing upon 
models of the imām’s authority that date from before that process.179 His ḥadīth presents the 
imām as a solution to the difficulties of textual transmission at a time when the imām has 
himself become the subject of such problems. If the imām is needed to transmit from the 
Prophet, who is then to transmit from the imām? Compared to ʿAlī’s inspired, divinely 
guaranteed transmission from Muḥammad, al-Ṣadūq efforts to transmit the imāms’ ḥadīth 
risks looking catastrophically inadequate by comparison. Such is the dilemma unleashed by 
the occultation. The Hidden Imām appears as an epistemological ghost at the feast, speaking 
of an ideal of knowledge-transmission to which compilers can never attain but whose absolute 
demands they are compelled to reaffirm.180 
                                                            
178 Studies of early Shīʿī theology and imāmology are many and varied, including about the axis of the 
extent to which the material in ḥadīth compendia like those of al-Barqī and al-Kulaynī represent the 
views of earlier Shīʿīs. Amir-Moezzi (Divine Guide; ‘Remarques’) and Lalani both take a thoroughly 
positivist approach, treating these later sources as fundamentally reliable portrayals of the 
second/eighth-century imāms’ teachings, thus situating the belief in the necessity of the imām’s 
presence in a solidly second/eighth-century pedigree if not even older. Even amongst studies that take 
a more critical approach to the sources, however, such as Kohlberg (‘Imāmiyya’) there is a broad 
consensus that the belief in the imām’s indispensable presence dates from before the turn of the 
third/ninth century.  
179 For discussions of the transition from visible to hidden imām see Modarressi, Crisis, pp. 3-105; 
Hayes; Arjomand, ‘Crisis’; ‘Imam Absconditus’; ‘Consolation’. All three authors’ analyses show the 
transition to have been a gradual one, the network of scholars and financial agents around the imām 
wielding steadily increasing authority in comparison to their ostensive master the imām (who on two 
occasions was an infant). 
180 It is worthy of note in this regard that nowhere in the extant literature of this period does an Imāmī 
compiler make what would appear to be the single greatest claim to authority for a book of ḥadīth in 
the period of occultation: that the Imām is hidden, and therefore only accessible by means of his 
recollected ḥadīth. Rather we see again and again books introduced by the sentiment that the imāms’ 
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It is to this dilemma, then, that we see al-Ṣadūq and his father responding to in their 
idiosyncratic approach to the ḥadīth corpus and its foibles. In their reluctance to discuss 
questions of how material is transmitted from the imām they are showing deference to older 
epistemology of revelation, abundantly voiced in the aḥādīth they compile, in which the imām 
should be the solution to such problems rather than their subject. Though the new status quo 
of the occultation has irrevocably changed this, the ideological about turn that acknowledging 
that change threatens to be is still an intimidating prospect in the first century after al-ʿAskarī’s 
death. Instead we see in ibn Bābawayh the Elder the extraordinary impulse to continue the 
imām’s status as a theologically justified panacea to issues of transmission, the imām’s very 
absence and the resultant uncertainty being no less a part of God’s plan than the infallible 
guidance he supplied when present. Writing a generation later, such an absolute solution no 
longer seems tenable for al-Ṣadūq. Whether this is due to the ever lengthening occultation 
(including the inset of the greater occultation) or to the increasing suzerainty of a model of 
jurisprudence in which isnād-criticism was paramount is not easy to say, but it was almost 
certainly a combination of the two. What we therefore see in his writings is a distinctive 
compromise. He acknowledges and makes use of isnād-criticism, but in a way which, in 
comparison to other scholars, is understated. Acknowledging the possibility of forgery can be 
of use, but it is subservient to the higher objective of defending the sanctity of the corpus of 
the imāms’ traditions. This same objective dictates that where possible the integrity and 
infallibility of all aḥādīth should be affirmed, their diversity explained by interpretation rather 
than by selective authentication. The text of the imām’s reported speech should be 
unconditionally revered even as the imām himself, whom it must now represent and whose 
function it must fulfil; as inspired and unimpeachable, as mysterious and inscrutable. 181   
 
                                                            
knowledge is the way to salvation and deliverance from bewildering disagreement (e.g. al-Kulaynī, al-
Kāfī, vol. i, pp. 5-9, al-Ṣaffār, Baṣāʾir, pp. 8-23, al-Qummī, Tafsīr al-Qummī, vol. i, pp. 1-29), 
sometimes along with a brief assertion that the book’s transmitted aḥādīth are sound. Nowhere do 
authors evoke the obvious truth that it the period of occultation aḥādīth are now of the utmost 
importance as only by them can the imāms’ knowledge be accessed. This may be because the onset of 
this reality was a gradual one (ḥadīth had, after all, been transmitted during the imāms’ lifetimes), but 
in light of what is explored here it seems likely that the uncomfortable nature of this truth also 
contributed to its remaining unexpressed. 
181 Melchert makes an interesting observation of the Imāmī ‘Semi-Rationalists’ as he calls them (in 
which he includes al-Ṣadūq), that they are eager to label themselves as traditionist but in practice they 
are quite willing to argue. This is certainly the case with al-Ṣadūq, who gives unflinchingly stark 
injunctions about the forbidden nature of dialectic and argumentation (al-Tawḥīd, pp. 497-504; al-
Iʿtiqādāt, pp. 49-50), but is can be found reasoning at length in polemical contexts (Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 
31-157). This would be well explained by what is hypothesised here of Imāmīs who were ideologically 
compelled to uphold a vision of the imāms’ reported words as the sovereign authority, even as the imām 
himself used to be, while being practically compelled to defend and support those words with textual 





Al-Ṣadūq’s understanding of the problems of ḥadīth criticism is quite unique in the extant 
textual record, and uniquely representative of the age of momentous changes through which 
he lived. We see in his writings the increasing presence of jurisprudential language, a presence 
which would only increase and solidify into complete methodologies and manuals in later 
Buwayhid scholars. Alongside this discourse, meanwhile, we encounter a quite different, 
retrospective approach to the texts, one which seeks to uphold their indispensable theological 
status in the face of the ongoing trauma of the imām’s absence. If established scholarly 
frameworks for studying the Imāmīya in the fourth/tenth century have tended to leave al-
Ṣadūq falling through the gaps, this is because his works bear witness to a brilliant, though 
short-lived, system of thought that saw the Imāmīya through the extraordinary transition from 
present imāmate to Hidden Imām, distinct both from those of the third/ninth century and those 
of the fifth/tenth,182 and quite unlike those of his contemporaries among other, non-Imāmī 
groups.183 
As he draws attention to the importance of jurisprudence in understanding the history of Imāmī 
Shīʿism, Stewart attributes the neglect of this area to an abiding assumption that the essence 
of Imāmī thought is imāmology, with the result that it has been on imāmology that studies of 
the Imāmīya have focussed, alongside theology of which it is considered part.184 What the 
above shows us is that while Stewart is not to be faulted in his drawing attention to the 
significance of jurisprudence, in the fourth/tenth century jurisprudence and imāmology are not 
easily separated. Rather what we see in al-Ṣadūq and in this crucial transitional period of 
which he is our most valuable representative is a system of thought in which methodological 
concerns about the approach to and analysis of proof-texts are inextricably bound to the 
conceptualisations of the imām’s authority, and how that authority is to be made effective in 
the new epistemological world of occultation.  
                                                            
182 It is interesting that Newman has documented a conspicuous decline in interest in al-Ṣadūq’s works 
among Imāmīs after the Buwayhid period. See Newman, ‘Recovery’, pp. 112-115. 
183 There is a comparison to be made between al-Ṣadūq’s activities and those Sunnīs in the early ninth 
century. Figures like al-Shāfiʿī and ibn Qutayba were then engaged in a similar endeavour to justify the 
ḥadīth corpus as a valid, indeed essential source of authority in the face of the text-shy rationalism that 
had characterised earlier decades. Unlike later disputes between traditionists and rationalists and like 
al-Ṣadūq, these thinkers were justifying ḥadīth on an existential level, against voices who would deny 
it any substantial validity. Of course, beyond these similarities the oppositions faced by al-Ṣadūq and 
these Sunnīs, and thus the ways in which they were compelled to justify their respective corpora, were 
very different. Though al-Shāfiʿī and ibn Qutayba had to defend the sanctity of ḥadīth, they also had to 
demonstrate that it could be technically viable, leading to a proliferation of isnād-critical discussion 
alongside lionisations of the importance of the Prophet’s speech. See Musa, pp. 31-80. 
184 Stewart, Orthodoxy, pp. 6, 13-14. 
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This was not a status quo that outlasted the Buwayhid period. For subsequent generations of 
Imāmīs the occultation of the imām became a purely theological problem, quite distinct from 
the practicalities of jurisprudential hermeneutics. For al-Ṣadūq, at the close of the first century 
after the occultation,185 this theological problem still looms as a fundamental epistemological 
catastrophe that threatens to undermine the whole edifice of textual authority. The Imāmīya 
moved inexorably towards what has become the utterly familiar ‘great synthesis’ of reasoned 
deduction controlled by revealed authority routinized in text, but a lingering ideal of a present 
imām still deemed this intolerable. The era of the imām’s immanence still harried the fringes 
of living memory, taunting those who sought to construct authority through texts and 
recollections with the lost promise of authority right here right now, authority that does not 
need to be remembered because it has never gone away. As Buwayhid rule inaugurated a 
newly cosmopolitan intellectual environment, al-Ṣadūq had to walk the tightrope between 
appeasing ever more demanding orthodoxies of authenticity whilst protecting the speech of 
the imām from the still unbearable compromise of sanctity that those orthodoxies threatened 
to impose. Seldom have the stakes of compiling ḥadīth been so high. 
 
  
                                                            
185 Modarressi employs this periodisation, and at least for this first century it is an extremely valuable 




TAQĪYA – al-Ṣadūq and Adab 
 
INTRODUCTION – Other Compilations 
 
While the matter of the previous chapter, the legal-theological use of ḥadīth, of the texts’ 
authenticity and transmission and of their role in the formation of doctrine, and of their 
incorporation into systematic epistemologies, must underpin any discussion of a ḥadīth 
scholar like al-Ṣadūq, it is not the only context in which his work must be examined. This is 
for the very good reason that it was not only in legal-theological works that aḥādīth were 
compiled in this era. There exists another area of intellectual endeavour which produced scores 
of compilations over the third/ninth, fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries, compilations 
which, though they contained material from a wide variety of sources in which legal-
theological scholarship had little interest, also contained a great many aḥādīth. This was adab. 
Adab is a notoriously difficult term to define, a task to which we shall devote more attention 
presently. We may begin by remarking that al-Ṣadūq’s relationship with adab has received no 
scholarly attention. No doubt as a result prominent place his works secured in the Imāmī legal-
theological canon (and their lack of a place in canons of adab), he has been viewed exclusively 
as the property of the histories of Imāmī law and theology, in which context we examined him 
in the previous chapter. But this is not the sum of al-Ṣadūq. We observed in the previous 
chapter that while the compilation of the imāms’ words was, in al-Ṣadūq’s time, as momentous 
a task as ever it was, it was yet to be subject, at least by al-Ṣadūq, to a formal, systematic 
jurisprudence as taught in an institutionalised school. It is, perhaps, for this reason that we find 
al-Ṣadūq in the present chapter engaging the imāms’ ḥadīth in contexts quite other than the 
legal and the theological, exploring both an eccentric and whimsical range of topics and a set 
of forms and genres that leaves us no choice but to radically reconsider the view of him as the 
sole property of Imāmī theology and law. Such explorations of form and content were not 
random, nor were they unique, rather they place al-Ṣadūq squarely in the context of the 
literature of adab, a literature by which he was surrounded at the court of Rayy where he 
composed much of his work. This context, we will here contend, was a formative one, and the 
understanding thereof is essential to understanding both al-Ṣadūq’s writings and his 
significance as a compiler and a scholar. It creates in al-Ṣadūq a fascinating interplay of 





ADAB AND ADAB LITERATURE IN THE BUWAYHID PERIOD  
 
It is an emerging consensus that adab is a term that eludes exhaustive definition.186 
Nonetheless, to proceed further without a working definition cannot be an option given this 
chapter’s stated objectives. We are aided in this necessity by the perspicacious scholarship 
that continues to appear on the subject and by the specifics of our context, being the later 
fourth/tenth century, and the limits of what pertains to al-Ṣadūq and his activities. 
The noun adab had a number of meanings in the fourth/tenth century context, foremost 
amongst them including good manners, moral education (often equated to the Greek παιδια) 
and sound literary and philological knowledge.187 As well as such abstract concepts (for which 
we will use the shorthand adab as culture188), however, adab could also refer to a body of texts 
in which this erudition and virtue could be discovered (which we will call adab as corpus). 
This concept of adab as corpus is, in turn, to be distinguished from what scholars term ‘adab 
literature,’ being literature which self-consciously undertakes to convey adab (adab as 
culture) primarily by means of collecting and presenting adab (adab as corpus). Thus a poem 
might be referred to as adab (as corpus), containing as it might philological and cultural 
erudition (adab as culture), but could not by itself be called adab literature. A compendium in 
which that poem was included on the basis of its constituting adab (as corpus) and containing 
adab (as culture) would be called adab literature. Thus a variety of different literary genres 
and even texts within genres can be concerned with adab and thus be classed as adab literature 
to varying degrees, with different scholars offering different verdicts of exactly where the line 
falls to define what conventionally falls within the adab literature. Thus the adab compendium 
(see below), which is devoted entirely and explicitly to collecting adab as corpus for the 
purpose of imparting adab as culture, is comfortably at the heart of adab literature. A genre 
like the universal history, on the other hand, exhibits considerable variation in different 
                                                            
186 Bonebakker, p. 30, Orfali, p. 29. This is compounded not only by the term’s eventful philological 
history in the early centuries of Islam (before the kinds of writing examined in this chapter appeared), 
but also its active service in a number of ideological projects in the modern period. See Bonebakker, 
pp. 16-19, Kilpatrick, ‘Adab’, p. 56. 
187 Bonebakker, pp. 16-24, Kilpatrick, ‘Adab’, pp. 54-55. 
188 ‘Culture’ seems as close a one-word translation of adab’s conception in the abstract as can be found. 
Culture has the advantage of evoking, like adab, a property that can be acquired; one could seek to 
acquire or impart adab just as one might seek to become more cultured or render others so. The two 
terms, moreover, have considerable conceptual overlap: much of what falls under adab’s semantic field 
(poetry, manners, even philological scholarship) is also covered by that of culture. Nonetheless, these 
overlaps have their inevitable limits and to use ‘culture’ as a straight translation of adab would, as the 
following makes abundantly clear, be quite impracticable. For examples of effective use of the term 
‘culture’ to discuss adab see Kilpatrick and Leder, pp. 18-23, Bonebakker, pp. 19-24. 
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authors’ interest in adab in relation to their interest in, for example, salvation history.189 The 
very act of chronicling the exploits of recent rulers may be classed by some as essentially 
concerned with adab by virtue its capacity to morally and culturally educate the reader, but 
others may differ. Meanwhile, an anthology of poetry might be classed as adab in that it 
clearly intends to impart adab as culture inasmuch as it concerns poetic erudition and 
philology, but might be distanced from inclusion on account of its not being much concerned 
with the moral dimensions of adab as culture, depending on the intentions of the anthologist, 
which might be expressed or unexpressed, or the contents of the poems themselves.190 191 
The word adīb (p. udabāʾ), meanwhile, can be an adjective describing one endowed with adab 
(as culture, which would in turn usually imply having a good deal of adab as corpus at one’s 
disposal), but it can also be a noun referring to the author of adab literature. In this thesis, 
following convention, we will use adīb exclusively in this second meaning denoting the author 
of adab literature.  
Who, then, were the udabāʾ, those members of society in this era who were interested in adab, 
such that they were concerned to collect and compile it (adab as corpus) and convey and 
disseminate it (adab as culture)? A central role was played by the secretaries of the chancery 
(kuttāb, sg. kātib), exemplified by the pioneering figure of ibn Qutayba. His adab compendium 
Adab al-kuttāb (‘The Adab of the Secretaries’) sets out a corpus of texts that constitutes and 
contains the essential moral, social and literary education of an Abbasid secretary. They should 
be well-mannered, astute in obeying, honouring and humouring their powerful masters, 
consummately literate in the Arabic language and its literature. Already by ibn Qutayba’s 
time, however, it was not only secretaries to whom adab pertained, and other adab compendia 
                                                            
189 Khalidi, Islamic Historiography, pp. 83-130. 
190 Orfali, pp. 29-32. 
191 As already noted, definitions of adab are elusive creatures. For valuable discussions of the scholarly 
understanding of adab as it stands see Orfali, pp. 29-37 (this study in particular is supported by a 
prodigious bibliography); Kilpatrick, ‘A Genre’, pp. 34-39; Bonebakker; Fähndrich. For a broader, 
more descriptive survey of adab’s manifestations writings see Khalidi, Islamic Historiography, pp. 83-
130. 
The threefold conceptualisation offered here will not overtly be much in evidence in what follows, since 
this chapter will focus in the main on adab literature specifically. This adab as culture/adab as 
corpus/adab literature schema serves us well here as a definition of the nature and constitution of that 
literature and its relationship to other uses of the term adab. 
In particular this conceptualisation seeks to avoid the pitfalls of seeking to understand adab primarily 
in terms of genre. Bonebakker experiments such a model, but inevitably confronts the problem that any 
notion of ‘adab as genre’ must inevitably end up excluding important examples of what Abbasid readers 
would have considered to be texts that constituted or were concerned with adab (pp. 27-30). Kilpatrick 
(‘Adab’) offers instead the notion of adab as an approach to writing, which may be observed at work 
across a variety of genres and themes (p. 56). Ultimately, any model for dealing with adab must be able 
to grapple with the fact that adab is associated with different concepts, texts and genres (histories, 
collections of letters and maqāmāt to name but a few) in different ways and to different extents, which 
can depend as much on the intentions of authors as on the genres they inhabit. 
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ibn Qutayba extended his reach. His al-Maʿārif undertakes to educate a wider body of courtly 
literati, equipping them with such material and manners as are required to participate 
effectively in the discussions and soirees of the great and the good. A third work, ʿUyūn al-
akhbār, spreads its net the widest, aiming to improve the reading public at large, be they 
paupers or princes.192 
This range of audiences in ibn Qutayba’s works reflects well the increasingly expansive 
character of adab literature in the later third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries. Under the 
Umayyads adab literature had been predominantly written by the court for the court, but by 
the time al-Ṣadūq was writing the authors of adab literature were aiming to convey adab to as 
wide a readership as possible.193 This expansion was meanwhile accompanied by a 
corresponding broadening of the kinds of people who were writing adab literature, which 
ceased to be much confined by one’s profession. In the figure of al-Tawḥīdī we have a 
consummate adīb who strove to make a living solely from his literary output, but we also see 
works of adab being written by viziers and by merchants. Authors of adab literature were also 
regularly active figures in legal-theological scholarship. 
As far as al-Ṣadūq is concerned, we will here be examining certain of his works in relation to 
the core of adab literature mentioned above, the adab compendium. This is a collection of 
texts which a compiler puts together expressly for the purpose of imparting adab as culture. 
‘Peruse this work,’ states the compiler of the adab compendium, ‘And you shall be 
cultured.’194 The adab compendium is a mixture of the interesting and the edifying, the 
entertaining and the improving. A typical one will contain lines of poetry, anecdotes about 
famous historical or legendary figures and also fables about unknown persons, verses from 
the Qurʾān and aḥādīth from the Prophet, proverbs, aphorisms and even jokes. The compendia 
are often distinguished by an intense breadth and variety of sources, citing Ṣūfī saints, Greek 
philosophers, pre-Islamic poets, theologians, lexicographers and prophets. They may be 
broadly classified as being either encyclopaedic compendia, aspiring to discuss a 
comprehensive range of appropriate topics, or monothematic compendia, where the material 
is united around a single theme or subject such as flowers or loneliness. These compendia 
proliferate in the tenth century when al-Ṣadūq is writing, the more famous compilers of such 
works including Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (414/1023), Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Rabbih 
(d. 328/940), Abū Hilāl al-Ḥasan b. ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿAskarī (d. c. 400/1010), ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn 
al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044) and al-Muḥassin b. ʿAlī al-Tanūkhī (d. 384/994). Earlier 
                                                            
192 See Lecompte, pp. 85-92, 102-107, 121-126, 143-146, 421-477, for a discussion of these works as 
well as their chronology. 
193 Khalidi, Islamic Hostiriography, p. 96. 
194 Kilpatrick and Leder, p. 13. See also below.   
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examples of such work meanwhile stretch back to the ninth century from the pens of such 
figures as al-Jāḥiẓ, al-Mubarrad and Ibn Qutayba, a genealogy which the tenth-century writers 
often acknowledge. 195 
Despite the unparalleled ease with which the adab compendium may be identified as adab 
literature, the boundaries of this genre are still porous. Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih’s al-ʿIqd al-farīd, al-
Tawḥīdī’s al-Baṣāʾir wa'l-dhakhāʾir and al-Ābī’s Nathr al-durr all place themselves firmly in 
the category with clearly stated opening objectives to inculcate the reader with worthy, 
improving knowledge such as to make them a more effective member of mannered society.196 
With al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’s Ghurar al-fawāʾid, on the other hand, we have a work for which 
no introduction survives, and which therefore does not so forthcomingly classify itself 
alongside them. In this case, however, the work is extremely similar in character, in structure 
and in content to the former three, and we may therefore comfortably assume that it was 
compiled with the same objectives.197 Al-Tanūkhī’s compendium Nishwār al-muḥāḍara, 
meanwhile, is less usual in its contents, the great majority of which is anecdotes about figures 
from the recent past, but the text sports an introduction in which al-Tanūkhī himself 
acknowledges this difference and makes it quite clear that despite his innovation his aims are 
still those of moral, social and cultural betterment such as are the heart of adab as culture.198 
Yet another less certain case is al-Miskawayh’s al-Ḥikma al-khālida. While this book contains 
a diverse set of morally improving texts gathered from a variety of sources, and starts with 
declared objectives of improving the moral character of the reader, al-Miskawayh links this 
objective to his other writings in which pursue the same goal through systematic, 
philosophically conceived ethics.199 The compendium thus might be classed as too narrow in 
scope to be a true adab compendium, and instead considered some manner of philosophical 
miscellany. As such it illustrates the essential relativity of works’ and genres’ participation or 
not in adab literature with which we began this discussion. In such cases, we may suggest at 
the outset, it is better to see in such hybridity a belonging to both discourses rather than neither. 
It is in this spirit, then, that we approach al-Ṣadūq.  
                                                            
195 For the importance and nature of the anthology in adab literature see Kilpatrick, ‘A Genre’;, 
Kilpatrick and Leder, pp. 15-18, 20-23; Orfali, passim. 
196 See Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, vol. i, pp. 4-7, al-Tawḥīdī, al-Baṣāʾir wa'l-dhakhāʾir, vol. i, pp. 11-15, al-Ābī, 
vol. i, pp. 22-25. 
197 Brockelmann; Kilpatrick & Leder, p. 21. 
198 Al-Tanūkhī, pp. 1-14. 
199 Al-Miskawayh’s writings on such matters were numerous, but it is his famous treatise on ethics, 
Tahdhīb al-akhlāq, that he explicitly relates to al-Ḥikma al-khālida in the introduction to the latter. See 
al-Miskawayh, al-Ḥikma al-khālida, p. 25. See also Tahdhīb al-akhlāq, p. 2, and al-Ḥikma al-khālida, 
pp. 23-25 for the two works’ shared ethos, centred around what al-Miskawayh considers the primordial 




THE IMĀMĪYA, ADAB AND AL-ṢADŪQ 
 
Al-Ṣadūq’s case notwithstanding, the Imāmīya as a group have a distinguished presence in 
Buwayhid adab literature, counting among their number such distinguished udabāʾ as the 
philosopher and historian Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Miskawayh (d. 421/1030), the poet and 
vizier Manṣūr b. al-Ḥusayn al-Ābī (d. c. 421/1030)200 and al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, who as well 
as his significance as a poet and an anthologist was a student of al-Mufīd and a foundational 
figure in Imāmī theology and jurisprudence. To look for adab in a tenth century Imāmī ḥadīth 
scholar is not, therefore, an unnatural forcing of the sources. Rather it is necessary response 
to a clear context of interactions, to which any balanced account of al-Ṣadūq’s writings is 
obliged to consider his relationship. 
This far from exhaustive list of protagonists already illustrates an important variable in Imāmī 
participation in Buwayhid adab and in the nature of the Imāmī presence in Buwayhid 
intellectual life more generally. This is the fact that to identify as an Imāmī in Buwayhid Iran 
and Iraq did not necessarily entail any particular attachment to Imāmī legal-theological 
scholarship. This state of affairs is most clearly illustrated in the figure of the bibliographer 
ibn al-Nadīm, an Imāmī who we know to have been active in philosophical circles, and whose 
catalogue of books makes it quite clear that he was at best minimally acquainted with the 
legal-theological thought of his contemporary fellow Imāmīs.201 On the other end of the 
                                                            
200 Al-Ābī, it is clear, was a generation or two younger than al-Ṣadūq, and while details about his life 
are hard to come by, it should be noted that some scholars suggest that he studied with al-Ṣadūq in his 
youth. It is certain, meanwhile, that he knew ibn ʿAbbād, and the two speak one another’s praises. See 
Azarnoosh, Azartesh & Sana‘i. 
201 Ibn al-Nadīm knows of al-Mufīd and claims to have ‘seen’ him, but this only serves to highlight the 
very different intellectual worlds which the two inhabited. To begin with, ibn al-Nadīm does not go on 
to list any of al-Mufīd’s works, even though he notes his eminence among the Imāmīya. Moreover, he 
does not know of al-Kulaynī or al-Kāfī, a work that al-Mufīd meanwhile cites as the most trustworthy 
of Imāmī ḥadīth compendia. Concerning al-Ṣadūq himself, meanwhile, ibn al-Nadīm’s knowledge is 
extremely vague. He includes an entry for ʿAlī Ibn Bābawayh, al-Ṣadūq’s father, and a little later 
another entry for one Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn, author of an al-Hidāya who may be al-Ṣadūq, 
however identification cannot be certain since Ibn al-Nadīm gives no indication that this figure is indeed 
the son of Ibn Bābawayh the elder and lists only a single work. Indeed, when it comes to the ninth 
century ibn al-Nadīm has more to offer, giving works of a number of figures including al-Barqī and al-
ʿAyyāshī, who hold a central place in the asānīd of tenth century authors like al-Ṣadūq. Ibn al-Nadīm’s 
knowledge of Imāmī legal-theological scholarship, then, is extremely patchy. His knowledge of his 
contemporary Imāmī authors is minimal, knowing neither their works nor of their key sources. While 
he is aware of older figures like al-Barqī, this is clearly not as a result of any detailed interaction with 
the Imāmī contemporaries who drew upon him so heavily. See ibn al-Nadīm, pp. 274-279, 308-314; 




spectrum, we see in al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā a figure who was fully involved both in adab 
literature and in legal-theological scholarship.  
This state of affairs is no different to the general pattern of udabāʾ and their backgrounds 
discussed above, but it is important to emphasise that the Imāmīya, though a comparatively 
small group, were still subject to the same divisions and diversities as broader society. Al-
Miskawayh and al-Ṣadūq were contemporaries, both Imāmīs, both present at the court of Rayy 
and both associated with the vizier al-Ṣāḥib ibn ʿ Abbād, but this by no means implies that they 
overlapped intellectually. On the other hand, this diversity amongst Imāmīs should alert us to 
the fact that al-Ṣadūq’s identity as a traditionist faqīh by no means negates the possibility that 
he was also involved in adab literature. Above all, the fact that one could be identified as an 
Imāmī whilst moving solely in the circles of philosophers and litterateurs – with no knowledge 
of those ḥadīth compendia and works of theology that we have subsequently become 
accustomed to think of as central to any Imāmī Shīʿī identity – illustrates the extraordinary 
openness of the Buwayhid court to Shīʿīs, Shīʿī ideas and Shīʿī affiliations, allowing those 
ideas and affiliations a fluidity that they would seldom regain.  
What, then, of al-Ṣadūq’s affiliations? As already noted, he was present at the court at Rayy, 
a city through which passed many of the period’s most illustrious udabāʾ including al-
Miskawayh and al-Tawḥīdī. The only surviving work of al-Ṣadūq’s that is dedicated to a 
potential patron in his ʿUyūn, which is dedicated to ibn ʿAbbād, the vizier at Rayy and one of 
most important and powerful literary patrons of the Buwayhid age.202 While we do know from 
a remark by al-Tawḥīdī that al-Ṣadūq was at one point banished by ibn ʿAbbād in a fit of 
hostility towards traditionists,203 indicating that the relationship may not have been a profitable 
one, this event also corroborates the dedication of ʿUyūn in its indication that there was a real 
acquaintance between the faqīh and the vizier, al-Ṣadūq constituting a prominent enough 
presence in the ibn ʿAbbād’s mind for the latter to bother banishing him. Beyond these 
fragments of his relationship with the vizier, sparse biography we have of al-Ṣadūq offers little 
indication of broader connections, and we have no record of what other company al-Ṣadūq 
might have kept at Rayy beyond his instructors and students in ḥadīth and fiqh. Nonetheless, 
there are a number of indications in al-Ṣadūq’s writings and elsewhere that extend his presence 
and interests beyond those areas in which he is best known.  
Al-Ṣadūq is, in fact, cited twice in an adab compendium written by his contemporary at Rayy 
Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī. In his al-Ṣadāqa wa’l-ṣadīq, a monothematic compendium on the 
subject of friendship, al-Tawḥīdī twice quotes from al-Ṣadūq, once quoting a maxim from al-
                                                            
202 See Naaman, passim. 
203 Al-Tawḥīdī, Akhlāq al-wazīrayn, pp. 166-167. 
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Ṣadūq himslf and once narrating from him a ḥadīth from Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq.204 Though isolated, 
the evidence of this citation is significant in placing al-Ṣadūq within social and literary 
proximity to al-Tawḥīdī as well as geographical.205 Much more extensive and decisive, 
meanwhile, is the evidence available in al-Ṣadūq’s own writings. Here we find a great deal to 
place him far outside the mould of the simple ḥadīth-gather in which he is usually seen. We 
have already observed that al-Ṣadūq is more likely than his predecessors amongst the Imāmī 
ḥadīth compilers to step out from behind narrated material to explain things in propria 
persona.206 Less remarked upon, however, is that alongside this willingness to insert his own 
voice al-Ṣadūq draws on the voices of a range of other figures quite unprecedented in earlier 
Imāmī ḥadīth compendia. It is rare indeed to see al-Barqī or al-Kulaynī speak in propria 
persona, but never do we see them cite authorities other than the aḥādīth to which their works 
are devoted. In complete contrast, we see al-Ṣadūq give explicit reference to lexicographers, 
litterateurs, historians, grammarians and poets, among them the feted scholar of poetry and 
and chess-player Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Ṣūlī (d. 335/947)207 and the pioneering 
philologist and lexicographer ʿ Abd al-Malik b. Qurayb al-Aṣmaʿī (d. 213/828), 208 both staples 
of adab compendia of the period. In terms of a discretely observed ‘Imāmī thought,’ this may 
well strengthen the narrative we explored in chapter one of ever more assertive Imāmī scholars 
after the occultation. More importantly, however, it shows the limits of an examination of al-
Ṣadūq solely in such terms, for his writings are in an inclusive conversation with a variety of 
discourses beyond that of his own sectarian group. Specific to our purposes, al-Ṣadūq’s 
citations bring him into clear conversation with adab.  
In the main these citations are found in the service of the imāms’ aḥādīth. Al-Ṣadūq draws on 
poets and lexicographers to explore contentious vocabulary within the aḥādīth, whilst 
biographers and historians serve as a source for the aḥādīth themselves. Thus far, then, the 
conversation with adab is thoroughly subservient to legal-theological concerns, indeed to 
legal-theological texts. What alters this dynamic is the range of subjects about which al-Ṣadūq 
calls on the imāms’ aḥādīth to speak. To look at the listings of his prolific output given in al-
Ṭūsī and especially in al-Najāshī, one is left in no doubt that al-Ṣadūq was first and foremost 
a scholar of the law. The great majority of the works listed in these bibliographies are clearly 
identified by their recorded titles as treatises on individual legal topics: ‘Epistle on 
Pilgrimage,’ ‘The Book of Prayer,’ ‘The book of Ablution’ and so on, while many more 
profess to deal with theological matters or with methodological concerns like rijāl. 
                                                            
204 Al-Tawḥīdī, al-Ṣadāqa wa'l-ṣadīq, pp. 203, 291. 
205 See below.  
206 Gleave, pp. 352, 360-361, 381-382. 
207 E.g. ʿUyūn, p. 25. 
208 E.g. Kamāl al-dīn, p. 277. 
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Nonetheless, there remains a minority of recorded works which address areas significantly 
beyond this purview, a number of which survive for us to examine. 
Among those lost works whose recorded titles catch regretful eyes are a book on history (al-
Tārīkh), a book on poetry (al-shiʿr), a commentary on an ode (Tafsīr qaṣīda fī ahl al-bayt) a 
book on firsts (al-Awāʾil) and one on lasts (al-awākhir).209 In their titles we already see that 
the breadth of interest found in al-Ṣadūq’s citations found expression in whole books dedicated 
to subjects beyond the conventional reach of legal-theological concerns such as we find 
addressed in works like al-Iʿtiqādāt and al-Hidāya, subjects which, meanwhile, are  deeply 
embedded in adab discourse. We are not, fortunately, restricted to titles of forgotten texts, but 
possess a number of books from among those extant which clearly go beyond the purview of 
usual legal-theological literature and resonate instead with the interests of adab. This is most 
emphatically the case in five of his extant works: al-Khiṣāl, al-Mawāʿiẓ, ʿIlal al-sharāʾiʿ and 
Muṣādaqa al-ikhwān (a number of others certainly contain adabī elements but in a less 
formative capacity, as will be discussed below). Two of these exhibit clear and substantial 
overlap with adab in their subject matter. Al-Mawāʿiẓ, ‘The Counsels,’ in which are compiled 
the words of wisdom that the Prophet and the Imāms imparted to their successors, often as a 
parting testament (waṣīya), presents Imāmī manifestation of the adab staple of wisdom 
literature.210 In Muṣādaqa al-ikhwān, ‘Sincerity amongst Brethren,’ meanwhile, which 
discusses the virtues friendship and courtesy amongst fellow believers, we have treatise, again 
in the words of the imāms, on topics of central interest to adab writers of the period.211 
The two other works, al-Khiṣāl (The Qualities/Numbers212) and ʿIlal al-sharāʾiʿ (The Causes 
of Laws),213 are a larger and more complex affair. These two books share a recognisably 
common structural pattern. Both compile a considerable, extremely diverse volume of Imāmī 
akhbār under the rubric of a single, more or less eccentric, overarching theme. In ʿIlal al-
sharāʾiʿ, ‘The Causes of Laws,’ this principle is that of causation, but it is far from being 
restricted to matters of law. We read aḥādīth explaining phenomena as diverse as why the sky 
                                                            
209 Books of ‘Firsts’ constitute a particular genre of adab compendium, in which were listed for the 
curiosity and betterment of those who would be cultured anecdotes concerning the first precedents of 
activities and events as diverse as the first person to be stoned for adultery, the first person to draw lots 
for a godly cause, the first person to hire Turkic soldiers and the first person to pledge allegiance to 
ʿAlī. The best-known surviving such compendium by a contemporary of al-Ṣadūq is the al-Awāʾil of 
Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī. The book of ‘lasts’ is a less common phenomenon for obvious reasons, and in 
later literature sometimes appears discussing mystical and eschatological themes. We can, alas, only 
guess as to what al-Ṣadūq made of the genre.  
210 For wisdom literature’s significance in and relation to adab literature see Gutas, pp. 55-57, 62-69; 
Kilpatrick, ‘Adab’, p. 55; Kilpatrick & Leder, p. 4.  
211See Alshaar, passim. 
212 See below.  
213 The book’s full title is Kitāb ʿilal al-sharāʾiʿ wa al-aḥkām wa al-asbāb. 
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is called the sky,214 why corpses weep,215 why the sunset prayer contains only three bowings,216 
why pregnancy interrupts menstruation,217 why the world’s peoples differ in appearance,218 
why ʿAlī was unable to lift the Prophet on his shoulders when smashing the idols in the 
Kaʿba219 and why Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq stopped brushing his teeth two years before he died.220 Al-
Khiṣāl’s organising principle, meanwhile, is based on a pun in the title, which can mean both 
‘The Numbers (or Quantities)’ or ‘The Qualities.’ The book is structured according to the first 
of these meanings, each chapter being devoted to a number (first giving chapters on each from 
one to twenty, then rather more sporadically chapters covering higher numbers up to one 
hundred) and containing traditions in which that number appears. The contents, however, 
recalls the second meaning, with most of the book’s traditions enumerating qualities of some 
sort: the five virtues which guarantee paradise, the four marks of a Shīʿī and so forth. The 
organising schemata of these two books do not find many exact parallels elsewhere in adab 
literature, but they fit utterly into the broader convention of what some scholars term 
monothematic compendia.221 Adab writers routinely produced collections of interesting and 
edifying material based around a given theme, and the range of themes we see selected is more 
than broad enough to accommodate those of causality and number (including the books of 
firsts, one of which al-Ṣadūq wrote), giving expression to the powerful encyclopaedic impulse 
of intellectual culture in the fourth/tenth century.222 Meanwhile, in al-Khiṣāl’s case we have a 
close parallel in al-Thaʿālibī’s Bard al-akbād fī’l-aʿdād, a collection of poetic gobbets ordered 
like al-Khiṣāl on the basis of the numbers they contain. 
As well as the strong affinities with adab observable in their form and content, it is also clear 
is that the character of these books forms the starkest of contrasts with more familiar models 
of ḥadīth compendium favoured in legal-theological literature. al-Kulaynī’s al-Kāfī is a case 
in point. Al-Kāfī, whose title tellingly translates as ‘The Sufficient’ or ‘The Comprehensive’ 
presents itself unambiguously as an encyclopaedia of everything the believer needs to know, 
dividing its material precisely into uṣūl and furūʿ, law and theology, each of which are 
addressed in extensive and systematic detail. This eponymous sufficiency, however, must be 
challenged by the eclectic diversity of ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl. Al-Kāfī answer questions regarding 
the nature of God’s attributes, correct ablution and the continuation of the imāmate, but it does 
not address the ten qualities of the watermelon, Muʿāwiya’s grievances against ʿAbd Allah b. 
                                                            
214 ʿIlal, pp. 10-11. 
215 Ibid., p. 296. 
216 Ibid., pp. 311-312. 
217 Ibid., pp. 282-283. 
218 Ibid., 17-22. 
219 Ibid., pp. 171-174. 
220 Ibid., p. 286. 
221 See Orfali, p. 49. 
222 See Kilpatrick, ‘A Genre’, pp. 34-35. 
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ʿanswer questions regarding the nature of God’s 223 Excluded from sufficiency, such questions, 
the very stuff of these compendia of al-Ṣadūq, are deemed by al-Kulaynī to be unnecessary. 
In ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl we therefore encounter a different image of the imāms, and a much more 
expansive vision of the kinds of questions that their recorded speech may be expected to 
answer. This expansion takes al-Ṣadūq’s compendia beyond the bounds of legal theological 
discourse and into the curiosities that commonly distinguish adab. We are compelled to ask 
to what end he takes his compiling of the imāms’ ḥadīth in such a direction. 
 
SOTERIOLOGY AND ECLECTICISM – When Adab Meets Ḥadīth 
 
In understanding the purpose of al-Ṣadūq’s adoption of the characteristics of adab literature, 
it is important first to note that these characteristics are not unprecedented in Imāmī ḥadīth 
literature, rather we find a clear and significant predecessor in the person of Aḥmad b. 
Muḥammad al-Barqī (d. 274/887 or 280/893). Among the extant books of al-Barqī’s mostly 
lost magnum opus al-Maḥāsin we find two books which largely echo the structural schemata 
of ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl respectively: al-ʿIlal and al-Ashkāl wa'l-qarāʾin. Both books are much 
smaller (at least as they have come down to us) than the corresponding books by al-Ṣadūq but 
both order aḥādīth according to the same pattern of causality and number respectively, and 
both contain the same mix of contents. Like al-Ṣadūq, meanwhile, the recorded titles of al-
Barqī’s lost works point to the same adab-inclining erudition, including works on maths, 
grammar, poetry and history.224 
Unlike al-Ṣadūq’s ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl, however, al-Barqī’s al-ʿIlal and al-Ashkāl and their 
unusual nature have been subjected to recent study by Vilozny, who suggests a number of 
explanations for al-Barqī’s having composed them as he has. These are their situation in the 
pre-Buwayhid, pre-canonical phase of Imāmī ḥadīth, al-Barqī’s having borrowed an adabī 
form for his ḥadīth compendia, the influence of Middle Persian traditions of wisdom literature 
and Imāmī customs for the dissemination of knowledge amongst the faithful, including 
ensuring that secret knowledge is not made available to the uninitiated.225  
                                                            
223 See al-Khiṣāl, pp. 240-243; ʿIlal, p. 544. We need not infer from this that al-Kulaynī was ignorant 
of or disinterested in such matters, indeed biographical sources state that to the contrary he was widely 
educated in much greater range of subjects, subjects such as poetry and lexicography, than are discussed 
in al-Kāfī. See Amir-Moezzi & Ansari, pp. 139-141. 
224 Al-Najāshī, Rijāl, pp. 74-75. 
225 Discussing in isolation the similarity between al-Ṣadūq’s al-Khiṣāl and al-Barqī’s al-Ashkāl, Vilozny 
suggests that al-Ṣadūq had not seen the book itself but rather received some of its contents through his 
teachers. He bases this on al-Ṣadūq’s omission of much of al-Ashkāl’s material from al-Khiṣāl and also 
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We must examine how these hypotheses may be applicable to al-Ṣadūq’s apparent emulation 
of these same forms a century after al-Barqī. A first step is to interrogate the relationship 
between these two scholars that we may better understand the nature of that emulation. It is 
clear that this was one of emphatic influence of al-Barqī upon al-Ṣadūq. Al-Barqī is a regular 
presence in al-Ṣadūq’s asānīd, and in al-Faqīh al-Ṣadūq names al-Barqī’s al-Maḥāsin as one 
of the well-known books from which the texts in al-Faqīh are sourced.226 Moreover, there are 
two further books from al-Maḥāsin of which al-Ṣadūq authored compendia with the same 
titles, ʿIqāb al-aʿmāl (Deeds and their Punishments) and Thawāb al-aʿmāl (Deeds and their 
Rewards), and from the bibliographical record we know of many other pairs of similar works 
by the two authors, one or both of which is lost.227 In the extant works we can see that this 
emulation goes far beyond the titles, with sizeable portions and sometimes the majority of the 
material in al-Barqī’s books appearing in the parallel work by al-Ṣadūq.228 It is further 
recorded that al-Ṣadūq wrote a commentary on al-Barqī’s al-Rijāl, the only recorded incident 
of his having written a commentary on the work of a named author. We thus see across al-
Ṣadūq’s work, including those aspects of his oeuvre which depart from usual legal-theological 
paradigms of subject matter, a marked interest in and indebtedness to his ninth-century 
predecessor.  
This solid genealogy of influence between the two scholars renders Vilozny’s conclusions 
regarding the nature of al-Barqī’s writings all the more pertinent to al-Ṣadūq. In particular, his 
characterisation of al-Ashkāl as borrowing its structure from adab literature seems even more 
relevant for al-Ṣadūq, given our knowledge of his proximity to adab circles.229 230 On the other 
hand, al-Ṣadūq’s similarity to al-Barqī in these writings problematizes Vilozny’s attribution 
of the style of al-Ashkāl and al-ʿIlal to al-Barqī’s pre-Buwayhid and ‘pre-canonical’ context. 
                                                            
on al-Ṣadūq’s introduction to the latter work in which he justifies its composition with the observation 
that his fellow scholars have yet to produce such a work. (Vilozny, ‘A Concise Numerical Guide’, p. 
72). This conclusion, however, neither takes into account the extensive evidence of al-Ṣadūq’s interest 
in al-Barqī’s oeuvre outlined here, nor the fact that the author’s claim that a work has no precedent is a 
standard topos in Medieval Arabic scholarship, and thus does not constitute proof that an author making 
such a claim as al-Ṣadūq does is, indeed, ignorant of such clear predecessors as may exist. 
226 Al-Faqīh, pp. 13-14.  
227 These include a lost al-Mawāʿiẓ by al-Barqī (al-Ṣadūq’s al-Mawāʿiẓ being extant), amongst others. 
It is worth noting that al-Barqī had an awkward fondness for titles (‘’ and so on) which do not directly 
reveal a book’s subject. Amongst such works there may therefore be further doppelgangers to al-
Ṣadūq’s later compilations.  
228 We should further bear in mind the possibility entertained by Vilozny that al-Barqī’s works may be 
incompletely transmitted. (Vilozny, ‘A Concise Numerical Guide’, p. 73). It is therefore possible that 
complete versions of these works contained even more material that al-Ṣadūq recycled in similar format, 
or, indeed, more material that he did not.  
229 Vilozny’s suggestion that taqīya may play a role will be addressed in depth below.  
230 We know even less of al-Barqī’s life than we do of al-Ṣadūq’s, a lack of evidence which compels us 
for now to remain agnostic regarding the question of whether he too had links to such circles. Al-Barqī, 




It is intriguing in this regard that Vilozny refers to Imāmī ḥadīth as being canonized under 
Buwayhid rule, for though three of the four canonical works of Imāmī ḥadīth were written 
under the Buwayhids, their canonisation as such only took place long after. It is true that 
Buwayhid Imāmī scholars, not least al-Mufīd and al-Ṭūsī who authored half of that canon, 
addressed with a formative vigour the question of how the Imāmī ḥadīth corpus was to be 
approached and routinized, but that process is already thoroughly in evidence before the 
Buwayhids in al-Kulaynī, and in al-Ṣadūq and later Buwayhid writers we meanwhile see a 
continuation of al-Barqī’s style of compilation. This suggests, then, that rather than 
constituting an earlier stage in an evolutionary process that would ultimately give way to a 
less eccentric, more routinized style of compilation, al-Barqī and al-Ṣadūq present us with 
something more enduring and therefore more deliberate. 
That it is purpose rather than outdated convention driving al-Ṣadūq’s to compile ʿIlal and al-
Khiṣāl as he does is illustrated nowhere better than by the fact that he elsewhere does things 
quite differently. As observed above, accounts of al-Ṣadūq’s oeuvre as a whole reveal a solid 
focus on the conventional domains of legal-theological scholarship. Extant works like al-
Faqīh, al-Hidāya, al-Iʿtiqādāt and al-Muqniʿ leave us in no doubt that al-Ṣadūq could write 
as solid a legal manual or creed as the next scholar, with no hint of digression into obscure 
taxonomies involving watermelons. The style of ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl thus constitutes a clear 
authorial choice. 
Let us return to another of Vilozny’s interpretations of al-Barqī’s works, wherein he calls al-
Ashkāl ‘a collection of ḥadīth with an adab style and message.’231 This is, as acknowledged 
above, a valuable identification of a precursor to al-Ṣadūq’s engagement with adabī forms of 
compilation. The specific implications of this reading, however, come into conflict with the 
reality of al-Ṣadūq’s context. ‘A collection of ḥadīth with an adab style and message,’ Al-
Ashkāl is not for Vilozny a work of adab in essence, rather it is an Imāmī ḥadīth collection 
that draws on the adab tradition for certain aspects of its construction. Vilozny makes it quite 
clear in his discussion of al-Ashkāl that this adabī component is not considered of the foremost 
significance, dwelling primarily on the Imāmī doctrinal context of al-Ashkāl’s contents, and 
dwelling more on what its structure may owe to Pahlavi andarz literature than to ninth-century 
adab.232 By the time we reach al-Ṣadūq in the latter fourth/tenth century, however, the 
structures of ḥadīth compendia have implications far beyond the formal. An illuminating voice 
is that of ibn Qūlawayh. In the same introduction to his Kāmil al-ziyārāt discussed in Chapter 
One, he writes as follows:  
                                                            
231 Vilozny, ‘A Concise Numerical Guide’ p. 69.  
232 Ibid., pp. 73-75. 
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I have divided [this book] into chapters, and each of those chapters concerns one topic, 
such that it includes no ḥadīth that does not concern that topic. Were I to do so, this 
would distract the reader, rendering him unsure of what he sought, and of how and 
whence to seek it! Other authors have composed works in such a manner, fashioning 
chapters whose contents is contrary to how they are titled, chapters in which they cite 
aḥādīth that do not concern the topic of that chapter, even to the point where a chapter 
does not contain a single ḥadīth of clear pertinence amongst those that have absolutely 
no relevance to the title of the chapter! 
My purpose [in avoiding such practices] was to make it easy for the reader who seeks 
a particular ḥadīth in this book, such that he may go straight to the relevant chapter 
for the ḥadīth he seeks and find it therein. In this way the reader will not tire of this 
book, nor will the one to whom it is read, and they may thus learn what God has in 
store for his devoted servant who visits the tomb of al-Ḥusayn and the master, God’s 
blessings be upon them, and that they may increase in longing for the imāms and for 
the visiting of the imāms, God’s blessings be upon them, seeking the abundant 
rewards and manifold blessings that God has promised them.233 
For ibn Qūlawayh, we clearly see, how one structures ḥadīth compendia is an important and 
contentious issue. The last four lines are retained advisedly, for in these we see, as ibn 
Qūlawayh reverts to firmly beatific language, the divine justification for the more technical 
criticism dominating the previous lines. His point is simple enough: that he has ensured that 
his book is a functioning reference tool, that those in need of guidance may use it fruitfully 
without becoming bewildered or enraged. The stakes of this could not be higher, for the 
knowledge the book imparts if of the greatest salvific significance, and it must therefore be a 
disgrace on the part of the compiler should he not facilitate the reader’s access to that 
knowledge. Ibn Qūlawayh names no names, but the author of al-Khiṣāl and ʿIlal must surely 
feel his ears burning.  
Ibn Qūlawayh’s invocation of the compiler’s sacred duty to convey the imāms’ teachings to 
the reader prompts us to reflect in detail on ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl’s efficacy on that front. In this 
they may be illustratively compared to al-Ṣadūq’s more conventional works, works like al-
Faqīh, al-Hidāya, al-Iʿtiqādāt and al-Muqniʿ.234 These four books are all staunchly legal-
                                                            
233 Ibn Qūlawayh, pp. 6-7. 
234 The most prominent of these is the subsequently canonical Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh, presenting 
itself as the convenient answer to all the perplexed Imāmī’s legal queries. As well as unambiguously 
declaring this purpose in its introduction (al-Faqīh, pp. 12-14), the work facilitates and enacts 
doxothesis in its structure, arranged logically according to broad subject areas and derivative questions 
in what had become the standard layout for a legal manual. Al-Faqīh is not alone, though, and stands 
alongside a number of similar guides for the faithful. Al-Iʿtiqādāt is, as Fyzee’s translation renders it, 
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theological in their subject matter, outlining correct practice or correct belief, and are all 
constructed clearly, deliberately and methodically to instruct the Imāmī faithful in their 
religion. They lay out their explications of creed and law according to established formulae, 
addressing pertinent topics for easy consultation, be it the minutiae of how to pray correctly 
or correct understandings of God and his attributes. Points are supported with proof-texts 
where necessary, cementing unambiguous affirmations of orthodoxy. Potential disputes and 
conflicts between different aḥādīth are disambiguated. Such works are, of course, entirely in 
keeping with the rich tradition of manuals of belief and practice produced in the Abbasid 
period and after by Muslim scholars of religion, and their instructive format seems so 
objectively born of their didactic purpose as to be seldom remarked upon. Its significance 
here, meanwhile, is the flamboyance with which ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl depart from such 
structures. An Imāmī who has questions regarding times of prayer may, in al-Faqīh, turn to 
the relevant section,235 and select from a number of juxtaposed chapters which are relevant to 
these questions. If, however, that reader is instead consulting al-Khiṣāl, he is in luck only if 
he wishes to read aḥādīth containing a particular number. If the more pressing matter of prayer 
times is still his concern, he may, perhaps, turn to the chapter on five in search of material 
pertaining to the five mandatory prayers, but he will have to sift through accounts of the five 
most accursed amongst humankind, the five mosques in Kufa in which it is forbidden to pray, 
the five companions of the Prophet for whom the Garden yearns and the five ways in which 
white roosters are similar to prophets,236 in the hope of finding something useful. In ʿIlal one 
may turn to a demarcated section on prayer, but will still be frustrated in the search for 
definitive answers. The book frequently gives multiple, sometimes directly conflicting 
explanations for phenomena (the number of rakaʿāt in the sunset prayer, for example, are 
attributed both to divine command given during the miʿrāj and to Muḥammad’s joy at the 
birth of Fāṭima; the prohibition of wearing gold rings in prayer attributed variously to their 
being worn by the inhabitants of hell and their being sported by the inhabitants of 
paradise237).238  
                                                            
‘a Shiite creed,’ economically and definitively explaining the Imāmī position in matters of theology. 
Al-Muqniʿ, meanwhile, is another legal manual of a very similar mould to al-Faqīh, and al-Hidāya is 
another brief legal manual with a creed affixed.  
235 As well as a great many other matters, ʿIlal does contain large sections dealing with prayer, purity, 
fasting and pilgrimage. It must be noted that these are not signposted as discrete sections, but the 
chapters of which they are made up are unmistakeably grouped together according to shared subject 
matter.  
236 Al-Khiṣāl, p. 329. 
237 ʿIlal, p. 334. 
238 ʿIlal has remained a popular work up until modern times. An important element of that popularity is 
a genealogy of scholars stretching from al-Shahīd al-Thānī to Rūḥullāh Khumaynī, who found within 
it confirmation of their esoteric understandings of prayer. That they should have done so draws attention 
to the fact that although, as we have seen, al-Ṣadūq’s discussion of prayer in ʿIlal certainly does not set 
out to draw a systematised, gnostic understanding of such things, it contains much material which is of 
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The issue here is not the absence of information in the aḥādīth. Both of these compendia 
contain much that must be of interest to even the most pedantic of inquirers: one stumbles 
across material regarding the legal status of praying in marshland, of wearing skins of unusual 
creatures and drinking from silver goblets.239 Rather the way in which these narrations are 
compiled, not to mention the many unapologetic contradictions, means that only extreme good 
fortune or extreme patients will deliver specific information on demand. If we apply the 
demands of ibn Qūlawayh to these texts the verdict is clear: al-Ṣadūq, as he buries valuable 
information on the impermissibility of playing chess amongst physiognomical observations,240 
is callously obstructing his readers’ capacity to consult the soteriologically indispensable 
speech of the imāms, creating the pernicious inverse of a good reference work.  
Such are the momentous stakes of the enigma that is these books’ compilation, the urgency of 
the question of their purpose and the impossibility of viewing them as ḥadīth compendia like 
any other. Their departure from the didactic norms of legal-theological compilation as outlined 
by ibn Qūlawayh is highly morally and epistemologically charged, and liable to provoke 
severe censure from al-Ṣadūq’s fellow scholars. We are thus compelled to seriously examine 
the reasons behind these works’ being structured as they are, and in so doing to interrogate 
their relationship with the adab literature whence those structures appear to be derived. Of 
what use is adab to al-Ṣadūq? 
 
ADDRESSING THE MASSES 
 
We have established that these books to not undertake to instruct the Imāmī faithful after the 
manner of more conventional, legal-theological ḥadīth compendia. It is possible that they are 
intended to instruct these same Imāmī readers in a different fashion, but it is also possible that 
they are written with a different readership in mind. Some preliminary clues to these books’ 
intended audience may be found in their introductions. At first glance we are not well-served 
therein, for ʿIlal, al-Khiṣāl and smaller works with adabī characters like al-Mawāʿiẓ and 
                                                            
interest and use to those who might wish to. The significance of this is that while the Imāmī interest in 
such matters begins in earnest a few centuries later, al-Ṣadūq had around him a great many 
contemporaries of other Shīʿī denominations who were already enthusiastic proponents of such modes 
of thought. For reasons which will have become clear by the end of the previous chapter, one does not 
need to look hard to find groups with a greater interest in non-compiled systematic discourse than al-
Ṣadūq. Within the Shīʿī context, these range from some writings attributed to Zaydī and Fāṭimid Imāms 
which set out defined interpretative schemata for various doctrines to Zaydī writings on kalām to the 
elaborate philosophical systems of Ismāʿīlī duʿāt like al-Sijistānī and Nuṣayrīs like al-Khaṣībī, as well 
as the writings of the Brethren of Purity.  
239 Al-Khiṣāl, pp. 374, ʿIlal, pp. 314-315, 328-329.  
240 Al-Khiṣāl, pp. 276-8. 
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Muṣādaqa either have no introduction or an extremely brief one. Nowhere do we see a text to 
match the extended theological polemic with which al-Ṣadūq introduces Kamāl al-dīn, or even 
the terse but clear statements of intention which begin al-Faqīh and al-Tawḥīd.  
This very absence may be a telling one, however. Though al-Ṣadūq nowhere provides us with 
an introduction which squarely places a work in an adabī context after the manner of al-
Tawḥīdī or ibn Qutayba, we should not disregard his choice not to introduce them with 
specifically Imāmī discourse. Al-Ṣadūq opens al-Tawḥīd by stating that this book is to refute 
those among the opponents of the Imāmīya who denounce the reported speech of the imāms 
as theologically unsound.241 He opens al-Faqīh by expressing his ambition for it to serve as a 
convenient and comprehensive reference,242 and he opens Kamāl al-dīn with an extensive 
inter-Shīʿī polemic regarding the identity and legitimacy of the true imām.243 We would be 
well-entitled to expect him to open ʿIlal, al-Khiṣāl or al-Mawāʿiẓ with similar declarations of 
how these texts are (for instance) intended to instruct the faithful in the breadth of the imāms’ 
knowledge or the improving value of their sermons, but we find no such declaration. Vilozny 
reads al-Barqī’s al-ʿIlal as undertaking to illustrate the principle that ‘God has done nothing 
without cause,’ and indeed that the imāms are privy to such causes.244 While the reader of 
either al-Barqī’s al-ʿIlal or al-Ṣadūq’s ʿIlal is liable to be persuaded of such a conclusion, they 
are left to their own devices to do so, with al-Ṣadūq’s usual explanation of what he hopes the 
reader will learn from his compilation remaining a conspicuous absence. In al-Khiṣāl and al-
Mawāʿiẓ, for which a brief introduction is supplied, the books’ material is introduced in in 
very different tones. Al-Mawāʿiẓ’s contents are introduced as ‘precious glimmers and 
iridescent jewels, counsels of the house of prophecy,’ and the one who reads, ponders and 
memorises them is promised blessings and provenance.245 At the beginning of al-Khiṣāl, 
meanwhile, al-Ṣadūq notes simply that none of his predecessors have authored a book 
comprising ‘Those numbers and qualities/quantities that are praised and those that are 
condemned,’ and thus he did it himself, considering such a work a boon for seekers of 
knowledge and virtue.246  
These are not, it is true, paeans to the virtue of erudition or detailed musings on the 
programmatic education of the masses such as open the classic examples of the adab 
compendium.247 But they are shorn of sectarian polemic, speaking only in the most general of 
                                                            
241 Al-Tawḥīd, pp. 21-22. 
242 Al-Faqīh, pp. 12-14. 
243 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 31-157. 
244 Vilozny, ‘Réflexions’, p. 417. 
245 Al-Mawāʿiẓ, p. 293. 
246 Al-Khiṣāl, pp. 17-18. 
247 See above. 
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terms about the benefits of knowledge and the virtue of such wisdom as they contain. 
Moreover, while al-Khiṣāl’s introduction does start with a brief invocation declaring the truth 
of the imāms and the necessity of following their teachings,248 al-Mawāʿiẓ not only lacks such 
an explicitly Imāmī evocation but instead begins by praising only the Prophet, ʿAlī and the 
Prophet’s ‘successors’ (khulafāʾ, sg. khalīfa), this last word appearing as a conspicuous 
evasion of Shīʿī vocabulary (imām, waṣī etc).249 Such features put these books at a conspicuous 
distance from works like al-Tawḥīd and Kamāl al-dīn, and closer still to the adab compendia 
that they resemble in many other ways. Al-Ṣadūq is here making efforts to cast his book as 
wisdom literature like any other, courting the same readership for the imāms’ words as is 
found for adab’s accustomed constellation of sages, saints, Greeks, Persians, poets and fools. 
In such a context ʿIlal’s lack of any introduction looks more significant, and may thus be read 
as a similar attempt to court a broader audience than would be available to a book that began 
with the stated aim of demonstrating the imāms’ unique insight into God’s creative wisdom.  
This downplaying of explicit sectarianism in pursuit of a wider readership is also observable 
in the bodies of ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl, where we see the more forceful notes of Shīʿī discourse 
deliberately censored. A textbook case is the vilification of Muḥammad’s wife ʿĀʾisha and 
the first three caliphs Abū Bakr, ʿUmar and ʿUthmān, figures whom Shīʿīs hold primarily 
responsible for the catastrophic prevention of ʿAlī’s succession to Muḥammad, but whom 
Sunnīs conversely revere.  While we find (often comic) denunciations in these books of less 
revered characters like Muʿāwiya,250 aḥādīth condemning these more venerable figures are 
quite absent, an absence which sometimes leaves a visible hole.  A list of six figures who are 
destined for the fire names Muʿāwiya alongside accomplices like Abū Musā al-Ashʿarī and 
ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ, but ends by stating that the narrator ‘had forgotten two of them,’ without a 
doubt suppressing the names of Abū Bakr and ʿUmar.251 In other Imāmī contexts we find Abū 
Bakr and ʿUmar roundly criticised for their wickedly and blatantly ignoring Muḥammad’s 
clear designation of ʿAlī at Ghadīr Khumm, but in al-Khiṣāl we find a rather different Abū 
Bakr, contrite on his deathbed expressing regret that he did not heed ʿAlī’s designation as he 
should have.252 In ʿIlal a group of narrations discussing how the phrase ‘ḥayy ʿalā khayr al-
ʿamal’ was wrongly omitted from the call to prayer due to the shortcomings of ʿUmar are not 
presented in a discrete chapter as one would expect, but are instead buried in a bulk of other 
material in the chapter on the obscure matters (nawādir) of prayer.253 As for ʿ Āʾisha, al-Khiṣāl 
                                                            
248 Al-Khiṣāl, p. 17. 
249 Al-Mawāʿiẓ, p. 293. 
250 Al-Khiṣāl, p. 219. 
251 Al-Khiṣāl, p. 529. 
252 Al-Khiṣāl, pp. 503-509. 
253 ʿIlal, pp. 352-353. 
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gives a list of three individuals who lied about Muḥammad: Abū Hurayra, Anas b. Mālik and 
‘a woman.’254  
This sanitising of the more virulently sectarian voices in al-Ṣadūq’s ḥadīth make it quite plain 
that these texts are courting a non-Imāmī audience. Al-Ṣadūq is not merely borrowing the 
structures of adab, he is reaching out to the same readership, thus bringing these texts much 
closer to identification as works of adab in a sense that goes beyond formal emulation. In 
these books al-Ṣadūq makes a deliberate attempt to participate in adab literature and to address 
its audience. 
  
PERFECT SPEECH – Adab and the Imāms 
 
What are we to make of al-Ṣadūq’s apparent wish to educate non-Imāmīs in what the imāms 
had to say about the comparative luminescences of the sun and the moon?255 As we have seen, 
the little al-Ṣadūq tells us in the introductions to his works is most illustrative in what is left 
unsaid. More forthcoming is the introduction of an iconic text of Buwayhid Imāmī adab from 
a few decades later. This is al-Sharīf al-Raḍī’s Nahj al-balāgha. Unlike al-Ṣadūq, al-Raḍī was 
recognised first and foremost as a poet and litterateur,256 but he was also distinguished legal-
theological scholar, who had been a student of al-Mufīd. Nahj al-balāgha is similar in many 
ways to ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl. Like them, it resembles the form of a monothematic adab 
compendium composed only of the sayings of the imāms, or in this case only one imām, ʿAlī 
b. Abī Ṭālib. As its title indicates, Nahj al-balāgha (‘The Peak of Eloquence’) sets out to 
collect and present ʿAlī’s words on the basis of their supreme rhetorical value, and is 
accordingly along rhetorical lines that the book is arranged, dividing ʿ Alī’s words on the basis 
of form (sermon, epistle and aphorism) rather than of content. As with al-Ṣadūq’s works, this 
structure naturally limits the book’s use as a manual for those seeking specific theological or 
legal instruction from the imām’s words, or indeed answers to historical disputes. ‘I do not 
aspire to sequence and structure,’ al-Raḍī tells the reader, ‘but to glimmers and subtileties,’ 
closely echoing he does so al-Ṣadūq’s introduction of al-Mawāʿiẓ as ‘precious glimmers and 
iridescent jewels.’257 Al-Raḍī’s list of the beneficial content of ʿAlī’s speech is a veritable 
                                                            
254 Al-Khiṣāl, p. 218. 
255 Al-Khiṣāl, p. 533. 
256 Indeed, Mubārak considers him the very greatest of Arab poets. See Mubārak, p. 8 and passim.  
257 Al-Raḍī, Nahj al-balāgha, p. 17. Nahj al-balāgha has enjoyed a long and eventful reception history 
as a revered repository of ʿAlī’s speech that has quite obscured its origins in a distinctly adabī context. 
So extraordinary is the extent of this that the covers of modern editions often present the work as 
authored by the imām, with no sign of al-Sharīf al-Raḍī. That al-Raḍī’s interests lay quite outside 
certifying the authenticity of the book’s contents is clear from his unapologetic discarding of all asānīd, 
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check-list of the adab compendium: ‘Sermons, epistles, counsels and manners’ (ādāb, sg. 
adab).258 
In Nahj al-balāgha we also see much more clearly than in al-Ṣadūq the efforts of al-Raḍī to 
neutralise the sectarian charge of his material. Al-Raḍī tells us in the introduction to Nahj al-
balāgha how it was during the course of an earlier work, Khaṣāʾiṣ al-aʾimma (intended to be 
a biography of the twelve imāms, the first section of which thus concerned ʿAlī), that he 
became inspired to write a book devoted to ʿAlī’s magnificent speech.259 This is an innocuous 
enough origin-story the likes of which abound in introductions to Medieval Arabic literature. 
If, however, we then look to Khaṣāʾiṣ al-aʾimma we find a very different narrative of origins. 
Al-Raḍī tells us how he was taunted by a group of fellow descendants from the seventh imām 
Mūsā al-Kāẓim who were Wāqifīs (we may perhaps presume sevener Wāqifīs) and felt thus 
compelled to write a work that would affirm his distinctly Imāmī position.260 The situating of 
Nahj al-balāgha’s mother-text in so pugnaciously sectarian a discourse only reinforces the 
absence of such sentiments from Nahj al-balāgha’s own introduction. Telling us why he 
entitled the book as he did, al-Raḍī expresses his hope that a book entitled ‘The Peak of 
Eloquence’ will attract seekers of knowledge, and asserts the benefits that those attracted will 
find in the art of rhetoric, in asceticism and in the core Muʿtazilī truths of God’s justice and 
unity, and his transcendence of all created things.261 Nahj al-balāgha’s exclusive focus on 
ʿAlī, meanwhile, allows it to inhabit a far more neutral space than a book devoted to the twelve 
imāms.262 Al-Raḍī closes the introduction by enunciating his attachment to ʿAlī not as Shīʿī 
devotion but tribal pride in his most illustrious ancestor, encapsulating the sentiment with a 
line from al-Farazdaq (who was no Shīʿī) ‘Those are my fathers, so gather me alongside them 
// You who hold the reins, when you bring us together.’263  
                                                            
a move which, as we have seen in al-Faqīh (pp. 12-13), usually requires justification (such as 
convenience or considerations of space) and information on where the studious reader may seek the 
book’s sources. He does refer to the intense disagreement regarding ʿAlī’s words in his introduction, 
but this is no caveat or prelude to a solution, rather it is only an explanation for why the same words 
may appear attributed to ʿAlī in different contexts (al-Raḍī, Nahj al-balāgha, p. 18). Nahj al-balāgha 
sits quite comfortably among several adab compendia of an expressly Imāmī colour written by Imāmīs 
in the later Buwayhid period, most distinguished amongst them the Ghurar al-fawāʾid of al-Raḍī’s 
brother al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and the Nathr al-durr of Manṣūr b. al-Ḥusayn al-Ābī. Zaydī Shīʿīs were 
also composing adab literature with a sectarian colour, for instance the al-Maḥāsin wa’l-masāwiʾ of 
Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Bayhaqī (d. early fourth/tenth century) (see below).  
258 Al-Raḍī, Nahj al-balāgha, p. 16 
259 Al-Raḍī, Nahj al-balāgha, pp. 15-16. 
260 Al-Raḍī, Khaṣāʾiṣ al-aʾimma, p. 25. 
261 Al-Raḍī, Nahj al-balāgha, p. 19. 
262 This apologetic utility notwithstanding, it is undoubtedly the case that ʿ Alī has a particular reputation 
for eloquence quite beyond that of the other imāms and long before al-Sharīf al-Raḍī (For a brief survey 
see Qutbuddin, pp. xvi-xvii). ʿ Alī’s centrality to a distinctive Shīʿī wisdom literature is meanwhile noted 
by Gutas, p. 60. 
263 Al-Raḍī, Nahj al-balāgha, p. 19. 
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This very univocal quality sharply distinguishes both Nahj al-balāgha and al-Ṣadūq’s works 
from other adab compendia. Monothematic or encyclopaedic, adab compendia are 
characterised by a diversity of sources that mirrors the diversity of their contents. The same 
spirit of curiosity that drives adab writers to chronicle Persian customs of divination and the 
full variety of what has been uttered in verse regarding flowers naturally precludes the limiting 
of sources to fourteen Arabs of Hāshim, let alone one, rather it demands material from Greek 
philosophers, ribald poets, Persian kings, witty courtiers and pagan patriarchs, alongside 
Prophets, theologians, judges and ascetics. ‘Wisdom,’ said the Prophet, ‘Is the lost camel of 
the believer.’ Al-Tawḥīdī echoes many forbears in putting this forth as a flagship concept in 
his adab compendium al-Baṣāʾir, a concept he invokes to be defend the work against 
detractors who decry its inclusion of disreputable material.264 Al-Raḍī responds directly to this 
discrepancy in his introduction. In justification of his defying the conventions of adab by 
restricting his ‘glimmers and subtileties’ to a single source, he unreservedly declares ʿAlī the 
wellspring of eloquence, the model rhetorician who set out the rules of that art which others 
ever after follow, and by whose excellence all other early sages are dwarfed. He moreover 
declares that the unique quality of ʿAlī’s words from their bearing ‘the touch of divine 
knowledge and the imprint of prophetic speech.’265 Al-Raḍī is still holding back here, with 
concepts such as the necessity of the infallible ḥujja and the duty to consult his words 
conspicuous by their absence. Nonetheless, the message is no less Shīʿī thus shorn of doctrinal 
specifics, and serves to argue with supreme confidence Nahj al-balāgha’s reshaping of the 
adab compendium’s customary polyphony with a sweeping declaration of hierarchy: only the 
speech of ʿAlī is here because the speech of ʿAlī is best.266  
Though al-Ṣadūq never enunciates this claim in the compendia in question, there can be little 
doubt that they serve to illustrate the same claim made by al-Raḍī. Whatever edifying 
curiosities the reader of adab is used to read reported from sages and kings past and present, 
those reported from God’s chosen imāms are superior. ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl, muting sectarian 
voices and embracing eclecticism of structure and content, court the readership of adab 
literature to show them that the imāms can best it. They do not present arguments of the 
imāms’ superiority or, indeed, their necessity, rather they aim to illustrate it, liberating the 
imāms from the constraints of law and theology to show their mastery even over the lionised 
                                                            
264 Al-Tawḥīdī, al-Baṣāʾir wa'l-dhakhāʾir, p. 13.   
265 Al-Raḍī, Nahj al-balāgha, p. 16. 
266 No less an adīb than al-Jāḥiẓ makes analogous claims of Muḥammad’s speech, rooting its supremacy 
not just in Muḥammad’s unique soteriological status but also the rhetorical and aesthetic quality of his 
speech. See al-Jāḥiẓ, al-Bayān wa’l-tabyīn, p. 17. 
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polymathy that characterised much of Buwayhid literary culture.267 These books are portraits 
of omniscience. 
 
THE LIMITS OF ADAB? 
 
How does this objective affect these books’ attempted participation in adab? We find al-Ṣadūq 
in pursuit of his familiar objective of glorifying the ḥadīth of the imāms. This objective drives 
the rendering of these ḥadīth collections in the image of adab literature, emulating its 
structures and concerns and dulling the sharper edges of the imāms’ aḥādīth, but the same 
objective produces the books’ most conspicuous departure from adab literature’s conventions. 
Al-Ṣadūq aims to exalt the speech of the imāms, and so it is the speech of the imāms that he 
presents, nothing else.  
This pronounced divergence bids us examine whether or not al-Ṣadūq’s attempt to participate 
in adab literature was a success. We cannot, of course, hope to discern whether readers were 
indeed convinced of the imāms’ wisdom by what they read in al-Khiṣāl or ʿIlal, but we can 
examine whether these books would indeed have been read as adab literature by non-Imāmīs 
as al-Ṣadūq intended them to be.  
The long-term reception of these books, as already remarked at this chapter’s opening, paints 
a grim picture. None of al-Ṣadūq’s writings are considered as adab literature today, nor have 
they been for many centuries. Newman has illustrated that his writings declined in popularity 
even in the Shīʿī world in the centuries after his lifetime, and he has no discernible currency 
amongst adab writers for the remainder of the Abbasid era.268 This fate moreover contrasts 
with that of adab literature produced by other Buwayhid Imāmīs. Al-Murtaḍā’s Ghurar al-
fawāʾid and al-Ābī’s Nathr al-durr, both written a few decades after al-Ṣadūq, have received 
continued recognition as adab compendia, despite the unmistakeable Shīʿī tone of much of 
their content, and indeed the known Shīʿī identity of their authors. An obvious point of 
difference to explain this is that both works, despite their unconcealed reverence for the ḥadīth 
of the imāms, accommodate those aḥādīth, albeit in pride of place, within the adab 
compendium’s usual diversity of voices.269 It is hard to deny some correlation between this 
                                                            
267 Rosenthal, pp. 252-298; Alshaar, pp. 46-48, 69, 77-82. 
268 Newman, ‘Recovery’, pp. 112-115. 
269 Obvious though it is, this adherence to adab literature’s usual polyphony is not the only difference 
separating al-Murtaḍā and al-Ābī from al-Ṣadūq. al-Ābī was only ever famous as a poet, adīb and 
statesman, who made no recognised contribution to Imāmī legal-theological scholarship, and his 
surviving work Nathr al-durr meanwhile introduces itself quite explicitly as an adab compendium. Al-
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more conventional format and these works’ greater long-term recognition as part of the adab 
canon.  
This long-term picture is deceptive, however, as it negates the exceptional circumstances of 
the Buwayhid context in which al-Ṣadūq was writing. We have already seen how Buwayhid 
rule’s increased tolerance to Shīʿīs allowed Imāmī legal-theological scholars unprecedented 
opportunities of interaction with their non-Imāmī counterparts, leaving a great impact on their 
writings. The subsequent conquest of the region by the vehemently Sunnī Seljuqs saw Imāmīs 
fleeing the centres of power. The environment in which al-Ṣadūq’s writings, with their solidly 
Imāmī tone, could attain a broad readership thus vanished a few decades after his death. 
What, then, can we make of these writings’ place and their potential success in their immediate 
Buwayhid context? Al-Tawḥīdī’s citations of al-Ṣadūq in his al-Ṣadāqa wa'l-ṣadīq are 
certainly a positive indication. They do not prove a wide readership, but they do show that 
reading al-Ṣadūq’s books was not inconceivable for the non-Imāmī reader and writer of adab 
literature. Unfortunately we do not have a wider array of citations with which to develop this 
picture.270 Instead we must attempt a more precise placing of al-Ṣadūq’s compendia by 
examining the theoretical parameters of adab literature in this period. In doing so we may 
attempt to discern to what extent the nature of these books of al-Ṣadūq, particularly their 
restricted source material, is or is not to be deemed exceptional in their adabī context. 
We may begin this examination with a paradigm for the different spirits of adab and ḥadīth 
scholarship offered by Khalidi: 
While the Hadith scholar of the second or third centuries of Islam was occupied with 
the collection, assessment and arrangement of his materials for the sake of 
incorporating them into a system of belief and action, the adib would be more 
typically occupied in the pursuit of such materials for their own sake and wherever 
they might lead him. Where a muhaddith would be likely to regard Islam as a complete 
and completed cultural system, an adib would be more likely to regard Islam as a 
cultural beginning, a constant invitation to examine the world of man and nature. 
Where a Hadith scholar might regard knowledge itself as a necessarily circumscribed 
and even shrinking commodity, an adib might be more inclined to view knowledge 
as progressing endlessly into the future. And finally, where a muhaddith might 
                                                            
Murtaḍā, too, though better known for his prodigious legal-theological output, was also recognised 
from his lifetime as a poet and an anthologist.  
270 This lack of citations can only be exacerbated by al-Ṣadūq’s near-exclusive reliance on aḥādīth. Al-
Tawḥīdī’s citations quote Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq on al-Ṣadūq’s authority, but aḥādīth in adab contexts are 
frequently cited without a source. It is therefore quite possible that there exist invisible citations of al-
Ṣadūq’s works in the record, manifesting only as a quotation from ʿAlī or another imām. 
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consider certain subjects as irrelevant, uncouth or even harmful to the religious life, 
an adib would be more likely to tolerate all knowledge for its potentially aesthetic 
appeal.271 
The picture here is very much one of two radically different ethoi. The expansive curiosity of 
Khalidi’s adab is clearly opposed to the ḥadīth scholar’s exclusive endeavour of canonisation, 
a modelled dichotomy that would decisively exclude al-Ṣadūq’s compendia from adab 
literature and thus from any hope of success. In practice, however, this paradigm is illustrative 
precisely in showing us how what we have already observed of al-Ṣadūq’s works profoundly 
blurs such easy dichotomies. ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl clearly exhibit in their diverse subject matter 
an adab-like reluctance to circumscribe knowledge, their wilful departure from the systematic 
explanation of doctrine and admittance of contradictions decisively leaning towards the adīb’s 
open-ended search for knowledge rather than the ḥadīth scholar’s closed ‘system of belief and 
action.’ Yet these compendia meanwhile restrict themselves to the words of the imāms in 
deference to just such a system. Al-Ṣadūq is nothing if not a ḥadīth scholar. 
Khalidi goes further in his taxonomy to tentatively distinguish ‘secular’ adab from the 
‘religious’ scholarship of the jurists and theologians.272 In so doing he joins a number of 
scholars over the past few decades who have sought to draw attention to the enlightened, 
‘humanistic’ spirit of adab and particularly of Buwayhid adab. Focussing in particular on the 
figures of al-Tawḥīdī and al-Miskawayh, these several studies placed emphasis on their 
suspicion of sectarian polemic, their emphasis on shared humanity above religious difference 
and their perceived interest in the human subject over the divine will. While the value of this 
scholarship continues to be acknowledged, the emphasis it has placed on adab literature’s 
difference and distance from ‘religious’ thought has encouraged a vision of adab as secular, 
detached from if not opposed to legal-theological scholarship.273  
                                                            
271 Khalidi, Ilsamic Historiography, p. 85. 
272 E.g. Khalidi, Islamic Historiography, pp. 96-111. 
273 Goodman offers an image of humanism that is both diachronic, stretching from the fourth/tenth to 
the ninth/fifteenth centuries and beyond, and thoroughly paradigmatic, even ideological, defining it in 
opposition to distinctly negative manifestations of religiosity and fanaticism. The classic studies of 
Arkoun and Bergé of al-Miskawayh and al-Tawḥīdī respectively, as well as Kraemer’s study of the 
Buwayhid period in general (Kraemer, Cultural Revival), are more restrained, giving detailed 
examinations of particular trends within Buwayhid thought, such as a focus on the individual, an 
enfranchising of models of reason and a willingness to overlook differences of religious affiliation, as 
well as the relationship between these ideas and the Greek philosophical heritage. A more ‘sober’ image 
of this dichotomy is presented by Makdisi, who distinguishes humanism, defined as philology and the 
literary arts, from scholasticism, by which is meant matters of law (p. 2 and passim), in his comparative 
study of intellectual institutions in the Middle East and Europe from the third/ninth to the 
seventh/thirteenth centuries. A detailed discussion of the applicability of the term ‘humanism’ is 
supplied by Kraemer, ‘Preliminary Study’. A specific challenge to the applicability of the term to al-
Tawḥīdī and al-Miskawayh is meanwhile presented by Key. 
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Recently scholarship has challenged this Manichean characterisation. The pedagogical ethos 
of adab in the tenth century and its vision of the cultured man included such virtues as piety, 
generosity and asceticism that were of just as much interest to legal-theological discourse. 
Kilpatrick draws attention to figures like ibn Abī Dunyā (d. 208/823), whose works share adab 
literature’s concern with the ethical education of the masses and the elite (he was the tutor of 
several Abbasid princes), but like al-Ṣadūq these teachings are conveyed by a far more limited 
range of sources (in a given work at least half of his texts will either be or contain ḥadīth or 
Qurʾānic verses).274 Stefan Sperl, too, has pointed to common conceptual ground and 
exchange between adab and ḥadīth scholarship, exploring the understanding and use of the 
term ‘adab’ in what became the six canonical Sunnī ḥadīth compendia (five of which contain 
a chapter explicitly dedicated to ‘adab’), which he finds to encapsulate very similar goals to 
those of adab compendia, in particular that of ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058), 
who alongside his adabī writings was also a Shāfiʿī jurist. Sperl highlights not only the shared 
pedagogical concern of adab and ḥadīth scholarship but also ‘a similar conception of the 
edifying power of speech.’275 He also notes the extensive structural and aesthetic parallels 
between these Sunnī ḥadīth collections and adab compendia276 Alshaar, meanwhile, 
challenges the religious/secular dichotomy from the other direction, demonstrating how al-
Tawḥīdī was not a figure set apart from ‘religious’ discourse, but rather  rests on a polymathy 
that fully embraced the concerns and texts of legal-theological thought alongside his 
commitment to philosophical ideas.277 278 
Rather than two radically opposed types of literature, then, the relationship between ḥadīth 
and adab scholarship in the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries may rather be understood as 
‘a continuum covering the vast religio-cultural legacy inherited and codified by classical 
Arabic letters.’279 Different works occupy different points along a lengthy axis of exchange. 
We do see the kind of polarisation evoked by Khalidi in a work like al-Miskawayh’s adab 
compendium al-Ḥikma al-khālida (‘The Eternal Wisdom’), which intimates a radical 
construction of ‘the sage’ as transcending any particular parameters of religion or culture, 
downplaying the idea of Muḥammad’s or Islam’s supremacy in stark contradistinction to the 
ḥadīth compendium,280 or in Badīʿ al-Zamān’s Maqāmāt wherein we see adab literature 
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producing a veritable parody of ḥadīth discourse.281 Most adab compendia, however, exhibit 
strong continuities with legal-theological discourse, with the Qurʾān and the words of the 
Prophet being given pride of place in any chapter. Adab compendia frequently contain 
humorous, perhaps risqué material, but they just as frequently accompany these light-hearted 
elements with pointed apologies for their inclusion,282 indicating a continuing, significant 
resistance among the literati to admitting excessive frivolity to the serious, pious business of 
education. We may see ibn Abī Dunyā’s near-total exclusion of such humorous and eclectic 
elements in his compendia as only an uncommonly vehement expression of this same 
sentiment, and such a view must place al-Ṣadūq’s al-Mawāʿiẓ alongside ibn Abī Dunyā and 
other more pious udabāʾ.  
This variation is not limited to a single axis of ‘secular’ against ‘religious.’ Adab compendia 
are moulded to diverse interests of compilers, including pietistic, political, sectarian and 
philosophical concerns, with corresponding diverse effects on their shape. al-Ṣadūq’s works 
are certainly unusual in an adab context on account of their restricting their sources to Imāmī 
ḥadīth, but so too are ibn Abī Dunyā’s works with their focus on prophetic ḥadīth (as, indeed, 
is Nahj al-balāgha with its restriction to the words of ʿAlī). al-Miskawayh’s al-Ḥikma al-
khālida is no less unusual for its emphasis on non-prophetic, non-Qurʾānic source material. 
Moreover, though al-Ḥikma al-khālida’s sources are extremely diverse, their subject matter is 
restricted to a very stern, abstracted notion of wisdom, while al-Ṣadūq’s ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl 
use their limited sources to explore a dizzying array of miscellany that is far closer to Khalidi’s 
image of the free exploration of knowledge. al-Māwardī’s Adab al-dunyā wa'l-dīn is another 
text that subjects a wider pool of sources than al-Ṣadūq’s to a much narrower model of 
knowledge. al-Māwardī supplies long interjections in propria persona between individual 
texts to delineate and clarify the concepts that they serve to illustrate, a style of compilation 
quite unlike other such encyclopaedic compendia. The result is a clear effort to manage the 
eclecticism of the adab compendium on behalf of a thoroughly legal-theological (and 
thoroughly Shāfiʿī) urge to regulate and canonise, one befitting al-Māwardī’s place near the 
heart of Sunnism’s political resurgence under the caliph al-Qādir. This is clearly no less a 
sectarian-minded alteration of the adab compendium than al-Ṣadūq’s restriction of his 
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explorations of why pruned palm trees don’t resprout283 to what the imāms have to say on the 
subject.  
There is clearly a spacious margin of diversity in adab literature in which al-Ṣadūq may be 
comfortably situated. While we cannot map his reception in Buwayhid literary circles with 
any accuracy, we can firmly state that his foray into adab in the works under discussion does 
not stand out as especially unusual in its idiosyncrasies, and therefore have no reason to 
suppose that his effort thereby to address a non-Imāmī audience of literati was not successful. 
 
HIDDEN PERSUASIONS – Compilation and Dissimilation 
 
This apparent success is not the whole story of al-Ṣadūq’s participation in adab. Al-Ṣadūq is 
not content for the readers of these works to be won over by the unique quality of the imāms’ 
words that he has convinced them to read, rather this is only one component of a wider strategy 
to impart Imāmī doctrine to a wider audience.  
As is expected, al-Khiṣāl includes a chapter devoted to the number twelve. It starts 
innocuously enough, with a group of Jews asking ʿUmar eleven(!) difficult questions to 
determine the validity of his religion (a stock image that we see repeated in other chapters 
with a different number of questions). We also learn that there are twelve worlds and twelve 
seas, the significance of twelve dirhams given to Muḥammad and that there are twelve months 
in a year.284 Most chapters, as usual, contain only one report, and almost never more than 
three. In the middle of this by now familiar eclecticism, however, we find a chapter listing no 
fewer than forty-five aḥādīth declaring that Muḥammad will have twelve rightful 
successors.285 The objective of this authorial move is plain enough, but even here al-Ṣadūq is 
still holding back. None of these forty-five aḥādīth name the imāms beyond ʿAlī and his two 
sons, unlike in Kamāl al-dīn where al-Ṣadūq produces aḥādīth that name all twelve,286 thus 
keeping a veneer of impartiality. He does, however, inform his reader at the chapter’s close 
that more information on the subject can be found in Kamāl al-dīn.287 The device here is 
evident: in amongst al-Khiṣāl’s curiosities, its injunctions to piety and its curious, engaging 
structure, al-Ṣadūq springs on his reader a veritable barrage of proof-texts for the defining 
claim of Duodeciman Shīʿism. His polemics are not suspended for participation in adab, they 
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are concealed, all the more effective as they are thus conveyed to a broader and unsuspecting 
audience. 
This is not an isolated incidence, rather ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl both are filled with such devices, 
their engaging whimsy sporadically giving way to sudden, deftly asserted proofs and 
polemics. ʿIlal’s magisterial beginning lays out in a number of chapters the reasons for the 
foundational realities of the cosmos, from the reason why humanity turned to fire-worship to 
the angel on whose shoulders the world is balanced to the social habits of animals.288 The sixth 
chapter briefly addresses the Qurʾānic motif of how humankind can both rise higher than the 
angels and sink lower than the beasts, giving the familiar answer that humanity’s combining 
reason and passion elevates the achievement of those who conquer their passions while further 
debasing those who fall prey to them. This segues seamlessly into the next chapter which 
addresses the related question of how Prophets, Messengers and hujaj are better than angels. 
Here, though, the reader is in for a surprise, for the previous chapter’s brief treatment gives 
way to a sweeping miʿrāj narrative, in which Muḥammad in heaven is informed of orders of 
creation and his place within it, a place that is, indeed, above that of the angels. It is not this 
detail that takes up the bulk of the narrative, however, rather it is the identity of other beings 
of a similar status to Muḥammad: the twelve imāms and Fatima. The narrative is addressed to 
ʿAlī, and Muḥammad tells him how he and his descendants share his exalted status, and how 
he saw twelve lights bearing the names of the twelve imāms circling God’s throne. The image 
is certainly as engaging as those of the preceding chapters, but its message is now 
unmistakably the affirmation of an Imāmī view of the universe.289 
These instances of hidden doctrine amidst miscellany are far too many to name. They vary 
considerably in scope and in subtlety. That the sixth quality of ‘Six Qualities the Bearer of 
Which Shall Enter Paradise,’ is obedience to ‘those who command your affairs’290 is a rather 
oblique laying of Shīʿī claims. ‘The Imām has Thirty Distinguishing Marks’ is more open,291 
while the massed evidence of the Prophet’s twelve successors clearly aspires to indisputable 
proof. ʿIlal is similarly variegated. The chapter on why ʿAlī more than once delayed his ʿaṣr 
prayers until after sundown includes several reports in which ʿAlī is prevented from praying 
at the normal time on more than one occasion for legitimate reasons. In every report, however, 
what happens next is that the imām repairs the fault by successfully commanding the sun to 
come back up to that he can pray in the right legal conditions!292 This account of the power of 
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the imām, backed up with several reports and multiple asānīd, is unmistakeably the prevailing 
message of the chapter. ʿIlal’s guiding rubric of causation also lends itself well to polemic, 
and there occasionally surface in its text pockets of quite systematic argument. The chapter on 
why it is permissible to combine prayers without cause for dispensation addresses a standard 
bone of contention between the Imāmīya and other groups. An explanation for the practice is 
supplied as usual (that the Prophet wished to ease the burden on his community) but this is 
then supported by a formidable set of proof-texts. Al-Ṣadūq narrate seven reports in total, one 
of which is supported by two asānīd, two of which give no reference to causation but only 
affirm the practice’s legitimacy, and two of which are narrated from ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿ Abbās and 
one from ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar, companions revered by Sunnīs.293 Similarly, in chapter on the 
prohibition of praying in black clothing, al-Ṣadūq not only amasses a number of reports to 
assert and reassert the argument that black is the garment of wrongdoers, but he follows these 
with a group of traditions in which the Imām seems to endorse the wearing of black, which he 
then explains is a result of taqīya.294   
Though al-Ṣadūq’s manoeuvres are at their most ambitious in imparting distinctly Imāmī 
contentions, a more pervasive endeavour in these texts is that of conveying simple 
exhortations to piety. For all the extravagant encyclopaedism of these works’ contents, one 
need read no more than a few pages of either to discern that beneath this there lies a fairly 
homogenous message. This is perhaps clearer in al-Khiṣāl, wherein the division by numbers 
of the books’ many aḥādīth does little to obscure the fact disparate chapters discussing ‘the 
five marks of the believer,’ ‘the four qualities that a believer never lacks’ and, ‘the believer is 
he in whom are gathered seven qualities,’ are, in fact, made of fairly similar stuff.295 In ʿIlal 
too, though, the theme of causality is fertile ground for similar kerygmatics. Some chapters do 
not undertake to explain so much a known phenomenon or ruling but rather a proverbial moral 
truth, such as that concerning ‘the reason why two men may enter a mosque, one worshipful, 
one corrupt, and yet when they leave the pious one is corrupted and the corrupt one has become 
righteous,’ the given reason being given in its single report that the worshipful man was 
conceited in his worship, whilst the corrupt man lamented his faults.296 In other cases, the 
explanation an imām gives can be a diagnosis of a religious difficulty, such as when a man 
asks ʿAlī why he is unable to perform the night time prayer, receiving the reply that he is 
fettered by his sins.297 This prevailing concern for piety over the books’ advertised theme 
shows neither the efforts at concealment evident in their more polemical content nor its 
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probative force, but there is still a deception of the reader here, a disjuncture between the 
instruction offered and the instruction given. The pun in the title of al-Khiṣāl perfectly 
encapsulates this effect. In his preface al-Ṣadūq juxtaposes the word ‘al-khiṣāl’ with its dual 
meaning with the word aʿdād which unambiguously means ‘numbers.’ Yet we know that the 
reader searching for information about numbers is destined for disappointment, the numbers 
in al-Khiṣāl’s narrations seldom playing a pivotal role in reports. Rather it is ‘qualities’ that 
dominate the vast majority of the book’s material, with any given number yielding a list of 
enumerated virtues and vices the numerical delineation of which does little to obscure their 
similarity with those of a different number. There can be little doubt that when al-Ṣadūq 
promises a work concerning ‘The praised numbers and qualities/quantities’ he was aware of 
the numerological literature this would call to mind for many readers. We may detect a hint 
of parody, even satire in his so crushing his readers’ expectations, promising the mysteries of 
numbers only to deliver solid, improving sermons on a numerical theme. 
A particularly intricate example of this compiler’s sleight of hand, in which both pietistics and 
the supremacy of the imāms are combined, is found in a little chapter of ʿIlal located in its 
large section dealing with matters of purity. Alongside chapters detailing the reason why it is 
preferred in law to keep one’s eyes open why washing one’s face and the reason why some 
ways of assisting others in their ablutions are discouraged, we find a chapter concerning ‘The 
reason why people look down while defecating.’298 This chapter consists of four aḥādīth. The 
first ḥadīth furnishes us with the answer to the title question: that God entrusts an angel with 
the task of bending people’s necks forward, so that they may be shown what emerges from 
them and whether it is ḥalāl or ḥarām. The second tradition quotes the words of ʿ Alī, ‘I wonder 
at the son of Adam, that his beginning is a droplet, his ending a corpse, and while he stands 
between them he is a casket of excrement. God is great.’ This is clearly something of a 
departure from the original question. We have leapt from the further reaches of miscellany to 
the familiar, stark asceticism of the first Imām, with matters excremental providing a 
convenient link. Having served its purpose, however, the title concept is wholly abandoned, 
and the third tradition passes without any mention of the scatological at all. A man asks 
Salmān, ‘Who and what are you?’, and receives the reply, ‘As for my beginning and you 
beginning, it is an unclean droplet, and as for your ending and my ending, it is a putrescent 
corpse. But when judgment day comes and the scales are set, he is vile whose balance rises, 
whilst he is noble whose balance falls.’ This is manifestly an elaboration on the words of ʿAlī, 
again affirming the ephemeral nature of the world, now with the added stress on virtuous 
actions as the way to transcend this. 
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This brings us to the final tradition: ‘A man from amongst the Mughīrīya asked Abū ʿAbd 
Allāh about a matter from the sunna, and was told “There is nothing of which any one of the 
children of Adam has need, save that there avails concerning it a sunna from God and His 
messenger, known to those who know it and unknown to those who know it not.”’ 
Accepting the challenge, the man asks the Imām about defecation, and Jaʿfar naturally meets 
his request, supplying a pious formula to be uttered at the opportune moment. His interlocutor 
then remarks as an afterthought on the mystery of this chapter’s title, that at such a moment 
man is compelled to look upon what issues from him. The Imām again explains the reason, 
this time at a little more length. This time two angels chide their protégé ‘See, son of Adam, 
what you laboured over in the world until it passed thus.’ 
This little sequence reveals al-Ṣadūq as a master of compilation. The chapter starts with an 
intriguing, outlandish question which might claim the attention of even the most single-
minded reader. This is used as a starting point whence the compiler then segues into more 
serious material, shifting deftly from angels and scatology for a meditation on the radical 
frailty of the material world. At the close of the chapter title question is then re-invoked, but 
now it has become not an idle curiosity but a site both of moral reflection and normative 
practice. The final image is of the imām al-Ṣādiq asserting his supreme knowledge of the law 
in the face of scepticism, and thus the sovereignty of the Imāmī sources of law. The reader is 
putty in al-Ṣadūq’s hands as, ḥadīth by ḥadīth, he leads them to the truth of Imāmī teaching. 
We clearly see that the adab-like eclecticism of these works is not idle, pedagogy-inhibiting 
curiosity, but is in fact harnessed by al-Ṣadūq to draw his reader into distinctly Imāmī 
assertions.299 The curiosity of the subject matter functions as a lure, and once a reader has 
embarked on the chapter he can then be drawn to matters more significant. Moreover, al-Ṣadūq 
elsewhere admits to using precisely such a device. In Kamāl al-dīn, following his 
counterintuitive decision to include stories about the Buddha in a work on the occultation of 
the Twelfth Imām, he explains that people are drawn to such exotic tales, and it is thus his 
hope that having been thus attracted to his book they may read the rest of it and so learn the 
truth of the imām.300 It is this same device that can be seen, unconfessed, guiding much of ʿIlal 
and al-Khiṣāl. We begin to see the real significance of these books’ eccentric form, and of the 
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participation in adab which that form signals. They could not be further than inconsequential 
miscellanies, just as al-Ṣadūq could not be further from the faceless, artless assembler-tradent. 
He uses precisely the driving curiosity, diversity and eclecticism of the genre, alongside its 
capacity to take the imāms’ aḥādīth to a wide audience, to preach the truths of Imāmism and 
the truth of the imāms’ aḥādīth to legion unsuspecting readers. The very concealment within 
these works of valuable knowledge which, as we observed above, makes them poor reference 
works for the Imāmī reader such as are lamented by ibn Qūlawayh, is what makes them an 
effective address to the non-Imāmī reader, who at any moment may find himself being 
informed that it is impermissible to pray while wearing an iron ring.301 
We now perceive the intricately disingenuous character of these works’ compilation: the 
reader is lured by novelty and curiosity to injunctions of piety, legal instruction and sectarian 
polemic, is offered wisdom and knowledge only to be compelled, ultimately, to regard and 
revere instead the source of that knowledge. Returning to Khalidi’s distinction between the 
adib and the hadith scholar, the reader is offered the expansive, open world of adab only to 
be commanded with uncompromising religious truth. It is tempting indeed to lapse into moral 
qualifications of these authorial acts; to decry al-Ṣadūq as perverting the humanistic space of 
adab with falsehood and lies, with sectarian strife and brute polemic. Such judgements would 
be a mistake when directed from scholarship, but it is, conversely, important to reckon with 
al-Ṣadūq’s deceptions in terms of the moral universe of the adab literature in which he 
conducts them. Adab under the Buwayhids was a discourse that was profoundly concerned 
with morality and human interaction, with truth and sincerity amongst friends. The question 
of how al-Ṣadūq’s acts of compilation appear to that discourse is a serious one, and it is to this 
question that we shall now turn, attempting in so doing to give a complete answer to the 
question of how and to what extent these compendia of Imāmī ḥadīth may be considered adab. 
 
MANNERED DECEPTIONS - Ṣadāqa and Taqīya 
 
Among al-Mufīd’s many criticisms of al-Ṣadūq in Taṣḥīḥ is an objection to the latter’s 
pronouncements on taqīya. This is, perhaps, unsurprising, for al-Ṣadūq’s treatment of the 
subject in al-Iʿtiqādāt is strikingly absolute: ‘Our belief regarding taqīya is that it is obligatory, 
and the station of one who neglects it is that of one who neglects prayer.’302 Al-Mufīd, 
predictably, softens the blow, adding conditions and nuance to the effect that taqīya is only 
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obligatory to the extent that revealing one’s true position would incur imminent harm from 
hostile non-Imāmīs.303 His is the familiar voice of Buwayhid Imāmism, while al-Ṣadūq seems 
in this instance to be channelling a starkly pre-Buwayhid kind of Imāmism, hunted, exclusivist 
and hostile.304 It behoves us to be mindful of his stated position as we consider his 
engagements with adab, to consider the diligence and ingenuity with which he manipulates 
his non-Imāmī readers in light of this stark rupture in integrity which he states must divide the 
Imāmī from his fellow Muslims.  
While al-Mufīd takes technical exception to al-Ṣadūq’s definition of taqīya, in adab it 
confronts an opposition that is far fiercer. A common theme in adab writings is the celebration 
of sincere discourse amongst friends, the liar and the deceiver receiving repeated censure.305 
Hostility to taqīya does not end at such moral opposition, however, for there also emerges a 
sense that such deception is the very antithesis not only of the ethos that adab literature seeks 
to promote but of the very mode of discourse in which it operates.  
Such an existential opposition to taqīya is a fundamental aspect of the vision of adab presented 
in Salah Natij’s illuminating analysis of al-Tawḥīdī’s al-Imtāʿ wa’l-muʾānasa. Natij describes 
al-Tawḥīdī’s construction and sacralisation of safe, honest speech amongst equals (or rather 
men who have agreed to treat one another as equals regardless of differences in status) as the 
sine qua non of valuable intellectual exchange, of meaningful, cultured interaction, of adab. 
Truly valuable speech is the cathartic, uninhibited expression of the cultured self, unburdened 
by such hurdles of secrecy.306 Natij singles out the idea and practice of taqīya as quite inimical 
to this ideal of adab. If true conversation relies on radical openness and assumed equality, 
then dissimilation, with its assumption of hostility as aspiration to manipulate and deceive, 
must be profoundly destructive to such conversation. Alshaar similarly points to how al-
Tawḥīdī as well as the vizier ibn Saʿdān emphasised the need for equality in cultured 
discourse, contending the suspension of the protocols and imbalances of power that usually 
dominated court settings. True understanding was to be reached between peers, peers whose 
discourse was free of fear and self-censorship, indeed of the need to dissimilate.307  
In light of such an assessment, al-Ṣadūq’s compendia appear as a deeply subversive and 
invasive presence in adab discourse. Their efforts to inform and persuade the reader without 
the reader’s consent, enacting proofs and polemics quite foreign to the genre which they mimic 
is surely the very antithesis of the ethos propounded by udabāʾ like al-Tawḥīdī. On the one 
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hand we have seen how ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl’s participation in adab is far deeper and more 
intricate than mere surface structure, but now that same depth of participation appears as a 
violation, an entry under false pretences and with sinister motives utterly anathema to adab’s 
guiding spirit.  
Yet Natij’s paradigm is not the whole story, nor are deception and manipulation of the reader 
are such alien endeavours to adab as al-Tawḥīdī’s calls for parity suggest. Another titan of 
adab, the judge and courtier al-Tanūkhī, introduces his collection of instructive anecdotes 
Nishwār al-muḥāḍara with the following discussion and defence of how the work is 
structured: 
I present what I have written of things long-remembered mingled together with things 
heard only recently, neither rendered into chapters nor ordered by types. For the book 
contains reports each one of which merits consideration from several angles. Most of 
them would appear cold and tiresome were I to spent time arranging, categorising and 
ordering them. Moreover, when the reader had perused the first item in a chapter, he 
would then know that those making up the rest of the chapter would be similar to it, 
such that reading all of them might lessen his enjoyment and stymie his enthusiasm. 
Lost, too, would be the many gobbets and poems, epistles and proverbs secreted 
herein.308 
Here, it seems, is the polar opposite of ibn Qūlawayh. Al-Tanūkhī wholeheartedly advocates 
a total lack of transparency of structure, his contention being that this will better the reader’s 
chances of digesting the book’s contents as he should. Ibn Qūlawayh seeks to empower the 
reader, to create a reference work which readily subjects itself to the reader’s agency, the 
reader who is assumed to be a sincere seeker of knowledge. Ibn Qūlawayh’s readers know 
what is good for them, and only need to have it made available by its dutiful custodians. Al-
Tanūkhī’s reader, by contrast, is not to be trusted. Al-Tanūkhī takes that same readerly agency 
to choose what and where to read, so valorised by ibn Qūlawayh, and hamstrings it, replacing 
benign transparency with an asserting opacity. Al-Tanūkhī affirms the innavigability of his 
text as the author taking control of the reading process. Without the direction of chapters the 
reader has no choice but to proceed blindly, trustingly forward and receive what the author 
chooses to give him.  
Al-Tanūkhī shows us the centrality of deceit, and the capacity of deceit to safeguard the 
author’s control of the reading process, for the pedagogical project that underpins adab. In the 
                                                            




ingenious apology for authorial control with which he opens Nishwār we see demarcated the 
limits of the above vision of convivial transparency. Indeed, this preoccupation with 
manipulating the reader is, we shall see, of no less central importance in adab literature than 
ideals of trusting camaraderie. In this will to control, moreover, we see a great deal that we 
recognise from al-Ṣadūq’s taqīya. 
One of the cardinal features of adab literature is its concern to entertain and interest the reader 
as well as to edify and inform. This concern owes much to the social contexts in which adab 
flourished and to which much of it is tailored, instructing readers in the manners of courtly 
environments where the amusing anecdote or well-placed witticism was an essential 
component of the courtier’s arsenal. The importance of wit and levity in the presence of the 
ruler is exemplified in the figure of the boon companion (nadīm), an important figure at the 
court whose task was to drink with the ruler and entertain him. In each of the thirty nights 
recorded in al-Tawḥīdī’s al-Imtāʿ the long evening of enlightened scholarly debate in the 
vizier’s presence is concluded by a humorous tale. In written adab meanwhile, where the task 
of ingratiating and improving the ruler was combined with that of bringing culture to the wider 
reading public, this utility of entertainment is acknowledged not only in the wealth of jokes, 
curiosities and amusing and intriguing stories that Abbasid adab literature offers, but also in 
texts wherein writers discuss how and why such material is to be used. This ranges to as simple 
a sentiment as ibn ʿAbd Rabbih’s omitting asānīd in his definitive compendium al-ʿIqd al-
farīd lest the reader be bored by them to the elaborate mixtures of humorous and serious 
material in writers like al-Jāḥiẓ and al-Ābī.309  
In Nathr al-durr, the surviving adab compendium of the al-Ābī, we find the adīb as we have 
found others, justifying his mode of compilation: 
Perhaps someone will say, why has he not devoted an independent book to jesting, or 
placed it all at the end, giving it a section of its own after the completion of the serious 
part? He does not realise that I did this in order to trap the ignorant, that he might 
come upon some knowledge, and to ensnare the jester, that he might fall upon 
something serious. If I had devoted a separate section to it and had not mixed jest and 
earnest in this book, most present-day readers would have gone for that one section 
and they would have considered the serious parts as something heavy and dull, even 
something to be avoided and left alone, in spite of its being valuable like gold and 
pearls.310 
                                                            
309 Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, vol. i, pp. 5-6. See Van Gelder (‘Part 1’; ‘Part 2’). 
310 Translation here supplied by Van Gelder, ‘Part 2’, p. 170. 
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As he outlines his strategy to dominate the reader (a strategy very similar to that of al-Tanūkhī) 
al-Ābī tells us in particular how the structuring of different layers of material serves to force 
improving material on an unwilling reader. This is not benign encouragement of a well-
intentioned but weary seeker of knowledge, rather it is a trap for the unwary: entertainment is 
the bait, wisdom the hook.  
The frivolous reader may go in search of jest and ribaldry, only to be educated against his will 
in moral decency. The parallel with al-Ṣadūq’s reader, whose search for miscellaneous 
edification leads him to the creeds of the Imāmīya, could not be clearer. What we see in ʿIlal 
and al-Khiṣāl is an extra layer of hidden instruction secreted beneath the paradigm outlined 
by al-Tanūkhī and al-Ābī. Whilst they and others like them use the interesting and the 
entertaining to lead to the edifying and the improving, a device entirely emulated by al-Ṣadūq, 
in the latter’s works this in turn leads the reader to a third body of material, one which may 
surprise the reader looking for improving wisdom just as much as the reader seeking amusing 
anecdotes. This is the instruction in the tenets of Imāmī Shīʿism, that the twelve imāms are the 
only rightful conduits of the Prophet’s message, and thus that their reported speech, of which 
al-Ṣadūq’s books are compiled, is the single authentic source of truth.311 It is a device that is 
both germane to adab literature’s patristic impulse to rob readers of agency for their own good, 
and quite innovative in its reconstituting of that impulse to serve an Imāmī agenda. 
What, meanwhile, are we to make of al-Tawḥīdī’s seemingly disingenuous denouncement of 
taqīya? This apparent simultaneous advocation of deceit and sincerity is not simple hypocrisy, 
it points to the multiple audiences that adab anticipates. Much of the above casts the writer of 
adab as a potent figure indeed, assuming considerable authority over their readers to direct 
and control them by means of subterfuge. This is, however, only one half of the conversation, 
for among the plurality of audiences that adab seeks to addresses there exist those who exert 
considerable power over the adīb, and whom the latter must therefore treat with extreme 
caution. This is the person of the ruler and of the patron. We have already seen how adab 
literature in the Abbasid period became increasingly concerned with the education of a wide 
reading public beyond its courtly origins. This did, however, detract from a simultaneous 
concern to address the political elite, a category of persons who might well be no less in need 
of education than their subjects, but who are to be feared much more than they, not only for 
such dramatic retribution as death and banishment but also their more mundane but much 
more immediate capacity to give or withhold patronage.312 
                                                            
311 For an illustration of al-Ṣadūq’s views on this point see below, Chapter III. 
312 For al-Tawḥīdī’s endeavours in this arena see Alshaar, pp. 124-131. 
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The ruler-patron’s looming presence augments and complicates the dynamic of subterfuge and 
deception in the adab compendium’s address to the reader.313 Van Gelder observes how the 
mixing of humorous and serious material in these compendia acquires before the ruler’s gaze 
an aspect of self-preservation: as jest and earnest are juxtaposed and interwoven the boundary 
between them blurs, and it becomes harder (not least for the modern reader) to tell how 
sincerely or otherwise material is intended. Hazardous texts are insured against, the compiler 
reserving the right to cry if pressed, ‘But I was only joking!’314 It is precisely this reality which 
engenders al-Tawḥīdī’s dreams of discursive equality, but they remain an ideal to be aspired 
to in the face of an author-patron relationship that was doomed to be overshadowed by the 
latter’s arbitrary power. Al-Tawḥīdī’s own miserable perambulations between courts cut an 
archetypal emblem of that relationship, and of the wretched futility of the author’s attempts to 
confront the patron’s unjust dominance.315 
It is precisely this capacity for ungoverned injustice that makes the stakes of addressing the 
ruler so high but also makes the attempt to culture him so necessary. In what has been called 
the clearest exposee of adab literature’s goals,316 Ibn Qutayba explains in the introduction to 
his ʿUyūn al-akhbār why, though the text is not a legal manual or theological tract, it still 
contains great benefit: 
The way to God is not a single way, nor is all that is good to be found in praying late 
into the night, continuous fasting and knowledge of what is licit and prohibited. Rather 
the ways to God are many, the gates of virtue are wide. For religion to be in order the 
times must be in order, and for the times to be in order those in power must be in 
order, and those in power are kept in order – with God’s provenance – by guidance 
and good education.317 
So it is that not only the adīb’s own career but the very existence of good legal-theological 
scholarship are contingent on the success of the endeavours of adab. Power must be coaxed 
into righteousness, ibn Qutayba states. Later Sunnī tradition will celebrate Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, 
the unbreakable traditionist who was tortured and imprisoned by al-Maʾmūn’s inquisition for 
refusing to recant the views that ultimately became orthodoxy, as the triumphant embodiment 
of how legal-theological scholarship ultimately faced down the ruling powers.318 For ibn 
                                                            
313 Highly pertinent to this state of affairs are Mottahedeh’s observations regarding the nature of 
relations to the powerful in Buwayhid society. The emphasis on constructing relationships with rulers 
and patrons was heavily weighted towards the personal; courting the ruler’s generosity and responding 
to it with grace and gratitude were vital to success. See Mottahedeh (1998), pp. 82-96. 
314 Van Gelder, ‘Part 2’, p. 174. 
315 For a brief summary of al-Tawḥīdī’s perambulations see Kraemer, Cultural Revival, pp. 212-222. 
316 Gutas, p. 81. 
317 Ibn Qutayba, ʿUyūn al-akhbār, vol. i, p. 3. 
318 Turner, pp. 86-104. 
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Qutayba, however, this is an impossible dream, rather the ruler must be bend not with force 
and defiance but guileful counsel. The next sentence of his introduction leaves his intentions 
but thinly veiled: 
I have put together these wellsprings of reports (ʿUyūn al-akhbār) as instruction for 
the one who neglects manners, as a reminder for those with knowledge, as culture for 
both for people who rule and who are ruled over, and as a relaxation for kings.319 
One might well be curious of how for all other readers ʿUyūn al-akhbār is a stern corrective, 
whilst being for kings it transmutes to light entertainment. The truth, of course, is that the light 
entertainment is identical with al-Ābī’s lure, a decoy whereby ibn Qutayba distracts the sultan 
whilst tricking him into righteousness.320 
We now see that the fearsome but indispensable task of influencing political power is the apex 
of adab literature’s noble pedagogical calling and also of its capacity to manipulate and to 
deceive. It is in this objective and its consequences, moreover, that the link between al-Ṣadūq’s 
endeavours and those of the writer of adab literature are at their most profound, complex and 
conflicted. We see that even al-Ṣadūq’s hidden Imāmī polemics are closely tied to a long-
standing concern of adab literature to covertly impart instruction to those in power who might 
take violent exception to being instructed more directly. Where al-Ṣadūq and other udabāʾ 
differ is in the identity of this fearsome potentate. Al-Ṣadūq’s fear is the fear that drives taqīya; 
fear of an oppressive, non-Imāmī majority from whom the confession of Imāmī identity or 
Imāmī beliefs may provoke hostility. It is for fear of this misguided majority that the imām 
hides, and it is that same fear that bids his Shīʿa hide until he returns.321 As al-Ṣadūq takes the 
highly unusual step of hiding Imāmī contentions deep within works of adab literature, we may 
be certain that this is motivated by an identical ethos of frightened caution. While the adīb 
fears the sultan, al-Ṣadūq the Imāmī traditionist fears almost everyone. He fears the wider, 
non-Imāmī reading public just as much as the ruler, who are eminently capable of inflicting 
damage on him and his community (we need only recall the destruction wrought in the anti-
Shīʿī riots that frequently ravaged Buwayhid Baghdad).322 He fears sultans and viziers, but he 
fears too the courtly intellectual culture at the head of which these potentates sit and to which 
                                                            
319 Ibn Qutayba, ʿUyūn al-akhbār, vol. i, p. 3. 
320 As noted above, ʿUyūn al-akhbār is one of several adab compendia ibn Qutayba wrote, and is 
marked among them by the breadth of readership to which it aspires, comprising both the literate 
population at large and the rulers themselves. His Adab al-kuttāb ‘Manners for Secretaries,’ as the name 
suggests, is directed specifically at secretaries, while his al-Maʿārif offers assistance to courtiers. 
321 While there does appear in al-Ṣadūq’s writing (and many other Shīʿī discourses) the 
conceptualisation of need for secrecy as an initiatic concern, demanding that mystic truths be hidden 
from those not ready to hear them (e.g. below), this is far less common than the prevailing sentiment 
that taqīya and occultation alike are fuelled by fear of oppression. See Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 507-509. 
322 Kennedy, pp. 387-393; Donohue, p. 103, Busse, pp. 429-30; Kraemer, Cultural Revival, pp. 39-44. 
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the majority of udabāʾ belong. We have seen above the evidence that al-Ṣadūq feels compelled 
as a Shīʿī to self-censor before the Sunnī reader’s gaze, but the hostility he faces is derived 
just as much from his traditionism as his Shīʿism. We should recall that it was on account of 
the former that ibn ʿAbbād banished him, and we meanwhile have ample evidence that the 
court at Rayy was dominated by the rationalism of Muʿtazilīs and philosophers, by whom 
traditionism was dismissed as primitive, populist and detrimental to individual enlightenment 
and the public good.323 We have seen al-Ṣadūq penetrate adab literature with singular alacrity, 
but that very act of entry ultimately only underscores his status as an outsider. 
This identification and fear of power returns us to the roots of al-Ṣadūq’s choice of adab 
literature as the vessel for his concealed polemics. Adab, representing the standard for the 
educated establishment, the very stuff of the culture to which the literate classes aspired and 
which they aimed to acquire, was intimately linked to the aspiration to power. We must recall 
that the very building blocks of the adab compendium are dictated by the genre’s intrinsic 
links to social aspiration: lexicographical information, amusing anecdotes, poetry, tales of 
moral virtue and gobbets of erudition to impress a courtly soiree. This literature is the perfect 
conduit for an address to power, a discourse wherein al-Ṣadūq’s concealed demands for the 
rights of the imāms may reach the eyes and ears of the great and the good. It is for this reason 
that these books of his must mimic adab literature as closely as possible, so that they can attain 
its capacity to influence. Books like ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl assimilate to adab literature’s forms, 
content and even effect, but in their intentions they are a Trojan horse, hijacking adab 
literature’s aspiration to educate with a mission to proselytize al-Ṣadūq’s determinedly, 
exclusively Imāmī message amongst an overbearing majority who would reject that message. 
Al-Ṣadūq’s works thus effect the radical, accusing alchemy of identifying his entire non-
Imāmī readership with the figure of the irascible sultan. al-Ṣadūq might be accused of violating 
adab, of breaking its consensual, mannered civility with raucous sectarianism. But his true 
subversion is a moral one, at its greatest not in his polemics’ mere presence but in the act of 
their concealment. In veiling the most fervent heart of his message to the reader, al-Ṣadūq 
levels at that same reader an accusation that is both utterly rooted in adab literature’s discourse 
and a powerful assault thereupon. He merges adab literature’s conventional fear of the 
oppressive patron with Shīʿī taqīya’s fear of the Sunnī majority, thereby damning the readers 
of adab literature and its writers alike as guilty of the same tyranny as that of the potentates 
                                                            
323 Al-Tawḥīdī, Akhlāq al-wazīrayn, pp. 166-167. It is noting that al-Ṣadūq’s traditionism also 
differentiates him from the prominent Imāmī udabāʾ of the later Buwayhid period, al-Ābī, al-Sharīf al-
Raḍī and al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, who all leaned heavily towards the dominant Muʿtazilī thinking of the 
court and held high office therin. Al-Ābī was Majd al-Dawla’s vizier, while al-Raḍī and al-Murtaḍā 
held in succession the syndicate of the Ṭālibids of Baghdad. 
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whom adab is supposed to resist. In a uniquely and utterly Shīʿī twist of subversion and 
introspection, al-Ṣadūq calls out as the oppressors those who posture as the oppressed, making 
adab itself the object of the same fear-induced education by subterfuge that it directs at 
common ignorance and political power. Al-Ṣadūq, with the insight of the downtrodden, 
equates political power with intellectual power, in so doing turning adab’s moral power 




REASON, FRIENDSHIP AND MEANING – Adab for Imāmīs 
 
We have argued in the above that, far from being a superficial adoption of certain adabī forms 
and moods, al-Ṣadūq in ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl conducts an immensely sophisticated infiltration 
of adab discourse, both subverting it to the Imāmī cause and in doing so presenting a moral 
challenge to the hegemonies which would exclude him. The nature of these two works, 
however, and the profound significance which they our reckoning of al-Ṣadūq, do not mean 
that elsewhere he does not draw on adab as a resource for addressing Imāmī readers, 
appropriating its forms and ethoi for didactic projects that, though they share an audience, 
seek to instruct the faithful in a very different manner to the creed and the legal manual, and 
exploring potential interfaces between Imāmī and adabī conceptual frameworks. 
The most interesting example of the latter endeavour is to be found in three short, parallel 
works: Ṣifāt al-shīʿa (‘The Attributes of the Shīʿa’), Faḍāʾil al-shīʿa (‘The Virtues of the 
Shīʿa’) and Muṣādaqa al-ikhwān (‘Sincerity Amongst Brethren’). We have already had cause 
to mention the latter work, which has strong resonances of interest with adab discourse, but 
placed alongside the other two it forms an interesting commentary on internal Imāmī debates. 
A number of scholars have studied the discussion in Imāmī literature, especially Imāmī 
literature of the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries, of the question, indeed the problem of 
                                                            
324 A further philological dimension to al-Ṣadūq’s address to his fellows may be found in the dual 
meaning of the term ʿāmma ‘masses; commoners’ amongst Shīʿīs. Imāmīs of this period use the term 
to denote non-Shīʿīs, with Shīʿīs being termed the ‘khāṣṣa’ (‘elite’), but the ʿāmma were meanwhile the 
mass of less educated people whom the community-minded adīb hoped to educate. The significance of 
this overlap is that in the latter sense of ‘the common people’ ʿāmma was deeply derogatory. We may 
thus see in al-Ṣadūq’s appropriation of adab’s aspiration to educate the ʿāmma (‘the common people’), 
reconceived as an effort to educate the ʿāmma (‘non-Shīʿīs’), a play on the dual meaning of the term 
amongst Shīʿīs and an underscoring its derogatory aspects as generalised across both meanings. For a 
discussion of the negative connotations of the ʿāmma in Buwahid literature see Antoon, pp. 128-132. 
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Imāmīs and indeed Shīʿīs’ remaining a small minority within the larger Muslim community, 
and their attempts to reconcile this with unassailable truth of the Imāmī cause. What was the 
status of non-Shīʿī Muslims? Why, despite its luminous truth, did Imāmism not command 
more adherents? If Muḥammad was God’s last prophet, how was his mission allowed to be so 
comparatively unsuccessful, with the majority of the Muslim community having deviated 
from the true path?325 
Much of the literature (nearly all of which is ḥadīth literature) engaging with these questions 
is devoted to metaphysical solutions. Both al-Barqī and al-Ṣaffār narrate a voluminous body 
of material describing how Shīʿīs were pre-created as such before even the creation of the 
world. Their pre-existent souls were created from the light of Muḥammad and his family or 
from the same special clay, thus distinguishing them from the rest of humankind. 326 As well 
as reinforcing ideas of the Shīʿa as an enlightened few set apart, this projection of sectarian 
identities onto a pre-existential past removed the potentially wearisome concern that the wider 
umma remained unpersuaded of the truths of Shīʿism. Shīʿīs, these texts taught, were 
ultimately born, not made, and those who did not understand the imāms’ truth never would 
and never could. The Shīʿa were to live as a tight-nit minority among a larger Muslim 
community who were unaware of their special status, interacting with them only when 
necessary and doing so with both the caution and the inner condescension appropriate for their 
innately inferior spiritual nature. 
Bar-Asher and Newman convincingly link this isolationist outlook and the elaborate 
cosmology that accompanied it to the hostile environment of the pre-Buwayhid period. Bar-
Asher in particular outlines a set of identifying features of pre-Buwayhid Imāmism as 
exhibited in exegetical writings, amongst which is a virulently hostile attitude to non-Shīʿīs.327 
As discussed in Chapter I, the advent of a more tolerant climate with Buwayhid rule facilitated 
a more open Imāmism that was much more ready to engage intellectually with the wider 
community, and was correspondingly less invested and less interested in constructing a 
radically cosmologically distinct identity. 
Muṣādaqa, Faḍāʾil and Ṣifāt offer a fascinating reflection on this process of change, al-
Ṣadūq’s perspective drawing both from his significant position at the beginning of the 
Buwayhid period and from his familiarity with a parallel discourse of enlightened communal 
solidarity: the extensive adab literature on friendship and intellectual brotherhood. The 
different dynamics of the three works show us al-Ṣadūq’s negotiations between these two 
                                                            
325 For developments of these ideas in the centuries prior to al-Ṣadūq see Dakake, pp. 103-251; 
Newman, Formative Period, pp. 67-93, 174-177, 193-201; Bar Asher, passim.  
326 E.g. al-Barqī, vol. i, pp. 226-247. al-Ṣaffār, pp. 27-32. 
327 Newman, Formative Period, 67-93; Bar Asher, pp. 71-86. 
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conceptual worlds and his innovative exploitation of their common ground to reshape Imāmī 
identity for a different age.  
Faḍāʾil al-shīʿa is closest of the three in tone to the discourse of al-Barqī and al-Ṣaffār 
discussed above. There is little of the cosmological in its pages, but it offers a sober recension 
of the same message. Most of its comprised aḥādīth affirm that the Shīʿa are the enlightened 
community of salvation; to be amongst the lovers of Muḥammad’s house is to be among the 
people of paradise. The words of Muḥammad: ‘The one amongst you with his foot most firmly 
on the path is whosoever is fiercest in his love for my House.’ And, ‘Love for ʿ Alī b. Abī Ṭālib 
consumes sins even as fire consumes firewood,’ exemplify the driving motif of salvific 
belonging that underpins this work.328 
Ṣifāt al-shīʿa, meanwhile, places the emphasis differently. Though it is far from empty of 
aḥādīth asserting the special soteriological status of the Shīʿa of ʿAlī, this book undertakes to 
hold those who would attain that status to a certain standard of behaviour. Muḥammad al-
Bāqir addresses his disciple Jābir al-Juʿfī as follows: 
Said Abū Jaʿfar: ‘O Jābir, is it enough for one who would be counted amongst the 
Shīʿa to declare his love for us, the House? By God, No-one is amongst our Shīʿa save 
the one who is mindful of God and obeys him, who is known only for modesty and 
humility, for keeping trust and frequent remembrance of God, for fasting and prayer, 
for piety towards his parents, for taking care of the poor amongst his neighbours, of 
the wretched, of debtors and of orphans, for speaking the truth, for reciting the Qurʾān, 
for holding his tongue from addressing people expect with what is good, who is the 
guarantor of his kinsfolk.’ 
Jabir replied: ‘O son of God’s messenger, we know nobody who is as you describe!’329 
                                                            
328 Faḍāʾil, pp. 192-193, 199 (ḥ. 10). Though al-Ṣadūq does not include cosmological material in these 
books, it is to be found scattered across some of his surviving works, not least ʿIlal, as we have seen 
above. We moreover see certain titles among his lost works, such as ‘The Creation of Man’ (Khalq al-
insān), which may well have explored such material. This, of course, only underscores the significance 
of his decision to exclude it from the three works discuss here. In al-Barqī’s case, meanwhile, while 
much has been made of the theological content of the cosmological and cosmogonical traditions in al-
Maḥāsin, it is arguable that his focus here is already on their ethical implications rather than their 
theological specifics. In the first chapter of the Kitāb al-ṣafwa in al-Barqī’s al-Maḥāsin, for example, 
the subject of which is God’s creation of the believers from his light, of the four aḥādīth it contains 
only two describe the creation of believers from God’s light, the other two declaring believers’ being 
infused with God’s spirit and being possessed of a non-specific special relationship with God 
respectively, while all four follow accompany these metaphysical revelations with similar imperatives 
to treat believers with respect. See al-Barqī, vol. i, pp. 223-224. 
329 Ṣifāt, pp. 142-143. 
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Al-Bāqir continues thereafter, but the reader of Faḍāʾil has already received a nasty shock. 
The love that leads to paradise is revealed here as a dauntingly exacting one. The text enacts 
a muscular transmutation of Shīʿism from a broadly confessional identity (one easily 
conceived as determined by distant metaphysical events) to an identity predicated on rigorous 
practice and observance. It is significant that in many of the aḥādīth in Ṣifāt the Prophet or 
Imām speaks not of the qualities of a Shīʿī but those of a believer (muʾmin). The effect is to 
further move away from sealed exclusivism to a vision of Shīʿism that is fully comprehensible 
to the Muslim community at large. As well as reforming Imāmī identity the work’s message 
has obvious apologetic advantages: the Imāmīya are distinguished not by their idiosyncratic 
beliefs but only by their rigorous piety. 
This brings us to Muṣādaqa al-ikhwān. This text, a compendium of the Prophet’s and imāms’ 
sayings like the other two, can be read as a straightforward ethical work on how Muslims 
should treat each other. Among its most basic injunctions are al-Ṣādiq’s words: ‘The Muslim 
is his fellow Muslim’s brother, neither wronging him nor forsaking him,’ and those of the 
Prophet: ‘If one of you meets his brother let him greet him and wish him peace. God has 
blessed the angels with this practice, so do you then as the angels do.’330 As observed above, 
this text is substantially similar in tone to a number of adab compendia, most notably al-
Tawḥīdī’s al-Ṣadāqa wa’l-ṣadīq which actually cites al-Ṣadūq. Muṣādaqa is undoubtedly in 
conversation with this discourse, a conversation that cannot be totally devoid of the same 
dynamics of infiltration at work in ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl. The work has equal pertinence, 
however, to the discourse of Ṣifāt and Faḍāʾil and thus by extension to that of al-Maḥāsin and 
Baṣāʾir al-darajāt. To look again at the second ḥadīth cited, for an unsuspecting reader 
‘brother’ reads as ‘fellow Muslim,’ but for a Shīʿī reader it could certainly be understood to 
refer to one’s fellow Shīʿī. Such ambiguity has obvious uses for broadening the work’s 
readership, but for the Shīʿī reader alongside Ṣifāt and Faḍāʾil it further develops the 
transformations of Ṣifāt. As a trio these works thus collectively effect the shift of Imāmī from 
exclusivist, metaphysically idiosyncratic salvationism to an expansive communal ethics which 
brings belonging to the Shīʿa of ʿAlī into conversation with the forefront of philosophical 
speculation on the nature of society.331 
These works constitute a valuable document of the transition between the pre-Buwayhid and 
Buwayhid stages of the Imāmīya. Al-Ṣadūq’s fluency both in the Imāmī ḥadīth tradition and 
the discourses of courtly literary circles enables his daring perspicacious realisation of the 
potential overlap between these two very different ideas of community, one from the 
                                                            
330 Muṣādaqa, pp. 252 (ḥ. 2), 266-267 (ḥ. 2). 
331 It should be clarified that this need not entail that the works were intended to be read in sequence or 
even as a group (though this is not impossible).  
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Imāmīya’s isolationist past and one from their cosmopolitan future. He neither directly 
invokes either the vision of universal human brotherhood explored by his philosopher 
contemporaries332 nor the exclusive, preexistentially determined Shīʿī community of salvation 
found in al-Barqī’s aḥādīth, rather he explores through select ḥadīth how the former may 
enrich the latter, imbuing the image of the saved sect with a staunch ethos of ethical 
commitment. We see in these three works that his relationship with adab was not only the 
challenging negotiation we see in ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl, rather adab could also be a useful 
resource whose concepts could assist a reconceiving of the Imāmī community’s understanding 
of itself.  
A different utilisation of adab is found in al-Ṣadūq’s Maʿānī al-akhbār, ‘The Meanings of 
Traditions.’ Similar in many ways to ʿIlal, Maʿānī gathers diverse texts under the rubric of 
meaning and interpretation. Many of these concern lexicographical questions, with traditions 
either explaining obscure vocabulary in other texts or containing obscure vocabulary 
themselves, but many of the ‘meanings’ discussed are, conversely, conceptual in nature, 
regarding the different kinds of drunkenness or what the ornament of the afterlife might be.333 
The reason we have not grouped it with ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl is that despite these structural 
similarities this is evidently a work written for an Imāmī readership. It opens by placing its 
contents within a solidly Imāmī conceptual framework, citing Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq’s words: ‘You 
shall be the most knowledgeable of people when you know the meanings of our speech. A 
word may shift from meaning to meaning, and one can if one wishes change the meaning of 
one’s speech without lying.’ This not only presents as an insider’s account of the very taqīya 
deployed in other works, but also addresses the thoroughly Imāmī concern of the polyvalence 
of the imāms’ speech, something that we have seen preoccupy al-Ṣadūq extensively in his 
legal-theological writings. The second ḥadīth of the book, meanwhile, continues in this overtly 
Imāmī vein: ‘Know you, my son, that the stations of the Shīʿa are in accordance with their 
telling of narrations and their knowledge, and that knowledge is the understanding of what 
they narrate…’334 This is a book that announces itself unambiguously as addressing Imāmī 
concerns for Imāmī readers. 
What, then, does its address profit from its adabī aspects? Maʿānī remains very close in its 
structures and tone to ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl. There is the same meandering between topics, the 
same mixing of pietistic injunctions with points of curiosity with sporadic legal trivia, the 
same willingness to admit contradictions. This is occasionally punctuated by flashes of 
vigorously Imāmī discourse (the discussions of the meaning of the imāms’ sinlessness or of 
                                                            
332 See Alshaar, p. 178 and passim; Kraemer, Cultural Revival, 103-206; Arkoun, pp. 303-306. 
333 Maʿānī, pp. 315, 280-281. 
334 Ibid., p. 3. 
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the significance of Ghadīr Khumm are as densely substantiated and contested as any in al-
Ṣadūq’s writings),335 but this is no theological tract. If al-Ṣadūq is, indeed, educating the 
faithful here, he is still not doing so as he does in al-Faqīh or al-Hidāya, or, indeed, as ibn 
Qūlawayh would like him to do. Many chapters of Maʿānī which address the meanings of 
axial, much-contended theological concepts, concepts such as prophecy (nubūwa) and ʿAlī’s 
epithet ‘Father of Dust’ (abū turāb) consist only of a single, short ḥadīth, further emphasising 
that this is not a book of rigorous instruction.336 
This returns us to the book’s opening chapter, ‘The Reason Wherefore We Named this Book 
“The Book of the Meanings of Traditions,”’ the first two entries of which were cited above. 
The third and last gives a similar message, ‘To understand a single ḥadīth is better than 
narrating a thousand aḥādīth. No man amongst you understands until he knows the 
ambiguities of our speech, and one word from our speech can shift between seventy different 
meanings, and the key to them all belongs to us.’ Particularly in a post-occultation world, this 
picture of radical hermeneutic uncertainty is a daunting one. We have seen in the previous 
chapter and will see again how al-Ṣadūq sets considerable store by the interpretation of the 
imāms’ words, preferring it over questions of reliability and asānīd as a tool for negotiating 
with the corpus.337 Had Maʿānī offered a systematic account of how he does this it would have 
been an invaluable asset to the previous chapter’s analysis, but it does not. We have the 
meaning of the statement that camels are like devils, the meaning of ‘the river of excrement’,338 
and other such miscellanea. 
What the book instead conveys, by means of the deliberate nuance of its eclectic form, is a 
compound illustration of how this polyvalence is to be managed. The book’s opening aḥādīth 
do not mince their words about the salvific significance of the imāms’ speech and its 
hermeneutic depths, and there are certainly points in the book where the correct meaning of 
holy speech is asserted with severity. Such moments are the exception, however, and it is the 
work of Maʿānī’s contents in the main to set a benign face to hermeneutic ambiguity. Above 
all this is achieved by the same homogenising emphasis on basic piety which infuses ʿIlal and 
al-Khiṣāl. The meaning of calling blessings (ṣalāt) upon the Prophet is given as a reiteration 
of humanity’s primordial covenant of obedience to God; the meaning of ‘that which has its 
roots in the world and its branches in heaven’ is a brief votary formula to be recited after 
prayer; ‘the three back-breakers’ are interpreted as the man who overestimates his deeds, 
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336 Maʿānī, pp. 99, 105. For the polemical significance of the epithet Abū Turāb see Kohlberg (1978). 
337 See also Chapter III. 
338 Maʿānī., pp. 56-63, 117-121, 278-279, 284. 
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forgets his faults and enjoys his own opinions.340. The presentation of such a body of material 
as a purported exploration of the numinous semiotic plurality of the imāms’ words with which 
al-Ṣadūq introduces the work gives a powerful, instructive and comforting directive to the 
Imāmī reader: however profound the imāms’ knowledge may be, however inexhaustible a 
source of meaning their recorded speech, the fundamental requirement of allegiance to them 
and so to God may always be fulfilled though simple, obedient humility before the divine.  
This dynamic of conciliation is further borne out in another theme of Maʿānī’s contents. A 
regular concern of its chapters is to soften the apparent contents of aḥādīth which appear to 
contain frightening propositions or exacting legal injunctions. In the case of these words of 
Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, for example: ‘Whosoever is riding a beast of burden and falls to the ground 
and dies will enter the fire,’ al-Ṣadūq ensures the reader that God is not quite so arbitrarily 
malicious, that riding beasts of burden is fine and carries no inherent risk of damnation and 
that this ḥadīth is in fact a warning against the unsafe practice of doing so without holding the 
reins.342 In another ḥadīth Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq’s disciples are concerned about his declaration that 
God hates the house in which meat is consumed, not wishing to become vegetarians. Al-Ṣādiq 
assures them that the consumption of meat referred to was in fact the metaphorical cannibalism 
of speaking ill of the absent.343 The Prophet’s reported declaration that those who practice 
cupping during Ramadan have broken their fast is meanwhile furnished with multiple 
explanations, variously using metaphorical interpretations and lexicographical alternatives, all 
removing the apparent prohibition.344 
While Muṣādaqa, Ṣifāt and Faḍāʾil take adab’s vocabulary to questions of communal identity, 
in Maʿānī we see al-Ṣadūq putting to work its forms and nuances in the service of the same 
cultivation of reverence for the imāms’ ḥadīth that we saw driving his approach to ḥadīth 
criticism in Chapter I. Maʿānī’s assertions of polyvalence and its assembled illustrations that 
a ḥadīth’s contents may not be as they seem reinforce the ethos of agnostic acceptance of the 
imāms’ traditions that al-Ṣadūq constructs in al-Iʿtiqādāt and elsewhere.345 In Maʿānī, 
however, unlike the contexts examined in the previous chapter, al-Ṣadūq remains content to 
illustrate rather than assert. The commands to submit to the akhbār that extensively 
preoccupies some of al-Ṣadūq’s other writings is a negligible presence in Maʿānī’s pages. 
Such commands may be implicit in its text, but they are left implicit, in the face of its far 
louder message of pietistic conciliation. Maʿānī draws on the hermeneutic possibilities that 
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fuel al-Ṣadūq’s traditionist epistemological contentions, but also draws on the hybridity of 
form and ethical thrust of adab literature, combining them to turn ambiguity in aḥādīth from 






Taqiya, not unlike adab, is a difficult concept to study. How, after all, can we study with surety 
what our authors insist is their prerogative to conceal the truth? Such a study must be 
predicated on a failure of that prerogative, an assumption that we know our long dead authors 
well enough to recognise when they are telling the truth and when they are concealing it, as 
they warn us they are wont to do. Moreover, to acknowledge that the authors whose texts we 
read really are lying some (if not all!) of the time is a daunting prospect for the scholar of 
millennium-old intellectual traditions. It is enough of a task to reconstruct our subjects’ 
thoughts in the face of the formidable obstacles of fragmentary evidence, obscure concepts 
and opaquely partisan witnesses without having to grapple with deliberate obfuscation as well. 
Scholarly approaches have, for these reasons amongst others, tended to assume that taqīya is 
not at work in the Imāmī legal theological literature that they study, scholars sharing the 
assumption we maintained in this chapter and the previous one that when an Imāmī author 
claims to be writing with the purpose of instructing Imāmī believers that is, in fact, what he is 
doing, rather than pretending to do so in order to deceive non-Imāmīs. A partial exception to 
this is Amir-Moezzi, who has hypothesised that the many aḥādīth attributed to the imāms in 
which they refute disciples’ claims that they are divine as taqīya, and that the imāms in fact 
did believe themselves divine and only said otherwise to conceal this.346 
The first of three conclusions to this chapter is that this image of taqīya as an hermeneutic and 
historiographical obstacle – whereby we either ignore it and thus ignore the paramount 
importance which scholars like al-Ṣadūq accord it or attempt the unwieldy task of reading 
apparently didactic texts as lies – may be overcome by turning to literary deployments of the 
                                                            
346 Amir-Moezzi, Divine Guide, pp. 125-131 and passim. For a brief historical survey of the theory and 
practice of taqīya amongst Imāmīs see Kohlberg, ‘Views on Taqiyya’.  More recently, as more texts 
come to light, a number of studies have shown us empirical evidence of devices used in the writings of 
Imāmīs and other Shīʿī groups to conceal the true import of certain of their contents from the hostile, 
non-Shīʿī reader. See Bar-Asher, pp. 107-110; Asatryan.  
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concept, such as we see in the works of al-Ṣadūq discussed here. By appreciating the literary 
sophistication of Shīʿī authors (especially compilers), we can move away from a binary of true 
or untrue. Instead we may scrutinise the nuanced role of concealment, deception and 
manipulation in these texts’ address to the reader. We have seen al-Ṣadūq’s texts 
simultaneously educating and deceiving, entertaining and persuading. He does not evoke the 
concept of taqīya in these works, though in the circumstances this is hardly surprising as such 
a confession would be self-defeating.347 It seems, conversely, highly likely that this imperative 
to deceive that he enunciates so strongly in his creed informs the deeply disingenuous 
character of his authorial agency across these compilations.  
Essential to this understanding of taqīya in the context of adab literature is observing how 
familiar it is to this context. The adab literature in which al-Ṣadūq participates is entirely, self-
consciously used to devices of authorial deception, devices that are deeply rooted in its core 
objectives of educating the masses and civilising the elite. Curiously, then, far from being a 
sinister Shīʿī idiosyncrasy, taqīya as practiced in adab literature is at most only an extra layer 
of deception, but just as often quite indistinguishable from the dissimulations employed 
regularly by the most ardently Sunnī of udabāʾ. Al-Ṣadūq lures his unsuspecting reader to 
proofs of the Twelfth Imām, but he lures them too to exhortations to pray at night and 
information about correct ablution, just as ibn Qutayba seeks to do.  
The dexterity with which al-Ṣadūq adopts and adapts the mores of adab literature leads us to 
the second conclusion of this chapter, that many of al-Ṣadūq’s writings, though they are 
compendia of the imāms’ ḥadīth, are also compendia of adab, inextricable from the richness 
of the broader context of adab literature in which this identity places them. It is abundantly 
clear that we cannot hope to understand these works without acknowledgement of this context, 
as it is clear, too, that the nature of these works, their form and their content, renders them 
nonsensical when approached in the same way as a creed or a legal manual. Even as the 
recognition of these works’ true context enables us to understand them, it prompts us, too, to 
recognise the expertise that created them. The anarchic character of books like ʿIlal, al-Khiṣāl 
and Maʿānī has played its part in the repeated characterisation of al-Ṣadūq by his 
contemporaries and successors in the Imāmī theological tradition as a compiler of imperfect 
rigour. Viewed in his true context, however, al-Ṣadūq could not be less deserving of these 
                                                            
347 An exception is the instance in Kamāl al-dīn noted above where al-Ṣadūq does acknowledge the 
function of some texts to entertain the reader and so lure them to more serious material. This exemplar 
is of great value as evidence in its incontrovertible proof that al-Ṣadūq was fully aware and capable of 
such a ruse, but Kamāl al-dīn is not among al-Ṣadūq’s texts that are closest to adab literature. We shall 
see, in turn, in Chpater IV how in the different context of this work, with its determined legal-theological 
contentions, there is more to this apparent confession of misdirection than meets the eye. 
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accusations of ineptitude. The compiler we see in the writings studied in this chapter is 
ingenious, calculating, furtive and masterful. 
It is with this vision of al-Ṣadūq in mind that we proceed to the second half of this thesis, in 
which we will examine his compiler’s expertise in greater detail. It is by now apparent that 
the image of a compendium as artlessly thrown together is quite untenable, rather the 
arrangement of material, both the importance thereof and its possibilities, was subject to 
intense and varied speculation by compilers of adab and legal-theological literature alike. We 
have seen authors of the period voice concern that their material should be compiled in order 
to best meet its objectives, as well as providing detailed explanations of how this should be 
done. We have seen, too, that al-Ṣadūq and others are quite capable of conducting authorial 
schemes quite beyond what they openly declare.   
Our third conclusion pertains to the Buwayhid period. As has been long established, the 
Buwayhid period has long been acknowledged as a (if not the) formative period of Imāmī 
theological and legal scholarship, indeed the birthplace of a true Imāmī school. The works of 
al-Ṭūsī and al-Mufīd as well as some of those of al-Ṣadūq remained (eventually canonical) 
staples of Imāmī thought for ever after. But it this was not the only achievement of Buwayhid 
Imāmism, for Buwayhid Imāmīs did not only write and excel in the fields of law and theology. 
They also flourished in letters and literature, in poetry and in adab, and just as the legal-
theological scholars profited from the opportunity to interact with non-Imāmī traditions, so 
too in Buwayhid Imāmī adab, and nowhere more than in al-Ṣadūq, we see an unique inhabiting 
of Imāmī concerns and concepts within a discourse the majority of whose participants were 
not Imāmīs. Even as Imāmī legal-theological scholarship was stimulated by Imāmīs’ need to 
justify themselves in the face of others’ positions and the skills and concepts that could be 
adopted from others, we see Imāmī thought invigorated by the challenges and possibilities of 
an unprecedentedly ecumenical adab literature. Here was a chance to explore new ways of 
speaking truth to power, new ways of negotiating and enacting the Imāmīya’s simultaneous 
superiority and coexistence with the wider umma. Here, too, were new avenues through which 
to discover and assert the supremacy of the imāms, presenting their words to the literate classes 
as more interesting, more edifying and more aesthetically splendid than those of any other.  
In many ways Buwayhid Imāmī adab, unlike Buwayhid Imāmī legal-theological 
developments, did not outlast the environment in which it was created. Though similar 
minglings of sectarian and literary identities would appear at other moments in history where 
the political status quo allowed it, these were new experiments and offered no especial homage 
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to al-Ṣadūq or his fellows.349 For all their brilliance, al-Ṣadūq’s adventures in adab did not 
earn him lasting praise, even though they were not without a significant legacy. Writing at the 
very start of Buwayhid rule, al-Ṣadūq paved the way for later authors of the period whose 
efforts would achieve greater recognition, including no less revered a text than Nahj al-
balāgha. Less tangible but no less important is the credit we must give to al-Ṣadūq and writers 
like him for the integration of the Imāmīya into the Buwayhid intellectual establishment. His 
writings offer crucial testament to a rapprochement with power that was far more wide-ranging 
that what we see of the concessions to Muʿtazilism and the Sunnī madhhab effected by al-
Mufīd and al-Ṭūsī, a rapprochement without which the latter figures’ achievements would 
have been impossible. Above all, in al-Ṣadūq’s writings we see how these different 
achievements and experiments of Buwayhid Imāmī thought overlapped, in an ongoing, 
explosively creative struggle to assert the legitimacy of the Imāmīya and the texts on which 
that legitimacy was built. 
  
                                                            
349 Prominent examples of such moments, none of them accorded the study they are due, are the rule of 
the Tīmūrids, as seen in figures like the poet ibn Hisām (author of the Khāvarān nāmah) and the writer 
and preacher Wāʿiẓ Kāshifī (d. 910/1505), and points during early modern Ottoman rule, best 
exemplified in the work of Fuẓūlī (who, in fact, composed a versfied reworking of Kāshifī’s 
























As its title suggests, Kitāb al-tawḥīd, ‘The Book of God’s Unity,’ relays a great deal of 
material from the Imāms regarding axial questions of the nature of the divine, a resource for 
which it has been gratefully perused since its composition, receiving several commentaries, 
while editions and translations are both published widely. It has also found extensive use 
amongst scholars seeking information about the theology of al-Ṣadūq, the earlier Imāmīya and 
the imāms themselves. 
Though al-Tawḥīd’s content is overwhelmingly theological, it is not a creed in which correct 
beliefs are elucidated for the faithful. We have already encountered two other works of al-
Ṣadūq which do fit this description, al-Iʿtiqādāt and the first part of al-Hidāya, works to which 
we will have frequent recourse for comparison over the course of this chapter. Rather in his 
introduction al-Ṣadūq announces al-Tawḥīd as an apologetic work, the purpose of which is to 
refute those who denigrate the Imāmīya as heretically theologically inept, and more 
specifically those who decry the Imāms’ akhbār as theologically unsound.350 We are already 
here presented with a caveat: despite being by far al-Ṣadūq’s most extensive surviving 
engagement with theological questions, al-Tawḥīd is not straightforwardly a pronouncement 
of al-Ṣadūq’s own views on these subjects. His focus is not on doctrines that the traditions 
might help to elucidate, rather it on the traditions themselves, defending them as a source 
whatever they might be perceived to say. Any given ḥadīth in al-Tawḥīd’s pages therefore 
does not necessarily reflect the views of the compiler, nor is it there to support them. Our 
purpose in reading this work cannot thus be to decode al-Ṣadūq’s own theology, though we 
will often have reference to those other works in which he professes it. Rather we examine 
here al-Tawḥīd’s self-professed objective of upholding the legitimacy of the Imāmī ḥadīth 
corpus. 
This approach differs significantly from previous readings of the work, most significantly 
those of McDermott, Sander and Madelung. All three scholars engage al-Tawḥīd as a source 
of al-Ṣadūq’s theology, citing material across the book according to individual reports’ 
pertinence to particular doctrines, with minimal interest in how material in one part of al-
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Tawḥīd may interact with another. There is a great deal in these studies that will be of use to 
us in what follows, and they provide invaluable context to the study presented here in the 
detailed comparison each provides between al-Ṣadūq and his Imāmī and Muʿtazilī 
contemporaries. We will, nonetheless, also have cause to note where inconsistencies in these 
studies arise from their reluctance to consider either al-Tawḥīd’s structure or the implications 
of its stated objectives. 
If al-Tawḥīd has its limits as a source of al-Ṣadūq’s exact theological convictions, it speaks 
with a brilliant eloquence on his approach ḥadīth. The book explosively oversteps its opening 
sentiments, evolving from a defence of the imāms’ ḥadīth from theological critique to a 
thunderous moral and epistemological assault on theological debate, presenting a symphonic 
manifesto of al-Ṣadūq’s traditionism. A glimpse of this may be achieved by briefly looking 
ahead to the book’s very last chapter. Chapter sixty-seven concerns ‘The Prohibition of 
Debate, Argumentation and Posturing with Regard to God,’ and amasses a hefty body of 
traditions unanimously discouraging theological disputation, often in the most absolute, 
hellfire-evoking of terms.351 This is clearly a far cry from the dialectic apology which the 
introduction seems to promise, a first indication both of how this is ultimately a book about 
ḥadīth not about theology and of the transformative bearing that the different part of al-Tawḥīd 
exercise on one another, creating a compilation that is far more than the sum of its parts. 
Al-Tawḥīd has much to add to chapter one’s examination of al-Ṣadūq’s legal-theological 
context, not least in its overtly addressing itself to a readership of the theologically literate. 
Though it leaves us little the wiser when it comes to isnād-criticism and legal methodology, 
the sustained and nuanced reflections on the nature and significance of the Imāmī’s 
relationship with the words of the imām that al-Ṣadūq offers in this book are far and away 
beyond the brief, overtly methodological statements that were surveyed in the first part of this 
thesis. Nonetheless, al-Tawḥīd also draws a great deal from the adabī context examined in 
chapter two. The above observation that al-Tawḥīd’s ending stands at quite some conceptual 
distance from its beginning points to what we shall see below of the extraordinary linearity of 
its address to the reader. The extent to which this book builds and develops its arguments 
based on the reader’s passage from beginning to end, from introduction to conclusion, is 
unique amongst the works surveyed in this thesis. This energetic concern with the reader’s 
experience of the book has a pronounced resonance with what we saw of al-Ṣadūq’s 
negotiations with adab in the previous chapter. Meanwhile, al-Tawḥīd is a text profoundly 
interested in comparative merits of systematic argument and the aphoristic, pious injunction 
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of the individual ḥadīth. As such it may be read as much as any of al-Ṣadūq’s works as a 
negotiation between the two contexts discussed in section one.  
 
OUTLINE OF AL-TAWḤĪD 
 
Below is the translated table of contents of al-Tawḥīd (as supplied in the edition referred to 
throughout). To this are added annotations to demarcate the basic divisions and structures of 
the text that will be argued and referred to during the course of this chapter. As it is read in 
what follows, al-Tawḥīd is principally divided into three sections. In his introduction al-Ṣadūq 
singles out two erroneous beliefs which the Imāmīya are often falsely accused of holding: 
belief in God’s similarity to created entities (tashbīh), the worst excess of which being 
anthropomorphism, and fatalistic belief in predestination (jabr). It is to these two doctrinal 
areas that the first and third of these three sections are respectively devoted. The exact nature 
of the second, central section is less immediately clear, and will be discussed presently. This 
chapter’s analysis of the work, meanwhile, will be correspondingly divided into three sections. 
 
Introduction 
1. The Reward of Those Who Declare God’s 
Oneness and of Those Who Know 
2. The Oneness of God and the Prohibition 
Against Likening Him to Created Things 
(tashbīh) 
3. The Meanings of ‘The One,’ ‘Declaring 
Oneness’ and ‘He Who Declares Oneness’ 
4. Exegesis of ‘Say He is God the One’ 
(Q112:1) 
5. The Meaning of Divine Oneness and Justice 
(ʿadl)  
6. That He Has no Body nor any Form 
7. That He, Blessed and Exalted, is a Thing 
8. What Has Reached Us Regarding Vision [of 
God] 
9. [God’s] Power 
10. [God’s] Knowledge 
SECTION I – Affirming 
God’s Transcendence (~180 
pp.) 
In this first section the chapters 
all assert different aspects of 
the basic notion that God is 
unlike any created thing 
(tashbīh). Three main types of 
chapter are included: those 
affirming his transcendence in 
broad terms, those upholding a 
particular theological concept 
and those disambiguating 
Qurʾānic verses that might 




11. The Attributes of Essence and the Attributes 
of Actions 
12. Exegesis of God’s Words, ‘All things perish 
but His face’ (Q28:88) 
13. Exegesis of God’s Words, ‘Oh Iblīs, what 
prevents you from prostrating to what I have 
made with my hand?’ (Q38:75) 
14. Exegesis of God’s Words, ‘A day when a 
shin is uncovered, and they are called upon 
to prostrate…’ (Q68:42) 
15. Exegesis of God’s Words, ‘God is the light 
of the heavens and the earth.’ (Q24:35) 
16. Exegesis of God’s Words, ‘They have 
forgotten God, and he has forgotten them.’ 
(Q9:67) 
17. Exegesis of God’s Words, ‘On the Day of 
Resurrection the whole earth is in his fist, 
the heavens folded into his right hand.’ 
(Q39:67) 
18. Exegesis of God’s Words, ‘No! On 
that Day they shall indeed be cut off 
from their Lord!’ (Q83:15)  
19. Exegesis of God’s Words, ‘And there come 
your Lord and the Angels, row upon ro’ 
(Q89:22) 
20. Exegesis of God’s Words, ‘Do they wait 
only for God to come to them in the 
shadows of the clouds with the angels? 
(Q2:210) 
21. Exegesis of God’s Words, ‘God despises 
them.’ (Q9:79), ‘God holds them in 
contempt.’ (Q2:15), ‘They scheme and God 
schemes, and God is the best of schemers.’ 
(Q3:54) 
22. The Meaning of God’s Side 
23. The Meaning of [God’s] Circumference 
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24. The Meaning of [God’s] Eye, [God’s] Ear 
and [God’s] Tongue 
25. The Meaning of His Words, ‘The Jews say 
that God’s hand is withdrawn – bound are 
their hands, they are accursed for what they 
say, and His hands are spread wide’ (Q5:64) 
26. The Meaning of His Pleasure and His Anger 
27. The Meaning of His Words, ‘And I breathed 
into him my spirit.’ (Q15:29)  
28. The Negation of Place, Time, Rest, Motion, 
Descent, Ascent and Locomotion With 
Regard to God 
29. The Names of God and the Differences 
Between Their Meanings and the Meanings 
of the Names of Creatures 
30. What is the Qurʾān? 
31. The Meaning of, ‘In the Name of God, the 
Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful’ 
32. Exegesis of the Letters of the Alphabet 
33. Exegesis of the Letters of the Abjad 
34. Exegesis of the Letters of the Calls to Prayer 
35. Exegesis of Guidance, Error, Providence and 
Debasement from God 
36. Refutation of the Dualists and Zindīqs 
37. Refutation of Those Who Say that God is 
the Third of Three – There is No God but 
One God 
38. Mention of God’s Majesty (ʿAẓma)  
39. God’s Subtlety 
40. The Minimum Permissible Level of 
Knowledge of God’s Oneness 
41. That He Is Only Known Through Himself 
42. Proof of the Transience of the World 
43. The Ḥadīth of Dhiʿlib 
44. The Ḥadīth of Subbukht the Jew 
45. The Meaning of ‘God be Exalted’ (subḥān 
Allāh) 
SECTION II – The Mysteries 
of God’s Majesty (~160 pp.) 
As noted above, the exact 
nature of this section is not 
immediately obvious and will 
be discussed below (much of 
its transformative nature is in 
the content of its chapters, and 
is not much signposted by their 
headings). It’s departure from 
Section I is marked at the point 
where chapters cease to be 
about matters which concern 
God’s transcendence and enter 
into more obscure matters: the 
meanings of names and so on. 
There is a certain amount of 
dovetailing between the two 
for reasons that will be 
discussed. Nonetheless, the 
very fact that theologically 
straightforward chapters are 
now mixed with other material 
itself signals a significant shift 
from what has gone before.  
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46. The Meaning of ‘God is Greatest’ (Allāh 
Akbar) 
47. The Meaning of ‘The First and the Last’ 
(Q57:3) 
48. The Meaning of God’s Words, ‘The Most 
Compassionate is Seated on the Throne 
(Q20:5) 
49. The Meaning of His Words, ‘And his throne 
was on the water.’ (Q11:7) 
50. The Throne and its Attributes 
51. That the Throne is Created in Four Parts 
52. The Meaning of God’s Words, ‘His seat 
encompasses the heavens and the earth.’ 
(Q2:255) 
53. God’s Predisposition of his Creation 
Towards the Declaration of His Oneness 
54. Badāʾ 
55. Will and Intention 
56. Capacity 
57. Tribulation and Experience 
58. Happiness and Despair 
59. The Denial of Free Will and Predestination 
60. Decree, Power, Trial, Bounties, Prices and 
Rewards 
61. Infants and God’s Justice with Regard to 
Them 
62. That God Deals with His Servants Only 
According to Their Best Interests 
63. Command, Prohibition, the Promise and the 
Threat 
64. Teaching, Proof, Argument and Guidance 
65. Record of the Council of al-Riḍā ʿAlī b. 
Mūsā With the Scholars of Different 
Religions and Communities, Such as the 
Catholicos, The Exiliarch and the Chiefs of 
the Sabeans, and the hrbdh, and What He 
SECTION III – Free Will 
and Predestination (~140 pp.) 
This third section returns to 
conventional theology, at least 
in terms of its subject matter. 
The second of al-Ṣadūq’s 
opening concerns, that of free 
will and predestination, is now 
addressed. Many of the 
chapters, like those in Section 
I, address particular concepts 
within this area. As will be 
seen, this apparent similarity of 
subject matter contrasts with 
the very different treatment 




Told ʿImrān the Sabean Regarding Tawḥīd 
in the Presence of al-Maʾmūn 
66. Record of the Council of al-Riḍā with 
Sulaymān al-Marwazī, the Disputant of 
Khurāsān, in the Presence of al-Maʾmūn 
67. Forbidding of Discourse, Argument and 
Posturing with Regard to God 
 
1. TASHBĪH – Apology and Obfuscation 
 
The two heresies of tashbīh and jabr differ to one another in nature, and these differences and 
the corresponding difference in al-Ṣadūq’s treatment of them is the axis on which the 
development of al-Tawḥīd pivots. The first, tashbīh, is the easy question of for all concerned. 
In sharp contrast to questions of predestination, the charge of anthropomorphism can be 
countered by a wholesale espousal of the opposite position. By the time al-Ṣadūq is writing, 
especially within the context of a heavily Muʿtazilī-leaning Buwayhid court, to espouse 
tashbīh is a relatively fringe position, held only by literalist ḥashawīya.352 While this does, of 
course, lend an urgency to al-Ṣadūq’s need to position the Imāms’ teachings on the orthodox 
side of the fence, this urgency is not a troubling one, for al-Tawḥīd bears extensive witness to 
the wealth of traditions available to an tenth-century Imāmī scholar affirming the 
transcendence of God. As for such traditions as might be more troublesome, al-Ṣadūq has no 
trouble excluding them (at least for now). 
It is in this first section that al-Ṣadūq’ compiling is most fully engaged with the apologetic 
objectives set out in the introduction. The chapters dealing with tashbīh teem with mechanisms 
and strategies to convince the reader that the aḥādīth that he reads are fully in keeping with 
orthodox theology, without any trace of the heresy and intellectual laughing-stock of 
anthropomorphism. Our foremost concern as we examine this section will be to identify these 
compiler’s mechanisms and examine how they work in the text. To begin with a note on his 
sources, it is a conspicuous feature of this work that it has the most restricted set of sources of 
any of al-Ṣadūq’s surviving writings. Al-Ṣadūq narrates here only from his most frequently 
cited and clearly most trusted teachers, figures like Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Mājīlawayh, ʿAlī b. 
Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. ʿImrān al-Daqqāq, his father and Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad 
                                                            
352 Kraemer, Cultural Revival, pp. 72-73. Significantly, ḥashw is listed amongst the intellectual crimes 
for which al-Ṣadūq and other traditionists were banished by ibn ʿAbbād in the account supplied by al-
Tawḥīdī. See al-Tawḥīdī, Akhlāq al-wazīrayn, pp. 166-167. 
Chapters 65-66: The councils 
of al-Riḍā – These two 
chapters are, formally 
speaking, a striking departure 
from what precedes, 
constituting long narratives of 
the imām al-Riḍā’s debates 
with various interlocutors. 
Thematically, however, they 
are integral to the third section, 
as will be seen. 
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b. al-Walīd, excluding more eccentric sources, an obvious defensive device, but also excluding 
Sunnī sources who, though useful in many apologetic situations, have no bearing in a 
vindication of the Imāmī corpus. A striking absence, meanwhile, regarding sources is that 
nowhere in al-Tawḥīd does al-Ṣadūq mount the defence with which he begins al-Iʿtiqādāt: 
that any tradition ascribed to the imāms that compromises God’s oneness is a forgery.353 
Instead, as is so often the case in al-Ṣadūq’s work, he suspends this most useful (but most 
compromising) of rebuttals in his quest for a ḥadīth corpus that can be more intact and more 
sacred.  
In the first two chapters of al-Tawḥīd we already see combined two very different to vindicate 
the Imāms’ akhbār. In chapter one, ‘The Reward of Those Who Know and Declare God’s 
Oneness,’354 the chapter’s title concern is affirmed in thirty-five mostly short, 
straightforwardly relevant aḥādīth: ‘God has forbidden to the fire the bodies of those who 
declare his oneness;’ ‘O Muḥammad, blessed among your community are those who say there 
is no god but God, only he, only he, only he.’355 The result is a specific point clearly made 
with a self-evidently large body of targeted evidence. In chapter two, ‘Tawḥīd and the 
Refutation of tashbīh,’ meanwhile, we see something very different. This chapter is the longest 
in the book, and presents a thundering, at times hymnic assemblage of what appear to be the 
most powerfully eloquent attestations of monotheism attributed to the Imāms that al-Ṣadūq 
could find, many of which are of considerable length. To the Imāms ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib and ʿAlī 
al-Riḍā in particular there are attributed a rich corpus of sermons and councils, and of these 
al-Ṣadūq makes extensive use here:  
Praise be to God who cannot die, whose wonders are boundless, since each day he is 
bringing into being new things that had not been before. He it is who has no beginning, 
such as would share in his glory, nor does he have any offspring such that he might 
be succeeded or pass away. Thoughts cannot grasp him to apprehend him with fancies 
or likenesses, nor to eyes see him, such that he would change with their shifting. He 
it is in whose primacy there is no end, nor is there edge or in his finality. He it is whom 
no time precedes, whom no age follows, nor does there touch him any excess nor 
weakness.356 
                                                            
353 Al-Iʿtiqādāt, p. 30. 
354 Starting a book with a chapter affirming the salvific value of the knowledge it contains is extremely 
common practice amongst Imāmīs and others in this period. We have already seen its use by al-Ṣaffār, 
al-Kulaynī and others alongside al-Ṣadūq in chapter one. See above.  
355 Al-Tawḥīd, pp. 24-25 (ḥḥ. 8, 10). 
356 Al-Tawḥīd, p. 37. 
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This is pure kerygma, and indeed, the size and magisterial character of this chapter’s traditions 
gives it so decisive an air that one might be forgiven for wondering whether al-Ṣadūq has 
already achieved at least half of his stated goals. But decisive it is not, for this only the 
beginning of the book. The greater part of al-Tawḥīd’s text will be taken up, meanwhile, with 
an approach closer to that of chapter one, offering concise and elucidating of specific points. 
This may tempt us to forget that chapter two is there with its very different mode of 
demonstration, weighted less to precision and more to expansive rhetorical force. We should, 
conversely, remain mindful of its presence as we proceed into the long, meticulous, heavily 
subdivided apology that follows. 
If al-Tawḥīd is often taken for a reference work then this must largely be due to this first 
section, which does, indeed, appear to address the reader in very explicatory tones. We see a 
long sequence of chapters each of which addresses a particular subsidiary questions to the 
overall theme of refuting tashbīh. This encompasses all the textbook queries of the determined 
trasnscendentalist: disambiguation of Qurʾānic verses which describe God with such 
anthropomorphist vocabulary as ‘hand’ and ‘eye’, whether God can be seen, the distinction 
between his essence and his attributes and so on. These chapters often offer a considerable 
measure of precision, both in their subject matter and their contents. In chapter 7, ‘That God 
is a Thing’, we learn that ‘He is a thing in the truth of thing-ness, though he has no body or 
form,’ that ‘everything which is called a thing is created except God,’ and so on. Though this 
mode of presentation may be of use to the inquiring theologian, we should not forget that al-
Ṣadūq’s professed goal is not primarily didactic but apologetic. The message of this near-
encyclopaedic treatment of questions of tashbīh is therefore that these are all questions to 
which the Imāms are wholly, uniquely able to give sound answers. Their demarcated variety 
affirms, in contrast to the book’s opening sermons, that the Imāms do not merely preach the 
generalities of tawḥīd, but effectively, indeed infallibly supply correct knowledge of its 
various essential corollaries and minutiae. In chapters sixteen to twenty-one we see this 
comprehensiveness represented as economically as possible, with each chapter only 
containing a single report, each disambiguating a single Qurʾānic verse, and each expanding 
the Imāms’ depicted capacity for guidance no less for such brevity.357 
                                                            
357 A separate, more targeted device of apology is also to be found in al-Tawḥīd’s opening pages. 
Chapter five, ‘The Meaning of Tawḥīd and Justice (ʿadl)’, is a clear overture to the Muʿtazilīs whose 
driving slogan constitutes its title. Little surprise, then, that we find this overture to tawḥīd and ʿadl 
among the early chapters, all the more conspicuous as we have, of course, already had a chapter on 
tawḥīd. The brief chapter’s three traditions begin with one which winningly states that tawḥīd and ʿadl 
are the foundation of religion, before the next two expand on the concept. Moreover, these narrations 
all come from outside al-Ṣadūq’s usual, select set of sources for al-Tawḥīd, indicating that he has gone 
so far as to sacrifice his usual scrupulousness in this matter in order to include the material necessary 
for this essential apologetic. 
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Even as he demonstrates the Imāms’ unique and unimpeachable theological acumen, an 
uncommon feature of al-Tawḥīd in the context of al-Ṣadūq’s other works is that alongside the 
Imāms’ words we regularly encounter al-Ṣadūq’s own voice. Far from an invisible compiler, 
he is forever interjecting in propria persona between the traditions, a feature which is 
inseparable from the work’s apologetic purpose. Al-Ṣadūq’s interjections in al-Tawḥīd 
overwhelmingly serve to interpret and to clarify what he narrates, whenever a tradition might 
be open to unhelpful, unorthodox readings. Even in the first chapter he takes no chances: for 
example, following the statement that whomsoever professes the oneness of God shall enter 
paradise, wine-drinkers and adulterers included, al-Ṣadūq inserts the caveat that in such cases 
as these they shall be granted the opportunity for repentance, such that they may then enter 
paradise, thus deflecting potential accusations of excessive, murjiʾī faith-based salvationism 
which this tradition might incur.358 Whenever the Imāms speak in a slightly more figurative 
register one can expect to find al-Ṣadūq on hand to keep order. In chapter ten, ‘Knowledge,’ 
for example, the Imām tells his interlocutor that God’s knowledge is to God as one’s hand is 
to oneself, and al-Ṣadūq steps in to clarify with a much more technical turn of phrase that ‘His 
knowledge is not other than him, indeed it is among the attributes of his essence,’ and so 
forth.359 Elsewhere, in direct contrast to what we shall see later in Kamāl al-dīn, he also steps 
in as and when he narrates narratives of previous prophets to suppress any elements of the 
story which might threaten the doctrine of the prophets’ sinlessness.360 
This careful hermeneutical policing has obvious utility for the al-Tawḥīd’s apologetic purpose, 
and it furthermore echoes and respond to a particular grievance which al-Ṣadūq voices in his 
introduction: that the Imāmīya’s detractors condemn them for heresy ‘On account of those 
akhbār which they find in [Imāmīs’] books, of whose exegesis (tafsīr) and meanings (maʿānī) 
they are ignorant.’361 Faulty interpretation is a hazard which must be avoided. A further 
strategy employed to combat this menace may be seen in the frequency with which al-Ṣadūq 
abbreviates a long ḥadīth to give only the section relevant to the chapter in which it is situated, 
alerting us in an aside to the fact that he has done so. While this is not unknown in his other 
works, it happens far more often in al-Tawḥīd, to the point where he even abbreviates to the 
task at hand traditions sections of which he uses in other parts of the book.362 Meanwhile the 
converse tendency exhibited in other works to blithely include lengthy and colourful 
                                                            
358 Al-Tawḥīd, p. 31. 
359 Ibid., p. 145. 
360 Ibid., p. 128. 
361 Ibid., p. 21. 
362 E.g. ibid., pp. 53 (ḥ. 10), 80 (ḥ. 28), 131, 142 (ḥ. 14). 
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traditions, of which only a small part relates to the matter at hand, is conspicuously absent 
from al-Tawḥīd’s pages.363 
We thus see in this text an array of strategies whereby al-Ṣadūq exhibits unprecedented care 
over how his compilation is read. Nonetheless, already in this first section we encounter points 
where absolute clarity regarding the precise and contentious theological issues under 
discussion seems an uphill struggle. Chapter eleven, ‘The Attributes of Essence and the 
Attributes of Actions,’ is a classic case of a topic which is both highly technical, deeply 
contested and inextricably connected to a broad set of separate questions. In consecutive 
aḥādīth in this understandably lengthy chapter we learn that God has full knowledge of things 
before they are created as well as after, that God is light without darkness, life without death 
and knowledge without ignorance, and that he is only willing insofar as there is something to 
be willed but he is eternally all-powerful. What we may be seeing here are the limits of the 
precision which can be attained with compiled aḥādīth alone, and accordingly at such times 
we see al-Ṣadūq adding a further control mechanism: he supplies at the chapter’s close a 
lengthy explanation of the question at hand in his own prose. Here it is apparently not enough 
to clarify the content of the individual narrations, but a systematic account of the full concept 
to which they fragmentarily attest is also required. Such summaries are sometimes 
significantly longer than the remainder of the chapter,364 and variously employ both the 
discursive tools of kalām (‘If it is argued… Then our response is…’) and learned citations 
from a range of sources. Once again, though these banks of prose can be read as instructive 
treatments of the topics in hand, we must remember that in al-Iʿtiqādāt the same theological 
question is settled in a handful of lines without a single proof-text, whereas here in al-Tawḥīd 
it follows nineteen diverse aḥādīth with the express objective of defending them. The role of 
such summaries in this work is thus to affirm that they are indeed summaries of those aḥādīth 
to which they are juxtaposed, and that the reasoned theology they expound is identical with 
the Imāms’ teachings as contained, albeit fragmentarily, in those aḥādīth. 
Al-Ṣadūq thus appears to push to the limit his traditions’ capacity to attest to their own 
orthodoxy, using a range of compiler’s tricks alongside line after line of his own prose to show 
precisely what the aḥādīth mean, such that the reader may know the precision with which they 
are theologically sound. However, this is not the sum of al-Ṣadūq’s labours here. There is 
another side to al-Tawḥīd’s text to all these checks and balances, a side which, when 
examined, indicates that al-Ṣadūq is not simply striving to be as clear as he possibly can. An 
attentive reading of the book alerts one to the conspicuous absence of a further set of 
                                                            
363 See both Chapter II and Chapter IV for frequent illustrations of this tendency in al-Ṣadūq’s writing. 
364 E.g. al-Tawḥīd, pp. 90-94, 159. 
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mechanisms, indeed more common mechanisms than those described above, which al-Ṣadūq 
and other Imāmī scholars in this period employ to produce from disjointed aḥādīth the most 
cogent and complex explanations of orthodoxy. 
The first of these is the simple strategy of grouping similar reports. In chapters which are 
divided according to topic one does, of course, expect all the reports therein to be united by 
common themes, but it is common practice amongst al-Ṣadūq and his fellows (and, indeed we 
shall later observe its use elsewhere within al-Tawḥīd) to group narrations according to exact 
similarities in their content.365 For the vast majority of al-Tawḥīd’s text, however, al-Ṣadūq 
neglects to do this: in chapter nine, ‘Power,’ for example, a number of akhbār address the 
question of whether or not God can put the universe inside an egg without making the universe 
smaller or making the egg bigger, but these reports are not all juxtaposed but dispersed across 
the chapter, mixed with those addressing very different questions.366 
A second, more labour-intensive feature is the structuring of a chapter’s aḥādīth so as to 
simulate the development of an argument through the sequence of material. The most basic 
form of this is to begin with reports which straightforwardly state the desired position and then 
to move to those which treat subsidiary aspects of the question or illustrate the truth a little 
more lengthily colourfully. Once again, as well as in al-Ṣadūq’s other works and those of other 
writers this will also be encountered later on in al-Tawḥīd’s own pages. 367 Again, however, 
this strategy is only an occasional presence in this first half. To return to the example of chapter 
six, the egg and the universe, not only are the akhbār addressing this question not grouped 
together but they produce different answers. We are told first that just as God can contain 
within the space of the eyeball all the images of the heavens and the earth that the eye can see, 
so he can contain the universe within an egg. However, a few reports later the reply seems to 
be a negative one. ‘God,’ the Imām says, ‘cannot be called lacking in power, and what greater 
power than of him who could so shrink the universe and so magnify an egg?’ The implication 
is surely that he could not, but the fact that he could do so if only in violation of the 
enlarging/shrinking clause is testament enough of his omnipotence. The same answer is 
repeated later, but with several other akhbār separating the two, as well as one report which 
simply answers in the negative, prohibits the attributing of impotence to God and leaves it at 
that.368 Overall, one is left with the distinct impression that al-Ṣadūq is taking much less care 
than he could be to supply a definitive answer to this knotty little problem, indeed to structure 
                                                            
365 See below. 
366 Al-Tawḥīd, pp. 132-134 (ḥ. 1), 137 (ḥ. 5), 139 (ḥ. 9). 
367 Gleave discusses the use of this compiler’s technique in al-Ṣadūq’s al-Faqīh as well as in al-
Kulaynī’s al-Kāfī. See also Amir-Moezzi & Ansari, p. 154.   
368 Al-Tawḥīd, pp. 132-134 (ḥ. 1), 137 (ḥ. 5), 139 (ḥ. 9). 
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the aḥādīth such that they would supply it for him. Far from being an isolated instance, this 
disordered and occasionally contradictory quality is visible across much of al-Tawḥīd’s first 
section. Often the effect is amplified by the volume of material supplied. Returning to chapter 
eleven and God’s attributes of essence and action, again we find key components scattered 
with no attempt at grouping. Furthermore, although al-Ṣadūq supplies his long summary, 
within the chapter’s many reports we find many significant terms and concepts of which al-
Ṣadūq’s summary makes no mention, such as aspects (nuʿūt), the flowing (jary) of the names 
of God’s attributes amongst his creatures, the notion of ‘without asking how’ (bilā kayf), veils 
(ḥijāb), forms (ṣūra), similitudes (mathal) and so on. We have observed how the summary 
serves to clarify the disparity of the akhbār, but why not use a smaller, more homogenous 
sample of akhbār (in other chapters al-Ṣadūq is sometimes content to give only a single 
report!), and so avoid creating the disparity in the first place? 
It is clear that there is more at work here than simple explication, indeed the above seems to 
indicate that alongside al-Ṣadūq’s conspicuous efforts to clarify his material he seems 
simultaneously to be engaged in deliberate obfuscation. Though this seems wildly 
contradictory, these two aspects of al-Tawḥīd in fact work in harmony, together furthering the 
book’s driving apologetic concern. Once more, we must recall that al-Ṣadūq is not preaching 
to the converted. This is not the place to use the unchallenged authority of the Imāms’ aḥādīth 
to explain doctrine to the faithful and answer their questions in depth. Instead the goal is to 
persuade a potentially quite hostile readership that the Imāms’ teachings can answer such 
questions, justifying their authority as a source of doctrine. 
Let us turn to chapter eight, ‘What is Said Concerning Vision (of God),’ where we find of the 
more striking instances of divergent material. While most of the chapter’s reports deliver the 
unsurprising message that God is far greater than to be seen, in one ḥadīth the Imām declares 
that believers will, indeed see God on the day of judgement, and moreover cautions his listener 
not to repeat this information! If the goal of this text were pure instruction such a report could 
only be deeply counterproductive (it is a curious creed that professes two conflicting beliefs 
about the same thing), but in the defence of traditions this risqué flirtation with heterodoxy is 
very useful. Al-Ṣadūq subsequently introduces a set of reports on the theme that vision with 
the heart is not like vision with the eyes,369 before inserting his own discussion of how even 
in aḥādīth do seem to suggest that God can be seen, what is meant is this theologically more 
palatable sense of seeing that is quite unlike physical seeing. Read in sequence, then, the 
                                                            
369 Ibid., pp. 124-126 (ḥḥ. 16, 17, 20). 
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chapter first denies that God can be seen, then suddenly suggests that he actually can, before 
mollifying this contradiction by clarifying that some types of seeing’ are not like others. 
By taking the reader through this perverse process of disturbance and disambiguation, al-
Ṣadūq communicates through his compiled material a powerful and vital message: however 
strange or troubling a single report of the Imāms may seem, the reader should always be certain 
that there exists either another report or the discerning power of a scholar which will explain 
such problems away. Both by such iterations of the sanitizing of heterodox material and more 
generally by including disordered and diverse material which requires his own summaries, al-
Ṣadūq thus extends the apologetic reach of al-Tawḥīd’s text far beyond its covers. He purports 
to show his own reading process as compiler, including not just the clearest reports but 
ambiguous texts they serve to explain, not only giving the finished product of such summaries 
that are found in his creeds but also the disparate diversity of texts from which they are 
constructed. The endeavour of al-Tawḥīd is threatened by the potential accusation that 
however many aḥādīth al-Ṣadūq may assemble, he excludes many others which might not 
have been so agreeable. He does not respond to this threat by arguing his selection 
qualitatively with discussion of narrators and asānīd,370 rather he engineers the studied 
disunity of al-Tawḥīd’s contents to make his sample look representative. In so doing he 
attempts to gain a hold on readers’ perception of whatsoever unsavoury or conflicting material 
they may hear reported from the Imāms in the future, suggesting that just as the unwieldy 
plurality of al-Tawḥīd’s contents yields to orthodox readings so too will other unlikely-looking 
aḥādīth. The whole corpus is thus justified metonymically by means of a part of it. 
This endeavour to represent the entire body of the Imāms’ reported speech may be seen in 
several other features of al-Tawḥīd’s first section. The simplest of these is size. While very 
large chapters do not much aid with theological clarification (in al-Iʿtiqādāt a single point is 
almost never backed up by more than one report), they are obviously of great use for al-
Ṣadūq’s aim to represent the entire corpus. In chapter eight al-Ṣadūq concludes a run of 
twenty-four narrations with the sentiment that were he to set down all available material on 
the subject the book would become excessively long!371 He declares what the reader sees to 
be a representative sample, a claim that is implicitly echoed across the entire work, buoyed up 
by other similarly voluminous chapters. Meanwhile, the diversity of ideas which such chapters 
may contain, as well further shoring up the illusion of comprehensiveness, has additional 
                                                            
370 Again we should recall that al-Ṣadūq uses just such a strategy when it suits him in al-Iʿtiqādāt, 
warning readers that unorthodox-looking aḥādīth may be inauthentic. We have discussed in Chapter I 
how al-Ṣadūq is ambivalent about such assertions, and in the more ambitious context of al-Tawḥīd he 
shows how productively they may be thrown aside.  
371 Al-Tawḥīd, p. 131. 
140 
 
apologetic value. While we can point to the predominantly Muʿtazilī character of al-Ṣadūq’s 
native Rayy, al-Tawḥīd does not begin as some of his other works do by invoking any 
particular adversary. The well-travelled al-Ṣadūq was likely to have in mind a diverse 
readership for his text, and maintaining an element of plurality in the Imāms’ reported words 
anticipates such diversity and widens the work’s apologetic potential. Any reader, it is hoped, 
will find something to their liking. 
Even as these anarchic elements of al-Tawḥīd enable it to mirror the larger body of Imāmī 
ḥadīth, we may now turn back to those devices which impose order on the text, the 
interjections and the clarifications, and in them, too, see a purpose that is more mimetic than 
straightforwardly didactic. Though we have listed many a function for these features, it 
remains true that often they appear awkward and redundant. In chapter twenty-eight, ‘That 
God is Beyond Time and Space, Motion and Stillness, Descent and Ascent’ the text addresses 
a fairly basic question of transcendence with which the reader must, by now, be fairly familiar. 
The Imāms in its many reports are frequently shown in what may be called the ‘idiot ex 
machina’ scenario, wherein the Imām is asked a proverbially misguided question (‘Where is 
God?’) which forms the opportunity for him to respond with serene, homiletic rectitude. 
Though reference is consistently made to the specific notions promised in the title, these 
resounding paeans to God’s transcendence are very much hewn from the same stuff as those 
of chapter two, ‘Tawḥīd and the Denial of Tashbīh.’ In the very middle of the chapter (between 
the tenth and eleventh of twenty-two reports) al-Ṣadūq intervenes, purporting to give ‘the 
proof (dalīl) that God is beyond space.’ The significance of the proof he gives, that God is 
eternal, all-powerful and so on and thus beyond such limitations, is that it is so thoroughly 
unnecessary. Even the theological language of al-Ṣadūq’s ‘proof’ has already been supplied 
by the preceding reports of this chapter and many others. More curious still is that al-Ṣadūq 
concludes his ‘proof’ by declaring, ‘and the confirmation (taṣdīq) of this is as follows,’ that is 
to say that, contrary to all appearances, his arguments are to be confirmed not by the previous 
aḥādīth, which they fully echo, but those which follow, which in turn do not noticeably differ 
from what precedes. The chapter’s fairly homogenous material is thus inexplicably divided 
into two, with the second half held up as an explanation of the reasoned truths which the first 
half, it is said, anticipates.  
What we see here is a simulacrum of theology. With his brief interjection al-Ṣadūq insists that 
the akhbār amassed here constitute the development of a systematic argument when in fact 
they do no such thing. Even as he abstains from getting too theologically specific with the 
content of his aḥādīth, on a stylistic level he is conversely labouring to make his text look 
more theological, more dialectic and more in conformity with the discursive paradigms 
favoured by traditionism’s detractors than it actually is.  
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As we have observed, it is perhaps not easy to make compiled aḥādīth look like systematic 
theology. Detailed arguments and taxonomies are not wholly absent from the aḥādīth, but nor 
are they its most familiar traffic, with more common voices by far being those of proverb, 
parable and aphorism. Al-Tawḥīd begins with elegant kerygma, with Imāms who do not 
answer individual queries but who tell the whole truth, the beautiful truth uninterrupted as it 
should be told, that is to say beautifully. This is not an image which al-Ṣadūq is easily 
persuaded to give up. If the triumphant vindication declared by the second chapter’s sermons 
is belied by the long, Byzantine apology that follows, it must also be said that that apology 
never fully escapes the former’s shadow, nor is it meant to escape it. Al-Ṣadūq’s intense 
polemical defence his traditions against the venerable and belligerent discipline of dialectic 
theology drives those traditions through an extraordinary balancing act, simulating through 
the akhbār all the polyphonous vagaries of the corpus, even as they simultaneously mimic the 
precise discursive tropes of kalām. In the midst of such dissimulating intricacy the pure 
aesthetic force of the Imām’s sermon provides a welcome stability. For all his many chapters 
and their many questions, al-Tawḥīd often appears a very repetitive book, especially in this 
first portion, as the Imāms again and again assert in decorated prose the transcendence of God. 
Al-Ṣadūq goes to a great deal of effort in this first section to answer beyond all doubt any 
challenge to the theological authenticity of the Imāms’ reported words, but complex ingenuity 
of his labours are forever counterbalanced with a no less deliberate assertion that the answer 
is simple and self-evident.  
 
2. ʿAẒMA – Metaphysical Heights and Hermeneutical Depths  
 
The identifiable end of the first section comes at the point when al-Tawḥīd ceases to be a book 
which gives a simple answer to a simple question. Around the book’s centre, the studied 
apology in the compiler’s voice rapidly vanishes, as we are confronted with a set of chapters 
which transport the reader to somewhere a great deal more mysterious than encountered thus 
far. The assertive confirmation of orthodoxy begins to give way, and apology clearly ceases 
to be the primary objective, if indeed it does not seem actively threatened by this new material. 
We are informed of such matters as the meanings of the letters of the alphabet, of the meanings 
of God’s many names and of the fact that the heavens are balanced on the back of a rooster, 
standing on top of a rock which in turn rests on the back of an enormous fish. What is al-
Ṣadūq, once the meticulous apologist, trying to do? 
This change begins with chapter twenty-nine, ‘God’s Names and the Difference Between their 
Meanings and the Meanings of the Names of Created Beings.’ Thus advertised the chapter 
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purports to be another stock question of tashbīh, and initially no change is noticeable. 
However, as the chapter proceeds into the details of God’s possessing ninety-nine names, there 
appears a ḥadīth stating that whosoever counts (aḥṣā) these names shall enter paradise. Here 
al-Ṣadūq intervenes, informing the reader that paradise is attained not merely by counting the 
names, but by attaining understanding of their meanings (maʿnā). This would still be 
unremarkable, were it not followed by a twenty-odd page exegetical odyssey in which al-
Ṣadūq undertakes to explain these ninety-nine meanings one by one, drawing on an eclectic 
mix of tradition, speculation, and lexicography. For some names he offers a simple synonym, 
such as khabīr (‘knowing;’ ‘aware’) which he equates to ʿālim (which indeed means much the 
same thing), others have lengthier discussions citing various proof-texts to establish their 
semantic field, while other names require conceptual clarification (while ḥayy means ‘alive’ 
this does not entail that God may die). We are still in broadly conventional theological territory 
(there is not a rooster in sight), but in al-Ṣadūq has embarked on a new direction that will 
escalate radically over the next few chapters.  
In string of similar chapters, first the basmala (chapter thirty-one), then the letters of the 
alphabet, both the abjad (chapter thirty-three) and the muʿjam (chapter thirty-two) and the 
phrases of the calls to prayer (chapter thirty-four) are given similarly lengthy interpretations, 
although this time these are delivered as aḥādīth from the Imāms. The effect of these vistas of 
interpretation is a resounding illustration of the depth of the Imāms’ knowledge. The 
explanation of God’s names was a cautious introduction, with al-Ṣadūq providing the 
explanations and these being thoroughly uncontroversial, grounded in theological reasoning 
and lexicographical evidence and supported by frequent citations. As well as the obvious shift 
to deferring the explanations to the Imāms, the topics are also more ambitious. The letters, in 
particular, signal a move to far more esoteric territory: the assertion of an intrinsic link 
between the last judgement and the nineteenth through twenty-second letters of the alphabet372 
is clearly a step or two up from adducing exemplars for the lexicographical difference between 
al-Raḥmān and al-Raḥīm.373 This section builds, as al-Ṣadūq gradually expanding an image 
of the inspired and inimitable scale of the Imāms’ understanding. In chapter thirty-four in 
which the calls to prayer are interpreted every phrase is expanded into an elaborate set of 
theological truths. We are beyond reason here, the Imāms’ interpretations asserting meanings 
which no dialectic can confirm or deny, resting only on their inspired authority and so 
asserting it. The choice of subject is, of course, masterful. The Imāms’ knowledge, al-Ṣadūq 
shows his reader, plumbs the depths of language, speech and interpretation, bringing the very 
                                                            
372 Al-Tawḥīd, p. 259. 
373 Ibid., p. 221. 
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letters of the alphabet alive with hidden meaning and enchanting the whole of speech and text 
in a vast web of signification, one before which any lesser interpreter must be humbled. 
An early, pivotal moment of this new section is chapter thirty, ‘The Nature of the Qurʾān.’ It 
begins with the following narration: 
I asked al-Riḍā, “O son of God’s Messenger, tell me of the Qurʾān, is it creator or 
created?” He replied, 
“It is neither creator nor is it created, rather it is the speech of God, exalted and mighty 
is he.”374 
This is brave new territory for al-Tawḥīd. Confronting no less a question that that which had 
fuelled the debacle of al-Maʾmūn’s inquisition a century before, and which was still hotly 
contested, he opens his chapter with an unmistakeable attack both on the teachings of 
dominant groups and the very premise on which they differ.375 This once defensive text, al-
Ṣadūq announces, is now taking the fight to its opponents in this strange and radical ḥadīth of 
the Imām. 
But this is not the start of a sustained theological argument. The notion of a middle ground 
between a created and an uncreated Qurʾān is not elaborated upon in the aḥādīth that follow, 
rather what is developed is that the Qurʾān, as the speech of God, is quite above such arbitrary 
speculation as to its nature or its meanings. The eye-catching doctrinal challenge of the first 
ḥadīth is now rendered secondary, and is instead made to fuel a staunch traditionist rebuttal 
of theological debate in this arena. A subsequent ḥadīth re-states the matter to this effect: 
I said to Abū al-Ḥasan Mūsā b. Jaʿfar, “O son of God’s messenger, what say you of 
the Qurʾān? For there is disagreement among us in this matter, some saying that it is 
created and others that it is not created.” Said he, 
“I do not say as they do in this matter. Rather I say that it is the speech of God.”376 
At length al-Ṣadūq intervenes in the discussion with some judicious points of lexicography. 
He explains how statements regarding the Qurʾān’s createdness or otherwise, whilst possibly 
carrying legitimate meanings, also risk heretical ones. Language here is unreliable, the 
capacity of words to mean more than one thing making them far too hazardous a tool when 
the stakes are so high. Alongside strengthening the chapter’s message of the perils of debate, 
this stress on the ambiguity of language also defends against Muʿtazilī rebuttals. Some of 
                                                            
374 Al-Tawḥīd, pp. 244-245 (ḥ. 1).  
375 See Turner, passim.  
376 Al-Tawḥīd, p. 246 (ḥ. 5). 
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aḥādīth may seem to contradict their doctrine of the Qurʾān’s createdness, but if, as al-Ṣadūq 
says, ‘uncreated’ (ghayr makhlūq) can simply mean ‘not falsified’ then they cannot object. 
Though this may carry echoes of al-Ṣadūq’s earlier cautions, it should not distract from this 
chapter’s new and powerful claims. This new attack on theological disputation, buoyed up by 
arguments about the labyrinthine nature of meaning, clearly resonates with the previous 
chapters’ illustration of how the key to that labyrinth is the sole prerogative of the Imāms. The 
alternative to unseemly disputes, al-Ṣadūq declares, is submission to their knowledge. 
The daring extent of this attack becomes fully apparent with chapter thirty-eight, ‘On God’s 
Majesty (ʿaẓma).’ 377 The chapter’s assembled aḥādīth set out to illustrate the greatness of the 
divine, and illustrate it does, with all the potential conflict with anti-tashbīh transcendentalism 
that the word implies. It brims over with accounts of vast cosmological distances such as those 
between the curtains of smoke, light and fire which veil the almighty, angels whose wings are 
covered in many-mouthed faces which forever voice the praises of the Almighty, other angels 
wondrously assembled of intermingled ice and fire378 and, of course, the sea of shadows in 
which swims the fish on whose back is balanced the rock on which stands the colossal rooster 
on whose back the very heavens are placed. In keeping with the title of the chapter, the 
appropriately formidable dimensions, such as necks of angels the length of which would take 
                                                            
377 Before its climax in chapter thirty-eight this second section makes efforts to legitimise these new 
hermeneutical horizons and affirm in new registers the supremacy of the imāms’ knowledge. In chapters 
forty-eight through fifty-two, Al-Ṣadūq ends the section with a set of tame exegeses regarding God’s 
throne(s) (al-ʿarsh and al-kursī), as mentioned in various Qurʾānic verses, in so doing reminding the 
reader with impeccable timing that such unknowable concepts demanding interpretation as these are to 
be found in the Holy Book itself. The most concentrated instance of this device meanwhile comes 
directly before chapter thirty-eight (ʿaẓma). Chapters thirty-six and thirty-seven, ‘The Refutation of 
Dualists and Zanādiqa,’ and ‘The Refutation of Those Who Claim that God is One Among Three’ 
constitute our first example of what will become a familiar phenomenon in al-Ṣadūq’s writings, wherein 
arguments are appended to mythic dramatizations of the abstract concepts that have been discussed. 
We shall discuss this as a phenomenon in more detail later on (see below). As an operation in this 
context, meanwhile, we may observe that before embarking on the axial cosmic extravagance of chapter 
thirty-eight, al-Ṣadūq shows us the Imāms as defenders against Islam’s very nemesis, the very antithesis 
of tawḥīd, the notion that there is more than one God. Our text began with the Imāms asserting tawḥīd, 
but now we see them protecting it against its most perverse and seditious foes. Moreover, in the reports 
contained within these chapters we have moved from lists of brief reports to sustained narrative, 
multiple reports being replaced by long, unbroken descriptive prose. We are reminded of the kerygmatic 
force of chapter two as al-Ṣadūq moves briefly back into a less analytical, more rhetorical register. The 
chapter against dualists gives several long narratives, in each of which an Imām is confronted by a 
heretic and defeats them in debate. The chapter against trinitarianism give only a single story, that of 
an elderly, celebrated patriarch whose sincere desire for truth and the indomitable arguments of the 
Imām ultimately compel him, reluctantly and in spite of his position, to turn to Islam. The narrative is 
engaging and detailed, as the patriarch goes back and forth first to the Imām’s disciple and then to the 
Imām himself, meanwhile counselled at home by his wise, Muslim housekeeper. Artfully located as 
they are, these chapters serve well to further imbue readers on new and powerful registers with the 
image of the Imām as the embodiment of tawḥīd, just as al-Ṣadūq is most in need of their trust. 
378 The angel in question, the ḥadīth narrates, prays as follows: ‘Glory to God who dulls the heat of this 
fire lest it melt this ice, and who dulls the chill of this ice lest it extinguishes the heat of this fire. O God, 
you who unite fire and ice, unite the hearts of the believers, your servants, in obedience to you.’ Al-
Tawḥīd, p. 308 (ḥ. 5). 
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a bird five hundred years to fly,379 of all of these elements are relayed in detail. God, the 
chapter tells us, is certainly great. But this, of course, is a fact of which we have already 
repeatedly made aware. Nearly thirty preceding chapters have told us that God’s greatness is 
beyond description and beyond dimension. Moreover, far beyond the risk of repetition, it is 
quite apparent that the lurid images of this chapter and the previously affirmed transcendence 
are dangerously close to contradiction. Surely we have seen here described what we learned 
previously is not to be described! It is also the case that quite apart from logical and theological 
objections that rationalists theologians might have to this mode of discourse, the metaphysical 
circus offered in this chapter seem to flamboyantly challenge the very parameters within which 
rational theology is conducted. 
Here then is the climax of the change of register that al-Ṣadūq enacts in this middle section. 
Through this fast-escalating turn for the stranger he engineers a transformation of the reader’s 
encounter with the Imāms’ speech. Up till now their reported words have expanded, clarified 
and defended, displaying a comforting conformance to familiar theological truths. But the 
inspired speech of God’s vicegerents is not all so benignly knowable. This eruption of the 
unfamiliar is a shift from defence to aggression, as the Imāms burst out of kalām’s discursive 
box and command the reader to do the same. Al-Ṣadūq has nailed his traditionist colours to 
the mast, unveiling his Imāms and their akhbār as the single, perfect source of sacred 
knowledge, knowledge which is quite beyond the degraded quibblings to which al-Tawḥīd 
began as a response. 
There is no doubt that al-Ṣadūq is running a serious risk here. His declaring the Imāms to be 
beyond kalām must look perilously close to simply condemning their teachings as 
contradictory to kalām, utterly subverting the apology of the first section. But high though the 
stakes may be, he cannot be accused of having neglected to take precautions. Even as the 
middle section speeds away from the apologetic quietism of the first, it can only succeed in 
what follows by leaning heavily on the crutch of legitimacy and credibility, of unimpeachable 
orthodoxy that the first section provides. Al-Ṣadūq is counting on the fact that, after over two 
hundred pages, his readers now trust the Imāms and trust that transcendence is at the heart of 
the Imāms’ teachings, before springing on them this new and startling set of images. That al-
Ṣadūq’s own voice was affirming orthodoxy alongside the Imām tells readers that their 
compiler, too, is trustworthy, encouraging them to give him the benefit of the doubt. If the 
first section at times felt repetitive, this was in necessary anticipation of surprises to come. 
                                                            
379 Al-Tawḥīd, p. 309 (ḥ. 8). 
146 
 
For all the mimetic force and novelty of the central section’s aḥādīth, al-Ṣadūq interjects in 
propria persona in chapter forty-one, ‘That God Cannot Be Known Save Through Himself,’ 
to condense it into a sober and simple theological point. Following the aḥādīth’s 
straightforward confirmation of the title contention, al-Ṣadūq steps in to specifically deny 
knowledge of God to a hitherto unmentioned entity: reason (ʿaql).380 Al-Ṣadūq specifically 
contemplates the ‘Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān’ scenario of the man grows up in complete isolation and 
infers the central truths of religion from reasoned observation of nature,381 and declares that 
this is impossible (unless, of course, that man receives divine inspiration). The only way to 
God, al-Ṣadūq now spells out to us, is through the conduit of revelation, revelation that is 
embodied, of course, in the words of the Imāms. 
The significance of this is that not only has al-Ṣadūq now reshaped the work into so firmly 
traditionist a mould, but that after forty chapters of by turns mimicking and mocking theology, 
he has at last outlined a distinct theological position. He tells his readers what he has first 
shown them: the Imāms manifest their unique knowledge of unknowable and, indeed, 
unreasonable things, battering the readers’ comprehension with shocks, impossibilities and 
wonders, and only afterwards does al-Ṣadūq confirm that their reasoning is not, in fact, 
required. Theology such as the Muʿtazilīs practice it is repudiated as misguided and 
unnecessary: the Imāms’ traditions have shown first that they have no need of it and then that 
they go beyond it.382 
 
                                                            
380 ʿAql has received a number of translations among scholars of Shīʿism, ranging from ‘the intellect’ 
to ‘hiero-intelligence,’ while ‘reason’ is usually avoided (See Amir-Moezzi Divine Guide, pp. 6-13). 
Another proponent of this conception of Shīʿī uses of the term is to be found in Crow). This seems 
based in a notion that ʿaql in Shīʿī thought constituted something more than cold rationality, as well as 
its presence in highly traditionist sources such as al-Kāfī in which one does not expect sanctions of 
independent reasoning (See especially al-Kulaynī, vol. i, pp. 10-29). In al-Ṣadūq’s usage here, 
conversely, ʿaql clearly refers to reason conceived as the faculty at work in independent reasoning and 
analogy, hubristic challenges to the authority of text to which al-Ṣadūq was firmly opposed. 
381 This is not to claim any influence of ibn Ṭufayl’s work by the same name on al-Ṣadūq, the former 
having only been written many decades later. 
382 It is Madelung who characterises al-Tawḥīd as an attempt to minimise disagreement with the 
Muʿtazilīs, though he does point out some areas where al-Ṣadūq diverges from Muʿtazilī positions. He 
does not, however, acknowledge the full extent to which the book, having worked hard to appease a 
Muʿtazilī readership in the first section, emphatically changes direction in the middle as described 
above. Similarly, McDermott describes al-Ṣadūq’s preference to discourage controversy, noting his 
strong words on taqīya in al-Iʿtiqādāt and a number of conciliatory theological positions expressed in 
his works. We have seen this diplomatic side of al-Ṣadūq at work in the previous chapter of this thesis 
as well as in earlier sections of al-Tawḥīd. It is significant that neither author engages this combative 
aspect of al-Tawḥīd that is so vehemently adopted in the later chapters of the book, as it bears full 
witness to the perils of failing to acknowledge the integrity of such a composition, even to the point of 
measuring different chapters against the objectives stated in the introduction. Neither scholar engages 




3. JABR - The Ethical Climax 
 
A remarkable feature of al-Tawḥīd’s composition is that al-Ṣadūq does not perform this 
transition from apologetic to polemic at the end of the book, rather he does it half way through. 
More specifically, at this point there still remains the second of the two doctrines from which 
at the start he set out to disassociate the Imāmī ḥadīth corpus: that of jabr. Al-Ṣadūq’s 
treatment of this doctrine is a remarkable development from the edifice constructed in the 
previous section, tapping the explosive panache of its revealed wonders to fuel a sustained and 
nuanced study of how one should be guided by the Imāms’ akhbār in the face of difficult 
theological questions. 
Chapter fifty-four, ‘Badāʾ’ decisively informs the reader that we are back in theological 
waters, and treacherous theological waters at that. The declared subject matter is one of the 
most troublesome theological bogeymen of the Imāmīya in this period. Badāʾ most commonly 
refers to the idea that God can change his mind, an idea that met with horror and ridicule 
among theologians and especially among Muʿtazilīs. While later narratives associating this 
doctrine with moments in early Shīʿī history are hard to verify, it is clear that by al-Ṣadūq’s 
time the doctrine is firmly associated with the Imāmīya. This association is embodied in a 
quantity of aḥādīth in which the imāms discuss badāʾ, a corpus that thus presents a serious 
hurdle to al-Ṣadūq’s efforts of defending Imāmī ḥadīth. Far from the relative ease with which 
al-Ṣadūq was able to put tashbīh related concerns to rest, he now faces a highly contentious 
doctrine which, in the particular damage it does to the credibility of the Imāmīya and their 
traditions, demands a response. 383 
The turn to so troublesome a theological topic after the assault on theology enacted in the 
previous chapters is a provocative gesture. Having apparently signalled a triumphant end to 
                                                            
383 See McDermott, pp. 329-33. Badāʾ was reportedly first invoked by al-Mukhtār in the seventh 
century, to explain the loss of battles in which he had told his followers in advance that God had 
promised them victory. While undoubtedly contentious amongst theological circles from its inception, 
the idea has a clear persistence in Shīʿī and later Imāmī circles. The second locus classicus of the 
doctrine is the death of Ismāʿīl the son of Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, who is widely narrated to have been designated 
by al-Ṣādiq as his successor before unfortunately predeceasing him. Thus told the story casts obvious 
doubt on al-Ṣādiq’s inspired knowledge and the divine provenance of his office. If the Imāms are 
appointed by God’s will (let alone marked as such since the dawn of creation), how could al-Ṣādiq 
make such a clear error in appointing a successor? One answer proffered was, once again, badāʾ: God 
simply changed his mind. al-Mufīd laments in Taṣḥīḥ (p. 50) that when it comes to badāʾ the Imāmīs 
are slaves to traditions. In this complaint we see a theologian who has minimal tolerance for the concept 
of badāʾ acknowledging its tenacious presence in the Imāmī ḥadīth corpus. Al-Ṣadūq, meanwhile, 
makes the analogous but tellingly different comment, ‘badāʾ is not as the ignorant think it to be.’ Like 
al-Mufīd, he is troubled and defensive regarding the perception of this stubbornly Imāmī doctrine, but 
unlike al-Mufīd, he blames its woes not on thoughtless following of the aḥādīth but on ignorance, 
including (so the previous discussion makes plain) ignorance of those same ḥadīth. 
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theological argument in the middle section, he begins this new one with what seems and urgent 
need for it. Rather than representing a retreat, however, he boldly choses this most 
controversial issue to demonstrate precisely how the supremacy of tradition over argument 
works in practice, achieving this by the compiler’s arts of selection and arrangement.384 To 
see this we must proceed through the chapter in some detail. 
Al-Ṣadūq begins with a pair of reports declaring that God ‘never before has been 
worshipped/glorified with something like badāʾ.’ In so doing he brings the subject to the table 
with some very useful ambiguities. Badāʾ, we learn, is unique, mysterious, an unprecedented 
phenomenon concerning which we rush to judgement at our peril. Moreover, while the 
stronger implication of the traditions is an affirmation of badāʾ, inasmuch as God is 
worshipped therewith now (and certainly settles on that meaning in light of what follows), it 
could at this stage also constitute a disavowal of the concept. All we know for certain at this 
point is that the Imāms understand badāʾ and we don’t. Thus we read on. 
In the next two traditions the word badāʾ itself is absent. What they each affirm confidently is 
that God can alter his creation, postponing and hastening, confirming and erasing, the second 
tradition shoring up this inoffensive truth with a Qurʾānic verse. The implication, though left 
implicit, is clear: that it is this capacity to instigate change to which badāʾ refers. This sets the 
scene for the fifth and sixth reports in which badāʾ is fully instated as indispensable creed. No 
prophet has neglected to preach this doctrine, standing as it does alongside such foundational 
notions as the prohibition of wine and prostration to God.  
‘If people only knew,’ preaches the next reports, ‘The rewards of affirming badāʾ, they would 
not shrink from attesting to it.’ Again, if the reader is perturbed by these wholehearted 
endorsements of the concept, she is reminded that this is down do flawed understanding. A 
vital blow is then struck in the eighth tradition, which denies unequivocally that there can be 
any deficiency of God’s knowledge of unfolding events. Nothing can surprise him, for he 
knows totally the past the present and the future. The conceptual threat of the doctrine’s 
founding instances, that the failures of al-Mukhtār or the death of Ismāʿīl were somehow 
unanticipated or unplanned, it now firmly disavowed. 
The ninth report serves to affirm the two principle facts that we have now learned: firstly, that 
badāʾ, far from denigrating God’s knowledge, concerns the complete extent to which that 
knowledge and power subsumes the ever-changing face of creation, and second, that it is thus 
an obscure and difficult concept the understanding of which we should thus defer to those who 
                                                            
384 It should not go unremarked that the meticulous dexterity with which al-Ṣadūq here orders his 
material, tradition by tradition, is exactly the explicatory precision the absence of which was so 
conspicuous in the first section.   
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know. The report gives a formidable taxonomy of the different components of God’s power 
and knowledge and their relation to created things, including badāʾ’s place therein. Tellingly, 
the details of this taxonomy are not reiterated either in al-Ṣadūq’s closing summary or in his 
discussion of badāʾ in his discussion for badāʾ in al-Iʿtiqādāt. These details are not essential 
points of Imāmī doctrine, rather they are an instance of the rhetorical aspect of the Imāms’ 
compiled traditions that we have seen so often in al-Tawḥīd. The essential difficulties of badāʾ 
have been resolved at this point, and this lengthiest tradition of the chapter has its principle 
goal not in expanding the definitive picture of badāʾ but of reaffirming the image of the 
Imāms’ unparalleled understanding and thus the necessity of deference thereto.  
Al-Ṣadūq now steps in to contribute his own summary. Quite unlike the largely cosmetic 
summaries of the first section, here al-Ṣadūq adds to the message received from the aḥādīth 
with a highly focussed authorial address of a specific issue: a problematic ḥadīth, that in which 
al-Ṣādiq appears to evoke badāʾ with regard to his son Ismāʿīl’s death. The most widely 
reported core of the ḥadīth is the Imām saying, ‘There never was unto God an instance of 
badāʾ as there was regarding Ismāʿīl.’385 The text is particularly difficult as it seems to describe 
badāʾ as something of which God is on the receiving end. Al-Ṣadūq’s response is to unleash 
what is in his extant writings an almost uniquely concentrated effort of suppression of these 
problematic implications. In just a few lines he blasts the problem text with potential different 
versions, mitigating context (for example the suggestion that al-Ṣādiq was talking about his 
father Ismāʿīl the son of Abraham), and lexicographical acrobatics. The result is sound 
enough, though would be much weakened were it not able to draw credibility from the 
preceding bulk of the chapter. 
Though the management of this worrisome concept certainly has an apologetic function, the 
force of this chapter’s argument is a long way from the repetitive, platitudinous defences of 
section one. There is no pseudo-theology here. Having thrown down the gauntlet of the 
Imāms’ epistemic sovereignty, al-Ṣadūq now demonstrates their infallibility even regarding 
the most troublesome of questions. Both by the conspicuously heightened energy of the 
chapter’s workings and the sheer fact of pulling acceptability even out of so infamous a group 
of reports, al-Ṣadūq gives powerful testament here not only to the unfailing truth of the Imāms’ 
words but also the wrongs which faulty interpretation inflicts on them. ‘If people only knew 
the rewards of affirming badāʾ, they would not shrink from attesting to it.’386  
Badāʾ leads us decisively into the promised discussion of jabr that dominates al-Tawḥīd’s 
final section, beginning a long run of chapters addressing this and related problems of the 
                                                            
385 ‘Mā badā lillāh badāʾ kamā badā lahu fī Ismāʿīl.’ 
386 Al-Tawḥīd, p. 366 (ḥ. 7). 
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relationship between God’s power and human agency and culpability. The next six chapters 
address in sequence ‘Will (irāda) and Intention (mashīʾa),’ ‘Capability (istiṭāʿa),’ ‘Tribulation 
(ibtilāʾ) and Experience (ikhtibār),’ ‘Happiness (saʿāda) and Despair (shaqāwa),’ ‘The 
Refutation of Predestination (jabr) and Free Will (tafwīḍ)’ and ‘qaḍāʾ, qadar, fitna, arzāq, 
prices (asʿār) and rewards (ājāl).’ We noted above that the question of tashbīh addressed in 
al-Tawḥīd’s first section is the easy question of the book, and with qadr we have now arrived 
at the hard question. Madelung notes that it is in these areas that al-Ṣadūq is in his sharpest 
disagreement with the Muʿtazila, on no less pivotal a notion than the central Muʿtazilī creed 
of God’s justice.387 Madelung, however, bases his conclusions almost entirely on al-Iʿtiqādāt 
rather than al-Tawḥīd’s treatment of this topic. The reasons for this are not hard to see, for 
while al-Iʿtiqādāt gives brief, definitive answers on points like free will and human agency,388 
al-Tawḥīd is open to the same criticism which prompt Madelung to reject al-Kāfī as a viable 
source of theological thought: it presents only amassed aḥādīth that do not constitute full 
answers to theological questions.389 Quite unlike the meticulous precision applied to the 
discussion of badāʾ, the these next six chapters of al-Tawḥīd, whose titles promise solution to 
the second of the two points of contention al-Ṣadūq identifies in his preface, are pervasively 
vague, chaotic and inconclusive. We see exactly the same obfuscating features observed in 
the first section: reports are scattered at random with no attempt to group similar aḥādīth, and 
meanwhile there appears no attempt to structure the different reports to create argument or 
didactic such as we saw in the previous chapter on badāʾ.  
Three of these six chapters have identically titled counterparts in al-Iʿtiqādāt: ‘Will and 
Intention,’ (al-Iʿtiqādāt, chapter ) ‘Free Will and Predestination’ (al-Iʿtiqādāt, chapter ) and 
‘Agency’ (al-Iʿtiqādāt, chapter ). Each of the chapters in al-Iʿtiqādāt begins with al-Ṣadūq 
declaring that the Imāmī position on this topic is summed up in a brief ḥadīth that h then cites 
(a ḥadīth which, in all three cases, makes up the majority of the chapter’s text). Conversely in 
al-Tawḥīd all three corresponding chapters do contain these aḥādīth that perfectly encapsulate 
al-Ṣadūq’s position (as articulated in al-Iʿtiqādāt), but in all there cases the ḥadīth in question 
is not placed prominently at the chapter’s beginning, let alone introduced or framed by al-
Ṣadūq’s own prose, rather all three are positioned innocuously in the chapters’ assembled 
aḥādīth.390 Al-Ṣadūq is evidently not attempting to replicate the didactic structures of his creed 
here. It may further be observed that al-Ṣadūq’s own voice is almost totally absent from these 
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388 Al-Iʿtiqādāt, pp. 35-36, 41-42, 45-46. 
389 Madelung, ‘Imāmism’, p. 29. 




chapters. Unlike the vigilant hermeneutic policing with which we see in al-Tawḥīd’s first 
section with its interjections and interpretations, these chapters are devoid of such comments 
save for two in the chapter on agency, and nowhere does he give full summaries of the 
doctrines that his aḥādīth purport to represent. This is particularly striking in the chapter on 
will and intention, given that in the parallel chapter in al-Iʿtiqādāt al-Ṣadūq is vocally on the 
defensive. In al-Iʿtiqādāt he twice decries those who misrepresent Imāmī beliefs on this point 
out of spite, and adduces in light of this a long list of Qurʾānic verses to support his position. 
He further provides a long case study on the death of al-Ḥusayn, rigorously demonstrating 
how God’s utter control over human actions does not compromise the culpability of those who 
killed the imām.391 In al-Tawḥīd, meanwhile, there is no sign either of this apparently 
contentious issue or its accompanying sense of urgency.  
Al-Ṣadūq’s intention in these six chapters is far from clear. It is certainly the case that one can 
deduce clear overall messages from the almost one hundred aḥādīth that they contain: again 
and again in chapter fifty-five we read that nothing happens save with God’s will, while in 
chapter fifty-six we are repeatedly told that nothing is demanded of God’s servants beyond 
what they are capable of. Nonetheless, this is far from being unanimous let alone 
unambiguous. While supplying material pertaining to the core moral implications of God’s 
power over humankind, these chapters also digress into other dimensions of their subject 
matter. Chapter fifty-five tells us amongst other things that God’s will is accident392 and that 
it is among his attributes of action.393 Chapter fifty-six supplies a number of reports delving 
into the legal question of who qualifies as able to make the Ḥajj such that it is obligatory, as 
well as a report affirming the truth of ʿAlī’s claim to succeed Muḥammad (based around the 
exegesis of a Qurʾānic verse containing the chapter’s eponymous concept, istiṭāʿa). Nor are 
the compiled aḥādīth free of contradictions: in chapter fifty-five we read that both 
wretchedness (shaqāwa) and felicity (saʿāda) are from God,394 but in another ḥadīth we 
conversely read that ‘Whatever good befalls you is from God, and whatever ill befalls you is 
from yourself.’395 Meanwhile, there are very occasional interventions (sometimes it is not clear 
whether these are from al-Ṣadūq or his source) which seek to mitigate the deterministic 
message of a ḥadīth, for example clarifying the statement that both good (khayr) and evil 
(sharr) come from God with this reading that ‘good’ refers to health (ṣiḥḥa) and ‘evil’ refers 
to sickness (maraḍ).  
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393 Ibid., p. 371 (ḥ. 5). 
394 Al-Tawḥīd, p. 373 (ḥ. 10). 
395 Ibid., p. 371, (ḥ. 6). 
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Most vexing of all is the absence of the summaries which al-Ṣadūq used to clarify his 
apologetic chapters in the first section. He does not make the same effort in this third section 
to bring the disparate and diverse ḥadīth to a definitive conclusion, an omission which also 
contrasts with his discussion of such topics in al-Iʿtiqādāt. Not only is the absence of 
summaries striking by comparison, but the nature of the topic of free will and predestination, 
and the concern that al-Ṣadūq voices in al-Tawḥīd and elsewhere about the Imāmī position 
being overly identified with determinism, makes the leaving of large numbers of diverse and 
ambiguous aḥādīth to speak for themselves all the more curious and hazardous. A ḥadīth like, 
‘God the exalted moves his servant from wretchedness to felicity, but does not move him from 
felicity to wretchedness,’396 is clearly open to dispute. Does this refer to preordained states of 
felicity and villainy into which people are cast from birth,397 in which case it is surprising that 
they can, in fact, be altered positively, or does it make the improbable assertion that a life of 
felicity can never change to a life of villainy? Al-Ṣadūq leaves it for the reader to decide. In 
chapter fifty-five we read of how ʿAlī’s devoted servant Qanbar comes to his aid in battle as 
the Imām is set upon from all sides, only to be told that it is the people of heaven, not of earth 
who guard him, and only by God’s permission can the former do anything to defend him, and 
therefore he should retreat and leave the Imām to his own devices. Taken to their logical 
conclusion, ʿAlī’s remarks entail a deeply theologically suspect kind of fatalism: if Qanbar is 
excluded from fighting alongside the Imām on the grounds that he is a mortal rather than 
celestial force, what excludes the Imām’s entire army from such censure? One would expect 
al-Ṣadūq step in to dispel such notions as he does so dependably in al-Tawḥīd’s first section, 
but he is nowhere to be seen.  
A further feature that serves to inhibit the arrival at any definite answer to this burning 
epistemological question is the fact that these chapters are predominantly ordered according 
to the vocabulary they contain rather than strict pertinence to discrete theological questions. 
There is little to distinguish the message of these three statements: ‘God has rendered us 
capable of what he has demanded of us and he has rendered us capable of abstaining from 
what he has forbidden to us;’398 ‘God wills that I am able to do things which he does not wish 
me to do;’399 ‘God, blessed and exalted, is too generous to impose on people what is beyond 
their capacity, too mighty for there to occur in his domain what he does intend.’400 They are 
taken, however, from three separate chapters. There is in fact one ḥadīth which occurs in both 
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397 This is a concept described in a number of aḥādīth in the same chapter (chapter fifty-eight, ‘Felicity 
and Wretchedness’), e.g. ḥḥ. 3, 5. 
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chapter fifty-six and chapter fifty-nine.401  It is, however, true not only that the vast majority 
of aḥādīth in each chapter contain that chapter’s eponymous term or terms, but that when 
chapters include more tangentially relevant material, such as believer’s ability to perform the 
Ḥajj or when God’s will was created, these are tied to the chapter by their inclusion of the title 
vocabulary. This ordering of material by vocabulary rather than by conceptual distinctions 
certainly does not result in the creation of a precise terminology, rather it subdivides the 
overriding question of God’s power over human wrongdoing in terms of different ways in 
which the same question can be talked about, confronting the reader with an enforced diversity 
of approaches that inhibits a straightforward, schematised conclusion.  
In these chapters we see al-Ṣadūq exploiting the full obfuscatory potential of the compilation. 
He presents the reader with an abundance of aḥādīth, but scales back all devices by which 
those aḥādīth might be reduced to a definitive meaning. The imāms, he shows the reader, had 
a great deal of wisdom to impart on this subject, and they consistently affirm certain 
comfortable truths like God’s omnipotence and the fact that he does not wrong his creations 
by making demands they cannot meet, but he does not make any effort towards reconciling 
their collected words.402 This is clearly not a defensive measure. As Madelung and McDermott 
both point out, there is a great deal here that clashes obviously with the teachings of those 
same Muʿtazilīs whom al-Ṣadūq went to such lengths to placate in the first section.403 
Moreover, we saw in the book’s opening how al-Ṣadūq laments misinterpretation of aḥādīth 
as one of the key reasons for the imāms’ being ascribed unfashionable views, a risk which he 
expends great efforts to control in the first section with his commentary on the traditions, the 
same commentary that he conspicuously suspends here. More importantly still, we are now in 
the aftermath of the glorious demolition of al-Tawḥīd’s apologetic tone enacted in the second 
section. 
In the tenacious opacity of these chapters, then, we see something quite different to section 
one’s laboured demonstration of conformity. Rather, in the newly aggressive tone inherited 
from the middle section, these chapters enforce agnosticism upon the reader. In their 
unembellished, diverse, ambiguous and occasionally contradictory aḥādīth we see a 
declaration of the priority of text over doctrine. What matters is to revere what the imāms say 
and to approach it with due humility, not to subject it to the futility of reason-wrought 
abstracted doctrines. The absence of al-Ṣadūq’s own voice here does not signal any less will 
                                                            
401 Al-Tawḥīd, pp. 56 (ḥ. 8), 59 (ḥ. 1). 
402 None of this, of course, is to deny that al-Ṣadūq must omit innumerable aḥādīth from al-Tawḥīd on 
the grounds of their unhelpful content.  
403 Madelung, ‘Imāmism’, pp. 19-20, McDermott, pp. 341-352.  
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to guide and direct his reader, rather in these chapters’ abrupt change to an address consisting 
purely of aḥādīth, al-Ṣadūq announces them to his reader as the only real source of guidance. 
This approach begins to intensify in chapter fifty-nine, ‘The Denial of Free Will and 
Predestination.’ The change is immediately clear: rather than simply advertising the subject 
matter, this chapter’s title announces, too, the view that is to be affirmed with regard thereto. 
The view advertised is robustly supported in the chapter’s twelve aḥādīth, all of which affirm 
that this infamous dichotomy is a false one, that one can affirm both God’s omnipotence and 
humanity’s capacity for culpable choice. Unlike the previous chapters, where potential 
conflicts and paradoxes are passed mutely by, here the paradox is identified and sanctified. To 
deny either of these twin truths, the aḥādīth repeatedly state, is unbelief. Though this is a move 
forward, al-Ṣadūq is still not eager to be more definitive than is necessary, particularly 
concerning how these truths are reconciled. As noted above, the tradition with which he frames 
this topic in al-Iʿtiqādāt, ‘Neither free will nor predestination, but something between the two 
(amr bayn al-amrayn), is buried inconspicuously amongst the other traditions of the chapter, 
and the assembled aḥādīth describe the resolution of the paradox variously. One affirms only 
that there is a third position between the two extremes which is ‘More vast than the space 
between heaven and earth.’404 In another Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq tells a disciple who presses him for 
the answer to this cosmic riddle, ‘If I answered your question you would turn to unbelief!’405 
Yet another gives a less daunting response, likening God’s paradoxical role to the man who 
sees his fellow doing wrong and admonishes him, only to see him continue in wrongdoing. 
The last ḥadīth of the chapter is notable for entering territory which for the most part al-
Tawḥīd scrupulously avoids. ʿAlī al-Riḍā tells a disciple that whosoever attributes aḥādīth 
sanctioning either tashbīh or jabr (note the pair here) to him or his forefathers has forged them 
and is amongst the ghulāt.406 Al-Ṣadūq thus presents a consistent denial of adopting jabr over 
tafwīḍ or vice versa, but is thoroughly agnostic when it comes to bringing this denial to a 
conclusion.  
It is in chapter sixty that this message of agnostic reverence of text comes to a head. This 
chapter bears a more idiosyncratic title than its predecessors: ‘God’s Decree, Preordainment, 
Sedition, Bounties, Prices and Rewards.’ At first the tenor remains unchanged, though only 
the first two components of the title are addressed. ‘His Preordainment and decree,’ the first 
ḥadīth tells us, ‘are two of God’s creations, and God makes increase in his creation howsoever 
                                                            
404 Al-Tawḥīd, p. 393 (ḥ. 3). 
405 Ibid., p. 397 (ḥ. 11). 
406 We see here a sentiment that could have solved al-Tawḥīd’s apologetic objectives at the outset, al-
Ṣadūq’s omission of such a strategy all the more conspicuous for his admitting it here in the words of 
the imām, just one more ḥadīth amongst the hundreds that he presents and defends with no recourse to 
notions of forgery or, indeed, ghuluww.   
155 
 
he wills.’ In another we learn only that God created his preordainment fifty thousand years 
before the creation of the heavens and the earth.407 Miscellanies notwithstanding, the shared 
theme of the aḥādīth is that humanity should accept what God has ordained, for it in their 
reckoning of their decreed lot that they shall be judged, and pondering the metaphysical 
mechanics of this is not only irrelevant but a seditious futility, ‘A deep sea; approach it not!’408 
However, as the chapter proceeds al-Ṣadūq escalates this detheologising of his compilation to 
cross the line between theology and what more resembles the pietistic, ethical content we 
encountered in chapter two of this thesis: ‘All the world is ignorance save where there is 
knowledge, all knowledge is a condemning witness save that which is acted upon, all action 
is vanity save that which is sincere, and sincerity is imperilled so long as the servant does not 
ponder the fate that awaits him.,’ declares the chapter’s tenth ḥadīth. No pretence is made here 
of providing reasoned speculation on the deeper workings of fate and destiny, rather the 
emphasis is now firmly on how the reader should behave. It in this direction, now, that al-
Ṣadūq pulls the chapter. The message of pious, unenquiring submission to God’s decree is 
expanded into its ethical implications, moving in the process away from hubristic theological 
speculation. In another ḥadīth God announces, ‘Let whosoever is not content with my decree 
and does not believe in my preordainment worship a god other than me.’409 ‘The generous 
man is he who attends to what God has ordained,’ declares another, ‘While the miser is he 
who begrudges what God has ordained.’410 Al-Ṣadūq here narrates further variants of the story 
encountered earlier of ʿAlī refusing Qanbar’s help in battle on the grounds that God will 
protect him.411 The story, with its vision of the imām’s heroic (if theologically dubious) 
submission to his fate, now appears unsurprising amidst this newly firm address of outlook 
over understanding. The chapter abounds in reports which identify themselves as sermons 
(khuṭba), preachings (waʿẓ) and counsels (waṣīya), further emphasising its increasingly 
kerygmatic character. Two reports even contain passages of poetry. 
As noted, the chapter at first only deals with qaḍāʾ and qadar at the expense of its other 
advertised topics. This continues for thirty-two akhbār which do not, on the whole, exhibit 
any internal ordering. The last one, conversely, appears portentous. ʿAlī says: 
Qadar is a mystery from God’s own mystery, a veil from God’s own veil, a sanctuary 
from God’s own sanctuary, raised up in God’s own concealment and hidden from his 
creation. It is sealed with God’s seal and preeminent in his knowledge. God has placed 
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his servants far from the knowledge of it, raising it up beyond their sight and the limits 
of their reason, for they do not grasp it with the reality of sovereignty nor with the 
power of the everlasting, not with the majesty of radiance nor the splendour of unicity. 
It is a vast ocean which belongs to God alone and whose depth is the distance between 
heaven and earth, whose width is the distance between east and west, black as 
gloaming night, full of fish and creatures, at times rising and at others subsiding. At 
its bottom is a glowing sun, which none must approach save God, the one, the unique, 
and whosoever approaches it has thus challenged God, majestic and exalted, in his 
command and vied with him for his power, exposed his veil and his secret. He will 
come to face God’s wrath, and his fate will be Hell, most wretched of ends. 
Once again the message that there are mysteries beyond our comprehension rings loud and 
clear. There have been scattered statements to this effect in the aḥādīth of the past six chapters 
but the length and power of this, combined with its final position, marks it plainly as intended 
to command what has gone before. If readers have felt that al-Ṣadūq is not answering the 
questions he evokes, the reason why is no longer in doubt. In ringing contrast with section one 
and the question of tashbīh, when it comes to qadr his response to the Muʿtazila is not to 
demonstrate acquiescence but to channel the imāms’ ruling that this is a mystery not to be 
explored, and the efforts of those who try (including the Muʿtazilīs) will earn them at best 
nothing and at worst damnation.  
The chapter does not end here, however, rather the aḥādīth are interrupted by a long discourse 
from al-Ṣadūq himself. This begins with the familiar. God, we are told, decrees (qaḍāʾ) and 
has Preordainment (qadar) over all of his servants’ deeds and all things, good and evil, that 
occur in the world. What follows, however, is truly radical. Al-Ṣadūq first declares that qaḍāʾ 
can simply mean ‘knowledge of,’ citing a number of Qurʾānic verses to this effect, thus 
opening the possibility (and only the possibility) that the previous statement in some cases 
means that God does not necessarily decree all things, good or evil, to happen, merely that he 
knows that they do. This being the case, al-Ṣadūq goes on, his initial statement becomes 
incontrovertible, for while people may disagree over God’s role in relation to human agency, 
none dare deny God’s total omniscience. Qadar, he meanwhile contents, can also mean to 
write, demonstrated this line by a line of poetry as well as a Qurʾānic verse, producing a similar 
effect. He proceeds, citing ‘some scholars’ that qaḍāʾ has no fewer than ten meanings, listing 
them in full. The meanings largely cluster around commanding, doing and knowing, the latter 
of which is the most useful to al-Ṣadūq’s purposes as we have already seen. He reiterates his 
point to finish: that it is permitted (yajūz) to say that all things are by God’s qaḍāʾ and qadar, 
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since their combined polyvalence more than suffices to ensure that such a statement is always 
true.412 
This extraordinary manoeuvre, rehearsed in miniature in the earlier chapter on the Qurʾān, is 
clearly intended to be the final trump card in the defence of the Imāms’ akhbār. We now see 
a clear trajectory from al-Ṣadūq’s opening complaint of people’s inability to understand the 
Imāms’ words, to his own laborious explication of them, to his illustration of the miraculous 
hermeneutic depth of their understanding to this most radical statement of ambiguation which 
he now unveils. The exegetical, apologetic constraining of meaning found in section one is 
now turned on its head, as meaning is thrown wide open in this declaration of consuming, 
paradigmatic uncertainty. Theology is dead, killed by hermeneutics (or perhaps anti-
hermeneutics; the impossibility of reading).  
It would be a grim text that left us so immersed in doubt, and al-Ṣadūq does no such thing. 
This is not the end of chapter sixty, for thus far we have only addressed three of the subjects 
heralded in the title.413  Now we move, somewhat precipitously, to ‘prices’: aḥādīth forbidding 
the monopolisation of goods and the manipulation of prices. ‘Prices are God’s concern; he 
                                                            
412 Al-Tawḥīd, pp. 419-424. McDermott (McDermott, p. 349) takes this discussion of the meanings of 
qaḍāʾ as a concession to the need for intellectual enquiry, and thus a retraction of al-Ṣadūq’s oft-
expressed disavowal of any discussion of the question, a reading which in turn contributes to his 
hypothesis that al-Tawḥīd is a later work than al-Iʿtiqādāt and al-Hidāya, written after al-Ṣadūq had 
been influenced by his rationalist neighbours at Rayy. This reading only seems viable if one is to 
disallow any coherence between al-Ṣadūq’s various statements and cited aḥādīth across al-Tawḥīd, not 
least the fact that this statement of polyvalence immediately follows a formidable set of aḥādīth 
disavowing speculation on this matter. Conversely, as the above makes clear, these multiple meanings 
are not a self-defeating acquiescence to speculation but an illustration of the futility of confident 
judgements on this matter and on the aḥādīth themselves.  
413 Al-Ṣadūq in fact follows his pronouncement in qaḍāʾ and qadar with a second list of ten meanings, 
this time for the word fitna. Unlike the case of the first list, it is entirely unclear why he does this. Fitna 
is, of course, one of the subjects listed in this chapter’s title. However, this taxonomy of its meanings 
stands alone as its sole appearance in the chapter; there is no conclusion, al-Ṣadūq draws no overt lesson 
from the reader from the material, nor does the word fitna appear in the chapter’s aḥādīth. The 
taxonomy itself  is conspicuously precise, with al-Ṣadūq taking the time to note that one ʿAlī b. Hāshim 
considers the word to have an eleventh meaning, while his opinion is that this is subsumed under one 
of the ten previously listed. While it is not the goal of this chapter to pinpoint the reason for the exact 
location each and every component of al-Tawḥīd, this passage stands in the middle of a section in which 
al-Ṣadūq is breaking dramatically new ground, and pass over it as anomaly or whimsy seems 
inadequate. Its position is too important for it to be doing nothing, a fact which must strike al-Ṣadūq’s 
intended audience as much as it does us. Indeed, the lack of any explicit linking of this passage to any 
wider argument, immediately following the rare urgency of argument driving the previous point, is 
highly conspicuous, conspicuous enough to produce the conclusion that its import must be implicit. 
Pondering what implicit signal the ten meanings of fitna might be, meanings refine its usual 
connotations of destructive sedition to include death, burning in hellfire, unbelief and tribulation, the 
answer is perhaps not so very mysterious. Al-Ṣadūq has just delivered the masterstroke in his argument 
against disputing or rejecting the reported words of the Imāms. Following this with a list of all the 
terrible things encompassed by the archetypal Islamic concept for the hubristic challenging of authority 
is a message which may well be left implicit. Al-Tawḥīd contends a depth of meaning which inspires 
fear as well as reverence. 
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raises them as he wills and lowers them as he wills.’414 Carefully arranged, the opening aḥādīth 
are clarified and expanded on by later ones. Al-Ṣadūq intervenes in a long aside to carefully 
delineate acceptable and condemnable behaviour. This is a chapter designed to instruct. 
‘Whosoever raises prices excessively then upon his head be it, and whosoever lowers prices 
upon his head be it.’415 The leap from hermeneutic apocalypse to marketplace jurisprudence 
seems long, but there is a bridge: submission (taslīm) and contentment (riḍā). Trust in God, 
the merchant is told, and keep prices as they should be. Al-Ṣadūq brings the threads decisively 
together in his concluding remarks: 
‘When [an increase in prices] is as a result of acts of God then it should be met with submission 
and contentment, as it should be in cases where a monopoly is a result of scarcity of resources 
or income. Acts of people and acts of God alike are known to first to God, just as is the making 
of all creation, in accordance with his decree and foreordainment, such as we have explained 
regarding the meanings of qaḍāʾ and qadar.’416 
Al-Ṣadūq thus deftly sweeps al-Tawḥīd’s theological mysteries back into the real world. The 
topic is, of course, ideal; what better than market forces to stand for the labyrinthine interface 
between human action and unknowable provenance? This is not an allegory, however, this is 
sharīʿa. Following al-Ṣadūq’s collapsing of the preceding two hundred pages’ speculation on 
divine will and human agency into the realm of the unknowable, the appearance of the known 
rules of God’s law is ringingly emblematic of the message of the whole text. Obey God’s law 
and submit to his will, al-Ṣadūq tells his reader. The rest is commentary. 
One of al-Tawḥīd’s most memorable gestures is that al-Ṣadūq does not confine this 
construction of reverent obedience to matters legal, but thereafter takes it somewhere much 
more personal and emotive. Chapter sixty-one concerns how God’s infinite justice relates to 
the death of infants. This is, of course, a textbook locus for the affirmation of God’s total 
justice and the need for submission thereto in extreme circumstances, but it is also an 
ubiquitous lived trauma which demands consolation. Al-Ṣadūq’s detailed legal minutiae turn 
in a flash to kerygma and conciliation (as al-Tawḥīd’s text is forever ready to do), beginning 
with an elaborate eschatological diorama in which the deceased children of non-Muslims are 
brought before God on the day of judgement, whereupon he tests them to establish whether 
they are righteous and deserving of paradise, conjuring up the hottest fire of hell and bidding 
them throw themselves in. The virtuous children, of course, obey without question and enter 
the fire unharmed, while those who disobey are helpless as the fire comes to them to inflict 
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415 Ibid., ḥ. 34. 
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their just deserts.417 In such elaborate content we see how this chapter’s subject matter is not 
only a locus classicus for testing the notion of a just God but also a perfect context in which 
to demonstrate the efficacy of the radical traditionism at which al-Tawḥīd has arrived. The 
events of judgement day, the fate of the deceased and, indeed, the fate of the unborn is not to 
be known by theological reasoning. Rather the Imāms and the Imāms alone, with their perfect, 
inspired knowledge, can give answers to such questions and comfort to the bereaved, knowing 
as only they can that God will treat them justly, will welcome them to paradise, and, as one 
tradition describes, will entrust them to the care of no less a heavenly nurse than Fatima 
herself.418 419 
We are now nearing the end of al-Tawḥīd, its contentions and transformations for the most 
part now played out. The text’s central trajectory – from apology for the content of the imāms’ 
traditions to their establishment as the supreme source of knowledge, the substitution of which 
with human reason is flagrant heresy – is by this point, as al-Ṣadūq concludes his treatment of 
qaḍāʾ and qadr, clear. In chapter sixty-two, ‘That God Only Acts in His Servants’ interests,’ 
this concluding message is continued. Far from any abstract schematisation of God’s justice, 
such as the title might indicate outside the book’s context, the chapter roots contemplation of 
the divine ever more firmly in the devotional at the expense of the speculative. Though there 
are simple declarations to the effect that God knows best, these stand alongside the repeated 
sentiment that faith is its own reward. We are told that God hides the extent of his blessings 
to the faithful so that they might call on him all the more, and that the Prophet used to laugh 
at believers who mourned their misfortune, not realising the divine rewards that suffering 
brings. We also have the raw pietistics of the following: ‘Lord dishevelled, dust-covered and 
with tattered garments, turned away from door after door, if I swear by God I remain 
faithful.’420 Explication of God’s mysteries is totally suspended in favour of an ideal of pious 
surrender, put forward in an eclectic and sometimes hymnic pedagogical mix complete with 
prayers and the stories of previous prophets.421 
                                                            
417 Al-Tawḥīd, p. 328. 
418 Ibid., p. 431 (ḥ. 8). 
419 While McDermott (pp. 349-350) discusses al-Ṣadūq’s position on the fate of deceased infants, he 
does not cite this passage of al-Tawḥīd, despite its being by far al-Ṣadūq’s most extensive discussion 
of the problem. This omission is noteworthy as it illustrates the limits of reading al-Tawḥīd purely as a 
doctrinal text. To do so is to find little in this chapter other than contradictions, with different 
descriptions of the day of judgement being presented which in turn may be variously interpreted to 
conflict with al-Ṣadūq’s professed views on free will and predestination. When, however, one reads the 
text, as it announces itself, as a defence of the imāms’ traditions, the utility of these colourful, 
inconsistent eschatologies becomes apparent.  
420 Al-Tawḥīd, p. 437 (ḥ. 2). 
421 The appearance of stories of previous prophets as a regular feature of al-Tawḥīd’s final chapters is 
worthy of note, signalling as it seems to a change not just in register but in source criteria. No longer is 
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Chapter sixty-three, ‘The Command, the Prohibition, the Promise and the Threat,’ is 
something of a parting shot at the Muʿtazila, addressing the God’s capacity to forgive sins 
(and the bearing thereof on his justice) and the concomitant question of intercession on the 
believers’ behalf by the Prophet and the imāms. The Muʿtazila were distinguished by their 
denial that God could forgive major sins having pledged to punish them, while the also denied 
intercession on the basis that a perfectly just God should not change his judgement so 
arbitrarily. This chapter unapologetically presents a set of aḥādīth which challenge both of 
these views head on, in keeping with a long-standing Imāmī disagreement with the Muʿtazilī 
view, including a ḥadīth in which the imām explicitly condemns the Muʿtazila.422 Where once 
al-Ṣadūq was defending the imāms’ traditions against the Muʿtazila, those same traditions, 
now valorised as the sovereign source of knowledge, are adduced to condemn and contradict 
them. The chapter meanwhile continues the concluding, God-fearing mood of the book with 
a medley of warnings to act righteously in anticipation of God’s judgement.423 
In chapters sixty-four and sixty-seven424 al-Ṣadūq offers his resounding, belligerent 
conclusion. Both give their final message with that systematic unanimity which al-Tawḥīd so 
selectively deploys. Chapter sixty-four, ‘Instruction, Declaration, Ḥujja and Guidance’ 
presents seventeen aḥādīth affirming that knowledge comes from God alone, and that it is 
humanity’s duty only acknowledge that knowledge and its source and thereupon to act with 
humble righteousness. It concludes with the words of Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq ‘Whosoever acts in 
accordance with what he knows, he has no need of what he does not know.’ Three chapters 
later, this is brought to a resoundingly absolute epistemological conclusion in al-Tawḥīd’s last 
chapter, ‘Forbidding Dialectic, Disputation and Self-Aggrandisement Regarding God.’ 
Amassing thirty-five separate akhbār, none of them more than a few lines in length, al-Ṣadūq 
presents with narration after narration condemning outright the practice of dialectic theology, 
tellingly merged with self-aggrandisement. When a ḥadīth appears in multiple versions they 
are now grouped together. The simple, ordered, unanimous, repetitive clarity delivered here 
is unparalleled in al-Tawḥīd’s text. The chapter’s message is meanwhile seamlessly wedded 
to the previous chapters’ message of piety, the hubris of theological speculation being 
portrayed as antithetical to humility and reverence. ‘Command your fellows to spare their 
tongues, to put aside squabbling over religion and to exert themselves in worship of God.’425 
                                                            
he seeking the straightforward injunctions from the mouths of the imāms that made up the first half of 
the book.  
422 Al-Tawḥīd, p. 444 (ḥ. 4).  
423 As noted above, it is precisely with regard to this point of doctrine that Madelung and McDermott 
identify al-Ṣadūq’s most conspicuous clash with Muʿtazilī views. Madelung, ‘Imāmism’, pp. 19-20, 
McDermott, pp. 341-352. 
424 The significance of the two intervening chapters will be addressed presently. 
425 Al-Tawḥīd, p. 503 (ḥ. 29). 
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Here, then, is the conclusion of Kitāb al-tawḥīd. In isolation this final chapter might be read 
(and often is) as a typical polemic against dialectic theology, but placed at the climax of al-
Tawḥīd it a number of powerful, carefully interwoven assertions. It fuses the epistemological 
objection to reason’s encroachment on the role of revelation with the pietistic command to 
suspend such idle speculation and focus on godly conduct. This, in turn, is merged with al-
Ṣadūq’s justification of the imāms’ ḥadīth. Just as readers are exhorted to adopt a pious 
agnosticism towards the divine mysteries complex theological questions, they are urged to 
meet the imāms’ traditions with a similar attitude. The words of God’s ḥujaj are the only true 
guide to God’s will, but like their subject matter they, too, can be mysterious and confusing, 
even dangerous if improperly approached. Just as the reader should act and endure with the 
conviction that God knows best, he should read the imāms’ ḥadīth, however baffling they may 
appear with the reverent conviction that they contain the truth. Al-Tawḥīd sets out over its 
course a vision of traditionism as an ethical, hermeneutical, theological and epistemological 
paradigm, a way of living, of thinking and of reading with the Imāmī ḥadīth corpus enthroned 
at its very heart.   
Reverence for the imāms’ words must entail reverence for the imāms themselves. Indeed, we 
have seen in Chapter I how at the time al-Ṣadūq is writing no question for him is more urgent 
than that of the transition from authority represented in an accessible imām to authority 
represented in recollected ḥadīth. al-Ṣadūq engineers in al-Tawḥīd a contention of the 
authority of those ḥadīth, but he must contend too the equivalence between the texts of ḥadīth 
and the imāms whose teachings they convey. It is this contention that is made in between 
chapters sixty-four and sixty-seven, in one last, long aside in which this equivalence is 
addressed, in which is addressed, too the most emotive and perhaps the most destructive face 
of the hubris of kalām, and in which the contentions of al-Tawḥīd are taken to their greatest 
mimetic heights. 
 
JIDĀL – The Councils of Imām al-Riḍā 
 
Chapters sixty-five and sixty-six each consist of a single long narrative, each describing a 
council (majlis) of al-Riḍā at the court of al-Maʾmūn. While describing different events they 
share a common scenario as follows: the jealous caliph plans to discredit the Imām by having 
him publicly defeated by skilled disputants whom he summons, but al-Riḍā, of course, roundly 
defeats all who oppose him. 
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We are already clearly in a stylistic space very different to that which we have occupied thus 
far. These reports, in their length, their drama, their narrative detail and the extent to which 
their extensive range of religious topics appear subservient to a larger endeavour of 
representation, stand far apart from the usual building blocks of al-Tawḥīd (which, as 
discussed, al-Ṣadūq is for the most part eager to keep free of digressions). This difference, 
moreover, is clearly recognised in al-Ṣadūq’s cordoning them off into two separate and 
prominently placed chapters. 
The first of these councils falls into two distinct parts. In the first of these al-Riḍā debates with 
representatives of the Christians, the Jews and the Zoroastrians, whilst in the second he 
confronts the theologian ʿImrān al-Ṣābī. The debate with the religions of the book is a 
comforting triumphalism; a fantastical, indeed mythic vision of the traditionist ideal. Al-Riḍā 
begins by conceding to his non-Muslim opponents that he will debate with them using only 
their own religious texts, which he proceeds to do with devastating success. The Catholicos 
and the Exiliarch are dumbfounded as the Imām cites at them line after line from the Torah 
and the Gospels in which the coming of Muḥammad is foretold (many of which are entirely 
fictional), the Jew and the Christian conceding every time that the text is just as al-Riḍā says. 
He also knows the interpretation of passages which they do not, such as the identity of the 
foretold camel rider, bathed in light. He even knows the textual history of the Gospels, 
explaining to the Catholicos, who is quite open about his ignorance on the subject, how they 
were lost after Jesus’ illusory crucifixion and only rediscovered by Matthew, Mark, Luke and 
John a century later. This is al-Ṣadūq’s and al-Tawḥīd’s vision of traditionism distilled and 
writ large. Knowledge of scripture, of its words, meanings and origins, is all, granting total 
victory and total ownership of knowledge itself. Coming at the close of a work which has 
engaged extensively with kalām, the utter absence of argument from this section rings 
unmistakeably polemical, a monument to the omnipotence of correct knowledge of scripture. 
This, we are told, is how things should be.426 The non-Muslim antagonists, with their stark, 
uncomplicated alterity (and looser demands of realism), allow this paradigm to be cast in far 
more absolute a mould than would Muslim interlocutors. The Imām’s triumph stands as a 
dizzying intellectual ideal, standing in iridescent, inspiring contrast with al-Ṣadūq’s tortuous 
negotiations. Nonetheless, the associating echoes are distinct: in al-Riḍā’s berating of the 
Zoroastrian priest, demanding why, if he believes in Zoroaster and his miracles on the basis 
of akhbār then how can he reject akhbār which prove the status of other, more Abrahamic 
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prophets, we see almost verbatim the driving argument with which al-Ṣadūq exhorts belief in 
the Hidden Imām in Kamāl al-dīn.427 
The debate changes in tone when the defeated non-Muslims retire and ʿImrān al-Ṣābī takes 
the floor. ʿImrān’s exact identity is not dwelled upon: the text describes him only as a 
theologian and debater (mutakallim), one who has defeated all the scholars of Kufa, Basra, 
Syria and Arabia in debate, but his name obviously suggests a non-specifically non-Muslim 
origin. As becomes quickly clear, this allows him to ask questions and to be answered 
concerning the very fundamentals of the nature of God. Despite this suggested subversive 
identity of al-Ṣābī, however, the debate goes very smoothly. Though he asks questions which 
challenge the very fundaments of Islam, such as from what the first entity was created, and 
whether it knew of itself, these remain precisely as questions. Al-Ṣābī does not retort, does 
not argue with al-Riḍā to any notable extent, rather he poses successive questions which act 
effectively as foils to which the Imām responds with much the same kind of kerygmatic 
material as we have found in abundance in chapter two and elsewhere. The Imām finishes a 
particular explanation, asks al-Ṣābī if he understands, to which he will give a humble 
affirmative before politely asking: ‘Master, tell me more.’ The scene is not a debate but an 
education, which accordingly culminates in al-Ṣābī not only accepting Islam but becoming a 
loyal disciple of al-Riḍā, eventually entrusted with financial responsibilities in Balkh.  
The picture painted of traditionism has evolved here. The Imām himself no longer figures as 
the ideal traditionist, references to scripture in this debate being few and far between, rather 
he himself becomes scripture. The figure of al-Ṣābī is the object par excellence of the Imām’s 
inspired, indispensable guiding speech. He is sorely in need of guidance and so he receives it, 
perpetually acquiescent in the face of enlightenment after enlightenment from the lips of the 
Imām until finally he is brought into the fold. We now see those stirring sermons with which 
al-Ṣadūq began al-Tawḥīd represented in their rightful place, as scripture to be heeded without 
question, a place which al-Ṣadūq has fought to justify over the entire length of the book.  
The mood changes as we move to the next chapter and a new council on a new occasion. The 
debate here is also with a mutakallim, but profoundly different in tone from that with al-Ṣābī. 
The interlocutor, Sulaymān al-Marwazī, is another figure whose exact religious affiliation is 
not dwelled upon, but his character as a disputant is established with an extraordinary degree 
of verisimilitude. Unlike al-Ṣābī, al-Marwazī argues, retorting, protesting and persisting in his 
opposition to the positions explained by al-Riḍā. The strategy, of course, is not a happy one. 
Al-Marwazī is made to squirm, contorting and contradicting himself, led down cul de sac after 
                                                            
427 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 34, 85, 113-114, 117, 134 etc. 
164 
 
cul de sac until he finally breaks. The narrative of the debate is meticulously put together, as 
indeed it must be for this image of seething dialectic to work; al-Marwazī is repeatedly led 
into statements which clash disastrously with what he has previously said, in a developing 
conversation which requires far more structural integrity than al-Ṣābī’s sequence of requests 
and affirmations. Moreover, the atmosphere here is quite unlike what preceded. There is a 
perennial reverence in the air of the first debate. Half way through the conversation with al-
Ṣābī those assembled retire to pray. Al-Ṣābī is always polite, and al-Maʾmūn, too, steps in to 
question the Imām with similar deference. Conversely, there is a savage tone to the second 
council, as al-Maʾmūn mocks al-Marwazī with increasing derision. The caliph is, of course, 
the instigator of the affair, and it is in his interests for al-Marwazī to prevail, but once he has 
realised that he has backed the wrong horse he turns on his pawn, begging him sarcastically 
to desist in good grace and himself pointing out the contradictions in his arguments, even as 
his onlooking courtiers laugh. 
There is a progression here. We move from a vision of the Imām as the master scriptural 
hermeneut to that of the Imām whose own speech is scripture. Where we then finish is a brutal 
warning against disputing this natural order, a reminder of the humiliation that awaits those 
who contest the Imām and thus, in al-Ṣadūq’s era of occultation, who dispute the Imāms’ 
narrated words. Al-Ṣadūq’s traditionist message is brought to life in these richly coloured 
accounts, in which the central action of the debates is constantly accompanied by an absorbing 
level of narrative craft and detail, such al-Riḍā’s smile as he chides the disciple who seems 
worried that he might not win the debates. Al-Tawḥīd’s conclusion of devoted adherence to 
the Imāms’ traditions in a time when the Imām is hidden is brought to life in the context of a 
living Imām, the adherence to textual authority transposed onto a represented past where it 
becomes loyalty to the living, resplendent teacher. In their equation of living and textual 
authority, the real imām and the ḥadīth that must now represent him, these accounts’ drama 
and realism is thus central to al-Ṣadūq’s goals.  
There is a darker side to bringing the Imāms to life. As we progress to the final defeat of al-
Marwazī a deeper, more visceral charge builds to impassion al-Tawḥīd’s final refusal of 
dialectic. The first council concludes with a thorough redemption of al-Ṣābī, detailing his 
subsequent fealty to al-Riḍā in a well-shaped conclusion which chimes with the 
straightforward positivity of his final conversion and his good behaviour throughout. On the 
other hand, there lurks al-Maʾmūn. The subtext of his defeat is dragged firmly into text as one 
of the onlookers muses, ‘I fear for the Imam lest this caliph come to envy him, perhaps 
poisoning him or doing him some other harm.’428 The ultimate, tragic conclusion of the 
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encounter is laid bare. Nonetheless, at this juncture al-Maʾmūn’s menace is comfortingly 
separate from al-Ṣābī’s enlightenment and al-Riḍā’s triumph. This separation does not survive 
the second council. Here the narrative ends rather abruptly when the wretched al-Marwazī at 
last concedes defeat. This is surprising, following so carefully narrated an account, not to 
mention the sculpted closure of the first council. There is a sense that something is wrong 
here, and that the cautionary tale of al-Marwazī carries a more threatening kind of hubris even 
than the murderous, usurping Abbasid on his throne. 
Al-Marwazī’s vanquishing is not a happy one. Even if he ends up conceding defeat like al-
Ṣābī, the route taken robs this end point of its grace. The Imām has triumphed just as clearly, 
but the lack of any redemptive close combines with the raucous, irreverent tenor of the debate 
to suggest that, victory or not, something sordid has taken place here. As noted, the tenor of 
al-Riḍā’s sermon-like answers to al-Ṣābī echo material found throughout al-Ṣadūq’s text (even 
repeated word for word at one point), but the argumentative style in which the second majlis 
casts the Imām is much less familiar to what has gone before. The context is already an 
unnatural one. The atmosphere of the court is inherently doom-laden, for the reader knows, 
even before al-Ṣadūq reminds us, that al-Riḍā’s summons thither by the caliph ends in his 
death. But alongside the threat of death there is also that of dishonour. Al-Riḍā’s appointment 
by al-Maʾmūn was a tarnishing one, such that al-Ṣadūq is still, nearly two centuries after the 
event, anxious to absolve the Imām of any complicity.429 It is in this deadly and degraded 
atmosphere that the fate of al-Marwazī becomes more than just an admonishing image of error. 
Against al-Ṣābī in the first debate the Imām is wholly effective in his divinely appointed office, 
but he is less the victor in the second debate. In the absence of any last redemption or 
conversion, the wrong of al-Marwazī was not rendered into right. There is no concluding 
reference this time to al-Maʾmūn’s final murder of al-Riḍā, but as such there is no mention of 
his frustration at al-Riḍā’s superiority. Without this comforting binary, looking at a conclusion 
that produced only humiliation and defeat, we feel that the Imām, mighty as he is, has been 
dragged somewhere he is not meant to be, his refutations of al-Marwazī forming a discordant 
chorus with the crowing of al-Maʾmūn and his courtiers. Such is the profound moral cost of 
disputing the Imām. As al-Ṣadūq tells us at the end of the chapter, God always grants his ḥujja 
victory, and that probative force remains unharmed, but to question it is to sacrilegiously haul 
the Imāms though sullying discourses the like of which they are not meant to inhabit. There is 
something of Karbala here; something of the perverse, violent resistance to the divine which 
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killed al-Riḍā as it killed al-Ḥusayn and, as al-Ṣadūq writes, has forced the Imām’s indefinite 
absence upon his people.430 
These council narratives constitute nothing short of apocalypse,431 laying bare the both the 
perfection of the ideals for which al-Ṣadūq argues and the horrors of their violation. The 
moral-intellectual imperative of traditionism is here infused with the viscerally Shīʿī trauma 
at the Imām’s defilement and absence. It is only, al-Ṣadūq shows us in these narratives, in the 
submission to the Imāms’ narrated speech that we can overcome the disaster of the ḥujja’s 
disappearance. It is only now, having birthed from his text this seething emotive and moral 
value of the Imāms’ akhbār, that he concludes it with his final, total refusal of the premise of 




In many ways Kitāb al-tawḥīd has not taught us anything new. Both the epistemology it 
preaches and the practical, religious response to that epistemology which the book makes it 
its business to demand from the reader are familiar from the first part of this thesis. We see 
the same al-Ṣadūq who beyond all questions of source-criticism is concerned to solicit 
unconditional reverence for the recorded speech of the imāms, based on their unparalleled 
soteriological status. We also see the same al-Ṣadūq who, supremely capable and active jurist 
though he is, is often to be found detailing the letter of the law but rather encouraging basic 
pious attitudes of obedience before the sources of law and humility before God. We see the 
same al-Ṣadūq who, a little paradoxically, demands uncomplicated submission to the material 
he narrates even as he himself subjects that material to his considerable authorial skill.  
                                                            
430 For the importance of Abbasid persecution in al-Ṣadūq’s vision of the occultation and its causes, see 
above, pp. and Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 507-508 (ḥḥ. 7-10). 
431 This is neither the first nor the last time we encounter the apocalypse as an important element in al-
Ṣadūq’s style of compilation. ‘Apocalypse’ is not meant here in the sense of the end of the world, but 
rather that of a final ‘opening up’ or, ‘unveiling’ (αποκαλυπση), showing things as they truly are. We 
alluded briefly to this in note 30 with regard to al-Ṣadūq’s closing of his illustrations of the imāms’ 
theological rectitude at the end of al-Tawḥīd’s apologetic section with a dramatic depiction of the 
imāms’ refutation of the archetypally antimonotheistic heresies of dualism and trinitarianism. What we 
see here in the counsels of al-Riḍā is a more pronounced, more climactic repetition of the same device. 
At the close of his work al-Ṣadūq effects a radical shift in style to represent (‘re-present,’ that is to say 
to present afresh and anew) to his reader in dramatized, intensified form the truths he has been 
developing over the book’s course. Hence, as described, the struggle to assert the value of the imāms’ 
words is finally re-depicted not as epistemological debate but as the imām himself battling the evil 
caliph. So the reality of al-Tawḥīd is unveiled. This is a recurring device in al-Ṣadūq’s writings, and we 
will see it again, no less strikingly, below.  
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Less familiar in al-Tawḥīd is what we see of how elaborate and nuanced these simple 
contentions can become as al-Ṣadūq lays them out in the form of compiled aḥādīth. Most 
distinctive of this compilation in particular is the extent to which it sustains a linear, evolving 
address across its entire length. The passage from the apologetic introduction to the closing 
fulminations against kalām is unbroken, as al-Ṣadūq creates with simultaneous meticulous 
care and seething energy a transformation from defence to vindication to assault.  
Apart from presenting us with an extraordinary iteration of al-Ṣadūq’s epistemological vision, 
al-Tawḥīd constitutes a vociferous and much-needed warning to scholars about the perils of 
reading an individual compiled ḥadīth as equivalent to a statement in propria persona of the 
compiler’s own views. We have seen how attempts to read this book’s contents as such 
inevitably enforce arcane decodings, gaping lacunae or both. What we learn from al-Tawḥīd’s 
crescendoing hymn to the sovereignty of the Imāms’ words is that al-Ṣadūq’s aḥādīth exist, 
indeed live, in structures far larger than individual reports, and it is only by taking account of 
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the contents of individual reports be taken as confessions of faith. In the absence of other evidence, 








In all three of the preceding chapters we have seen al-Ṣadūq preoccupied with the concern to 
exhort acceptance and reverence for the aḥādīth of the imāms as the only true way towards 
authentic, prophetic teachings and true understanding of the Qurʾān. In short, al-Ṣadūq’s 
endeavour is to have the imāms’ recorded words revered even as the living imām should be if 
he was still there to be revered. The reason he is not there, and thus the reason behind al-
Ṣadūq’s emphasis on recorded texts, is the occultation. Al-Ṣadūq authored several works 
devoted to this subject during his career, of which only one survives, Kamāl al-dīn wa tamām 
al-niʿma.  
Kamāl al-dīn is only the second-oldest complete surviving work devoted to the question of 
the occultation, out of scores of such works that were written in the first century after al-
ʿAskarī’s death,433 and contains many texts and ideas of which we have no prior exemplar and 
some of which we have no other exemplar at all, and is thus of great historical value as a 
document of this doctrine’s development. Yet Kamāl al-dīn is also a curious work, both in the 
context of al-Ṣadūq’s oeuvre and in the broader output of its place and time of origin. While 
elsewhere we have seen al-Ṣadūq adhere stringently to narrating only the imāms’ ḥadīth, in 
Kamāl al-dīn we see those aḥādīth joined by a great variety of other sources. These narrated 
texts are meanwhile accompanied by an unprecedented quantity of al-Ṣadūq’s own prose. In 
Kamāl al-dīn, then, we see al-Ṣadūq grappling with the very doctrinal foundations of his 
traditionist stance, the absence of the imām, and we simultaneously see him mount an 
                                                            
433 The older work is that of al-Nuʿmānī. Both al-Kulaynī’s al-Kāfī and al-Khuṣaybī’s al-Hidāya al-
kubrā, both earlier works than Kamāl al-dīn, speak of twelve Imāms and give details of the occultation 
of the twelfth, though both address a broader range of topics. Another such text is pseudo-Masʿūdī’s 
Ithbāt al-waṣīya, which seems to date from the fourth/tenth century. Ibn Bābawayh the Elder’s al-
Imāma wa'l-tabṣira introduces itself as a work on the occultation, but while it discusses the question at 
length in its introduction the remaining chapters of the text as it has come down to us do not discuss the 
Twelfth Imām. This is almost certainly because the work was either left incomplete or has been 
incompletely preserved, though some have suggested that the text indicates that ibn Bābawayh the Elder 
was in fact a Wāqifī and did not accept the doctrine of twelve imāms. This latter suggestion is rendered 
unlikely by the extensive body of text to the contrary that al-Ṣadūq narrates from his father in Kamāl 
al-dīn.  Ṭihrānī in al-Dharīʿa lists a great many books entitled Kitāb al-ghayba, but there were doubtless 
many more discussions of the topic under less obvious titles, not least many of the Kitāb al-imāmas 
that Ṭihrānī lists from the period. As far as extant works from al-Ṣadūq’s near-contemporaries are 
concerned, we have that of al-Nuʿmānī, a generation older than al-Ṣadūq, and al-Mufīd, a generation 
younger. It is these two works that will be our first port of call for any comparisons. 
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unexpected departure from the stylistic conventions that that those foundations and that 
traditionism elsewhere compel him to adopt. In Kamāl al-dīn al-Ṣadūq faces the most 
formidable of problems, the paradoxical absence of the imām who must be present, and the 
corresponding ingenuity and daring that he brings in response makes Kamāl al-dīn his most 
complex and fascinating work. 
*** 
As observed, Kamāl al-dīn was neither al-Ṣadūq’s first nor his only book on the occultation. 
As he tells us in the introduction, when in a dreaming visitation the Imām commanded him to 
write the work, he objected that he had already given the subject ample coverage. What he 
had yet to do, however, as the Imām pointed out, was illustrate how the occultation had been 
prefigured in the careers of earlier prophets.434 Rather than a disturbing rupture, the current 
absence of the Imām from his community of believers was part of a long-standing pattern in 
God’s eternal project to reveal his will to humankind. It is this particular aspect of the 
occultation, al-Ṣadūq tells us, that he now seeks to address.  
Just like the opening sentiments of al-Tawḥīd, this little origin story tells us much about what 
Kamāl al-dīn is and what it is not. Al-Ṣadūq has told us that Kamāl al-dīn does not set out to 
give a definitive creed of occultation, be it to believers or hostile polemicists. Such 
groundwork, where al-Ṣadūq explained and substantiated his central views on the topic, had 
already been written in other books, sadly lost to us. Chapters addressing details of doctrine, 
such as the impossibility of the imāmate passing from brother to brother after al-Ḥasan and 
al-Ḥusayn, do appear in Kamāl al-dīn, but they are a rarity, interspersed mnemonically 
between the other materials that form the bulk of the work. This is no more a straightforward 
account of al-Ṣadūq’s beliefs on occultation than al-Tawḥīd is a straightforward account of 
his beliefs on God’s justice and unity, a fact similarly demonstrable by comparison with the 
very different texts wherein al-Ṣadūq does self-evidently set out to supply basic instruction to 
the faithful text like al-Iʿtiqādāt and al-Faqīh. In Kamāl al-dīn al-Ṣadūq instead builds on 
such prefabricated assertions, creating a work that is more complex and more ambitious.435 
 
 
                                                            
434 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 33-34. 
435 Here we must disagree with Yoshida, who states that al-Ṣadūq relies on the unusual operations of 
Kamāl al-dīn at the expense of any ‘straightforward’ discussion, thus considering it the sum total of his 
treatment of the occultation. See Yoshida, pp. 97-98. 
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OUTLINE OF KAMĀL AL-DĪN 
 
As supplied for al-Tawḥīd, here first there is a translated and annotated table of contents for 
Kamāl al-dīn. Kamāl al-dīn is both a longer and a more structurally complex work than al-
Tawḥīd. Below we delineate four distinct sections, defined on the basis of the different means 
of proof for the Hidden Imām and his occultation that they present. As we shall see, it is the 
construction and reconciliation of these different proof-types that is the work’s central 
occupation. The first section is concerned with the examples of earlier prophets and sacred 
persons, the second with the prophecies concerning the Hidden Imām uttered by Muḥammad 
and the previous eleven imāms, the third with accounts of those who encountered the Hidden 
Imām either before or during his occultation and the fourth with less conventional proof-texts 
whose exact significance will need to be discussed at length.  
  
Introduction 
1. On the Occultation of Idrīs 
2. Recording Nūḥ’s Appearance as a 
Prophet 
3. On the Occultation of Ṣāliḥ 
4. On the Occultation of Ibrāhīm 
5. On the Occultation of Yūsuf 
6. On the Occultation of Mūsā 
7. Moses’ Passing and the Onset of 
Occultation Amongst the Legatees  
8. ʿĪsā b. Maryam’s Foretelling of the 
Prophet Muḥammad al-Muṣṭfā 
9. The Account of Salmān al-Fārsī 
Regarding the Above 
10. On the Account of Quss b. Sāʿida al-
Ayadī 
11. On the Account of Tubbaʿ 
12. On the Account of ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib and 
Abū Ṭālib 
13. On the Account of Sayf b. Dhī Yazn 
14. On the Account of Baḥīrā the Monk 
SECTION I – Stories of the 
Prophets (~70 pp.) 
In this group of chapters, as 
their headings illustrate, al-
Ṣadūq sets out instances of 
occultation observable in a 




15. The Story of the Leader of the Monks on 
the Route to Syria and his Knowledge of 
the Matter of the Prophet 
16. On the Account of Abū al-Muwayhib 
the Monk 
17. On the Account of Saṭīḥ the Priest 
18. The Account of Yūsuf the Jew 
Regarding the Prophet 
19. The Account of Dawwās b. Ḥawwāsh, 
who Came from Syria 
20. The Account of Zayd b. ʿAmr b. Nufayl 
21. The Reason Wherefore an Imām is 
Required 
22. The Continuation of the waṣīya from 
Adam Onwards 
23. God’s Investiture of the Qāʾim 
24. The Prophet’s Investiture of the Qāʾim 
25. What the Prophet Related Concerning 
the Occurrence of the Occultation 
26. What the Prince of Believers Related 
Concerning the Occurrence of the 
Occultation 
27. What is Narrated from the Sovereign of 
Women of the Matter of the Qāʾim 
28. The Account of the Tablet 
29. What al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī Related 
Concerning the Occurrence of the 
Occultation 
30. What al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī Related 
Concerning the Occurrence of the 
Occultation 
31. What ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn Related 
Concerning the Occurrence of the 
Occultation 
32. What al-Bāqir Related Concerning the 
Occurrence of the Occultation 
Chapter 21 – Here we see the 
first example of a feature 
exhibited through the text of 
Kamāl al-dīn – the insertion of 
a brief chapter between the 
main sections outlining a 
particular doctrinal matter, 
deeply pertinent to the 
concerns of Kamāl al-dīn as a 
whole but not always 
especially related to the 
sections with which it is 
juxtaposed (for further 
instances see e.g. chapters 39 
and 40). Not uncommonly for 
such chapters, the subject of 
this one has already been much 
discussed in al-Ṣadūq’s 
introduction.  
SECTION II – Foretellings 
of the imāms (~150 pp.) 
Here al-Ṣadūq collects reports 
from the eleven earlier imāms, 
Muḥammad and Fāṭima 
prophesying the occultation of 
the Twelfth Imām.  
172 
 
33. What al-Ṣādiq Related Concerning the 
Occurrence of the Occultation 
34. What al-Kāẓim Related Concerning the 
Occurrence of the Occultation 
35. What al-Riḍā Related Concerning the 
Occurrence of the Occultation 
36. What al-Jawād Related Concerning the 
Occurrence of the Occultation 
37. What al-Hādī Related Concerning the 
Occurrence of the Occultation 
38. What al-ʿAskarī Related Concerning the 
Occurrence of the Occultation 
i. What is Narrated from the ḥadīth of al-
Khiḍr 
ii. What is Narrated from the ḥadīth of the 
Horned One 
iii. Returning to What is Narrated from 
Imām al-ʿAskarī 
39. Regarding One Who Denies the Qāʾim 
40. That the Imāmate is Never Possessed by 
Two Brothers Except for the Two 
Ḥasans 
41. What is Narrated Regarding Narjis, 
Mother of the Qāʾim 
42. What is Narrated Regarding the Birth of 
the Qāʾim 
43. Those Who Congratulated Abū 
Muḥammad al-ʿAskarī on the Birth of 
the Qāʾim 
44. Those Who Witnessed the Qāʾim, Saw 
Him and Spoke with Him.  
45. The Reasons of the Occultation 
46. Record of the Written Missives [of the 
Qāʾim] 
i. The Supplication to be Uttered During 
the Qāʾim’s Occultation 
ii. Returning to the Written Missives 
SECTION III – Accounts of 
the Hidden Imām (~ 100 pp.) 
Here al-Ṣadūq presents the 
core proof-texts of the Hidden 
Imām: eyewitness testimonies 
to his birth and infancy as well 
as encounters in his later life, 
alongside the many documents 
reported to have been written 
by him. Though comparatively 
few chapters make up this 
section, it is of comparable 
length to the previous two, 
Chapters 44 and 46 both being 
of considerable length. 
i-ii – Note how these two 
stories are somewhat 
incongruously inserted into the 
middle if the chapter on al-
ʿAskarī’s foretelling’s of his 
successor’s occultation. They 
would seem better placed 
either in the earlier section on 
the stories of the prophets or 




47. What Has Reached Us Regarding 
Exceptional Longevity 
48. The ḥadīth of the Dajjāl 
49. ʿĪsā and the Gazelle in the Land of 
Nineveh 
50. The Ḥadīth of Ḥabāba al-Wālibīya 
51. The Ḥadīth of Muʿammar al-Maghribī, 
Abū al-Dunyā 
52. The Ḥadīth of ʿAbīd b. Sharya 
53. The Ḥadīth of al-Rabīʿ b. al-Ḍabʿ al-
Fazārī 
54. The Ḥadīth of Shaqq the Priest 
55. The Ḥadīth of Shaddād and his Garden 
i. Record of the Extraordinarily Long-
Lived (muʿammarūn) 
ii. Discourses From the Author of this 
Book 
iii. The Story of Bilawhar and Yūdhāsaf 
iv. The Meaning of These Stories’ Inclusion 
in This Book 
56. What is Narrated Regarding the Reward 
of the One Who Awaits the Relief 
57. The Prohibition Against Naming the 
Qāʾim 
58. The Signs of the Qāʾim’s Emergence 
59. Miscellanies of the Book, and the 
Author’s Clarification Regarding the 







Chapters 56-59 – Not 
unusually for a compilation, 
Kamāl al-dīn closes with a 
mix of material that is less 
precisely grouped that what 
precedes. The subjects of 
chapters 56 and 58 clearly fits 
near the end of the book, but 
the others less so. The uses to 
which al-Ṣadūq puts this 
device of closing miscellanies 
will be discussed presently.   
SECTION IV – The 
Muʿammarūn (~120 pp.) 
The last substantial group of 
chapters, this one focusses on 
those possessed of unusually 






PROOF 1 – Tawātur 
 
The introduction to Kamāl al-dīn is, in fact, a fascinating text in its own right, constituting not 
only by far the longest surviving piece of dialectic prose from al-Ṣadūq but one of the very 
earliest pieces of substantial length to survive from any Imāmī author. While other 
introductions to al-Ṣadūq’s compendia extend to a couple of pages at most, Kamāl al-dīn’s 
introduction reaches approximately 150 pages in printed editions. It is thus an invaluable 
resource for the study of al-Ṣadūq and for the study of the Imāmīya in the tenth century, and 
meanwhile makes Kamāl al-dīn of all al-Ṣadūq’s works the text for which we have a real 
opportunity to measure al-Ṣadūq’s compiled material (of which the body text is composed) 
against a detailed opening discussion of what he aims to achieve with its compilation.  
The concern of this introduction is above all the question of proof; of how the Twelfth Imām’s 
occultation and, by extension, his legitimacy as the last successor to Muḥammad who will 
return as the qāʾim at the end of time, is to be established as fact. It is at the very beginning of 
the introduction that al-Ṣadūq announces that it the evidence of earlier prophets’ lives and 
exploits that concerns this new book on the occultation. How that evidence is to be used is far 
from straightforward, however. Kamāl al-dīn does not merely undertake to present such 
stories of previous prophets as may support the Imāmī view on occultation, rather it is an 
extended experiment in how these stories can function as proof and how, as such, they may 
interact with the broad range of other probative strategies used by the Imāmīya. It is this 
question of unparalleled urgency, that of how the truth of the Imāmīya’s defining doctrine, 
that of the Hidden Imām, may best be asserted, that Kamāl al-dīn sets out to confront. 
To this end al-Ṣadūq spends a portion of the introduction shoring up some core theological 
proofs of the imāmate in general, in particular seeking to refute the notion that anyone other 
than God himself can nominate the ḥujja who will guide humankind. Much of this is centred 
around the Q  2:30, ‘And God said to the angels, “I shall place a vicegerent (khalīfa) upon the 
earth…”’ into which al-Ṣadūq delves to considerable hermeneutic depth to affirm that the 
process here described with regard to Adam not only identical is with the Imāmī doctrine of 
the imāmate but also refutes categorically any suggestion that the community may choose 
their own imām, such as is contended by a variety of non-Imāmī groups.436 He also allots some 
                                                            
436 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 34-49.  
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space to brisk refutations of rival Imāmī groups such as the Kaysānīya and the various strands 
of the Wāqifīya,437 and to the treatment of some more technical questions such as the 
legitimacy of an imām who conceals his own imāmate.438 
It is not long, however, before we arrive at the axial question of how one identifies the hidden 
son of al-ʿAskarī as the imām, and, indeed, how one justifies his imāmate in the face of his 
unusual hiddenness. It quickly becomes clear, moreover, that al-Ṣadūq’s preferred method of 
proof is textual. The dominant concept at work here evoked by al-Ṣadūq is that of tawātur – a 
density of textual evidence too formidable to dismiss as forgery. Al-Ṣadūq contends 
vigorously and repeatedly, including lengthy citations from earlier Imāmī authorities,439 that 
it is by this most solidly textual of means that the truth of the Twelfth Imām and his occultation 
is proven, regardless of the stubbornness of the majority who ignore this irrefutable evidence. 
This is not only an assertion that the aḥādīth are, indeed, mutawātir, but also that such 
textually-based probative methods have value in this context. Al-Ṣadūq cites opponents of the 
Imāmīya who mock the so-called ‘inevitablists’ (lābuddīya), a group of Imāmīs who claimed 
that the Hidden Imām’s existence was proven purely by the fact of theological necessity, 
regardless of what proof might be lacking for his positive identification.440 He responds to 
such criticisms by maintaining that it is the texts that supply the essential proof.441 
We observed in Chapter I how reticent al-Ṣadūq is when it comes to delving into the 
uncomfortable technicalities of the comparative reliability of aḥādīth.442 In some ways this 
elaborate insistence on tawātur might appear to be a change of heart. As well as being the 
longest single example of al-Ṣadūq’s prose, Kamāl al-dīn’s introduction also contains, in its 
discussions of tawātur, the longest single example of al-Ṣadūq discussing matters of 
authenticity. It is not, however, in the technicalities of tawātur that al-Ṣadūq concentrates his 
arguments. Indeed, asānīd are not discussed at all. The tawātur that al-Ṣadūq presents is a 
concern of volume, an assertion not primarily of reports’ quality but of their number.443 Even 
                                                            
437 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 62-75, 112. 
438 Ibid., p. 79 
439 While al-Ṣadūq cites unnamed sources (e.g. Kamāl al-dīn p. 93-94) elsewhere he names his sources, 
making Kamāl al-dīn a valuable repository of earlier fourth/tenth-century Imāmī theology. Most 
prominent in this regard are the lengthy quotations of Abū Sahl al-Nawbakhtī and of ibn Qiba al-Rāzī, 
including the latter’s polemics against named Zaydī scholars, who are also cited at some length. (Kamāl 
al-dīn, pp. 83-93, 118-157). Indeed, the quotations of ibn Qiba in Kamāl al-dīn form the basis of 
Modarressi’s ground-breaking study of him. See Modarressi, Crisis. 
440 Kamāl al-dīn, p. 82. We will below see how al-Mufīd presents just such an argument.   
441 Assertions of the value of textual proofs as the ultimate lynchpin of the Imāmī position pervade 
Kamāl al-dīn’s introduction.  
442 See above.  
443 The reliability of reports is, of course, crucial if their quantity is to have any value, and al-Ṣadūq 
certainly does not suggest that quantity supersedes the reliability of individual asānīd. Rather his focus 
on the quantitative question of tawātur allows him to leave the matter of reports’ comparative reliability 
largely implicit.  
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here he prefers to be vague, only once entering discussion of how sources are needed to 
constitute tawātur.444 What al-Ṣadūq instead focusses on is the existential need for textual 
proofs that is imbedded within the very fabric of religion itself. It is only by texts that we know 
of Muḥammad and his miracles, only by texts that we can know his teachings. Al-Ṣadūq’s 
argument pivots on the assertion that his opponents cannot reject his textual proofs without 
implicitly denying the validity of all textual proofs, textual proofs without which Islam could 
not exists. Again and again al-Ṣadūq asserts that the tawātur of the texts proving the existence, 
legitimacy and occultation of the Twelfth Imām is fundamentally equivalent to the tawātur 
that underpins the key texts of Islam, and thus that one must either accept their probative force 
or join the undesirable company of the Brahmins (barāhima), that is to say those outside Islam 
who do not accept any Abrahamic sacred texts and so reject all God’s prophets.445  
This is an audacious declaration of textual strength, and one that responds to anxieties at the 
heart of Imāmī ḥadīth scholarship. Al-Ṣadūq’s assertion is first and foremost one of probative 
equivalence, claiming for Imāmī ḥadīth as much validity as any other, and thus battles 
precisely against the exclusion from the mainstream faced by the Imāmī ḥadīth corpus and 
those who rely on thereon. Al-Jāḥiẓ famously remarks of the Shīʿa that they make up what 
they like and then attribute it to Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq,  and a hundred years later when al-Ṣadūq was 
writing the same prejudices against the Imāmī ḥadīth corpus in particular (quite apart from 
suspicions of ḥadīth as a whole) continued to be a hindrance. We shall see below how many 
Imāmīs turned to narrating aḥādīth from Sunnī sources in an effort to attain a probative 
traction denied to what they narrated from the imāms.446 In Kamāl al-dīn’s introduction we 
see cited an antagonist’s troubling complaint that the aḥādīth that the Imāmīya have their own 
trusted sources just as every group does, and the existence of such sources is not enough to 
make their testaments binding for everyone.447 Against all this al-Ṣadūq makes his opening 
claims of tawātur, claims for which, we shall see, he amasses extensive support in the book 
that follows.448 
                                                            
444 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 114-115. The context of this detail is also thoroughly defensive. Al-Ṣadūq registers 
the voices interrogating whether the tawātur of reports confirming the prophet’s miracles is not rather 
stronger than that with which he affirms the occultation, responding with the intimation that those 
traditionists (aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth) who narrate such prophetic miracles as the splitting of the moon could 
not, in fact, muster more than three reports, contrary to his opponent’s fancy that they could draw on 
ten or more. Al-Ṣadūq thus maintains that his own distinctly minimalist criterion of three exemplars is 
a common standard. 
445 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 34, 85, 113-114, 117, 134 etc. For a discussion of this role of the Brahmins in 
Islamic thought as those monotheists who reject all Abrahamic prophets (amongst other characteristics 
attributed to them), see Calder, ‘Barāhima’. 
446 See below.  
447 Kamāl al-dīn, p. 138. 
448 Parts of the introduction and especially its lengthy citations from figures like Ibn Qiba al-Rāzī (see 




PROOF 2 – From The Impossible to The Possible 
 
Even as al-Ṣadūq fulminates in his introduction to assert the unimpeachability of the 
occultation’s textual proofs, he meanwhile introduces a second avenue of proof that works 
along quite different lines, and which plays a no less pivotal role in the work that follows. This 
is the objective ‘to move [the occultation of the Twelfth Imām] from the realm of the 
impossible to the realm of the possible (min ḥadd al-maḥāla ilā ḥadd al-jawāz).’449 It is this 
endeavour that underpins Kamāl al-dīn’s stated raison d’être as commanded by the imām to 
al-Ṣadūq in his dream: narrating the occultations of earlier prophets. If Moses can be hidden 
from his shīʿa, so, too, can the Twelfth Imām. If Noah can live for a thousand years, so too 
can the Twelfth Imām. The sacred precedent of prophetic history proves that Imāmī claims 
about their Hidden Imām are, at least, possible. 
This is a probative strategy quite distinct from the aspirations to tawātur outlined above, not 
to mention a much more modest one. Al-Ṣadūq has regressed from proof to possibility, from 
declaring the Hidden Imām a textually indisputable fact to the mere aspiration of convincing 
the reader that it could have happened. What brings these two probative strategies closer is al-
Ṣadūq’s citation of a group of aḥādīth in which Muḥammad declares, ‘Whatsoever has fallen 
previous communities will befall my community also.’450 This, al-Ṣadūq points out, lends the 
qiṣaṣ material greater significance than merely making the occultation of the imām possible. 
Rather, if as the Prophet says the experiences of previous communities must be repeated, then 
                                                            
kalām discourses, contending with interlocutors and refuting their detailed refutations of various aspects 
of the Imāmī view of occultation (these in fact make Kamāl al-dīn a valuable source of early evidence 
for how other groups argued against the Imāmīya in this period). Though Sunnīs are referred to, the 
primary opponent of these arguments are Muʿtazilī-inclined Zaydīs, al-Ṣadūq describing the Zaydīya 
as ‘our fiercest opponents.’ (Kamāl al-dīn, p. 157) These opponents give some biting criticisms, 
accusing the Imāmīya amongst other things of relying on questionable interpretations of texts and 
lacking sufficient proof-texts to claim tawātur. It is interesting to note that al-Nuʿmānī’s Kitāb al-
ghayba directs itself primarily against Ismāʿīlī and especially Fāṭimid claims (al-Nuʿmānī, pp. 179, 240-
245), while both he and al-Kulaynī are recorded as authoring works against the Ismāʿīlīs (al-Najāshī, 
pp. 361, 367). Both scholars, like al-Ṣadūq, were based around Rayy and Qum. Al-Ṣadūq’s contrasting 
interest across his extant writings in the same broadly Zaydī-Muʿtazilī opponents encountered in Kamāl 
al-dīn, at the expense of any especial interest in Ismāʿīlī interlocutors, corroborates our information 
about Ismāʿīlī activities in the region. Having fostered a vigorous missionary campaign in the first half 
of the fourth/tenth century in Khurāsān with its centre at Rayy itself, the Ismāʿīlīs’ fortunes took a sharp 
turn for the worse after 332/943 (around a decade before al-Ṣadūq became active) and they ceased for 
the next few decades to be a significant intellectual force in the region. See Stern (1960), pp. 79-80. 
Kamāl al-dīn’s fiercest engagement with Ismāʿīlī ideas is when Zaydī opponents cite the Ismāʿīlī 
genealogy of Imāms as a foil against the Imāmī claims (Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 100-104). 
449 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 111, 157. 
450 Also frequently evoked are a group of aḥādīth in which Muḥammad states that the qāʾim will exhibit 
the sunna of one or more previous prophets, many of which will involve concealment, for example 
Mūsā’s concealed birth or Muḥammad’s use of the sword. See e.g. Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 58, 176-7, 184. 
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our learning of the occultations that occurred in former times compel us to accept that such a 
thing is bound to occur in the age of Islam. Not only can something that has happened before 
happen again, but in the case of prophetic history what has happened before must happen 
again. 
We can certainly see points of overlap between this proof and that of tawātur. If events in the 
past are to prefigure the present, it must surely be established whether or not they happened, 
a task for which tawātur is a useful tool. Conversely, the admission of this second line of 
argument calls the lie to the confidence of al-Ṣadūq’s previous claims. If accounts of the 
imām’s existence do, indeed, prove his existence beyond any doubt, there would scarcely be 
a need to look for further proof in exemplars from the distant past. These two modes of proof 
conflict at least as much as the complement, a relationship which we shall see played out 
extensively and artfully over the course of Kamāl al-dīn’s many pages. 
A key, immediate consequence of this plurality of proofs that al-Ṣadūq established in this 
introduction is that in these different kinds of argument the reader is offered a range of ways 
to read the many texts that will pass before him over the course of the book, as well as a 
corresponding range of expectations. Sometimes there will be clear indicators of what a 
particular text is for. The first section of the book is a collection of stories of earlier prophets, 
texts that the introduction has already specifically tied to the ‘whatsoever has befallen’ line of 
argument, and which al-Ṣadūq accompanies with frequent commentary asserting their 
probative value in these terms. Elsewhere, as we shall see, there are groups of texts that clearly 
undertake to represent tawātur. In many places, however, things are not so clear, and it is left 
up to the reader to decide whether a text is meant to be read as an inviolable fact, the 
disputation of which is tantamount to disputation of the reality of Muḥammad’s mission, or as 
a precedent of the prophetic past that must find an echo in the present, or some combination 
of the two. It remains to be seen whether this proliferation of hermeneutic options will be 
empowering or will instead leave the reader in debilitating uncertainty.  
Kamāl al-dīn’s introduction lays out the key theological proofs of the imāmate on which any 
discussion of the occultation must rest. Al-Ṣadūq is careful to note that if one does not accept 
the basic premise of the necessity of imāmate, there is little point in arguing over subsidiary 
questions of who and where that imām is and thus of the occultation.451 It also prepares the 
reader for the fact that beyond these foundations on which the importance of the book’s 
subsequent arguments rests, what follows will not be a book of theology, rather it will be a 
book about the nature and efficacy of textual proofs. Unlike al-Tawḥīd, which is nothing if 
                                                            
451 Kamāl al-dīn, p. 74. 
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not a book of surprises, in Kamāl al-dīn al-Ṣadūq uses his enormous introduction to set before 
the reader the core principles on which the rest of the book will pivot: the two proofs of tawātur 
and ‘Whatsoever has befallen previous communities will befall my community also.’ Kamāl 
al-dīn sets out to deploy these proofs and to exploit them for all they are worth, but it also 
conducts an exploration both of their respective possibilities and of the possibilities of their 
combination. Just as in al-Tawḥīd, al-Ṣadūq’s introduction to Kamāl al-dīn tells us that it is 
not doctrine that concerns him here, rather it is a book about the texts from which doctrines 
and more may be derived. Just like al-Tawḥīd, Kamāl al-dīn is a book about the imāms’ 
aḥādīth. 
 
TALES OF THE PROPHETS 
 
It is with the motion from impossible to possible that the main body of Kamāl al-dīn begins, 
embarking in earnest on al-Ṣadūq’s stated goal of demonstrating that the current occultation 
of the Imām is an established phenomenon in the history of God’s ongoing revelations to 
humankind. To this end, he presents through the medium of a large body of reports a select 
history of the occultation of prophets since the beginning of time. We read story after story of 
God’s chosen and their adventures in a wonderful corpus of qiṣaṣ al-anbiyāʾ material. Al-
Ṣadūq presents a range of Qurʾānic prophets in chronological order, starting with Idrīs 
(identified as a son of Ādam), and proceeding through Nūḥ, Ṣāliḥ, Ibrāhīm, Yūsuf, Mūsā and 
Jesus up to Muḥammad himself. Though their protagonists are familiar, as often as not the 
events described are less so: we read about Nūḥ’s flood and about Yūsuf’s longing to be 
reunited with his father Yaʿqūb, but we also read about Ibrāhīm’s encounter in the desert with 
the mysterious old man from beyond the sea and about the hidden island on which Jesus’ loyal 
followers were secreted to safeguard his religion. The narratives are filled with the dramatic 
unfolding of the divine will, with marvels and wonders and with suspense and vindication.  
Though al-Ṣadūq’s narrations are certainly the familiar stuff of the ‘stories of the prophets’ 
genre,452 both in substance and presentation it is thoroughly subjected to al-Ṣadūq’s objectives. 
                                                            
452 Despite their relative prominence, qiṣaṣ al-anbbiyāʾ, ‘the stories of the prophets,’ as manifest both 
in dedicated collections and in more diverse works such as Qurʾānic exegeses, ḥadīth compendia and 
adab literature, have received little study, either in terms of their nature and the extent to which they 
constitute a distinct genre or in terms of their reception amongst premodern readers. Nagel remains an 
authoritative survey of the genre with little to supersede it. It is of interest with regard to Kamāl al-dīn 
that Nagel identifies al-Thaʿlabī (d. 427/1035), a near-contemporary of al-Ṣadūq, as the point where we 
first see collections of stories of the prophets emerge as a genre distinct from historiography. Al-
Thaʿlabī’s stories certainly have a great deal in common with al-Ṣadūq’s qiṣaṣ material in Kamāl al-
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No story passes in which it is not clear to the reader that the prophet protagonist has not 
undergone some form of concealment that is portentously analogous to the present occultation 
of the imām. The care with which al-Ṣadūq has selected his corpus is very clear. He does not 
tell the prophet’s stories from beginning to end, and makes little effort to coalesce a 
synthesised narrative. Rather what he presents is an anthology of all the episodes of occultation 
to have occurred in these prophets’ careers. Some prophets were hidden from their followers 
on more than one occasion, in which case the separate episodes will be presented with no 
attempt to link them together. Sometimes al-Ṣadūq introduces a prophet’s story with a brief, 
instructive summary, but for the most part the stories are made up of narrations, transmitted 
from a stock of teachers familiar from his other compendia. 
The stories are emphatically diverse, and exactly what may constitute an occultation varies 
considerably from text to text. A prophet may be hidden, like the Twelfth Imām, for fear of 
persecution, such as when the infant Ibrāhīm is hidden from the depredations of Nimrūd, who 
has heard tell of the child to be born who will spell his downfall. 453 In other instances, 
however, more benign episodes in a prophet’s life will be appropriated for the occultation 
paradigm, such as Moses’ adoption by Pharaoh’s daughter (and thus his subsequent absence 
from his mother and the Israelites), Joseph’s years in Egypt apart from his grieving father and 
even Solomon’s remaining closeted with his new wife!454 Al-Ṣadūq’s instructive voice aids 
the process when an event is perhaps less obviously an exemplar of occultation, both by his 
expressly framing the stories as tales of occultation and occasionally by his inserting 
commentary to identify the key elements of a given narrative. Moreover, the diction of the 
accounts themselves sets them firmly within al-Ṣadūq’s desired frame of reference. The word 
ghayba itself and its cognates are a recurrent presence in the stories, as are stock Imāmī terms 
of rujūʿ (‘returning’), khurūj (‘emergence’) and ẓuhūr (‘reappearance’) as descriptors of the 
different protagonists’ return from their occultations. Moreover, the occultations themselves 
are regularly enriched with further details which can only resonate deafeningly with the Imāmī 
reader. Prophets will console their followers with the promise of a future qāʾim who will one 
day come to relieve them (this being neatly identified with the next prophet in the sequence 
of chapters: Idrīs foretells the appearance of Noah, Noah tells of Hūd and so on); the expected 
figure will often be identified as a young man (ghulām) like the mahdī himself; many a loyal 
shīʿa accompanies prophets and awaits (intiẓār) their return from occultation, even while their 
faith and resilience are sorely tested; we hear how when prophets do return many lack the 
purity of heart to recognise them; sometimes there is a faqīh to whom they may turn for 
                                                            
dīn, exhibiting (at much greater length) a similar spectrum of the wondrous, the entertaining, the moving 
and the miraculous. 
453 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 169-171. 
454 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 173-176, 180, 189-190. 
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guidance in the prophet’s absence; prophets leave legatees (waṣīy) after them; those who seek 
a sign of the hidden ḥujja will always be granted one if they persevere.  
The corpus is a remarkable one and it is to be regretted that pending new texts coming to light 
we know little about its sources. Nonetheless, its sheer size and the pervasive presence of Shīʿī 
motifs within the individual aḥādīth indicates a number of important things about this group 
of texts and al-Ṣadūq’s use thereof. We may deduce that, excluding the unlikely event of large 
scale forgery on al-Ṣadūq’s part, in the late tenth century there already exists a prodigious 
array of qiṣaṣ material which is steeped in unmistakeably Imāmī concepts and language, 
including but by no means limited to those directly pertaining to the Hidden Imam. This tells 
us in turn that there was by this time an established interest amongst Imāmīs in identifying 
and imagining precedent for the current soteriological status quo in the vast literature of qiṣaṣ 
al-anbiyāʾ. This, in turn, makes it very unlikely that Kamāl al-dīn’s stated objective of 
recounting the Hidden Imām’s precursors amongst previous prophets was an entirely new 
venture.455 
This information reinforces what we already suspect about Kamāl al-dīn. The simple exercise 
of presenting these stories of previous prophets and their occultations is not, contrary to al-
Ṣadūq’s account of his dream, the full extent of this book’s ambitions.456 Rather al-Ṣadūq is 
drawing on a pre-existing Imāmī literature to explore how these marvellous stories of hidden 
                                                            
455 Needless to say, as Kamāl al-dīn’s own title illustrates, there is no way to positively identify such 
other works on the subject as may have existed from the bibliographical record alone. Yoshida notes in 
his discussion of Kamāl al-dīn that stories about al-Khiḍr, at least, appear in Shīʿī literature in the mod-
fourth/tenth century, a contention for which he cites Franke who, in turn, cites Kamāl al-dīn as the 
earliest exemplar (Yoshida, p. 94, Franke, p. 11). The most similar extant text to Kamāl al-dīn in terms 
of its use of qiṣaṣ, material, and one that may well be earlier, is pseudo-Masʿūdī’s Ithbāt al-waṣīya. 
Here, too, is a work which prefaces accounts of the Hidden Imām with accounts of earlier prophets in 
which an Imāmī colouring, including many a motif of the occultation, is clearly evident. In pseudo-
Masʿūdī’s text, however, the focus is less on the Twelfth Imām than on creating a continuous narrative, 
and in between the stories of the prophets and the accounts of the Hidden Imām there is a fulsome set 
of chapters concerning the earlier imāms, while the discussions of proof and its construction that so 
dominate Kamāl al-dīn are entirely absent. This unique similarity to Kamāl al-dīn certainly renders the 
work’s uncertain provenance and dating all the more irksome. Indeed, its similarity to Kamāl al-dīn is 
a not insignificant component of its probable dating to the fourth/tenth century, such that to adduce it 
as evidence for the study of al-Ṣadūq’s text risks becoming circular. The text’s asānīd certainly argue 
for a date in the first half of the fourth/tenth century, narrating from such late-third/ninth-century figures 
like Saʿd b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Ashʿarī and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Jaʿfar al-Ḥimyarī, though this does not rule 
out the possibility of later links being elided. Moreover, these asānīd only occur in the second half of 
the work, with the first half narrating straight from Muḥammad and the imāms without asānīd. This 
may be indicative of differing standards towards qiṣaṣ material, but it could also indicate the composite 
nature of the work. The component of the work concerning the Twelfth Imām cannot, of course, predate 
the turn of the fourth/tenth century. If nothing else, the book certainly attests to a circulation of Imāmī-
influenced qiṣaṣ-material around the time of al-Ṣadūq’s writing Kamāl al-dīn. For discussions of the 
book’s provenance (albeit rather more focussed on the fact that al-Masʿūdī probably didn’t write it 
rather than who did) see Pellat; Khalidi Islamic Historiography, pp. 136-142. 
456 It is no surprise that the originality implied in al-Ṣadūq’s description of his motivation to write the 
book is a rhetorical device rather than a statement of fact. 
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infants and hidden prophets can be of use in the broader contests over proof and legitimacy 




The impression that al-Ṣadūq’s work is not done with this recounting of tales of occulted 
prophets is confirmed by the fact that when they finish we are still not far beyond the first 
third of the book. The collected qiṣaṣ materials in fact take up considerably less room than the 
introduction that precedes them.  It is quite clear that this extraordinary corpus has 
resoundingly, edifyingly and very entertainingly accomplished al-Ṣadūq’s professed aim to 
show the longstanding pedigree of the occultation. Immersed in these tales, both the Hidden 
Imām and his beleaguered awaiting shīʿa look fully at home. But as the curtain falls on the 
last of the prophets, Muḥammad himself (whose presence among the Arabs, unrecognised as 
the best of humanity until God first despatches him on his prophetic mission, is analogous to 
the Twelfth Imām’s unrecognised presence among the believers457), it is clear that our author 
has more to offer. What follows is the next stage of the story: that of Muḥammad’s successors 
and the Twelfth Imām himself. Al-Ṣadūq relates in a long sequence of chapters the accounts 
concerning the Hidden Imām’s birth and disappearance, his predecessor’s foretelling and 
designation (naṣṣ)458 of him and then a wide variety of witnesses to his continued, concealed 
existence in occultation, be it in the form of letters received from him or, more rarely, face-to-
face encounters. 
It soon becomes clear that al-Ṣadūq is doing more than bringing his narrative up to date, thus 
completing the necessary comparison with the qiṣaṣ material, rather when he comes to 
discussing the Hidden Imām directly the shape of Kamāl al-dīn’s text changes radically. The 
first group of text to be presented following the qiṣaṣ material are aḥādīth in which the Hidden 
Imām is designated by the earlier imāms, as well as Fāṭima, Muḥammad and God. This is a 
vast body of narrations presented in fourteen chapters, that are together far more extensive 
than the qiṣaṣ material, with fifty-seven aḥādīth narrated from Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq alone. This 
massive, repetitive mode of presentation, adducing long sequences of aḥādīth in which is 
repeated the same basic information (that there will be twelve imāms following Muḥammad 
and that the twelfth and last will enter occultation pending his return as the qāʾim) is utterly 
                                                            
457 Kamāl al-dīn, p. 231. 
458 Naṣṣ had long been a cornerstone of Imāmī imāmology. An imām was known to be the imām on the 
basis of his infallibility and knowledge but also proof that he had been explicitly named successor by 
his predecessor. See Kamāl al-dīn, p. 46. 
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different to what we encountered in the qiṣaṣ material, the intense diversity of which contains 
not a single report supported by multiple narrations. We have moved to tawātur, these naṣṣ 
texts embodying al-Ṣadūq’s introductory claims that the reality of the Hidden Imām is proven 
by an irrefutable volume textual witnesses.  
The sense of tawātur effect by these reports (and with it the divergence between their 
presentation and that of the qiṣaṣ material) is all the stronger for their content’s being focussed 
on a tightly limited set of contentions. The actual events and details of the Twelfth Imām’s 
career, including those of his occultation, such as might be compared illuminatingly to the 
qiṣaṣ material, have yet to appear. These reports instead concentrate only on asserting that the 
Twelfth Imām’s status as the final imām and the qāʾim have been foretold and sanctioned by 
his predecessors. A further difference between these texts and the qiṣaṣ material is al-Ṣadūq’s 
dividing these naṣṣ texts according to their sources (allotting separate chapters to reports from 
each of the imāms, Muḥammad and so on), a further device to underscore the density of 
transmission of these reports.459   
In these two very different bodies of aḥādīth and the two very different ways in which al-
Ṣadūq presents them to the reader we see in practice the two different types of proof outlined 
in Kamāl al-dīn’s introduction. The qiṣaṣ texts place no particular emphasis on their sources, 
their focus being rather on producing as many diverse and engaging images of previous 
occulted ḥujaj as possible. The naṣṣ text, by contrast, focus on the extended repetition of a 
very narrow set of contentions, behind which are amassed a prodigious array of sources to 
which al-Ṣadūq endeavours to draw the reader’s attention.  It is quite plain from their stark 
divergence that al-Ṣadūq is under no illusions regarding the different character of his two 
probative strategies, and that he is here compiling different sets of texts, each with one strategy 
in mind at the expense of the other.    
There are already indications that these proofs may not coexist entirely comfortably. On the 
one hand, while the qiṣaṣ texts evidence none of the strategies employed in the naṣṣ texts to 
affirm tawātur, it cannot be denied that their separate probative strategy cannot function 
without some of that same affirmation of textual reliability. Though they work as 
prefigurations of the Hidden Imām in distant the past rather than as corroborated witnesses to 
his existence, these qiṣaṣ texts do not work if they are not believed to be reliable. If we are to 
                                                            
459 It is significant that this specific contention of the tawātur of texts predicting and designating the 
Twelfth Imām’s special status has a precedent in al-Nuʿmānī, who makes exactly the same contention 
with texts on the same particular subject the focus of his Kitāb al-ghayba some decades before al-Ṣadūq 
(al-Nuʿmānī, pp. 97-140). We have, moreover, already seen al-Ṣadūq draw on this exact same group of 
aḥādīth as a powerful textual proof elsewhere in his writings. See above, and particularly al-Khiṣāl, p. 
523 (where al-Ṣadūq in fact directs the interested reader to Kamāl al-dīn for further information). 
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acknowledge that the events of Moses’ occultation must be repeated in that of the Twelfth 
Imām, we need to first be sure that Moses’ occultation did, indeed, take place as described.  
 
DALĀLA – Seeking the Imām 
 
After wading through al-Ṣadūq’s horde of naṣṣ texts we come to the chapters of Kamāl al-dīn 
which describe the actual events of the Hidden Imām’s preternaturally long life, starting with 
his birth, and focussing thereafter on his shadowy relationship with the faithful who seek his 
guidance. As we reach the Twelfth Imām himself, we reach both the figure whose existence 
the preceding naṣṣ texts guarantee and the figure whose exploits the qiṣaṣ texts must prefigure. 
This, then, is the shared object whereat al-Ṣadūq’s two proof-corpora and their accompanying 
probative logics meet. As al-Ṣadūq’s strategies converge on their goal, there is certainly an 
extent to which we encounter a Hidden Imām who is all the more real for having thus been 
proven by multiple means. This convergence, however, is not immune from the tensions 
between al-Ṣadūq’s two proofs. The reader soon finds that tawātur and ‘Whatsoever befell…’ 
are not easily cumulative, and it is not immediately obvious whether al-Ṣadūq’s picture of the 
Twelfth Imām will be more or less than the sum of its parts.  
The texts that al-Ṣadūq now presents, which may be usefully termed ‘occultation texts’ – texts 
whose primary subject matter is the Twelfth Imām and his occultation – are divided into four 
chapters: a brief chapter concerning the imām’s mother, a slightly longer one giving stories of 
his birth and then two very long chapters, the first collecting accounts of those who actually 
saw the imām and even spoke with him, and the second giving accounts of the many letters 
that the imām sent to the faithful through the medium of his emissaries during the nearly 
seventy years of the minor occultation.  
The potential parallels that the reader may draw between these occultation texts and the qiṣaṣ 
material at the book’s opening are too numerous and varied to list in comprehensive detail. 
We have alluded to many above and will discuss several more in depth below. As for tawātur, 
we see a number of sustained elements in the occultation texts’ presentation that aims to affirm 
their textual integrity. As is the case with the naṣṣ texts, volume is evidently an important 
factor in these chapters’ presentation of their material, with twenty-four reports being supplied 
for eyewitness accounts of the imām and forty-two records of letters received from him. Al-
Ṣadūq meanwhile supplies a comprehensive list of those who saw the Imām, which gives 
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sixty-five names in total.460 Recalling again al-Ṣadūq’s pronouncement that three 
corroborating reports constitutes tawātur, this is a considerable body of evidence and one that 
is designed to impress. To reject such a wealth of reports, al-Ṣadūq has repeatedly told the 
reader, can only be consistent as part of a total rejection of textual evidence and thus the 
foundation of all religion. Further efforts to emphasise the textual reliability of the chapters’ 
assembled accounts are visible in the adducing of multiple asānīd for some of the traditions. 
Al-Ṣadūq is clearly investing effort in convincing his reader that the events of recent history 
that he describes really did happen. 
A key element of this assertion of factuality is the concept of the dalāla; the ‘sign’ or 
‘proof.’461 A dalāla in Islamic literature often refers to a miracle by which the Prophet proves 
his prophetic status, and indeed there proliferated in the late fourth/tenth and early 
fifth/eleventh centuries a literature of ‘The Signs of Prophecy’ (dalāʾil al-nubuwwa) devoted 
to documenting these prophetic miracles.462 In Imāmī literature, meanwhile, the dalāla often 
denotes a miraculous sign of the imām’s legitimacy and, in the case of the Twelfth Imām, 
these signs of his legitimacy merge with signs of his very existence. By the time al-Ṣadūq was 
writing there was already an established Imāmī literature chronicling the dalāʾil of the imāms 
including those of the Twelfth Imām,463 and it is little surprise that the concept appears in 
abundance in Kamāl al-dīn’s occultation texts, where the term dalāla is used with a self-
conscious specificity. Many of al-Ṣadūq’s narrators tell in their accounts of how they came to 
meet the imām or to receive his written word how they were searching for a dalāla in order to 
strengthen their faith, while al-Ṣadūq himself on occasion intervenes after a report to explain 
to the reader what constituted the dalāla therein.464  
                                                            
460 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 470-471. 
461 The two instinctive translations of this term correlate eerily with al-Ṣadūq’s two probative methods, 
his use of dalāla shifting between ‘sign’ and ‘proof’ in different contexts. When tawātur is emphasised 
the dalāla appears as proof, the miracle by which the imām is confirmed as such. Elsewhere in Kamāl 
al-dīn, however, we see the faithful in search of ‘signs’ of the imām, such as might direct them towards 
him.  
462 Prominent examples of this dalāʾil al-nubuwwa genre include works by ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad 
al-Hamadhānī (d. 415/1024), Abū Nuʿaym, al-Iṣfahānī (d. 430/1038) and Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn al-
Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066). 
463 al-Kulaynī’s al-Kāfī and al-Khuṣaybī’s al-Hidāya al-kubrā both feature extensive collections of 
reports identified as the imāms’ dalāʾil. See al-Kulaynī, vol. i, pp. 439-525 (though these chapters are 
usually collected under the heading ‘The chapters concerning history’ (abwāb al-tārīkh) and present 
what purports to be a chapter on the birth of each of the imāms, in each case the majority of the chapter 
is given over to accounts of the imām’s miracles, often explicitly identified as dalāʾil). In each of al-
Hidāya al-kubrā’s fourteen chapters (one for each imām, Muḥammad and Fatima), meanwhile, a brief 
set of material detailing the subject’s dates, parentage etc. is followed by the bulk of the chapter which 
is presented under the rubric ‘And there were amongst his/her signs…’ 
464 E.g. Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 515 (ḥ. 9), 521, 528 (ḥ. 28). 
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The dalāʾil in Kamāl al-dīn are particularly concentrated in the accounts of believers’ 
epistolary encounters with the imām after the death of al-ʿAskarī.465 These take place in the 
context of the minor occultation, when Imāmīs could still consult with individuals identified 
as the Hidden Imām’s appointed emissary, through whom the imām would send written 
messages and instructions to his followers.466 What is noteworthy about these accounts is that 
while the accounts in the chapter of personal encounters with the imām hinge for the most part 
on the simple fact of meeting the imām, the same is not true of the epistolary encounters. The 
receipt of a letter is not enough to constitute a dalāla, rather there must be some miraculous 
element to the story. We have in al-Kashshī and al-Kulaynī examples of reports in which a 
believer corresponds with the imām without any wondrous occurrence,467 but such reports are 
absent from the collection al-Ṣadūq offers here. There are a number of stock patters which the 
miracles follow, the majority of which revolve around the Hidden Imām’s powers of 
premonition (ibtidāʾ). Again and again we read how a believer receives instructions in a letter 
which make no sense at the time but in hindsight prove miraculously perspicacious. Elsewhere 
we read of how Imāmīs write to the imām but for one reason or another omit certain queries 
from their letters, only to have them answered anyway by an imām who does not need a letter 
to know what is in his shīʿa’s hearts.468  
Al-Ṣadūq’s narration of this body of material is not without its risks. Most scholarly groups at 
that time, foremost amongst them the Muʿtazilīs, did not accept that anyone after the Prophet 
could perform miracles. This being the case, these compiled dalāʾil of the imāms have the 
perilous potential to read as accounts of the impossible,469 doing serious damage to the 
credibility of al-Ṣadūq’s contentions. On the other hand, if al-Ṣadūq’s assertions of tawātur 
are successful such that the reader has no choice but to accept that the events described in 
                                                            
465 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 509-549. 
466 See Chapter I. Though it is true that al-Ṣadūq’s material does conform to the division between major 
and minor occultations in many ways, it is not a distinction that he explicitly asserts with any force. 
This is in contrast to both the earlier al-Nuʿmānī and the later al-Ṭūsī, and, as we shall see below, the 
tacit acknowledgement of the distinction between occultations without directly declaring it, thus 
allowing that distinction to blur, well suits al-Ṣadūq’s objectives. 
467 It should be remarked that in al-Kulaynī’s case the report in question is not in his chapter on the 
Twelfth Imām’s dalāʾil but in a chapter regarding khums. For him too, it seems, the mere presence of a 
letter does not constitute a miracle, rather acts as a legal proof like any other imām’s reported injunction. 
See al-Kulaynī, vol. i, p. 545, ḥ. 12. 
468 For an alternative reading of the significance of these encounters see Amir-Moezzi, Spirituality, pp. 
431-460. 
469 While al-Ṣadūq has made it clear in his introduction that he is talking primarily to a Shīʿī readership, 
we need look no further than that same introduction to learn that there were Shīʿī, indeed Imāmī voices 
who shared the Muʿtazilī view on this matter. In one of al-Ṣadūq’s long citations of ibn Qiba al-Rāzī 




these texts did take place, these occultation texts become a powerful challenge to the Imāmīs’ 
opponents. The stakes in these chapters’ address, then, are high. 
It is surprising, therefore, that alongside al-Ṣadūq’s evident attempts to persuade the reader of 
these accounts’ tawātur we also see a perilous quantity of self-evident weaknesses and 
problems in these chapters’ assembled aḥādīth, weaknesses which far exceed such lapses as 
we observed in Chapter I and to which we saw al-Mufīd objecting. The collective state of 
these reports’ asānīd lamentable, riddled as they are with defects that would be just as apparent 
to an unschooled reader as they would to one learned in the science of aḥādīth. Whatever the 
status of his wide set of narrators (a number of whom are quite unknown beyond their names), 
many of the reports are narrated from unidentified sources, sometimes identified generically 
such as by their place of origin but other times only as ‘a man.’470 Thus these crucial 
eyewitness testaments to the imām’s existence do not always even identify the witness on 
whom they rely! In other instances the aḥādīth’s sources show less conventional defects. For 
example one of the reports of an encounter with the Hidden Imām begins as follows: 
We heard the following from a shaykh from amongst the people of ḥadīth called 
Aḥmad b. Fāris al-Adīb: ‘Once in Hamadān I heard a tale, which I told as I heard it to 
one amongst my brethren who asked that I set it down in writing. Finding no objection 
to this I did so, placing liability for the tale with the one who told it. 
‘I heard that in Hamadān there are a people called the Banū Rāshid, all of whom are 
Shīʿīs, their creed that of the people of Imāmate. I asked the reason why they, of all 
the people of Hamadān, had become Shīʿī. An old man amongst them who seemed 
righteous and upright told me the following: 
“The reason for this is that our grandfather from whom we trace our descent once set 
out for the Ḥajj…’”471 
This is clearly a far cry from the certainty usually promised by a conventional isnād, and 
places the text that follows it firmly in the realm of anecdote if not of legend.  
Nor do the difficulties of Kamāl al-dīn’s occultation texts confine themselves to the question 
of sources. The reader must also contend with overt internal contradictions between aḥādīth 
as well as material that flies in the face of orthodoxy. Details such as the imām’s age at the 
time of his father’s death and his physical appearance472 are recounted conspicuously 
differently in different reports. Meanwhile, a number of reports enact significant departures 
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471 Kamāl al-dīn, p. 480. 
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from what was already the established Duodeciman narrative of the imamate, such as those 
claiming that that the Twelfth Imām has a brother called Mūsā who shares his occultation with 
him, or that al-Ḥusayn designated not his son ʿAlī but his sister Zaynab as his successor.473 
Meanwhile, the occultation literature in these chapters is regularly punctuated by accounts of 
a starkly fantastical colour. While the imām’s epistolary dalāʾil, confined as they are to a 
limited set of types, are certainly miraculous but not flamboyantly so (the imām’s power 
largely being restricted to that of ‘knowledge of the unseen’), the accounts of those who have 
met the qāʾim expand the field considerably, describing such mysteries as letters rewriting 
themselves, the imām walking concealed amongst the people, and in one report the Hidden 
Imām tormenting his usurping uncle Jaʿfar the liar by appearing out of thin air at distressing 
moments.474 Not only does this inclusion of more colourful miracles court greater opposition 
from non-Imāmī groups opposed to the notion that non-prophets can perform miracles, it also 
casts the very existence of the Twelfth Imām as infused with the miraculous, leaving the reader 
who objects to such miracles little choice but to reject the imām’s existence. 
It is hard to overemphasise the antagonism with which al-Ṣadūq’s inclusion of such fantastic 
reports is flirting. Such accounts epitomise the ‘ridiculous’ beliefs on account of which many 
of al-Ṣadūq’s contemporaries denigrate the Imāmīya, including Muʿtazilīs and other 
rationalist-leaning groups but also Shīʿī groups such as the Ismāʿīlīs who possess colourful 
imamological narratives of their own.475 This hazard is meanwhile reflected in the 
circumspection with which al-Ṣadūq’s fellow Imāmīs treat such material. Al-Nuʿmānī totally 
excludes all such accounts from his discussion of the occultation, while al-Mufīd is careful to 
restrict his accounts to the imām’s power of foreknowledge.476 More tellingly still, al-Ṣadūq 
himself is much more careful in other contexts. In ʿUyūn, a text that addresses itself to the 
ardently Muʿtazilī ibn ʿ Abbād, al-Ṣadūq not only restricts his long chapter on al-Riḍā’s dalāʾil 
to instances of the imām’s miraculous foreknowledge, he makes sure to clarify that this 
knowledge is not afforded by miraculous powers of the imam, rather it is merely passed down 
from the Prophet.477 No such caveat appears in Kamāl al-dīn, rather the imām portrayed in 
these chapters is a thoroughly and unapologetically miraculous figure.  
                                                            
473 Ibid., pp. 474-476, 528. 
474 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 467, 470, 549. 
475 Al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān, Iftitāḥ al-Daʿwa  p. 24  
476 Al-Mufīd, al-Irshād, pp. 355-367. We shall see how al-Mufīd further underplays the epistemological 
importance of such miraculous accounts. As for the imāms’ capacity to perform miracles, al-Mufīd 
cautiously accepts it on the basis of reports to that effect, while conceding that the matter can neither 
be proven or disproven by reason, and also noting that even as a minority of Muʿtazilīs share his 
acceptance of the phenomenon some Imāmīs do not. See McDermott, pp. 107-119. 
477 ʿUyūn vol. ii, p. 224. We have, of course, already seen al-Ṣadūq contend with such opposition in 
Kamāl al-dīn’s introduction. See above.  
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The state of Kamāl al-dīn’s occultation narratives, with their weak sources and extravagant 
content, thus appears emphatically and needlessly inimical to al-Ṣadūq’s vital claims of 
tawātur. While some of these difficulties might be attributed to the state of the texts al-Ṣadūq 
had available, the fact that we see other Imāmīs of the period, including the earlier 
compilations of al-Nuʿmānī and al-Kulaynī, assemble traditions about the Hidden Imām 
wherein such problematic elements are less in evidence478 tells us that al-Ṣadūq is not only a 
victim of circumstance here. He could vet his material more thoroughly, as he does in many 
other works, but instead he includes this uncharacteristically troublesome body of reports even 
alongside his vociferous claims of tawātur, claims that do not appear in compendia of his with 
more cautious contents. Why does al-Ṣadūq, having so invested Kamāl al-dīn’s arguments in 
establishing the tawātur of its contents, undermine himself so apparently avoidably? 
 
IMĀM, MOTIF AND MYTH 
 
The answer to this question can only be that the advantages accrued by this textually and 
doctrinally problematic material outweigh its risks. This trade-off brings us back to the 
twofold proof at the heart of Kamāl al-dīn, for while his occultation material brings certain 
hindrances to al-Ṣadūq’s assertions of tawātur, the form it takes is vital for the link that is 
created with the qiṣaṣ material. The way in which this works is not immediately obvious. After 
all, if we start from the first principles of al-Ṣadūq’s plan of action, ‘from the impossible to 
the possible,’ the essential elements of the Twelfth Imām’s occultation, which need to be 
proved possible by way of establishing precedent in the careers of previous prophets, are few 
and simple: God’s ḥujja needs to be hidden and he needs to live a long time. Both of these 
phenomena are in generous evidence in al-Ṣadūq’s selection of qiṣaṣ material, and as far the 
occultation material is not concerned he need only adduce reports in which these elements are 
illustrated. This, too, he has evidently done in abundance, an abundance which in part appears 
motivated by the aspiration to tawātur. Thus far none of this creates a need for luminously 
troublesome material; there are plenty of narrations available with which al-Ṣadūq could 
affirm these two miraculous idiosyncrasies of the Hidden Imām without deviating from the 
more stable-looking corpora supplied by al-Kulaynī or even al-Mufīd. We imagine here a far 
simpler Kamāl al-dīn. 
But simple Kamāl al-dīn is not. What brings the probative value of the qiṣaṣ material and the 
dubious quality of the occultation texts together is al-Ṣadūq’s determination to go beyond the 
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basic elements of the imām’s occultation and longevity. Instead he creates a picture of the 
Twelfth Imām whose resonances with his juxtaposed image of the prophetic past are legion. 
To do this he needs a more colourful Twelfth Imām, and for this he needs a more colourful 
array of texts. We should recall the ḥadīth that underpins al-Ṣadūq’s use of the qiṣaṣ: that 
whatsoever has befallen previous communities shall befall Muḥammad’s community. Here is 
a paradigm that enjoins to the reader to absorb the qiṣaṣ al-anbiyāʾ, with all their wonders, 
their jellyfish being ridden by bees and little furry people with asymmetrical ears, as an 
authoritative blueprint for the present. It is an implication of his mechanism that al-Ṣadūq fully 
and creatively embraces in his compiled occultation texts.  
An illustrative example of this constructed, multifarious similarity is in what we may call the 
encounter narratives: the body of traditions among the occultation texts which suggest that, 
despite the Imām’s occultation, the true believer is still afforded the chance of a meeting with 
him (as distinct from those narratives in which a believer sees the imām prior to the 
occultation). It is with these narrative that al-Ṣadūq’s occultation material is at its most 
colourful and evocative. In the world of Kamāl al-dīn Western Asia is awash with pious Shīʿīs 
tirelessly seeking a sign from their vanished Imām, and who, beckoned by a mysterious 
messenger in the night, attracted by a light at a solitary window or even confronted by an 
astonishing, glittering city in the desert, are eventually rewarded with an audience. The details 
of their conversations with the imām are seldom the focus of these stories, rather it is the 
heightened expectation of the search, the sudden, suspenseful hint of presence and the radiant 
majesty of the imām’s revealed face.479 
These narratives exist very much at the hazardous end of al-Ṣadūq’s spectrum of occultation 
texts. Not only do they contain a wealth of fantastical and miraculous elements, their 
protagonists themselves sometimes mysterious figures from faraway places, but they enact a 
concept which even amongst the Imāmīya of al-Ṣadūq’s time is highly controversial. Neither 
al-Mufīd nor al-Nuʿmānī make any use of such narratives in their discussions of occultation, 
and both meanwhile expressly deny the possibility of meeting with the Hidden Imām. Al-
Ṣadūq, meanwhile, undertakes to illustrate that possibility in glorious technicolour, and as he 
does so he opens up a wealth of resonance and cross-signification between his qiṣaṣ material 
and his image of the occultation, between the mythical narratives of the past and a present that 
is no less infused with the drama of revelation and concealment. 
The most likely place to find the Hidden Imām (on the advice of al-Ṣadūq’s material) is at 
Mecca, where every year he attends the Ḥajj. Many accounts affirming this aspect of the 
                                                            




occultation repeat of the Imām ‘He sees them and yet they do not see him,’ establishing the 
powerful image of the Imām walking unrecognised amongst the people.480 This image, 
meanwhile, is prefigured in al-Ṣadūq’s earlier chapter on the occultation of Joseph. Just as 
God kept Joseph’s brothers from recognising him even when they stood before him, so in the 
exact same way he can hide his Imām in plain sight amongst the pilgrims to the Kaʿba. 
However, as al-Ṣadūq’s reader knows, Joseph was hidden neither entirely nor forever. His 
wicked brothers did not recognise him, but his righteous brother did, and al-Ṣadūq even goes 
out of his way in Kamāl al-dīn to argue (against the common grain of readings) that his father 
Jacob knew that he was alive, though he could not see him.481 So it is that we find in the 
occultation texts narratives wherein the imām reveals himself to deserving pilgrims. The 
emissary al-ʿAmrī saw him at Mecca, clinging to the Kaʿba’s cover and crying, ‘O God avenge 
me upon my enemies.’482 
In this instance the parallel between past and present is explicitly drawn by al-Ṣadūq, who 
spells out the points of similarity and their significance in his commentary on the traditions, 
but the vast majority of such similarities between multiple narratives are left implicit. A 
recurring figure in the encounter narratives is that of the seeker; the pious Shīʿī at wandering 
at a loss at the story’s opening, searching for al-ʿAskarī’s successor, news of the house of 
Muḥammad or even just ‘a sign’ (dalāla)).483 One particularly colourful such figure is that of 
Abū Saʿīd Ghānim al-Hindī (‘the Indian’). Inspired by reading the Torah in the court of the 
King of India, Abū Saʿīd journeys across Asia in search of God’s last prophet. On 
encountering Sunnī Muslims in Kabul, he makes the mistake of informing them that the 
Prophet whom he seeks was rightfully succeeded by ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, and the resulting 
antagonism nearly costs him his life. After a narrow escape, he gains access to a prudently 
secretive Shīʿī who informs him of the truth, including that the Imamate is now held by 
Muḥammad’s waṣī, the Twelfth Imām, whom Abū Saʿīd in turn successfully seeks out and at 
last meets.484 
This account is strikingly similar to the story of Salmān the Persian given earlier in the qiṣaṣ 
section of the book. Salmān, too, begins his story in distant lands of unbelief, but is compelled 
to set out in search of God’s messenger following an encounter with a hidden and secret text. 
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Like Abū Saʿīd, Salmān’s quest involves much trial and error, and he, too, must negotiate a 
mixture of many hostile unbelievers and a few secretive custodians of the truth. He has to 
learn from a succession of reclusive Christian teachers before at last the Prophet passes by the 
pillar in the desert on which he sits, and his patience and devotion are rewarded. Nor is Salmān 
alone in pursuing such a quest: al-Ṣadūq identifies the Prophet’s status before his mission as 
analogous to the occultation, and he tells the stories of a number of less known figures, like 
king Tubbaʿ and Saṭīḥ the priest,485 who also set out, guided by scripture, inspiration and 
provenance, to seek news of God’s last messenger, to await him and even to find him, even as 
he subsequently narrates those of Shīʿīs who set out to find the last Imām. In the more distant 
past, Solomon appears in a narrative of mysterious meetings that presents a remarkable fusion 
of Shīʿī motifs of occultation and the night-time wanderings of Harūn al-Rashīd in One 
Thousand and One Nights. Secluded from his shīʿa with his new bride, Solomon is compelled 
to walk the city in disguise to run a series of errands at his beloved’s bequest. On one occasion 
he meets a fisherman who gives him a pair of fish without ever discovering that he is God’s 
representative. On another occasion he brings his parents in law to dinner, and only once they 
have eaten their fill does he reveal his true identity as king and prophet with a display of 
magical power.486 A little later in his encounter narratives, al-Ṣadūq supplies many testimonies 
to the effect that his readers, too, can never be sure than an unsolicited invitation may not bring 
them before their Imām. ‘He sees them though they do not see him.’487 
These devout Shīʿī wanderers’ very desire to seek out the Imām or confirmation of his 
existence is couched in the precedent of earlier prophets. Al-Ṣadūq makes much of the episode 
in the Qurʾān when Abraham asks God to show him his power to bring the dead to life.488 ‘Do 
you not believe?’ Chides the Almighty, to which Abraham responds, ‘Only let my heart be set 
at rest.’ (Q 2:260) God, of course, indulges Abraham’s weakness, miraculously restoring to 
life four dead birds. This Qurʾānic proof-text lends a robust blueprint for the encounter 
narrative, but it also gives a knowing nod to the transgressive nature of al-Ṣadūq’s inclusion 
of these texts. In citing Abraham’s request for God’s indulgence, seeking tangible proof when 
he should not need to, al-Ṣadūq engages those Imāmī authorities who deny that the believer 
can still meet his imām face to face and thus would deny the validity of these encounter 
narratives. He draws on divine precedent to justify setting the believers’ hearts at rest, even if 
it means breaking the rules.  
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In al-Ṣadūq’s encounter narratives we see how this most controversial corpus, whilst 
undermining Kamāl al-dīn’s claims to tawātur, supply potent ammunition to al-Ṣadūq’s 
efforts to show how perfectly the prophetic past is mirrored in the imāmic present. The extent 
of al-Ṣadūq’s devotion to asserting this equivalence as fully as possible is meanwhile visible 
in the fact that just as it compels him to admit weaknesses in the occultation material, it also 
drives the introduction of heterodox texts into his original set of qiṣaṣ. Few doctrines 
concerning prophets are as dear to the Imāmīya than that of infallibility, however in the very 
first story of Kamāl al-dīn’s main text, that of Idrīs, we see a narrative whose prophet 
protagonist is definitely imperfect. Idrīs is angry with his community for rejecting his message, 
and therefore refuses to ask God to send them rain. As their suffering escalates, God rebukes 
Idrīs for his spite, at which Idrīs repents and at last makes the necessary prayer.489 The image 
of the prophet in his cave, delaying the people’s final salvation for wrath at their sins, is a 
valuable echo of the Hidden Imām, indefinitely absent and supremely wronged, but also 
threatens to damage a staple element of the Imāmī concept of prophecy. In al-Tawḥīd we see 
a more cautious al-Ṣadūq taking pains to explain away reports that might destabilise the 
infallibility of the prophets and imāms,490 but here in Kamāl al-dīn he lets this heterodoxy pass 
without comment, compelled by its value to a more important project. 
More conspicuous still is al-Ṣadūq’s Janus-faced negotiation of the concept of a ‘hiatus’ 
(fatra) between prophets. God, the good Imāmī may be absolutely assured, does not leave his 
creation without ḥujja, even for a heartbeat, lest it implode in meaningless futility, a doctrine 
that precedes al-Ṣadūq by decades if not centuries.491 Conversely, in Kamāl al-dīn we read 
that the world endured for a whole week without a ḥujja after the death of the prophet Ṣāliḥ.492 
Meanwhile, we have seen the book’s extensive coverage of the gap between Jesus and 
Muḥammad, a gap that is fruitfully populated by with seeker figures like Salmān, Saṭīḥ the 
priest and Joseph the Jew.493  Such characters are the perfect simulacrum of the Shīʿī awaiting 
the Twelfth Imām, however it is hard to overstate the affront which this motif of the long, 
ḥujja-less night that they inhabit represents to Imāmī theology. The idea that there was a gap 
in the succession of prophets is a and common and long-standing one in Muslim literature, but 
when it comes to the Imāmīya such a gap is the starkest of theological anathema. It is, of 
course, a highly useful doppelganger for the Hidden Imām’s occultation, especially in terms 
of the narratives it generates, but not only is the admission that there was such a gap a near-
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fatal compromise for the same Imāmī theology that asserts that there must, indeed, be an 
imām, but there is also a risk in pushing the similarity between fatra and ghayba too far. After 
all, the occultation of the imām is not, as Duodeciman scholars including al-Ṣadūq never tire 
of asserting, the same as his absence. He is still there, the sun behind the clouds, guiding the 
community even though they do not know it. ‘He sees them and yet they do not see him.’ The 
implication of these narratives of the fatra that the occultation is effectively identical to a 
complete absence of a ḥujja is a risky admission to toy with!494 
Sure enough, al-Ṣadūq does not, ultimately, let such a critical theological problem slide. He 
includes in Kamāl al-dīn a discussion the ‘gap’ spanning several pages, wherein he denounces 
the idea as impossible, producing a standard array of the imāms’ aḥādīth affirming that the 
world shall not be without a ḥujja until it comes to an end, and clarifying that it is only 
messengers, those prophets like Muḥammad and Moses who bring new laws, whose presence 
is punctuated by gaps. The prophets and their successors (waṣīy) who exist between the 
messengers may, of course, be forced to hide from persecution, but that, of course, is perfectly 
legitimate and quite incomparable to absence. Al-Ṣadūq specifically addresses the suggested 
fatra between jesus and Muḥammad, naming the successors of Jesus who continued his 
message after him and also assembling reports of prophets who were active in between Jesus 
and Muḥammad, such as one Khālid b. Sinān al-ʿAbbāsī, whose daughter later met with 
Muḥammad who saluted her as the child of a prophet.495  
As rigorous as this disavowal of the fatra is, our suspicions must be aroused by the fact that it 
is not allotted a chapter, let alone appended to the extensive set of narratives about the fatra 
near to Kamāl al-dīn’s beginning. Rather the discussion is postponed to the very end of Kamāl 
al-dīn and is to be found hidden between other material in the book’s concluding miscellany 
(nawādir). There is, moreover, no attempt to achieve coherence between the discussion of 
Salmān and of Jesus’ successors that figures in al-Ṣadūq’s ultimate refutation of the fatra and 
the descriptions of these figures in the qiṣaṣ section. There is, moreover, no mention of the 
aforementioned seven-day hiatus in the ḥujja’s presence after the death of Ṣāliḥ. It is plain 
that al-Ṣadūq is not overeager for the reader to heed this disavowal of the fatra as he reads 
stories about it. Rather, this relegation of the concept’s disavowal to the obscurity of the very 
end of the book shows us just how inconvenient it is. al-Ṣadūq must include a refutation of the 
fatra to cover himself, but it is both included and emasculated, secreted in a chapterless jumble 
of reports at the other end of the book where it cannot trouble the reader’s appreciation of the 
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fatra as a highly fertile context in which to prefigure the drama of the occultation. However 
theologically difficult the fatra is, the stories which it yields up are just too useful to let go. 
Once again, we have problematic material that al-Ṣadūq sanctions in Kamāl al-dīn for the 
purpose of creating ever more evocative and numerous points of contact between the Twelfth 
Imām and his prophetic predecessors. This is not a case of adjusting one corpus the better to 
fit the other, rather both the occultation corpus and the qiṣaṣ corpus are enhanced and 
expanded to create as rich a field of correspondence as possible. 
The correspondences we have seen thus far are of two types: there is the correspondence 
between the prophets and the Hidden Imām, and there is the correspondence between those 
non-prophetic seeker figures like Salmān and the Shīʿa. Kamāl al-dīn is not limited to such 
simple equivalences, however. Rather than presenting a single story that forever repeats itself, 
we instead see narrative elements that shift and transmute between stories, sometimes with 
improbable results. Let us return again to Salmān seeking his absent prophet. Prior to his 
reaching Muḥammad Salmān’s teachers are, inevitably, Christians, Christians, moreover, of a 
monastic colour. They are hermits whom he has to see out in their seclusion, and he himself 
adopts their asceticism, such that when Muḥammad at last finds him he is, like saint Anthony 
of Egypt, fasting on top of a pillar in the desert.496 The ascetic wanderer is a fertile model for 
the awaiting Imāmīya, and a fittingly frequent sight in Kamāl al-dīn. The model becomes more 
complex, however, when we see that these ascetic wanderers are as often as not the hidden 
ḥujja himself rather than those seeking them. The Jesus of the Gospels spent forty days in the 
desert, an image that al-Ṣadūq’s material echoes, referring to his occultations ‘when he 
wandered the lands.’497 Meanwhile, we read that when Joseph was hidden from his people he 
remained for ten years celibate and unanointed with oil or kohl, clearly colouring the imām 
figure’s absence from his people as a sojourn in the wilderness.498 Seeker and imām meet 
inextricably in the figure of Alexander, (‘the Horned One’). Alexander here is a king who 
would leave his royal duties to seek adventure, a desire which his subjects, like Khosrow’s 
ministers in the Shāh nāmah,499 fruitlessly entreat him not to indulge. They are left 
unmistakeably in the guise of the bewildered Shīʿa robbed of their Imām, but Alexander 
meanwhile appears less as a Messiah waiting to return than as one seeking enlightenment 
himself: 
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Alexander was once journeying through the world when he came upon an old man 
who was examining the skulls of the dead. He bade his soldiers halt and called 
out, ‘Old man! Why is it that you are examining these skulls?’ 
‘I am trying to tell,’ replied the old man, ‘Which of them belonged to high-ranking 
persons and which to the lowly. Yet I cannot tell, though I have been examining them 
these twenty years!’ 
Alexander took his leave and journeyed on. ‘It was for me and none other that he 
meant those words,’ Said he as he went.500 
We still see the hubristic conqueror, whose experiences as he journeys will ultimately avail 
him wisdom. Alexander is unmistakeably both Imām who leaves his followers and Shīʿī 
searching for the hidden truth. No less a figure than Abraham is found in similar mould. 
Following his more conventional encounter with Nimrūd, where he is, like Moses and like the 
imām, hidden from a tyrant as a child, al-Ṣadūq tells us that Abraham also had a second 
occultation ‘in which he wandered the world alone that he might reflect.’ On the edge of the 
sea he encounters an old man praying, praying, as it turns out, for God to let him see his great 
prophet Abraham. He is duly pleased to learn that his prayer has been granted. Abraham, it 
seems, has been hidden from one shīʿa only to appear to another, but he is clearly as 
bewildered as anyone else by the experience. Prophet again merges with seeker, discovering 
the old man from beyond the sea in a motif older than both Alexander and Abraham.501 
Kamāl al-dīn never softens its contention that the absence and return of the ḥujja and the 
patient endurance of his followers are of paramount importance in the ever-repeating narrative 
of revelation that it weaves. But this does not entail the endless reiteration of a single 
paradigm. Rather what we see in the above is construction of a set of highly evocative and 
highly mobile motifs that refract across al-Ṣadūq’s string of narratives, remoulding from 
context to context to beguile the reader as much by the variety of the forms they take as by 
their consistency. The fear of persecution which drives the Imām into hiding is the same fear 
which compels the devoted Shīʿī to secrecy. Meanwhile, one prophet’s occultation may double 
up as a Christ-like sojourn in the wilderness, mirroring in turn the secluded, ascetic expectation 
of the Shīʿī faithful. 
The results of al-Ṣadūq’s compiling are gloriously entertaining, but this cannot in itself be 
enough to justify what remains a jarring threat to his need to project textual integrity in his 
portrayal of the Hidden Imām. For all the blatant weaknesses and compromises that he admits 
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in search of enriching narratives of wandering sages and hidden luminaries, the desire to affirm 
tawātur remains simultaneously tenacious. No less outlandish a story than that of Abū Saʿīd 
the Indian is presented by a prodigious amassing of asānīd and authorities asserting its truth.502 
Al-Ṣadūq remains committed to the tawātur that he identifies in his introduction as so essential 
to the doctrine of the Hidden Imām, and we must therefore enquire to what purpose he is 
willing to undercut it so damagingly. Entertainment is not reason enough. Why is Kamāl al-
dīn’s shifting labyrinth of images so indispensable? 
We may begin to answer this question by considering the potential of al-Ṣadūq’s kaleidoscopic 
vision of the occultation to soften and domesticate the soteriological nightmare of the Imām’s 
absence. Cast as a theological problem, the absence or hiddenness of God’s single inspired 
guide to his creation is catastrophic. God can never leave his creation without a ḥujja, and 
what use is an imām whom the believers can neither consult nor even see? We need only recall 
what we saw in the first chapter of how core Imāmī epistemologies in the tenth century are 
still deeply invested in the ideal of a present imām to realise the difficulty of confronting that 
imām’s absence. Correspondingly the available theological solutions to the imām’s absence 
are inconclusive at best. While later authors will settle on such highly abstract, impressionistic 
dicta as the Hidden Imām’s guidance being like the light of the sun behind a cloud,503 al-Ṣadūq 
offers no one explanation, but prefers to settle on the inclement injunction that one cannot 
question God’s wisdom. What Kamāl al-dīn tries to do is illustrate that wisdom. Plumbing the 
depths of millennia of storytelling to spin around the occultation a fertile intertext of wonders, 
al-Ṣadūq uses the evocative power of his assembled narratives and leitmotifs to sidestep the 
theological. Kamāl al-dīn meets the trauma of the imām’s absence head-on, not by reasoning 
it away but by valorising the romance of hidden guidance and sought authority in an irresistible 
tapestry of adventure and discovery, which is meanwhile imbued and joined with many 
fundamental topoi of Islamic prophetological and hagiographic literature. The occultation 
ceases to be a horrendous epistemological paradox and instead becomes a glorious vista of 
tireless believers seeking the truth, solving puzzles and overcoming tyrants. The original 
command to await the Imām patiently is blurred with the notion that he walks unseen among 
us, with the notion that he, too, expects in ascetic anguish, with the apparent possibility of 
meeting him, with the adventures one may encounter on the way to doing so and even with 
the heroic wanderlust of Alexander.  
The value of this device is that it allows al-Ṣadūq’s instructions to the reader to work on the 
level of suggestion rather than committed doctrinal or historical assertions. The architecture 
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of al-Ṣadūq’s compilation creates a space where history is collapsed into a fusion of the sacred, 
prophetic past and the equally sacred, imāmic present. The reader is neither entirely in one 
place nor the other, rather al-Ṣadūq encourages him by his constant created resonances to 
inhabit an imaginative space between the two, actively abstracting myths and archetypes from 
the material that al-Ṣadūq offers. To take the example of the figure of ‘the seeker’ discussed 
above, which not only allows wildly heterodox equation of the Shīʿī’s experience of the 
occultation with that of the imām, but relies on theologically problematic concepts like that of 
the fatra to do so, this figure appears not in any one text but rather in the myriad meeting 
points between texts, be they the stories of the prophets or the stories of the Hidden Imām. It 
is in this intangible mythic space that al-Ṣadūq creates – or rather bids the reader create – his 
image of the Hidden Imām, an image that can offer the reader solutions to the psychological 
and epistemological challenges of the occultation, by turns explanatory and comforting, which 
it would be hazardous for to articulate as straightforward doctrinal statements. Al-Ṣadūq’s 
peculiar array of texts thus avails him and his reader not only a far richer set of solutions to 
the occultation but solutions which are textually and theologically unassailable, occurring as 
they do not in what is said to have happened but only in what it is suggested – through the 





Al-Ṣadūq’s brilliant if eccentric designs in Kamāl al-dīn have a clear use in meeting the 
conceptual challenges of occultation, but they also respond to the doctrine’s mechanical 
difficulties as experienced by al-Ṣadūq and his contemporaries. These become clear when we 
compare Kamāl al-dīn’s approach to the other surviving works on the occultation from the 
fourth/tenth century. Such a survey reveals that while the methods of Kamāl al-dīn are 
certainly unusual, they respond to a concern that is common to other authors of the period. 
This is the pervasive and deep-seated unease amongst Imāmī scholars regarding the viability 
of the proof-texts for the Twelfth Imām’s existence and occultation. By the time al-Ṣadūq is 
writing the whole corpus of these occultation texts has come to be viewed as deeply 
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problematic by other Imāmīs, the sustainability of its being used as a proof at all being cast in 
serious doubt. 
Let us look first to al-Mufīd’s Kitāb al-irshād. Writing at the very end of the tenth century or 
the beginning of the eleventh, al-Mufīd writes at the start of his chapter on the twelfth Imām 
that while there follows a selection of eyewitness accounts of the Hidden Imām’s birth, these 
are not a necessary proof of his existence. Instead, certainty in this matter is to be attained by 
theological arguments.505 This could scarcely be a more dramatic departure from al-Ṣadūq’s 
insistences on tawātur. al-Ṣadūq declares the textual record strong enough to constitute certain 
proof, al-Mufīd eschews such textual proof altogether. This is, moreover, quite unlike al-
Mufīd’s own comparison between his and al-Ṣadūq’s methods in Taṣḥīḥ; there his criticisms 
and corrections are justified on the basis that they rest on stronger reasoning but also on more 
reliable proof-texts than those of his traditionist teacher.506 What is it about the question of the 
Hidden Imām that leads him not to seek more reliable texts but instead to depart from text 
altogether? 
Al-Mufīd’s statement is all the more interesting for its being a deceptive hyperbole. Though 
he insists that the Hidden Imām’s presence is proven without narrations, the rationale he gives 
for why this is so clearly requires an acceptance of the reality of certain events. al-Mufīd’s 
reasoning runs as follows: we know that there has to be an imām, we know that the imām has 
to meet certain criteria, and we know that nobody alive whom we can see meets those criteria, 
therefore the imām must be hidden. We only know of one person who claims to be such an 
imām in hiding, and that is the son of al-ʿAskarī.507 It is immediately apparent that, whatever 
al-Mufīd claims, this proof does require textual evidence. While it attempts to sidestep textual 
issues by stating that the very existence of the Twefth Imām’s claims is enough in the face of 
theological necessity to guarantee their veracity, this still presupposes some coherent corpus 
of texts. Moreover, it also hinges on the son of al-ʿAskarī being the only claimant, which was 
not, in fact, the case, with various Ismāʿīlī and Wāqifī groups contending the contrary. Al-
Mufīd is thus implying the corpus asserting the son of al-ʿAskarī’s claim does not, in fact, 
need only to exist however tenuously, but that it is qualitatively superior to those textual 
sources adduced by the Ismāʿīlīs and the Wāqifīs. Not only, then, is al-Mufīd distancing 
himself from textual evidence with unusual vigour, but he is doing so disingenuously, seeking 
to deny the extent that he still relies on this corpus. Such an approach indicates grave 
reservations about this same body of material that al-Ṣadūq claims is incontrovertible.  
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We meanwhile see a different but similarly radical refusal of al-Ṣadūq’s proof-texts in al-
Nuʿmānī some decades earlier. Unlike al-Mufīd, al-Nuʿmānī’s treatment of the occultation is 
a solidly traditionist one. There are no extensive theological arguments, and all the key 
contentions are based on textual materials, alongside extensive assertions from al-Nuʿmānī of 
the reliability of his sources. Quite extraordinarily, however, al-Nuʿmānī does not narrate a 
single text evidencing any kind of contact with the Twelfth Imām. Not only are al-Ṣadūq’s 
encounter narratives of mystical meetings with the imām during his occultation nowhere to be 
seen, there are no accounts of the receipt of letters from the imām, there are no accounts from 
witnesses who saw the imām during the lifetime of al-ʿAskarī, there are not even any reports 
of al-ʿAskarī designating his son as his successor. Al-Nuʿmānī instead relies entirely on 
reports of earlier Imāms’ designation of the Twelfth Imām, their predictions that there would 
be twelve imāms, and that the twelfth would be hidden. This is an approach that is no less 
tradition-centred than that of al-Ṣadūq, but it excludes a vast corpus of precisely those 
traditions that would seem to offer the most valuable evidence. While al-Nuʿmānī vehemently 
rejects the possibility of anyone encountering the Imām while he is hidden,508 thus implicitly 
rejecting those texts that describe such meetings (a rejection seconded by al-Mufīd, as noted 
above), this does not explain his exclusion of accounts from before al-ʿAskarī’s death, even 
those recording such crucial events as the imām’s birth or his father’s naming him as his 
successor.  
Al-Nuʿmānī’s rejection of this corpus is all the more surprising given that he was the student 
of al-Kulaynī, whose al-Kāfī contains a considerable body of such material. al-Kulaynī’s 
corpus is a more sober one than al-Ṣadūq, excluding almost all accounts of believers actually 
meeting the imām, but he includes an assertive quantity of reports describing his designation 
by his father and chronicling the many dalāʾil surrounding the Hidden Imām’s letters to his 
followers.509 Al-Nuʿmānī cites al-Kulaynī’s material on other topics regularly across his Kitāb 
al-ghayba, only rendering his exclusion of this corpus all the more enigmatic.  
In both of these authors, then, we see two quite different expressions – one leaning towards 
dialectic theology and the other staunchly traditionist – of the same emphatic desire to distance 
proofs of occultation from what by all appearances seem to be its key proof texts. How is this 
aversion to be explained, even while al-Ṣadūq states in no uncertain terms that it is by these 
same textual proofs beyond all else that the occultation is rendered fact? 
The start of an answer lies in what we have already observed concerning the problematic state 
of the proof-texts themselves. The two early corpora we have are those of al-Kulaynī and those 
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of al-Ṣadūq himself (al-Nuʿmānī excluding all such material, while al-Mufīd’s texts in al-
Irshād are all transmitted from al-Kulaynī). Though, as observed, in al-Ṣadūq’s larger 
assemblage the texts’ problems are more acute, both authors’ occultation texts share the same 
menaces of self-evidently faulty asānīd, contradictions and unorthodox content. It seems these 
problems are peculiarly endemic to the occultations texts, prompting authors to seek 
alternative means of proof. 
Such concerns, however, are only part of the problem. There are also significant hindrances 
arising from the very nature of the task of proving the Twelfth Imām’s existence in the 
intellectual context of the tenth century, regardless of the available textual resources. Above 
all, in claiming that al-ʿAskarī had indeed had a son, the Imāmīya were bound to assert the 
reality of an event in the recent past which most of the Muslim community simply did not 
believe had happened. The inherent difficulty of such a task must not be underestimated. The 
Imāmīs had to change history, and changing history in the Abbasid intellectual milieu was not 
easy task. Donner has noted the remarkable unanimity with which the early Islamic historical 
tradition agreed on the Muslim community’s narratives of origins, pointing to the great extent 
to which writers in the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries were constrained from any 
attempt to generate new narratives by a redoubtable body of widely known earlier material.510 
Nowhere is this more visible than in Shīʿī polemical endeavours. As sectarian identities 
solidified over the ninth and tenth centuries, with Sunnism settling ever more firmly on a 
narrative of four rightly guided caliphs and collectively unimpeachable companions, Shīʿī 
beliefs were predicated on asserting a substantially different historical narrative, one of 
betrayal and frustration in which many of the figures whom Sunnīs held to be righteous had 
in fact reneged on the Prophet’s final commands. What we find in practice, however, is that 
even in this radical moral reshaping of the story of early Islam Shīʿīs had very little leeway to 
change the accepted sequence of events if they aspired to any kind of acceptability. We find 
aḥādīth in Shīʿī collections performing such transformative insertions into the accepted 
narrative as the story that the Prophet’s ghost had visited Abū Bakr after his instigation of the 
caliphate, demanding that he relinquish the office to ʿAlī, only to be interrupted by ʿ Umar who 
dissuaded Abū Bakr from acquiescing to God’s messenger’s request from beyond the grave 
on the grounds that this was merely witchcraft brought about by ʿAlī. Such unapologetically 
history-altering texts, however, were of little use outside the very small portion of the 
population who accepted them. Instead, polemics with the majority had to be constructed 
around events like Ghadīr khum the historical reality of which was broadly accepted.511 What 
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was contested were the details and the interpretations, even the exact meanings of the words 
spoken, rather that the events themselves. 
When it came to the occultation, however, Imāmī scholarship was forced down a more 
hazardous path. In contending the reality of the Hidden Imām they were affirming the truth of 
momentous, miraculous events to a great majority of believers who did not believe that they 
ever happened.512 Al-Ṣadūq’s own discomfort with this task is visible in passages of Kamāl 
al-dīn, where he places conspicuous emphasis on affirming that the Abbasids themselves were 
convinced that al-ʿAskarī had had a son and made great, conspicuous and widely documented 
efforts to find that son after the eleventh imām’s death.513 The advantages of affirming such 
an event are clear: this is not the hidden interactions of inspired miracle-workers and select 
initiates, rather it is the generally observable actions of the none-too-subtle ruling powers, a 
real-world event to which al-Ṣadūq can then anchor the more esoteric elements of the 
occultation narrative. Advantageous though it may be, al-Ṣadūq’s insistence that the Abbasid 
hunt for the imām is generally accepted fact does not mask its total absence from non-Imāmī 
histories. Even al-Masʿūdī, whose interests in Imāmī beliefs are nowhere clearer than when 
he notes the Twefth Imām’s birth as apparent fact, makes no mention of a dramatic Abbasid 
response.514 Al-Ṣadūq is clearly trying to persuade the reader that these events are more 
acknowledged than they are, an effort that we must then read not as ignorance of this difficulty 
of changing history but rather as an attempt, however desperate, to overcome it.  
This difficulty of making the occultation history is one and the same with the risks of violating 
the consensus identified by Stewart that we discussed in Chapter I. Stewart is referring 
primarily to institutions of law and jurisprudence, but as Donner shows the hazards of violating 
the historical consensus were no less acute. Moreover, these hazards were similarly 
compounded by the new circumstances of Buwayhid rule. Just as the new opportunities 
afforded Imāmī scholars to engage openly with the Sunnī majority exacerbated the imperative 
to form a school of law that could engage with the mainstream, so too we see in writings on 
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the occultation across the period a desire to couch this unwieldy new history in discourses 
acceptable to as broad a readership as possible. 
This is most evident in the attempt to several Imāmī authors on the topic to prove the Twelfth 
Imām’s existence using Sunnī aḥādīth. We first see this in al-Nuʿmānī, who in Kitāb al-
ghayba vociferously draws the reader’s attention to the presence of texts foretelling twelve 
successors to Muḥammad in the Sunnī corpus.515 This same approach is adopted in a more 
concentrated fashion by two of al-Ṣadūq’s students, whose works on the subject remain extant. 
ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Khazzāz (d. c. 420/1030) in his Kifāyat al-athar and Aḥmad b. ʿ Ayyāsh 
al-Jawharī (d. 401/1012) in his Muqtaḍab al-athar both set themselves the specific task of 
proving that the Prophet would be succeeded by twelve imāms using only Sunnī aḥādīth.516 
This density of works using the same approach with the same topic is a vivid further 
illustration of the sheer difficulty of contending the occultation, both in the face of a sceptical 
majority unwilling to accommodate versions of events not sanctioned by their own accepted 
corpora of texts and of a woefully sub-standard set of Imāmī proof texts. This is only 
emphasised further by al-Mufīd’s decision to declare his total independence from a textual 
approach, a move that is echoed especially in al-Khazzāz and al-Jawharī, whose works abstain 
both from the Imāmī corpus and its unwieldy subject matter of the detailed events of the 
occultation, instead focussing on the basic assertion that there must be twelve imāms. 
Al-Ṣadūq is in plentiful company in his decision in Kamāl al-dīn that there is a need to go 
beyond the tawātur of the Imāmī proof-texts. This, however, is where the similarity with his 
fellows ends, not least because despite his decision to diversify his probative strategies he still 
maintains the tawātur of the occultation texts as an assertive element of his argument. 
Moreover, whilst all four of the authors discussed above respond to their dissatisfaction with 
those texts’ efficacy by vociferously brining their proofs of the occultation closer to the 
epistemological demands of the mainstream, shedding the proof-texts that we see used by al-
Kulaynī and replacing them either with Sunnī texts or with theological argument al-Ṣadūq’s 
response is entirely the opposite. He responds to the difficulty of the proof-texts by 
exacerbating their instabilities, collecting a carnivalesque of often textually dubious but highly 
evocative material that he juxtaposes not with aḥādīth accepted by more powerful scholarly 
trends but with a corpus drawn from the qiṣaṣ al-anbiyāʾ, a corpus which enjoyed a wide 
currency but was little-used in legal-theological endeavours. 
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Kamāl al-dīn thus attempts a truly daring epistemological feat. Faced with a need to create 
probative force from a corpus that mainstream epistemologies condemned as weak, rather than 
find a different corpus he instead finds a different epistemology. The occultation texts score 
poorly in terms of their asānīd, so al-Ṣadūq simply taps into a resource in which they are more 
forthcoming: the sheer mythic fertility of the events they describe, and the diverse narrative 
wealth of mystery, drama and deferred salvation they contain. Al-Ṣadūq exploits an aspect of 
the corpus that to other authors is part of what renders the texts unusable: their far-fetched 
stories and internal contradictions. These in al-Ṣadūq’s hands only allow more expansion and 
cross-fertilisation of the narrative motifs with which he embeds the occultation so powerfully 
in the long count of sacred history.517 Not only does Kamāl al-dīn attempt to bypass the 
question of authenticity, it embraces and exploits precisely all that is blurred and unstable in 
the occultation literature to transcend problems of authenticity and arrive at a paradigm which 




Not only does al-Ṣadūq take advantage of the same diversities and inconsistencies in the 
occultation texts that his contemporaries find problematic, he weaves the very notion of textual 
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set out to prove, rather the notion of previous occultations and the probative potential of that notion is 
here harnessed for the primary objective of convincing the reader that the current occultation, that of 
the Twelfth Imām, is real. 
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instability and the difficulty of finding reliable evidence into the scintillating image of the 
occultation with which he persuades his reader. We have already observed in Chapter 1 how 
al-Ṣadūq makes some use in Kamāl al-dīn of his father’s theological doctrine that occultation 
is part of a much more pervasive necessity of secrecy in revelation.519 We have no evidence 
of al-Ṣadūq taking this as far as his father by attaching it to the technical problem of the 
authenticity of aḥādīth, but we do see him making extensive use of the idea of secrecy and of 
its intrinsic value in the mythic world of occultation in which he inhabits the reader. 
On a doctrinal level this appears most clearly in the question of whether or not it is permitted 
to reveal the name of the Hidden Imām. The short answer to this question is that it is absolutely 
not allowed to do so. The sin which naming the Imām constitutes is mentioned in numerous 
akhbār throughout the work, and al-Ṣadūq at the book’s very end gives a chapter where this 
prohibition is systematically affirmed.520 By way of some contrast, Kamāl al-dīn is all the 
while replete with materials which do name the Imām,521 such that long before we reach the 
chapter in which al-Ṣadūq lays down his verdict on the subject we are in no doubt that the 
Twelfth Imām’s name is Muḥammad and that a great many people have said so, and this 
because al-Ṣadūq himself has told us. In a construction analogous to al-Ṣadūq’s treatment of 
the fatra, here again we see him intervening at his work’s close to give a ruling which he has 
himself repeatedly subverted and violated in the main body of the text. Just as is the case with 
the fatra, this apparent contradiction serves a valuable purpose, allowing al-Ṣadūq to enrich 
his narratives with unorthodox material that he can later disavow once it has served its mimetic 
purpose. 
In his decidedly unconvincing prohibition of naming the imām, al-Ṣadūq is negotiating and 
ultimately enhancing a powerful theme of secrecy that pervades Kamāl al-dīn, unsurprisingly 
given the book’s subject matter. The need for secrecy and hiddenness are, of course, perennial 
features of the book’s myriad narratives of occultation. The ḥujja is hidden from persecution, 
the king leaves his people to wander the earth alone, the faithful lie low until guidance returns, 
the one who seeks the truth must remain silent lest the less enlightened masses take offence. 
Salmān’s parents cast him into a well when he resolves to leave idol worship and seek God’s 
                                                            
519 See above.  
520 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 123, 510, 676-677 
521 E.g. Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 91, 284, 368, 458, 469. In a number of such instances (though by no means 
all) the name Muḥammad is written with the letters of Muḥammad (b. al-Ḥasan, that is to say the Hidden 
Imam) separated in their isolated forms, clearly in a gesture of dissimilation. Needless to say, while the 
gesture is clear it does little to conceal the name from the reader, particularly in the presence of other 
reports which eschew such caution. Moreover, the device is self-evidently extremely susceptible to the 
whims of copyists, who might join the letters up or separate them depending on their sensibilities, be 
they the copyists of al-Ṣadūq’s own written sources or those of the manuscripts of Kamāl al-dīn over 
the past millennium. Only an autograph manuscript from al-Ṣadūq’s own hand or one endorsed by him 
could clarify his own position on the matter. 
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messenger, while Abū Saʿīd the Indian nearly meets his death at the hands of angry Sunnīs in 
Kabul when he ill-advisedly tells them that the Prophet he seeks named his successor not as 
Abū Bakr but ʿAlī.522 
Yet inextricable from this need for secrecy is the limit of secrecy. Kamāl al-dīn is not just 
about the hiddenness of the imām but about the fact that he is not hidden forever, nor, perhaps, 
from everyone. When prophets vanish they first foretell their return or the coming of the next 
prophet. The faithful do not know where the imām is, but they do know he is somewhere, 
walking among them, seeing them though they do not see him. Hidden though it is, the truth 
may still appear to the wanderer in the desert, and one day the imām will return. Secrecy is 
essential, but it is also partial. 
More specifically, the power of the written word to reveal secrets and to give access to 
knowledge in the absence of the knower is never far away in Kamāl al-dīn. Alongside some 
establishing images in the qiṣaṣ al-anbiyāʾ section of the book wherein prophets’ followers 
maintain their religion as a memory during their teacher’s absence, the assembled epistles of 
the Hidden Imām forge an image of text’s discrete, disclosing power that stretches far beyond 
them to pervade the pages of Kamāl al-dīn itself and thus its authorial address, commaning 
secrecy even as they reveal the imām’s power to their recipients.523 Meanwhile, the accounts 
of those who met the imām in person often conclude with the imām commanding the lucky 
disciple never to speak of what he has seen.524 Yet what these Shīʿīs saw is now set down in 
writing for the reader of Kamāl al-dīn to peruse at leisure. This book of al-Ṣadūq’s, too, is for 
its readers a potent written testament to the unseen, initiating the reader into the company of 
those know of the imām’s disclosure. Like the imām’s letters it holds the imām’s truth in his 
absence. Like them it reveals secrets. Like them it utters in text that which, paradoxically, 
must not be uttered aloud.  
Just as he weaves his book into the fabric of its own narratives, so al-Ṣadūq inserts even 
himself into this collapsing of the present and the mythic. At the beginning of the work, we 
are told that he was commanded to write it by the Imām himself in a dream. The inspiring 
dream is not, of course, an unfamiliar start to a Medieval Islamic book, but the deeper 
significance here could not be more obvious. The account inserts al-Ṣadūq himself into the 
company of those whose stories he tells, guided by a nightly vision of the imām just as they 
                                                            
522 Kamāl al-dīn, pp.  466-467, 522-523. 
523 E.g. ibid., pp. 509-512 (ḥḥ. 1, 3, 4). 
524 E.g. ibid., pp. 473. 
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were.525 More striking is a passage later in the work, near the end of the chapter on those who 
received letters from the Hidden Imām. Al-Ṣadūq tells us that one such message was received 
by his own father, who had written to the imām asking that he might be blessed with a son. 
The imām’s answer came that he would. That son was, of course, al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq.526 This 
fascinating little anecdote represents a kind of authorial self-representation that is highly 
unusual for a ḥadīth compiler. Rather than being only the impartial, discerning conduit through 
whom others’ words are transmitted to the reader, al-Ṣadūq here confesses himself as the 
interested subject of those words. The device works alongside the opening dream sequence to 
integrate al-Ṣadūq’s own authorial address into the fabric of the narrative that he creates.527 
Not only is Kamāl al-dīn another secret document for the privileged few, both its composition 
and the birth of its composer are direct consequences of the will of the imām, the book thus 
manifesting in its very existence the Hidden Imām’s continuing power to influence the world 
and guide his community from behind the veil. Book, author and reader are all subsumed into 
the drama of occultation, a drama that through this process becomes ever harder to deny as 
reality. 
   
PROOF 3 – The Plausible and The Implausible 
 
Al-Ṣadūq’s strategy for addressing the common problem of the weakness of the occultation 
texts is as unusual as it is fascinating. It is unusual on account of the wonderful matrix of story 
and signification that al-Ṣadūq constructs while other authors draw on theology and ḥadīth 
criticism, but it is also unusual because al-Ṣadūq, unlike other authors, chooses not only to 
retain those same weak occultation texts as part of his strategy but also keeps up a vocal 
insistence of their probative value. He begins Kamāl al-dīn by declaring in no uncertain terms 
the tawātur of the proof-texts of occultation, and at no point, even as he constructs his separate 
endeavour of proof by myth, narrating conflicting accounts of the imām’s age and appearance 
and fantastic tales of citadels in the desert, does he declare this claim to tawātur to be 
rescinded. How much of Kamāl al-dīn’s wealth of material is governed by these claims of 
                                                            
525 While it is true that in the encounter narratives this vision, of course, precedes an actual encounter 
with the imām, Kamāl al-dīn’s stories are not short of believers receiving messages in the forms of 
dreams and visions. See Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 559 
526 Kamāl al-dīn, p. 529. 
527 It is interesting that while it is commonly recognised that al-Ṣadūq is said to have been born in this 
way as a result of the Hidden Imām’s prayer (e.g. Fyzee (1982), it is seldom recognised that al-Ṣadūq 
himself claims this to have been the case, with scholars identifying it instead as a later tradition. That 
we can trace the story back to al-Ṣadūq himself perhaps adds credence that such an exchange occurred, 
but more importantly it shows how in its original context this oft-repeated legend about al-Ṣadūq plays 
an important role in the construction of his own authorial address.  
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textual certainty? There are certainly points in al-Ṣadūq’s material where tawātur is actively 
asserted, such as amassed naṣṣ texts, lists of witnesses and multiple asānīd, but this is left for 
the reader to deduce. If al-Ṣadūq demarcates a core of indisputable material around which he 
arranges texts which, though useful for other reasons, are not so reliable, he does not say so.528  
For all its potency, readers of Kamāl al-dīn’s beguiling narratives retain the capacity to ask 
how much of this is true. Indeed, the text often encourages them to do so. Even while al-Ṣadūq 
supports a problematic group of texts with even more problematic texts on the one hand and 
Quixotic claims of their tawātur on the other, he also maintains through Kamāl al-dīn a strong 
interrogative voice, a voice which bids the reader remain mindful of what is and is not 
plausible. Sporadically through the first two thirds of the book al-Ṣadūq frames a particular 
report with the complaint that detractors of the Imāmīya believe such stories as this (al-Khiḍr 
and the fountain of youth, for example)529 but scorn to accept the true miracle of the 
occultation. Why is one miracle more unbelievable than another? These complaints hold a 
double significance for our analysis of al-Ṣadūq’s methods here. Not only do we see him take 
the highly unusual step of bidding his reader ponder this question of the plausibility of narrated 
events, but it also reveals to us that this is a question of which al-Ṣadūq himself is aware. His 
prompts to the reader tells us that that al-Ṣadūq is thinking not just about the reliability or 
otherwise of his narrations’ provenance, but also their comparative capacity to be believed.  
It is in the last third of Kamāl al-dīn, after the qiṣaṣ texts, the naṣṣ texts and the occultation 
texts, that this line of discourse takes centre stage. Concluding his long run of testimonies to 
the Twelfth Imām’s existence, al-Ṣadūq begins an extensive treatment of the problem of the 
Hidden Imām’s unusual longevity, and specifically to whether or not the assertion that he 
really will live on in hiding until the end of the world, however remote, is to be believed. This 
is a noticeably peculiar step. The question has already been addressed, along with other 
contested aspects of the Imām’s nature, in earlier chapters, especially the qiṣaṣ material. We 
have already seen Noah live for nine hundred years! Why does al-Ṣadūq now return, after 
laying out his assembled proof-texts, to so unexceptional a question? Though the problem is 
comparatively new (we have no composition date for Kamāl al-dīn, but it must be at least a 
century after the imām’s disappearance), it does not feature prominently among the extended 
polemics of Kamāl al-dīn’s introduction, and does not seem to have been an exceptionally 
contentious issue amongst those pertaining to occultation. 
                                                            
528 We shall see how he ultimately does erect such a demarcation, but does so with regard to another 
group of texts, doing little to solve the ambiguities surrounding those discussed thus far. See below. 
529 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 422-423. 
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More conspicuous still is the fact that al-Ṣadūq introduces with this question a new corpus of 
texts. These are ostensibly compiled as examples of stories of miraculous long life more 
outlandish than that of the Twelfth Imām, but for the first time they are not drawn from the 
Imāmī ḥadīth corpus. We are no longer contemplating the history of revelation with stories of 
previous prophets, nor the more recent careers of the imāms, rather al-Ṣadūq’s exemplars of 
extreme old age are for the most art culled from Arab lore – stories purporting to date back to 
before Muḥammad of which a considerable volume were preserved under the Umayyads and 
then the Abbasids, mostly in histories, genealogical literature and in adab compendia.530  
It is not hard to see the utility of these texts’ content for al-Ṣadūq’s goals. Here is an abundant 
source of precedents for the imām’s longevity, which, guided but the ‘Whatsoever befell’ 
paradigm could amount to a valuable proof. But the change in genre remains significant. Al-
Ṣadūq is taking his reader still further away from the corpora of proofs with which legal 
theological literature is usually comfortable and upon which it was accustomed to rely. Unlike 
the qiṣaṣ material, which are all narrated from the imāms with full asānīd, these stories of the 
muʿammarūn are mostly presented with no chain of transmission. Al-Ṣadūq is once again to 
be found crossing Khalidi’s dichotomy between the curious, open-minded adīb and the 
authenticating, canonising ḥadīth scholar discussed in Chapter II.531 In this instance, however, 
he crosses in the opposite direction. While ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl combined a ḥadīth 
compendium’s limited sources with an adab compendium’s eclecticism of form and subject 
matter, here al-Ṣadūq is confronting serious polemics of doctrine, polemics at the heart of 
which exist disputes over the authenticity of materials, and drawing on texts that are 
traditionally the prerogative of adab and its comparative disinterest in source verification. The 
effect of this new corpus is thus a profound changing of the character of Kamāl al-dīn’s 
discourse, further blurring the already uncertain lines between those texts that are mutawātir 
and those which are not.  
In a further indication of the different status of these new texts, al-Ṣadūq does not present the 
muʿammarūn texts as validating precedents for the Hidden Imām’s longevity, despite their 
obvious utility as such. Instead he introduces them with the complaint that the opponents of 
the Imāmīya believe these accounts and those like them, but then have the gall to reject belief 
in the Hidden Imām as implausible. This, al-Ṣadūq laments, can only be hypocrisy.532 These 
stories of the muʿammarūn are not proof-texts but anti-proof-texts, examples of what other 
                                                            
530 The most significant example of this literature for our purposes is the Kitāb al-muʿammarīn of Sahl 
b. Muḥammad al-Sijistānī (d. 255/869). 
531 See above. 
532 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 578, 581. 
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groups adduce to which the proof-texts presented in Kamāl al-dīn’s earlier chapters are to be 
compared and confirmed as superior (or at least less absurd). 
Al-Ṣadūq is keen to identify these narrations as enemy property. Most, as noted, are supplied 
without asānīd, one text  purporting to have been found written on a rock near Alexandria and 
another even being quoted from a damaged text such that the story breaks off mid-narrative,533 
and this no doubt casts the preceding images of tawātur in a favourable light. In several 
instances, however, the muʿammarūn texts’ sources are discussed, at which point it is stressed 
that they are narrated by non-Imāmīs from non-Imāmī sources.534 Discussing ‘The Old Man 
of the Maghrib’ Abū Dunyā, al-Ṣadūq notes that ‘It is not even now confirmed among them 
that he has died.’535 The focus is entirely on these opponents’ beliefs regarding Abū Dunyā, 
with no indication given of what view al-Ṣadūq or his fellows might take on this. When telling 
the story of king Shaddād, who lived for nine hundred years and built the city of Iram, al-
Ṣadūq goes to some length to altericise the story, telling how no less a non-Shīʿī than 
Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān learns of the place, summons the man who claims to have seen it and 
asks Kaʿb al-Aḥbār536 to corroborate his account.537 This categorising of material is at its most 
specific when al-Ṣadūq asks how people can believe stories of warring serpents and hubristic 
kings from mere scholars, but not confirmation of the occultation spoken by Muḥammad or 
his imāms.538 We are left in no doubt that reports narrated from God’s representatives carries 
more weight than those from the companion Abū Wāʾil and his ilk. 
Al-Ṣadūq also expressly distances the content of these texts from his other corpora. The 
accounts of the muʿammarūn are a colourful and eclectic assemblage even by Kamāl al-dīn’s 
high standards, and much is made in Kamāl al-dīn of the scale of their miraculous elements. 
‘They believe,’ al-Ṣadūq objects regarding one such narrative, ‘that that gazelle’s dung 
endured in excess of five hundred years, unchanged by either rain or wind, or by the passing 
of days, night and years by it, yet they do not believe that the Qāʾim from Muḥammad’s house 
will endure until he rides out with the sword!’539 Regarding the magical city of Irum he strays 
into hyperbole, decrying his detractors’ telling ‘of a place like unto Paradise itself,’540 hidden 
                                                            
533 Ibid., pp. 575, 581. 
534 Kamāl al-dīn, p. 601. 
535 Ibid., p. 564. 
536 Kaʿb is one of the figures whom al-Ṣadūq singles out as narrators of the improbable whom the 
opponents of the Imāmīya inexplicably believe whilst rejecting the Hidden Imām. Kamāl al-dīn, p. 557. 
537 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 578-581. 
538 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 556-559, 601. 
539 Ibid., pp. 558-559. 
540 Kamāl al-dīn, p. 578. Tellingly, al-Ṣadūq inserts no such objection earlier on in Kamāl al-dīn when 
Alexander at the end of his wanderings comes across a land where live descendants of Mūsā’s people 




somewhere on earth, a comparison which the reports he cites do not themselves make, though 
Iram’s splendour is certainly emphasised. Al-Ṣadūq’s rhetoric clearly functions to further 
other these stories, to heighten the reader’s appreciation of their bizarre colour in a way he 
never does with his accounts of the Hidden Imām.  
Despite these emphatically drawn lines between proofs and anti-proofs, it is unclear from the 
outset to what extent Ṣadūq wishes his reader to invest in these lesser reports as fact. Whatever 
al-Ṣadūq’s objections, we do not have to look hard to see elements in these curious stories 
which have more to offer Kamāl al-dīn’s objectives than their ostensive function as exemplars 
of what others believe. Many times al-Ṣadūq will point to illustrative truths in accounts even 
as he derides them as implausible, and many more times the core messages of his text will 
appear unannounced in material that he labels as incidental. The story of Iram, for example, a 
jewel-encrusted city in the middle of the desert which the narrator stumbles upon whilst 
searching for his lost camel, bears uncanny similarity to the Hidden Imām’s citadel in the oasis 
that was stumbled upon by the Shaykh of the Banū Rāshid. The story tells how, having become 
stranded from his caravan on the way to Mecca, he put his trust in God and wandered on foot, 
eventually finding himself in a green oasis, in the midst of which was a glittering citadel rising 
like a sword from the grass. Entering it he was told by attending servants that God intended a 
blessing for him, and was led behind a veil to where there sat a young man above whose head 
was suspended a sword. The man announced himself as the Qāʾim of the house of Muḥammad, 
who would rise up with this sword at the end of time to fill the world with justice. The lost 
pilgrim from Hamadān falls on his face in reverence, but the Imām kindly raises him up sends 
him on his way home with a purse full of gold.541 
In another muʿammarūn story, Khumarawayh542 b. Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn seeks to plunder the 
treasure of the pyramids, whereupon he encounters an inscription in Greek that none can read. 
He is advised by a wise man from among the people that the only man with the knowledge to 
decode the text is a three hundred-year-old bishop who lives in Ethiopia. The bishop is too old 
to make the journey north, and so the king resorts to an exchange of letters. Eventually the 
Bishop reveals that the inscription instructs that none will be able to open the treasury until 
the qāʾim from the house of Muḥammad comes to claim it.543 Besides the instructive climax 
of the story, the necessity to seek knowledge from an absent, age-old authority, as well as the 
epistolary means of doing so, has clear resonances with the world of al-Ṣadūq’s other material. 
al-Ṣadūq purports to show the reader fantasies such that the Hidden Imām looks real by 
                                                            
541 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 480-481. 
542 The printed text of Kamāl al-dīn renders the name Ḥammādawayh, however Khuramawayh b. 
Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn, ruler of Egypt, is clearly meant. 
543 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 588-590. 
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contrast, but he simultaneously empowers the Hidden Imām with fantasy, projecting his story 
into these wildest flights of humanity’s imagination to show the reader the perennial truth of 
Imāmī doctrine. 
It is apparent that there is far more than mere parody at work here. Although al-Ṣadūq 
expressly distances his arguments from having any stake in the truth of these reports and, 
indeed, makes polemic capital from the intimation that they might not be true, this long 
procession of stories of the long-lived steadily expands the reader’s stock of images wherein 
they are by now thoroughly drilled to see the reality of ghayba. For all the improbable details, 
the talking wolves and the exploding dung,544 there is an element of sheer tawātur here. At the 
close of the last muʿammarūn story al-Ṣadūq has equipped his readers with a prodigious set 
of examples of what others believe regarding human capacity to endure time’s vicissitudes, 
but by the time the names of almost fifty such resilient men and women (alongside one or two 
vultures) have passed before them, only the most relentlessly cynical readers can have resisted 
the idea of such longevity becoming a little more plausible, regardless of who believes in it. 
The power of al-Ṣadūq’s mythic leitmotifs to embed the occultation in the fabric of reality and 
imagination is coupled here with tawātur’s power of sheer indisputable volume.  
 
APOCALYPSE –  Bilawhar and Yūdhāsaf 
 
After the muʿammarūn texts al-Ṣadūq moves to the last and most improbable of Kamāl al-
dīn’s diverse proof-corpora. This is an extremely lengthy, semi-synthesised account of the 
exploits of an Indian prince named Yūdhāsaf, better recognised as the Buddha.545 Not only is 
the subject matter, of course, highly unusual in the works of an Imāmī faqīh, but this text in 
fact includes a number narratives unknown in Buddhist sources. As such it has attracted some 
attention, but this has not thus far translated into much interrogation of the text’s role in Kamāl 
al-dīn.546 The text is substantial, comprising 10% of the book as a whole, and is conspicuously 
                                                            
544 Ibid., pp. 561, 568-569. 
545 Unlike the son of Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn, the Buddha, from whose title the word Yūdhāsaf ultimately 
derives, is a long way from any historical memory that al-Ṣadūq might be party to. Yūdhāsaf becomes 
Josephat in European context, a figure of legend with similarly little connection to any self-consciously 
Buddhist context. Although other Arabic versions of the story are nearer the mark in their location of 
dots with Būdāsf (as followed by Gimaret), and though we have no way of knowing whether the shift 
from b to y comes from al-Ṣadūq or a later scribe, to ‘correct’ the text would be to impose a quite 
fictitious notion that al-Ṣadūq or the scribe was somehow mistaken in giving the name Yūdhāsaf to the 
protagonist of this text’s wondrous adventures, when in fact Yūdhāsaf is perfectly named to perform 
the task intended for him. It seems judicious, then, to leave him as he is. 
546 Gimaret undertook to produce a translation and edition of Kitāb Bilawhar wa Būdāsf, based on an 
manuscript of Kamāl al-dīn and other Arabic exemplars of the story. Stern & Walzer give a translation 
and analysis of those stories in the text that are unknown in any Buddhist source. Matar examines an 
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placed as last substantial component of the book before the closing miscellanies. Far from 
being an eclectic afterthought, the interest of which was not appreciated by its compiler, this 
concluding flourish into the unknown plays a pivotal role in al-Ṣadūq’s compilation. 
At the end of a short isnād of mostly unknown sources547 the text begins thus: 
I have heard that there was once a king amongst the kings of India. His soldiers were 
many, his kingdom was large, he was held in dread by his people and was victorious 
over his enemies. But he was also possessed of great desire for the passions of this 
world, its delights and its diversions, and so was ruled and swayed by his passions. 
For him the most beloved and trusted of men was he who flattered him and lauded his 
opinions, while the most despised and doubted was he who neglected his commands 
and bade him do otherwise than he wished.548 
It is immediately apparent that we have travelled a great distance. We are no longer looking 
at Arabs to whom are attributed familiar poems and to whom tribes and acquaintances trace 
their genealogies, who for all their outlandishness are named and categorised in known 
sources. This opening places us squarely in the land of Once upon a time and Far, far away, 
where knowable, named figures are replaced by known types. This is not Nimrod or Pharaoh 
or even Hārūn al-Rashīd, but nor is it just a tyrant: it is all of them; it is the Tyrant.549 
The story as it proceeds from here is long and very complex, for it is in fact several stories 
within one another. This impious king is confronted by a lone sage who seeks to change his 
ways, and who tells him the story of Yūdhāsaf with that aim. This story in turn is that of the 
youthful Yūdhāsaf, a sheltered prince and the son of another, more graphically impious king, 
a king who has banished all men of religion from his kingdom on pain of death. So many were 
burned to death in this pogrom that the land of India remained ablaze for an entire year. Prince 
Yūdhāsaf, meanwhile, undergoes the proverbial realisation of change and mortality familiar 
from Buddhist literature, stealing out of the palace into the real world, where he sees before 
him the shocking realities of decay and death from which he had been protected. Cast into 
doubt, he seeks the means of answering his mortal dilemma, and learns of the men of religion 
who once roamed the land but whom the king has driven into hiding, whom he dearly wishes 
now to find and to consult. The wise man of God Bilawhar, who dwells in another country, 
hears of the prince’s plight, and travels in disguise to find him and to teach him. They meet in 
                                                            
instance of continued interest in the text in later Shīʿī readers. For an analysis of the potential sources 
of the text in Kamāl al-dīn see de Blois. 
547 Some manuscripts omit the isnād. See Kamāl al-dīn, p. 603. 
548 Kamāl al-dīn, p. 603. 
549 See Bray, ‘ʿAbbasid Myth’. 
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secret and begin Yūdhāsaf’s education, an education which consists largely of Bilawhar telling 
the prince improving stories, some of which contain characters who tell stories in turn. For 
seventy pages we are transported into a maelstrom of parables and aphorisms, narratives and 
metanarratives, a world where men of God are forever struggling to spread the faith in the face 
of despotic, idolatrous rulers, whose depravations often compel them to do their work in secret. 
Like the qiṣaṣ material at the start of the book, these narratives are filled with Imāmī 
vocabulary with terms like ‘imām,’ ‘khurūj’ and, of course, ‘ghayba.’ 
We noted in Chapter II that it is with regard to this story that al-Ṣadūq voices for the only time 
a concern that occupies much of his work: that these stories are included in Kamāl al-dīn as a 
lure to the curious reader, attracting them with tales of magic and derring-do in the hope that 
they will be compelled to read the rest of the book and so be educated in the truth of the Hidden 
Imām. While there is surely some truth to this, and the Yūdhāsaf stories are as alluring a bait 
as could be wished for, there is reason to suspect that this is not the sum of al-Ṣadūq’s motives. 
Al-Ṣadūq discusses the question at some length at the Yūdhāsaf stories’ close, referring first 
to ‘This ḥadīth and those of the akhbār of the muʿammarūn that resemble it,’550 and later 
simply to ‘This ḥadīth and what else in this book resembles it.’551 The description raises the 
point of axial ambiguity discussed above: where does the line fall between what resembles 
these stories and what does not? The continuum of refractions and echoes running the length 
of Kamāl al-dīn is not so easily broken down into similarity and dissimilarity. As we see 
Bilawhar’s covert instruction of Yūdhāsaf we cannot now but see too the figures both of the 
Hidden Imām and his disciples and of al-Ṣadūq himself educating his readers in this time of 
persecution.  
While al-Ṣadūq makes plain the easy contention that the aḥādīth of the imāms are a more 
reliable source than the Yūdhāsaf stories, the latter corpus thus remains inextricably integrated 
in Kamāl al-dīn’s web of images, and rather than viewing it simply as an appended lure we 
must consider how those images are finally developed in this the book’s long conclusion. It 
need barely be said that we see in Yūdhāsaf’s distant world a further development of the 
universalising of the occultation myth observed in the muʿammarūn section. In the Yūdhāsaf 
stories, however, this strategy is taken to a far more dramatic and transformative level. The 
difference is first one of scale: in the utterly distant, wondrous and non-Abrahamic context of 
India,552 al-Ṣadūq is free to draw his motifs larger than life. The wicked tyrants here are not 
                                                            
550 Kamāl al-dīn, p. 667. 
551 Ibid., p. 668. 
552 India has a history of playing the role of the exotic other in Abbasid literature. This receives abundant 
illustration in the ʿAjāʾib al-hind of Buzurg b. Shahriyār (d. 342/954), whose exotic tales must represent 
a much more widespread popular literature along similar lines now lost to us. This text, meanwhile, is 
illustratively compared to al-Bīrūnī’s introduction to his Taḥqīq mā fī al-hind, wherein he vents not a 
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just Abbasids but raw idolaters, not merely rejecting the messages of lone prophets but 
condemning entire religions to be burned to death. The persecuted sages do not teach obscure 
theology but essential truths of God’s oneness and power and of man’s frailty. All this 
meanwhile sits alongside a healthy quota of tales about daring princes and fair maidens in 
towers. Again al-Ṣadūq is ending his work with an apocalypse,553 turning the Yūdhāsaf stories 
from a flight of fancy to a description of things as they truly are. The stark, archetypal quality 
that al-Ṣadūq’s motifs take on here constitute a powerful statement of equivalence. The 
Abbasids are the idolatrous, genocidal tyrants. The imām is the sage teaching humanity 
everything they need to know.554 
Even as some elements of the narrative are expanded to become absolutes, there are other 
areas of this apocalypse in which the opposite is true, where elements of Kamāl al-dīn’s 
leitmotifs are made smaller. After all, while al-Ṣadūq and his fellows equivocate endlessly on 
the exact reason for God’s concealment of the imām and how that works for his community, 
here in the Yūdhāsaf stories things are simpler. The men of God hide for fear of persecution, 
not as a result of some inscrutable divine act. They are not miraculously concealed, only 
hidden in another country, and if needs must they can return. Yūdhāsaf himself, who starts the 
story as the seeker of knowledge, at the end becomes wise himself, such that he, too, is called 
upon to go forth and teach the people, another awaited qāʾim who has been in a state of 
hiddenness.555 So it is that the mysterium tremendum of the occultation is, at the last, lessened 
here, the Imām’s hiddenness incorporated into the older, indeed the Qur’anic and indelibly 
Shīʿī paradigm of the enlightened few fleeing the tyrannical, misguided majority. The 
soteriological rupture of the imām’s hiddenness becomes mollified into no less familiar a motif 
than the young man setting out to seek his fortune.  
Even as this last of al-Ṣadūq’s book takes us to the climax of his universalising myth of 
revelation and hiddenness, it also completes a powerful epistemological contention regarding 
the texts of which it is made up. Much of Kamāl al-dīn has been a text devoted to asserting 
equivalence: the events of the occultation are equivalent to the exploits of previous prophets; 
the textual proofs of the occultation are just as incontrovertible as those proving the 
fundamentals of Islam, as well as the equivalences that bind together the innumerable 
permutations of the book’s ruling motifs. These equivalences have been asserted repeatedly 
and directly by al-Ṣadūq himself. As we move into the muʿammarūn texts and then into the 
                                                            
little frustration at people’s credulity with regard to this subject matter. See al-Bīrūnī, Taḥqīq mā li-l-
Hind, pp. 1-6. 
553 See above.  
554 It is worth recalling the explicit denial in al-Tawḥīd of humanity’s ability to deduce even such 
essential truths as these without a ḥujja. See above.  
555 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 663-667.  
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Yūdhāsaf stories, however, the dynamic changes, and the reader is confronted by a deep 
ambiguity as to what all these texts are for. Are they entertainment for the easily led, examples 
of others’ folly or proofs of real events? 
Even as al-Ṣadūq creates this uncertainty regarding his texts’ probative status, he constructs a 
corresponding certainty that unites them: the perennial presence of the Hidden Imām’s image, 
sustained and even enlarged across Kamāl al-dīn’s most unusual materials through its 
constantly repeated and refracted motifs. We have seen how the perceived weakness of the 
proof-texts of the Hidden Imām’s occultation was a serious concern for the Imāmīya, a 
concern to which al-Ṣadūq’s devices of myth and motif offer a solution. We now see how 
further addresses the problem by presenting the reality of the Hidden Imām as one that 
transcends the provenance or authenticity of a given group of texts. Earlier on in Kamāl al-
dīn the reader meets repeated motifs of hidden authority and patient expectation combined 
with the assurance that the texts in which they are found are of sound, established provenance, 
the same aḥādīth from which the law is derived. By dropping this assurance in the book’s later 
chapters, maintaining the same motifs in texts the probative force of which he leaves unclear, 
al-Ṣadūq shows the reader that these questions of authenticity are ultimately unnecessary. The 
truth of the Hidden Imām transcends such concerns, revealing itself in fairy tales and 
adventure stories just as it is revealed in the imāms’ ḥadīth. Al-Ṣadūq never drops his 
contention that the occultation is proven by tawātur, but he meanwhile pushes the bounds of 
authenticity. The apocalypse enacted in the Yūdhāsaf stories becomes an apocalypse of genre, 
liberating occultation as real, cosmic fact from the confines of any particular textual corpus, 
and in particular from the demand for certainty of provenance which increasingly dominated 
the aḥādīth of the Prophet and the Imāms. 
 
CONCLUSION – Wisdom 
 
Yūdhāsaf addresses his teacher as al-ḥakīm, ‘the wise man,’ and the narrating voice, too, refers 
to him and similar figures in the metastories as such. Much of his teachings consist of maxims, 
(ḥikam) along such generic lines as ‘the worst of deeds is disobeying God,’ ‘Foolishness is to 
be content with the world and to neglect what is permanent and lasting,’556 and so on, the very 
stuff of the rich tradition of wisdom literature that we encountered in Chapter II. The story 
                                                            
556 See especially Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 641-645. 
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ends with Yūdhāsaf himself attaining wisdom, such that he himself may go forth as ‘An imām 
for the people who may call them to paradise.’557 
Wisdom (ḥikma) has a tenacious and multifarious presence in Kamāl al-dīn. The Yūdhāsaf 
stories give us a cycle of narratives where wisdom and its attainment are made the central 
theme, but in the muʿammarūn texts, too, it is a dominant element. Besides the longevity of 
their protagonists, these accounts unmistakeably exhibit a second shared trait: the valuable 
words of wisdom which these elderly, Luqmān-like Arab sages are again and again depicted 
uttering. This is no accident; the figure of the muʿammar is most commonly found in wisdom 
literature, his immense age only half of a topos in which the elderly sage shares with his juniors 
some of the insights he has gained from his long sojourn on earth. The full title of al-Sijistānī’s 
al-Muʿammarūn is sometimes given as Kitāb al-Muʿammarīn wa’l-waṣāyā; ‘The Book of the 
Long-Lived and of Testaments,’ referring to the usual device in which the old sage counsels 
his descendants. The wisdom component is thus firmly embedded in the muʿammarūn 
material, and certainly not engineered by al-Ṣadūq (al-Ṣadūq shares a great deal of material 
with al-Sijistānī and is very probably using him as a source. He refers to a Kitāb al-
muʿammarīn in which he finds much of his material, but does not name al-Sijistānī558). 
However, it is equally the case that al-Ṣadūq has chosen not to abbreviate these texts, an easy 
task given that in both Kamāl al-dīn and al-Sijistānī’s work each entry begins by stating the 
advanced age of the subject before detailing his wise or poetic utterances.  Instead he keeps 
the bulk of the texts, which beyond the age of their protagonists in the main add little to Kamāl 
al-dīn’s stock of motifs, but they do help transform the last third of the book into a treasure 
trove of wisdom literature. 
The presence of wisdom in the earlier parts of Kamāl al-dīn is of a different sort. As noted 
above, exhorting believers to trust in God’s (often inscrutable) wisdom, the same wisdom that 
prompts him to hide their imām away, is al-Ṣadūq’s preferred response to the question of why 
the occultation has occurred. In his short chapter on the reason (ʿilla) for the occultation, al-
Ṣadūq gives ten reports which variously give the reason that the imām should be hidden so 
that he would not be compelled to give allegiance to any other, and the reason that he is hidden 
out of fear of being killed,559 before concluding with by far the longest report in which Jaʿfar 
al-Ṣādiq answers the disciple ibn al-Faḍl’s question on the cause for the occultation as follows: 
The meaning of the wisdom (ḥikma) behind his occultation is the meaning of the 
wisdom behind the occultations of those of God’s ḥujaj who have gone before him, 
                                                            
557 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 663-667. 
558 It is also possible that the books share a common source or that al-Ṣadūq is getting al-Sijistānī’s 
material second-hand.  
559 Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 507-509. 
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and the meaning of the wisdom therein will not be revealed until his reappearance, 
just as the meaning of the wisdom of what al-Khiḍr did when he scuppered the boat, 
killed the boy and rebuilt the wall was not revealed to Mūsā until the time of their 
parting. O ibn al-Faḍl, this matter is from among God’s matters, a secret from among 
God’s secrets, an unseen from among the unseen things of God. When we know that 
God, blessed and exalted, is wise, we believe that all of his actions are wisdom, even 
if their meaning is not revealed.560  
 Kamāl al-dīn is a book about God’s wisdom. Al-Ṣadūq airs a sentiment common to several 
Imāmī authors of the century when he bemoans at the book’s beginning the dismay and 
confusion (ḥayra) that afflicts the Imāmīya with regard to the question of the Hidden Imām.561 
He thus introduces Kamāl al-dīn as a consolation, an attempt to reassure the community that, 
as he says in the passage just cited, God is wise, and thus all God’s actions will be wise. The 
myth of the Twelfth Imām that this book constructs across its many pages is an illustration of 
that wisdom, a gathering of images all depicting ways in which this epistemological nightmare 
can, after all, make sense.  
It is therefore both striking but strangely predictable that as Kamāl al-dīn’s address builds 
towards its climax and boundaries between past and present, self and other, even Shīʿī and 
imām are allusively broken down, we find an increasing proliferation of wisdom literature, 
literature articulating wisdom which, if not essentially human, is certainly articulated by 
humans in ways in which other humans can understand (unlike the wisdom that is a secret 
from among God’s secrets). Al-Ṣadūq is clear from the outset to assert that God’s wisdom is 
inscrutable, but he then embarks on a book-long process of showing the reader how that 
wisdom can, through narrative, become comprehensible or at least familiar. It is therefore 
entirely germane to this process that he begins, quite unannounced, to introduce less 
inscrutable forms of wisdom (still referred to as ḥikma, of course), gently eroding the 
boundaries between the knowable and the unknowable. God’s wisdom in hiding the imām, al-
Ṣadūq intimates, is no less self-evident than the wisdom of Bilawhar’s maxims or Luqmān’s 
testament. 
A chief active agent in this equation is the figure of al-Khiḍr.562 Evoked above in his locus 
classicus in al-Kahf, al-Khiḍr appears precisely as a curious blurring between human and 
divine wisdom, and also of the creative tension between theological principle and instructive 
narrative, ‘One among our servants to whom we grated some mercy, and taught some of our 
                                                            
560 Kamāl al-dīn, p. 509. 
561 Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
562 Yoshida has already astutely observed al-Khiḍr’s role in Kamāl al-dīn, as well as supplying a 
valuable comparison with his role in the writings of al-Mufīd and al-Ṭūsī on the occultation.   
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knowledge,’563 whose inerrant knowledge of things to come frustrates and baffles the prophet 
Mūsā. His appearances in Kamāl al-dīn, meanwhile, occupy a correspondingly broad, 
transitional frame, covering the full range of the book’s permuting motifs. He starts life as a 
seeker, adventuring in the service of the ḥujja Alexander, an adventure which leads to his 
drinking from the Water of Life, whereupon he takes on not only qāʾim-like longevity but also 
the characteristic of being hidden from the eyes of men. He comes to give authoritative counsel 
to Muḥammad al-Bāqir, but elsewhere appears, Shīʿī-like, lamenting the passing of the 
Prophet, of ʿAlī and of al-Ḥusayn. He attends the Ḥajj unseen like the Twelfth Imām, whose 
companion he is in their shared longevity. In his wanderings, transformations and sporadic 
presences this elusive, mythic figure thus embodies the possibilities that Kamāl al-dīn offers 
believer, foremost among them the possibility that the wisdom God’s divine plan will 
eventually yield up a final, cathartic explanation.564  
  
                                                            
563 Q 17: 
564 See Kamāl al-dīn, pp. 417-423, 561-562. A magisterial survey of al-Khiḍr’s appearances and 
figurings in Islamic literature is supplied by Franke in his Begegnung mit Khiḍr. As mentioned above, 




CONCLUSION - Traditionism 
 
 
AL-ṢADŪQ AND IMĀMĪ THOUGHT IN THE EARLY BUWAYHID PERIOD 
We see in al-Ṣadūq and in the formative moment of Imāmī ḥadīth that he shows us an 
uncommonly self-aware creation of a corpus. By the time what would become the Sunnī legal-
theological tradition began debating the importance and sanctity of the Prophet’s aḥādīth, the 
fact that the Prophet was dead and gone was the long-standing status quo. In al-Ṣadūq’s case, 
conversely, as he works to assert the value of the imāms’ recorded speech the fundamental 
validity of such an endeavour is still an open question in Imāmī circles. How can recollections 
and written words hope to replace the living imām? How can representation hope to equate to 
presence? It is the urgent purpose of al-Ṣadūq and his fellows to assert that they can, that 
God’s obligation to provide the faithful with his ḥujja has not been compromised. 
Al-Ṣadūq shows us in these concerns the concerns of the Imāmī traditionists at the close of 
the fourth/tenth century, the beginning of the Buwayhid period and the ending of the time 
when the presence of God’s imām remained in the living memory of the community. It is this 
last circumstance in particular that shapes al-Ṣadūq’s priorities, in his project to make a 
scripture of the imāms’ recorded words a viable alternative to their presence, one that was 
defensible both in the face of non-Shīʿīs who had their own ideas about what constituted a 
viable scripture, and in the face of non-Imāmī Shīʿīs who continued to insist on a more 
imminently present authority. 
This purpose suffuses al-Ṣadūq’s work. Nowhere amongst al-Ṣadūq’s extant works does one 
find a book which does not exert conspicuous efforts to assert the value of these aḥādīth and 
to defend them against criticism. This is not just reverence for the imāms, it is reverence for 
the textual corpus of their reported words, which in the era of occultation should be accorded 
the utmost sanctity, the sanctity of the imām to whose guidance these texts constitute 
believers’ only conduit. Inseparable from this summons to reverence, meanwhile, is the 
infinite variety of al-Ṣadūq’s ingenuity in putting it into practice. In al-Tawḥīd we observed 
how al-Ṣadūq uses the fragmentary nature of his collected sources to obfuscate, massing the 
non-specific, occasionally contradictory polyphony of compiled aḥādīth as a riposte to and a 
refusal of systematic theology’s intrusive subdivisions of divine mysteries. In Kamāl al-dīn 
he creates a vast sequence of juxtaposed, overlapping texts and images to create a vision of 
the Hidden Imām that is enriched and empowered by the very textual instabilities and 
ambiguities that troubled other Imāmīs writing about occultation. In ʿIlal and al-Khiṣāl, 
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tapping into uses of compiled form that are familiar from adab literature, he suffuses the adab 
compendium’s well-honed capacity to educate, entertain and outwit with a powerful dose of 
both of Imāmī legitimist claims and of the dissimilation that is so embedded in classical Imāmī 
experiences of political power.  
 
THE DISHONEST COMPILER 
What broader conclusions may we draw from al-Ṣadūq’s writings regarding the study of 
compilation more generally? A first question, one we asked in the introduction to this thesis, 
concerns the extent of sophistication of this medium, more specifically to what extent we may 
expect one part of a compilation to deliberately influence how other parts are read. In Section 
II, especially, we have sought to assert a maximalist answer to this question. In both of the 
works studied we pointed to structures of meaning that stretched the full length of the book. 
In both we have hypothesised a cumulative generation of meaning, whereby the compiler 
expects a broadly linear reading of his work in the order that he has presented it.565 In al-
Tawḥīd’s tripartite structure we have seen how the cosmological surprises of the middle 
section need to be cushioned by the apologies of the first section, whilst also being a necessary 
precursor to the assault on theology conducted in the third section. Kamāl al-dīn similarly 
works step by step – the echoes of the Twelfth Imām of Yūdhāsaf are no use if the reader has 
not first read those stories as presented earlier in the book, and they are much more effective 
if the extension of those images from aḥādīth into more apocryphal material has already been 
actualised by the reading of the muʿammarūn texts. In both cases the sequence is many-
layered. It is not enough for C to follow A, rather B must come in the middle, a process that 
requires the compiler to trust the reader to bear with his prescribed sequence over hundreds of 
pages and aḥādīth. 
It is hoped that our hermeneutic wager may be seen to have paid off, and that the structures 
pointed to in al-Ṣadūq’s work will find parallels in other compendia when they are subjected 
to a similar sustained analysis. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that the wager remains 
just that, and the conclusions arrived at in this regard remain speculative, hypothesises in the 
absence of authorial self-disclosure. 
This necessary analytical humility, however, allows us in turn to make certain observations 
about the nature of compilation as an act of authorship. As we point to the structures of 
                                                            
565 This echoes Burge’s conclusions regarding al-Bukhārī’s al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaḥīḥ. See Burge, ‘Reading 
Between the Lines’, pp. 187, 190; ‘Jalāl al-Dīn’, pp. 295-296 
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meaning at work in these texts we point in effect to a certain readiness in the fourth/tenth-
century reader to look for them. Books such as al-Ṣadūq’s were read largely by the same 
literate classes who wrote them, and what we see of compilers’ expectations of their readers 
may quite confidently be regarded as informed expectations. At the same time, the fact 
remains that the opacity of this medium that we as modern scholars confront is a very real one, 
and we may also be confident that the compilers were aware of this. Atomizing readings of 
ḥadīth compendia are not a modern invention, rather aḥādīth never ceased to be in circulation 
and to have meaning beyond any one setting a compiler put them in – their centrifugal meaning 
as Burge puts it.566 Even as compilers’ carefully ordered their works, they knew full well of 
readers’ capacity to ignore their efforts, to dip in at random or to seek out particular texts at 
the expense of all the rest. 
This might leave compilers looking frustrated, but that is not the emphasis which the preceding 
readings have suggested. Rather it should alert us to compilation’s inherent capacity to keep 
the author’s agency below the surface, out of sight of the reader. It is not simply the case that 
the reader might miss the structures of meaning that compilers create, rather it is frequently 
the case that these structures are more effective when this occurs. Compilers, especially 
compilers of ḥadīth, know that their agency more often than not remains concealed behind the 
greater authority of the words that they transmit, and use this to their advantage. This has been 
observed of other compilers,567 and we have seen it here time again in al-Ṣadūq’s writing. Al-
Ṣadūq knows that his books will be read in search of the imāms rather than in search of him, 
indeed he vigorously encourages that it should be so. This reflects an epistemological ideal, 
but also an authorial reality, a capacity of which he is aware and makes continuous use to hide 
in the deafening sanctity of the imāms’ voices, quietly affecting his readers in ways they will 
not notice. 
 
COMPILATIONS, CRITICISM AND THE LITERARY 
As we began this thesis it was tentatively asked whether or not the compilations under 
discussion might be counted as literature. To do so leads us with seeming inevitability towards 
a lengthy discussion of what literature is and what it might, in turn be in Buwayhid Rayy. This 
need not, I think, be the case. Ḥadīth compendia, it is clear, respond to what we call literary 
criticism with rich results. Indeed, we have demonstrated that a failure to appreciate this can 
lead to deeply misleading readings of these texts and of what their authors meant by them. 
                                                            
566 Burge, ‘Myth’, p. 216-221ff. 
567 Tokatly, pp. 60, 87, Burge, ‘Jalāl al-Dīn’, p. 299, Hodgson, vol. i, pp. 353-358. 
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Certainly it may be said of al-Ṣadūq’s kaleidoscopic image of the Hidden Imām in Kamāl al-
dīn, or his theology-collapsing illustrations of the majesty of God in al-Tawḥīd, that these go 
far beyond the simple, unambiguous functionality of the catechism, a progression that may 
well lead closer to a classification as literature by some reckonings. There is no question, 
however, of suggesting that these texts were read by al-Ṣadūq or any of his contemporaries on 
the same terms as poetry or ornamented epistolary prose. 
This is no cause for taxonomical alarm. Rather than dwell on how the literary character of 
compilations’ form may relate to other forms of a (perhaps more or less) literary character, it 
is more pertinent to dwell on how this fact effects how we view their contents. If compilations 
are necessarily apprehended as literary, this holds for the ideas that they convey. Kamāl al-
dīn is not readily distilled to a set of abstract doctrines about the Hidden Imām, nor indeed are 
al-Tawḥīd’s on free will and predestination. Their voluminous amassings of aḥādīth are not 
simply probative fuel for one or two lines of theological prose. This is not to deny that al-
Ṣadūq set down simple formulations of these doctrines in other works. Just as the dialectic 
theologian may elaborate on simple statements of creed with lengthily and intricately argued 
proofs, so in these compilations al-Ṣadūq expands on and develops his basic convictions. 
Compilations being as they are, however, the way these doctrines are developed therein is 
substantially a literary one. Kamāl al-dīn’s pool of molten images is al-Ṣadūq’s view of the 
Hidden Imām as set down in this text. Similarly, al-Tawḥīd’s long iteration is his 
understanding the tension between text and reason. A literary view of compilation bids us 
consider a correspondingly discursive view of such doctrines, embedded in the negotiations, 
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wa’l-Irshād al-Qawmī, 1975). 
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après: hommage à Etan Kohlberg (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009). 
227 
 
——— The Spirituality of Shi’i Islam: Beliefs and Practices (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010). 
——— The Speaking Qurʾān and the Silent Qurʾān (New York, Columbia University 
Press, 2016). 
——— & Ansari, Hassan, ‘Perfecting a Religion: Remarks on al-Kulaynī and his Summa 
of Traditions’, in Amir-Moezzi, 2016. 
Ansari, Hassan, ‘Bar resī-yi matn-i munāẓarah-i Shaykh-i Ṣadūq dar majlis-i Rukn al-
Dawlah-i Būyahī’, http://ansari.kateban.com/post/1418, posted 28/07/2008, accessed 
30/07/2016 
——— ‘Une Version Incomplète du Kitāb al-Nubuwwa d’al-Ṣadūq’ in Amir-Moezzi & 
Bar-Asher (eds.), 2009, pp. 49-53. 
——— ‘Uṣūl-i riwāyī (4): āthār-i mafqūd-i Shaykh-i Ṣadūq, chirā wa chigūnah?’, 
http://ansari.kateban.com/post/1735, posted 11/02/2011, accessed 30/07/2016 
——— & Schmidtke, Sabine, ‘The Shīʿī Reception of Muʿtazilism (II): Twelver Shīʿīs’, in 
Schmidtke (ed.), 2015. 
Arjomand, Said Amir, ‘The Crisis of the Imamate and the Institution of Occultation in 
Twelver Shiism: A Sociohistorical Perspective’, International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, 28/4 1996, pp. 491–515. 
——— ‘The Consolation of Theology: Absence of the Imam and Transition from Chiliasm 
to Law in Shiʿism’, The Journal of Religion, 76/4 1996, pp. 548–71. 
——— ‘Imam Absconditus and the Beginnings of a Theology of Occultation: Imami 
Shiʿism Circa 280-90 A. H./900 A. D’, Journal of the American Oriental 
Society, 117/1 1997, pp. 1–12. 
Arkoun, Mohammed, Miskawayh, Philosophe et Historien; Contribution À L’étude de 
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